Harper regime's pyramid scheme revealed

Part 3: LEGAL BASIS (for the claims of the plaintiffs: a concise summary of the legal bases)

1. A: Action in contract:
2. The plaintiff’s action is framed both in contract and tort. The alleged Crown parties to the alleged contract on which this action is based were the plaintiff and a Minister, apparently the Minister of Immigration (CIC). The action in contract is based on wrongs done to the plaintiff because he has never received a photocopy of that alleged contract.
3. The Crown – either Canada or BC – claims that an alleged debt of the plaintiff, in the amount of $38,149.45, arose out of a contract. Thus, the financial subject-matter before this Honourable court is more than thirty-eight thousand dollars. (Due to the unlawful garnishments on two counts, it has decreased to about thirty thousand dollars.) The amount involved here is definitely over $5,000 that is often a threshold in the Criminal Code. The two governments are adamant about the magnitude of the amount involved.
4. The plaintiff’s wife and stepson had no contract with Canada or BC. However, they are and have been clients of the CIC since February 2007, with an assigned client file number.  
5. On or about January 4, 2011, Ms. Zuanhao ZHONG and her son Jianfeng YE, citizens of China, assigned their rights in this action to the plaintiff personally by an official affidavit. It took place in the Guangzhou Notary Public Office in China, by a bilingual affidavit. They authorized Zoltan A. Simon to represent them at any time in any Canadian court, primarily in legal and financial issues related to immigration, human rights, and work permits. Thus, the main plaintiff, Zoltan A. Simon, is bringing the action on behalf of his wife (Ms. Zhong) and himself. The claim on Ms. Zhong’s behalf also contains the claim for damages for her son – Jian Feng YE – while the latter was a minor under her guardianship. Considering that he was a minor until his age of 19 years, based on the laws of Canada, the interval of Ms. Zhong’s claim for damages on behalf of Mr. Ye started in April 2007 and ended on October 3, 2010.
6. B: Action in tort:
7. The action in tort is complicated to characterize because it partly overlaps with the claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud or false pretences, conversion or theft, abuse of power, misfeasance in a public office, conspiracy, money extortion, etc. These torts are comparable to a pyramid that has been constructed by improper stones or bricks of many different colours. (In our case the different colours are the different torts that interlocking and overlapping with each other. However, studying the stones of a certain colour only, taken out of context as floating in the air, the pyramid-shape would hardly appear.)
8. Since we have a long list of independent and interlocking torts, the plaintiffs have no means to specify and repeat the names of the public servants involved in each individual tort or count. As a general rule, at each tort claim, the so-called “Honourable tortfeasors” indicate or include the following federal ministers: Mr. Stephen Harper, Mr. Rob Nicholson, Mr. Jason Kenney, and Ms. Diane Finley. Please refer to the full list of the Crown tortfeasors’ names on page 3 above. All of them acted knowingly, in bad faith, in order to get unlawful gains for the Crown by creating deprivation for the re-victimized sponsors (that had signed their CIC forms before June 28, 2002) – including the instant plaintiff – and often ruining the lives of their families. They are the key persons that invented, approved, promoted or/and maintained most of the torts or several systems of tort. Under certain claims below, where the tortfeasors were the employees of the SCC Registry, or administrators of British Columbia, that circumstance will be indicated or emphasized separately.
9. There are and have been, in all material times, five major groups of Crown conspirators as follow:
10. (A) Ms. XXXXXXXXX, Counsel, with at least one of her superiors;
11. (B) The top administrators of the CIC, CRA and the federal Ministry of Justice;
12. (C) The top administrators or officials of the RSBC, Ministry of Housing and Social Development of BC, Ministry of Finance of BC, and Ombudsman BC, with some moral support from the BC Ministry of Justice;
13. (D) The top officials or administrators of the FC/FCA Registry in Edmonton, with the moral support of the Courts Administration Service;
14. (E) The administrators of the SCC Registry, including Mr. Bilodeau and one of his superiors.
15. In our case, the entire structure of the Crown’s policies and tricks is false and unlawful. One cannot study only one of them absolutely separately from the other torts, taken out of context.
16. Fraudulent misrepresentations: The plaintiff alleges he relied upon to his detriment were printed on a CIC Sponsorship Agreement form and a CIC Undertaking form that he signed in January 1999 for the immigration of a previous spouse named Ms. Reyes. Particularly, he relied on the paragraphs setting out the possibility of a suit at “any court in Canada having jurisdiction over claims against the Sponsor” as a prerequisite, also the severability of the Sponsorship Agreement “by a court of competent jurisdiction.” These two paragraphs (16 and 18 of the agreement) with the severability clause extinguished his suspicion and made him to sign the sponsorship undertaking documents for Ms. Reyes in 1999. These two items constituted the element of “causa sine qua non” in order to give his signature for the undertaking since (in 1999) he trusted the knowledge and impartiality of Canadian judges in general if there would be any problem with Ms. Reyes. He loved the sponsored person and was certain regarding his own law-obedient conduct under any future circumstance.
17. As a general rule of law, “It is sufficient to allege malice, fraudulent intention, knowledge or other condition of the mind of a person as a fact, without setting out the circumstances from which it is to be inferred.”
18. In the case at bar, the plaintiffs respectfully submit, the issues are related to a pyramid of power that has been carefully designed by the honourable tortfeasors by several unlawful elements. One cannot say that several such pyramids of power have been built by the Crown, totally independently from each other.
19. A person with reasonable mind cannot imagine that tens of thousands of public servants revolted simultaneously from the laws of Canada as a “grassroots movement.” The Government of Canada would have notified the media regarding such problem. Also, one cannot imagine such grassroots movement, revolt, or conspiracy of the Cabinet’s ministers against the Prime Minister of Canada. The media would have informed the country about such thing, and the P.M. would have ordered them to resign.
20. Therefore, a reasonably thinking average Canadian can assume that the pyramid of power is associated with the person of the Prime Minister that must have known about the existence of such nationwide torts in four of his federal ministries. He may state or swear by an affidavit that he had zero knowledge of such ongoing torts between 2006 and 2014. Or, he may show an official paper issued by his family doctor stating, say, that he had suffered by brain tumor or bipolar disorder during those years. Canadians may accept such circumstance as an explanation but they are entitled to challenge the ministers’ unlawful actions and omissions that have turned Canada upside down, so to speak.
21. However, people should keep in their minds the Nuremberg Trials for the prosecution of prominent members of the political, military, and economic leadership of Nazi Germany. Hitler committed suicide but his ministers were prosecuted. If that trial was based on legal foundations and principles – and few people doubt that – a somewhat similar conspiracy of Canadian ministers against innocent citizens may be and shall be prosecuted as well although they did not institute gas chambers for the re-victimized sponsors.
22. Returning to the presence or requirement of “other condition of the mind of” the public servants involved, the plaintiffs are unable to prove that thousands of public servants belonging to four federal ministries and two ministries of BC always acted recklessly or maliciously as individuals. It is impossible to describe the mental state of thousands of persons. However, it is quite obvious that the four federal ministers and the leaders of four BC ministries or agencies acted in bad faith and maliciously on the long run since 2006. They have been aware of their illegal actions and omissions. They knowingly maintained such policies in order to use the re-victimized sponsors as cash cows, by a money extortion scheme that often ruined the sponsor’s families.
23. The bad faith element is clear and obvious from the extents of the torts as nationwide, during eight years (2006 to present), involving more and more cover-ups or larger and larger cover-ups through increasing oppression placed on the plaintiffs and the civil servants involved. The peak of such cover-ups is the heavy pressure on the administrators in several court registries, also the undue pressure placed on many federal judges in order to stop the plaintiff’s appeals and proceedings in general, mainly by refusing to file documents that may hurt the Harper Government’s reputation.
24. The plaintiffs do not claim that every civil servant involved acted in bad faith. Rather, all public servants involved were concerned about the possibility of losing their jobs or good positions if they were unwilling to become part of the political pyramid: a common scenario in any dictatorship. However, the plaintiffs are entitled to sue each administrator of lower ranks on the basis of their negligence. There was not a single “whistleblower” amongst them. Or, maybe there were a few but those persons lost their jobs immediately.
25. The Government of Canada, the Minister of Immigration, and/or the Minister of Justice all had a duty both in contract and tort to use reasonable care in the preparation of the printed CIC forms marked as “Sponsorship Agreement IMM 1344 C (02-98) E” and “Undertaking IMM 1344 B (02-98) E.” The accepted test seems to be restoration of the plaintiffs to the position in which they would have been if the negligent misrepresentation had never been made. Some cases suggest that what the plaintiff can recover is what might be termed “out of pocket expenses”. In other words, he is entitled to be reimbursed for those costs and expenses which he has incurred and has expended in reliance on the misrepresentation. Therefore, he may even be entitled to claim the reimbursement of his travel expenses – airplane tickets – related to the immigration of Ms. Reyes and her two sons, plus the CIC fees charged for their immigration and visas – he has not claimed those costs in his table above – plus the costs of nine of his ten round trips to China and a wasted one to Toronto for an IAD/IRB hearing.
26. Pursuant to subsection 4. (1) of the IRPA, “Except as otherwise provided in this section, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration is responsible for the administration of this Act. The plaintiff respectfully submits that the word “Minister” in ss. 146. (1) and (2) of the IRPA refers to the Minister of Immigration (CIC) who is and has been responsible for the certification of sponsorship debt claims in any province or territory. So far the Minister has failed to register and file the plaintiff’s alleged debt certificate at the Federal Court without delay, or within 30 days after the default. The default took place in October 2000, so the delay of the Minister would be about 14 years at the time of the hearing of this case while the limitation laws of BC and Canada do not permit the prosecution of any debtor after six years of silence if no self-help action (garnishment) has taken pace and no court order has been delivered.
27. Pursuant to the Sponsorship Agreement, starting at paragraph 18, “The suit may be placed in any court in Canada having jurisdiction over claims against the Sponsor (or Co-signer) for breach of contract… 19. This Agreement is the entirecontract between the Parties…” [Emphasis added.] These two words “contract” have been smuggled into the end of the sponsorship agreement or undertaking forms fraudulently, in bad faith. They do not change the fact that those CIC forms refer to “Sponsorship Agreement”, not contract. On the other hand, if the Sponsorship Agreement was the entire contract between the parties, and the Crown was a party to the undertaking, the document called “Undertaking” is not part of the “contract.”
28. C: Invalid Sponsorship Agreement and Undertaking:
29. Sometimes a Court interprets the obligations of the sponsors* as absolute without exception. For example, in Manitoba v. Khaleghi-Hashemian, 2002 MBQB 1 (CanLII), the Court stated: “Her liability, according to the words of the document, is virtually absolute.” Now, the instant plaintiff respectfully submits, the word or condition “absolute” is not mentioned in the CIC Sponsorship Agreement or the Undertaking forms at all. This is a fatal and incurable mistake in the CIC forms in light of the Crown’s policies and the execution phase. On the other hand, if a Court of Manitoba reads the texts of those two forms as stating the 100% financial responsibility of every sponsor regardless any legislation, any sponsor may interpret the text similarly. However, the Sponsorship Agreement and the Undertaking do not expressly state that they would overrule the relevant legislation, including the federal laws referring to garnishments of debts. But why could an agreement of two individuals change or override Canada’s laws? Similarly, the CIC Undertaking form is a declaration – not a contract – pursuant to the IRP Regulations, comparable to a person’s customs declaration towards Canada upon his arrival by plane. (Query: Does a person’s customs declaration influence or override Canada’s laws?)
30. The Sponsorship Agreement does not refer to any governing law, including common law. One exception is the “Immigration Act Regulations” cited in the Undertaking form but one cannot find such wording under “legislation” today by www.CanLII.org so it is misleading. It seems that the intention of its compiler was to keep the sponsors in total darkness regarding any relevant law. *[Handwritten note for 29 added:] The Sponsorship Agreement promises that the sponsored person needs to work, and the sponsor's responsibility is limited "to the shortfall only."
31. The cornerstone of the CIC Sponsorship Agreement and Undertaking constitutes an infringement of ss. 15. (1) of the Charter, Canada’s constitution, regarding equality rights. It cannot be justified in a free and democratic society, and s. 1 of the Charter does not save it. As in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, some important factors influencing the determination of whether (sub)sections of several acts and regulations have been infringed are, among others: (A) Pre-existing disadvantage, stereotyping, prejudice, or vulnerability experienced by the individual or group at issue; (C) The ameliorative purpose or effects of the impugned law upon a more disadvantaged person or group in society; (D) The nature and scope of the interest affected by the impugned law.
32. The Sponsorship Agreement states that it is the “entire contract” between the signatory parties. Therefore, the CIC Undertaking form is not part of the “contract.” The Undertaking states, “The Minister may take other actions to recover the debt from the Sponsor or the Sponsor’s spouse (if Co-signer).” Many civil servants now interpret this mysterious sentence as “The Minister may take any other action that could prevail over the federal legislation.” (Perhaps, say, the Minister can garnishee the re-victimized sponsors without colour of right, or send them to concentration camps.) The correct interpretation can be found in 118. (4) of the old Immigration Act, 1976. It is related to charges on the sponsors’ properties. Finally, The CIC Undertaking form associates the legal action with a “situation of abuse.” Abuse could be a physical abuse between the parties, or, an abuse of the social benefit system.
33. The paragraphs related to the Crown’s right to take the sponsor to a Court while representing the sponsored person seem to be related to the sponsor’s abuse of the welfare system. (For example, the sponsor instructs the sponsored person to pretend a separation from the sponsor while they keep co-habiting in secret, so the sponsored person receives welfare benefits by fraudulent means. It appears from the two CIC forms and s. 118. (2) of the Immigration Act, 1976 the that the word “may” referred such exceptional abuse situations as the legislative intent. Parliament did not intend to punish every innocent person or sponsor that did not act unlawfully. If the legislative intent were the punishment of every innocent sponsor the wording in ss. 145. (2) of the IRPA would state, “the amount … shall be recovered by Her Majesty in either or both of those rights,” instead of “the amount … may be recovered by Her Majesty.”
34. The “may” above indicates the Court’s discretion, so it is not a “must” for the Crown to recover the amounts. Nevertheless, a verdict of a judge nowadays may state that the word “may” in the IRPA always means “shall” or “must.” But, in a hypothetical case, a situation may happen as follows: The same judge, after equating the words “may” and “shall” in his Order, flies to Hawaii for vacation. In a shop he finds a large sealed tin box. Its label reads: “Macadamia” nuts. It may contain some peanuts. The judge buys the box, although it is not cheap. He takes it home for his wife’s birthday as the main present. The wife opens it and finds no macadamia nuts at all, only 100% peanuts. At first the judge considers to take the distributor to court for fraud. Then he remembers his own verdict in which he stated that the word “may” is permissive, so the distributor was allowed to fill the box by peanuts only.
35. The plaintiff have found that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Fidelity and Casuality Co. of New York v. General Structures Inc., [1977] where a misinterpretation rendered the insurance contract invalid, and jjBarnicke Ltd. V. Commercial Union Assurance Co. of Canada [1998] are good examples resembling his legal situation where the original or key issue is a nullified agreement or contract due to misrepresentation: the policies are null and void ab initio. The judgment of the Court, delivered by De Grandpré, stated: “misrepresentation automatically nullifies the contract (art. 2490 C.C.).”
36. Pursuant to ss. 145.(1) of the IRPA, “The following amounts are debts due to Her Majesty in right of Canada payable on demand: (a) a debt incurred by Her Majesty for which any person is liable under this Act…” The plaintiff claims, it is respectfully submitted, that he is not liable for any debt “under this Act.” His Sponsorship Agreement of 1999 is not under the IRPA because the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act did not yet exist in 1999. Therefore, the Crown servants’ reasoning is incorrect, absurd and fanciful.
37. The CIC sponsorship forms fail to state the number of parties. They do not specify any Minister or Ministry as a party.
38. We have seen above that – in light of the common policies of the Crown – ss. 279.(2) of the CriminalCode renders to Sponsorship Agreement invalid, void ab initio.
39. D: False Statement:
40. The plaintiff claims that Counsel representing Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada made and deposited a misleading statement in the SCC Registry on or about June 18, 2012 in her printed Response pleadings. The deliberately false or misleading representations or declarations of Crown Counsel – Ms. XXXXX XXXXXX – before the Supreme Court of Canada, by commission or omission, the plaintiff respectfully submits, should be determinative. Although the plaintiff is certain that Ms. XXXXXX is/has been a person with high personal integrity, honesty and goodwill, obviously she has been under a tremendous pressure of her superior(s) that instructed or pressured her toward the last-ditch effort of the Crown, namely to make a false statement by affidavit or deposition. Subsection 131. (1) of the Criminal Code refers such false or misleading statements, whether by affidavit, under oath, or by deposition. The plaintiff submits that Counsel committed such indictable offence under ss. 131. (1) by knowingly making such false statement.
41. Pursuant to s. 132. of the Criminal Code, “Every one who commits perjury is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.” Pursuant to ss. 139. (2), “Every one who wilfully attempts in any manner other than a manner described in subsection (1) to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.” The plaintiff notes that, in general, the Courts consider a document signed by a Crown Counsel as equivalent to an affidavit. (If Counsel’s seal is missing, such minor formal error does not make it invalid.)
42. The Crown had the requisite mens rea for the crimes. Ms. XXXXX XXXXXXX is a government official who “knowingly and willfully” falsified, concealed, or covered up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; and made a materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation in this government fraud case, for the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada. Pursuant to the application of the paragraphs of the Criminal Code cited above, and using a conversion of equating one year of imprisonment (for a high-rank white collar Crown servant) with a fine of $50,000 the maximum figures would be as follow: $700,000 with reference to 131. (1) and s. 132. of the Criminal Code, or, $500,000 regarding ss. 139. (2) of the same Code. The plaintiff respectfully suggests the average of the two amounts as a fine of $600,000 for Counsel’s false statement, payable to the plaintiff(s).
43. E: Material Misrepresentation Related to the Sponsorship Documents:
44. In [22] of Deng v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 CanLII 63185 (CA IRB) the Court described the legal test for misrepresentation. It is a tripartite test that consists of the following factors: a. Direct or indirect misrepresentation or withholding of material facts, b. Materiality to a relevant matter, c. An error or possible error in the administration of the law (we may add here: nationwide).
45. The plaintiffs submit that the required three factors are present in the case at bar. The CIC directly misrepresented and withheld crucial material facts in its CIC Sponsorship Agreement and Undertaking forms. Those forms were material and extremely important to the relevant matter: they caused a catastrophic situation for the plaintiff, though his previous sponsorship with Ms. Reyes. Anyone can see that the misrepresentations on the CIC forms resulted serious errors in the IRPA’s administration in (and since) 2007. One of them was the unlawful refusal of Ms. Zhong’s visa application that prevented the plaintiffs from their family’s reunification.
46. The Crown’s misrepresentation in the CIC forms and policies “induces or could induce an error in the administration of the Act” [IRPA] as expressed in Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Yang, 2007 CanLII 52935 (CA IRB), being part of the statutory test.
47. The CIC directly and indirectly (i.e., by several tortuous steps on different dates) misrepresented and purposefully withheld material facts relevant to the sponsorship agreements, the fulfillments of the sponsor’s promises, and the existing legal framework nationwide. Those misrepresentations were crucial and had materiality to the signing of the sponsorship agreements and undertakings by the sponsors. As a result of the misrepresentations and omissions by the CIC, errors occurred Canada-wide in the administration of the IRPA (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act).
48. The issue is not only whether the Crown and its servants or agents made the misrepresentations deliberately, inadvertently, recklessly or with wilful blindness, but whether the misrepresentation was “material” to the negative effect on the re-victimized sponsors and on the lawful administration of the IRPA in Canada. The ministers, in bad faith, obliged all of their administrators to handle the sponsorship agreements and undertakings as 100% binding contracts while those were neither valid nor contracts.
49. The Crown – primarily four ministers* of the CIC, the Commissioner(s) of the CRA, and three ministers of Justice since 2006 – knowingly (or innocently misinterpreted subsections 132. (4) (a), (b), and (c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations in the policy entitled IP 2 [Processing Applications to Sponsor Members of the Family Class]. The latter policy repeatedly claims that the sponsors signed binding contracts with the other parties. Every lawyer knows that an agreement or a declaration is not identical with a contract. The Crown made the same error twice in the Sponsorship Agreement and Undertaking forms, claiming near the end of the text that the sponsorship agreement was a contract. (*Note: the three ministers of the CIC mentioned above were: Mr. Monte Solberg, Ms. Diane Finley, Mr. Jason Kenney, and Mr. Chris Alexander. The federal ministers of justice during material times were Mr. Vic Toews, Mr. Rob Nicholson, and Mr. Peter Mackay.)
50. It is clear and obvious from the two CIC sponsorship undertaking forms that the CIC compiled them dishonestly. However, in January 1999 or before, the CIC was still operating under the rule of the Liberal Party’s government and that Party had carefully observed the laws of Canada in this field. They could not foresee that seven years later a Conservative government may utilize their controversial CIC forms for a huge fraudulent money-extortion scheme that would cover the whole country. Thus, the plaintiff respectfully submits, the misinterpretation began before 1999 but the Crown’s massive fraudulent scheme developed in 2006, under the Conservative regime.
51. There is no requirement in the IRPA, or, in its subsection 126. that the misrepresentation be intentional, deliberate or negligent. Regardless of these required components, ss. 128. (a) of the IRPA allows a maximum fine of $100,000 plus imprisonment for a term of five years. These two, after conversion, may be assessed as $100,000 + $250,000. This yields a total of $350,000 for a major misinterpretation even if the party’s officials causing it were innocent and acted in good faith but negligently.
52. F: Fraudulent misrepresentation:
53. As the first step of the fraud, the CIC obliged the plaintiff to sign vague, outdated, legally controversial, unconstitutional and unlawful CIC forms when he sponsored Ms. Reyes in January 1999. From the legal point of view, at least for the narrow class of the plaintiff, the Sponsorship Agreement is a nullity, only a moral guideline between spouses or relatives.
54. In para. [43] of R. v. Pilarinos, 2002 BCSC 452 (CanLII), the Court cited, “Protecting the integrity of government is crucial to the proper functioning of a democratic system.” It continues in para. [67]: “[T]he doctrine of vagueness does not require a precise definition to be attributed to the offence. It is enough if the provision, as interpreted, has shape where conduct might be illegal in contrast to an area where it is not. In Nova Scotia Pharmaceuticals, supra, the Court said, at p. 311: Language is not the exact tool that some may think it is. It cannot be argued that an enactment can and must provide enough guidance to predict the legal consequences of any given course of conduct in advance. All it can do is enunciate some boundaries, which create an area of risk.
55. The definition of fraud, in the context of a representation, is that the false representation was made knowingly, without an honest belief in its truth, or recklessly or carelessly whether it be true or false: Derry v. Peek (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337 (H.L.). The Crown is liable for fraud against the plaintiffs. The civil test for fraud is a high probability but at the hearing that higher standard of proof would be readily met.
56. The crux of the matters is the public officers’ knowledge or ignorance of the fraudulent scheme created by the honourable tortfeasors.
57. The test for fraud has been set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Olan, 1978 CanLII 9 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1175 at 1182: Where it is alleged that a corporation has been defrauded by its directors deception is not an essential element of the offence. (In the case at bar, the Crown is not a corporation.) The honourable tortfeasor ministers and their administrators involved, in co-operation or conspiracy, defrauded the sponsors and the whole nation – Canada – by disobeying about thirty laws of the country.
58. While the courts have been loath to attempt an exhaustive definition of “defraud” one can say that two elements are essential, “dishonesty” and “deprivation.” The plaintiff respectfully submits that both the dishonesty of the Crown’s public servants (including the ministers) and the deprivation of the plaintiffs (Z.A. Simon and Ms. Zhong) are present in the case at bar. The fraudulent acts and omissions have been committed by the public servants and officials of the CIC (Ministry of Immigration and Citizenship Canada), the CRA (Canada Revenue Agency), the RSBC (Revenue Services of British Columbia), and Justice Canada. The location of the fraudulent acts and omissions was mainly Ottawa and Victoria, although many of the forms, statements and policies – like the Sponsorship Agreement, Undertaking, IP 2, or MoU (Memorandum of Understanding between the CIC and the CRA) – show no city for their publication.
59. The plaintiff claims that his alleged debt towards the Crown arose out of a fraud committed by several cabinet ministers of the Crown. Those honourable tortfeasors included the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the Commissioner of Revenue or/and the minister responsible for the lawful operation of the CRA, probably the Minister of National Revenue or Minister of Finance. The Minister of Justice – then apparently Mr. Vic Toews – participated in the fraudulent tort scheme by wilful blindness. He failed to disapprove the scheme and the unlawful policies (IP 2 and MoU) of the CIC and the CRA. Also, it was the intentional omission of the Minister(s) of Justice not to maintain a special registry book or folder in the registries of the Federal Court in which the administrators could keep track of the judgments related to sponsorship debts in the country. Thus, he simply ignored the wording, “The certificate is to be filed and registered in the Federal Court” pursuant to 146. (2) of the IRPA. This is a conspiracy by wilful blindness on behalf of the three above-mentioned ministers that, purposefully and in bad faith, through such omissions for eight years, between 2006 and 2014.
60. The Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the Commissioner of Revenue signed and published a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), primarily for the use of the administrators of the CRA and the CIC. It contained statements that were not harmonious with the legislation. For example, it stated: “If the sponsored family member(s) receives social assistance benefits during the sponsorship validity period, the sponsor is considered to be in default and a debt arises…” and “subsection 145(2) of IRPA stipulates that an amount that a sponsor is required to pay under the terms of an undertaking is payable on demand to Her Majesty…” These two statements contradict ss. 118. (2) of the old Immigration Act, 1976, subsections146. (1) and (2) of the IRPA (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act), and the text of the Sponsorship Agreement. All of the latter three require the involvement of a Court of competent jurisdiction, or, the issuance of a certificate by the Minister that shall be registered at the Federal Court before a default or debt claim becomes real (certified) debt. The Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the latter interpretation in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, 2011 SCC 30, [2011] 2 SCR 504. That Order mentions about six times the certification of a debt at the Court as a prerequisite for the Crown (before garnishment).
61. The Canada (A.G.) v. Mavi case, supra, is the highest – or only – authority regarding failed sponsorship situations. In it, eight persons opposed the Crown. None of the eight sponsors claimed that they had not been notified by the Crown, or, that the ministerial certificate had not been filed, or that limitation law had extinguished their debts. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted, the cases of those eight persons were very different from the case of Zoltan A. Simon that is in a category of its own.
62. In order to give more support for the streamlining efforts of the federal ministers, the CIC published another policy in 2006, entitled IP 2 – Processing Applications to Sponsor Members of the Family Class [http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/ip/ip02-eng.pdf]. It was aimed towards the employees of the CIC and the CRA and it contains several counts of false or fraudulent statements. For example, under “Undertaking”, it is stated: “The undertaking is a binding contract between sponsors… and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. Or, “If the sponsor dies, CIC or the provinces will not seek compensation from the sponsor’s estate…” This wording means that CIC or the provinces are entitled to garnishee any sponsor without the involvement of any Court, even after decades of silence, regardless the limitation laws of Canada or a province. The policy named IP 2 shows the word “contract” five times: under paragraphs 5.18, 6.9, 12, and 16 (twice). These five instances constitute five counts of fraud because there was no “contract” in the Sponsorship Agreement or in the Undertaking forms, or, under ss. 132. (4) (a), (b) and (c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227.
63. The plaintiff alleges that the directors of the CRA involved and the Commissioner of Revenue did not act honestly and in good faith, with a view to the best interests of the Agency. They made the CRA appear as a fraudster. Also, the above mentioned officials contravened ss. 42. (1) (a) and (b) of the Canada Revenue Agency Act, S.C. 1999, c. 17. They and failed to exercise a reasonable standard of care, diligence and skill towards the public. They disregarded the relevant paragraphs of the above mentioned legislation – ss. 118. (2) of the old Immigration Act, subsections146. (1) and (2) of the IRPA – and common law determined by the SCC regarding the prerequisites of garnishment, namely the ministerial certificate and its filing with the Federal Court. They acted with the ulterior motive and collateral purpose of misleading every administrator of the RCA and the CIC. They correctly anticipated that an average administrator was aware of the difference between contracts and agreements, knowing that debts based on contracts did not need the involvement of a Court before garnishment while the Court had to be involved and an order needed to be issued in case of agreements. For comparison, subsections 23. (1), 66. (2), 66. (2.01), 66. (2.2), 66. (2.3) and 66. (2.6) of the Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-8 are using practically the same wording that the subsections of the IRPA andthe Immigration Act cited above in this paragraph, also the sponsorship agreement forms. While the CRA’s administrators obey these paragraphs of the Canada Pension Plan, they knowingly violate the said subsections related to alleged sponsorship debts of similar nature in identical legal framework.
64. Further, the CRA has been, or should have been, aware of the circumstance that the alleged debt of the plaintiff had not been registered with the Credit Bureau. (In the spring of 2008, the plaintiff applied for a Canadian VISA card and soon it was approved. He used it till the date of his personal bankruptcy in March 2014.) The managers of the CRA acted by wilful blindness: a fax inquiry to the Credit Bureau would have indicated them that the plaintiff did not have a valid or registered debt in June 2008 and in June 2009.
65. The Crown relies on a single paragraph such as ss. 145.(3) of the IRPA, containing the conditional word “may”, extrapolating it ultra-liberally: “A debt claim or suspected debt may be recovered at any time, even after a silence of decades, without even notifying the sponsor.” The plaintiff humbly submits that the correct meaning is, “A debt may be recovered at any time by legal means, such as registering it at the Federal Court, harmoniously with other legislation that includes limitation laws.”
66. Could such single paragraph, extrapolated beyond recognition, logic and imagination, vitiate the Charter? Let alone (sub)sections 6. (2),  27., 32. (2) and 42. (2) of the Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act, ss. 14 (1) of the [now obsolete] Debt Collection Act; sections 32., 45., and 50. of the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act; with rules 8. and 9. of the Family Support Orders and Agreements Garnishment Regulations. If Parliament has created s. 50. of the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act, and subsections 42. (1) (b) and 42. (2) of the Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act for routine adjustment situations in overpayment cases, would a similar adjustment be legally impossible here?
67. The Defendant Crown(s) have ignored and contravened ss. 449. (1)(b) and (2) of the Federal Courts Rules: the word is “and” – instead of “or” – between ss. 449. (1) (a) and (b). The plaintiff should have received a summons to attend a hearing at a Court but he has never been served.
68. About 90% of the CIC Sponsorship Agreement form dealt with the Court’s involvement and the mutual responsibility of the parties – but in reality that 90% did not exist or it was impracticable: there was no specified “Court of competent jurisdiction” that would be keen or willing to hear those issues. It was not obvious that a federal CIC form dealing with the federal matter of immigration should refer to provincial courts only, regarding the severability clause, etc. The plaintiff trusted the defendant 100% and relied on a “sine qua non” sentence on the CIC form that echoed section 118. (2) of the Immigration Act: the recovery of the payments may take place “in any court of competent jurisdiction.” [Being persecuted through a Court or without a Court are two very different notions.]
69. During the hearing of the Simon v. Canada, 2012 FCA 49 (CanLII) case, on or about February 13, 2012, the instant plaintiff asked the judges of the Federal Court of Appeal regarding a hypothetical situation as follows: He would write a letter to the CRA claiming that he sold a Rolls-Royce car for the Prime Minister, say, for the price of $50,000 twenty years ago. In the letter, he would allege that the P.M. had failed to pay him, so he would request the CRA to garnishee the pay cheques of the P.M. Would the CRA start the P.M.’s garnishment without any evidence? One of the three judges answered in the courtroom: Of course, not, Mr. Simon, because you are only an individual, not a province. (This is not a letter-by-letter citation.)
70. The plaintiff respectfully submits that there is no such distinction in the laws of Canada between a person and the province. One can compile a vertical list of garnishers as follows: The Office of the Prime Minister, The Minister for Sports of the Province of Prince Edward Island, BC Hydro, WAL-MART, Guildford Town Centre (Surrey), and Strawberry Bakery (Vancouver). The administrators of the CRA have no right to draw an arbitrary line between any two of these entities stating that above that line the entity or authority is allowed to garnishee any person while the ones below that line cannot garnishee anyone. Pursuant to Canada’s laws, the size or the power of the legal person is not determinative. The “line” to be drawn is determined by the fact regarding the debt’s registration. If a “debt” has not been certified, registered and filed with a Court, eventually the Federal Court, it is not a debt but only an empty debt claim that is not garnishable.
71. The plaintiff argues that the maximum penalty should apply in this case at bar where several consecutive ministers of the CIC repeatedly committed the same crime in bad faith for eight years, without any indication of respect towards the IRPA and the Criminal Code, and the acts and regulations prescribing the proper lawful ways in garnishment procedures. Since there is no specific punishment in the Criminal Code regarding fraudulent misinterpretation, please refer to such offence under “fraud” below.
72. G: Fraud or false pretences:
73. The Crown (Canada), by the introduction of controversial and unlawful policies or guidelines called IP 2 (2006) and MoU (2006) on the CIC web site, created a false impression for the provinces that each provincial authority had received unlimited power through ”blank cheques” from the sponsors and the federal government. Such IP 2 and MoU make every provincial public servant think that the Charter rights now would be suspended and Canadians may be punished or persecuted without any involvement of the Courts, without any Court order. If such interpretation were correct it would render the said two policies unconstitutional.
74. The test for fraud is described on Page 1182 in R. v. Olan et al., [1978] 2 SCR 1175: “The defendants were convicted and appealed. The Court of Appeal, in upholding the convictions, had this to say, at p. 1250: To cheat and defraud is to act with deliberate dishonesty to the prejudice of another person’s proprietary right. In the context of this case the alleged conspiracy to cheat and defraud is an agreement by a director of a company and others dishonestly to take a risk with the assets of the company by using them in a manner which was known to be not in the best interests of the company and to be prejudicial to the minority shareholders. The general direction as to fraud in the summing-up commences by stating that to amount to fraud the conduct must be deliberately dishonest.”
75. The plaintiffs respectfully submit that in the case at bar the federal and provincial Crown(s) were cheating and defrauding deliberately dishonestly to the prejudice of their and the re-victimized sponsors’ proprietary rights through a sophisticated tort system and conspiracy and extortion, by preventing the plaintiffs to defend themselves before a Court of competent jurisdiction before garnishment, and creating insurmountable obstacles for the unification of their family.
76. In R. v. Théroux, [1993] 2 SCR 5, the Court outlined the test for fraud, based on the Criminal Code: “380. (1) Every one who, by deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means, whether or not it is a false pretence within the meaning of this Act, defrauds the public or any person, whether ascertained or not, of any property, money or valuable security, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding ten years, where the subject matter of the offence is a testamentary instrument or where the value of the subject matter of the offence exceeds one thousand dollars… This brings me to the question of whether the test for mens rea is subjective or objective… In applying the subjective test, the court looks to the accused’s intention and the facts as the accused believed them to be: G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed. 1983), at pp. 727-28. … The Actus Reus of Fraud   Since the mens rea of an offence is related to its actus reus, it is helpful to begin the analysis by considering the actus reus of the offence of fraud.  Speaking of the actus reus of this offence, Dickson J. (as he then was) set out the following principles in Olan: (i)     the offence has two elements: dishonest act and deprivation; (ii)   the dishonest act is established by proof of deceit, falsehood or “other fraudulent means”; (iii) the element of deprivation is established by proof of detriment, prejudice, or risk of prejudice to the economic interests of the victim, caused by the dishonest act.
77. These doctrinal observations suggest that the actus reus of the offence of fraud will be established by proof of: 1. the prohibited act, be it an act of deceit, a falsehood or some other fraudulent means; and 2. deprivation caused by the prohibited act, which may consist in actual loss or the placing of the victim's pecuniary interests at risk.
78. Correspondingly, the mens rea of fraud is established by proof of: 1.   subjective knowledge of the prohibited act; and 2.   subjective knowledge that the prohibited act could have as a consequence the deprivation of another (which deprivation may consist in knowledge that the victim’s pecuniary interests are put at risk). Where the conduct and knowledge required by these definitions are established, the accused is guilty whether he actually intended the prohibited consequence or was reckless as to whether it would occur.” [Here ends the citation from R. v. Théroux.]
79. Pursuant to ss. 380. (1) (a) of the Criminal Code as of today, Every one who, by deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means, whether or not it is a false pretence within the meaning of this Act, defrauds the public or any person, whether ascertained or not, of any property, money or valuable security or any service, (a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding fourteen years, where the subject-matter of the offence is a testamentary instrument or the value of the subject-matter of the offence exceeds five thousand dollars.
80. The plaintiff is unaware regarding the date when the amount in the text of ss. 380. (1) (a) of the Criminal Code changed from one thousand dollars to five thousand dollars. The plaintiff respectfully submits that all of these required conditions existed in the case at bar. The four federal ministers – the honourable tortfeasors – and the two provincial ministers involved had been aware of the prohibited acts or omissions of each other and their public servants. They knew that a deprivation of the plaintiffs and that of the re-victimized sponsors would occur. They were reckless as to whether or at what degree the prohibited consequence or the damages to the sponsors would occur. They knew that they had been guilty because they covered up their torts for seven year, by more and more cruel and illegal means.
81. Pursuant to ss. 362. (1) (a) of the Criminal Code, Every one commits an offence who (a) by a false pretence, whether directly or through the medium of a contract obtained by a false pretence, obtains anything in respect of which the offence of theft may be committed or causes it to be delivered to another person. Under ss. 362. (2) (b), the Criminal Code prescribes an imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, where the value of what is obtained does not exceed five thousand dollars. The actual value taken was under $4,000. Therefore, the plaintiffs respectfully submit that such term would reasonable correspond to an amount of $100,000 that is claimed from the Crown defendants, payable severally or solidarily.
82. On the other hand, the CIC and the CRA have “created” a debt or debt claim of over $38,000 for the plaintiff, by fraud. Thus, the situation is associated with 14 years of imprisonment that may be equated with a penalty of $700,000 payable to the plaintiff.
83. H: The contra proferentem rule – Release from liability:
84. In Manulife Bank of Canada v. Conlin, [1996] 3 SCR 415, the Court stated: [Para.] (2) Release from liability   Per La Forest, Sopinka, Cory and Major JJ.: It has long been clear that a guarantor will be released from liability on the guarantee in circumstances where the creditor and the principal debtor agree to a material alteration of the terms of the contract of debt without the consent of the guarantor. … If there is any ambiguity in the terms used in the guarantee, the words of the documents should be construed against the party which drew it, by applying the contra proferentem rule. … [Para.] 9: G. H. L. Fridman, in his text The Law of Contract in Canada (3rd ed. 1994), at pp. 470-71, puts the position in this way: The contra proferentem rule is of great importance, especially where the clause being construed creates an exemption, exclusion or limitation of liability. … Where the contract is ambiguous, the application of the contra proferentem rule ensures that the meaning least favourable to the author of the document prevails.   Professor McGuinness, in his work The Law of Guarantee, supra, at pp. 612-13, explains the application of the rule as follows: … the contra proferentum rule of construction (under which the provisions of an agreement that were inserted by a party for his own protection are subjected to a strict interpretation) provides one method through which the courts can restrict the scope of extremely broad provisions which purport to eliminate the rights of the surety. … Where the guarantee was drafted by the creditor, and there is any ambiguity or imprecision in the terms of a provision which purports to limit the rights of a surety, it is only fair that the ambiguity be resolved against the party who prepared the document. If the creditor wishes to take away a right belonging to the surety, he should use clear language in the document.
85. The instant plaintiff submits that the “creditor” (the Crown) and the principal debtor (Ms. Reyes) agreed to a material alteration of the terms of the contract of debt without the consent of the sponsor and guarantor, Zoltan A. Simon. The Crown (BC) sent Ms. Reyes to several courses to study English language, for about four years. Thus, the Crown disabled her to be self-supporting for that period. The meaning least favourable to the author of the document prevails: namely (a) that the sponsor and the sponsored person were equally responsible for the alleged “debt” since both signed the sponsorship agreement regarding their obligations. It the Crown forgives the “debt” of Ms. Reyes, it means that the “debt” of Zoltan A. Simon has been forgiven as well. Both Canada and BC has forgiven the alleged debt of Ms. Reyes – who received the actual monies from the Crown – so they must forgive the guarantor’s alleged debt as well. However, following the “contra proferentem” rule, the proper solution is to consider the plaintiff’s Sponsorship Agreement a nullity from the very beginning. There was no “meeting of the minds.”
86. The laws of Hammurabi, king of Babylonia (r. 1848-1805 BC), recorded that a man is not responsible for the debts created by his wife. This principle has been accepted universally and it is valid in our days world-wide. If the CIC or the CRA wishes to challenge such massively established international common law, they must produce some good legal argument to this Honourable Court.
87. I: Unconscionability, lack of valid agreement: it is void ab initio
88. Often the Crown claims that it has a valid contract with each sponsor. Sometimes the Crown is uncertain if it has any contract with them. It seems that the Crown has an on-and-off contract with every sponsor. When the Crown has rights under such contracts, it has those contracts. When the Crown would have some obligations under such alleged contract, the Crown does not have any contract. It is a fraudulent game of “hide and seek.” The Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, under the subtitle(s) SPONSORSHIP and Sponsorship agreements, specify several requirements as follow.
89. Pursuant to ss. 152. (1) of the IRP Regulations, “The Minister may enter into a sponsorship agreement with a sponsor…” The Minister mentioned here has not entered into a sponsorship (or any) agreement with the sponsor, now the instant plaintiff. Even if these rules would be valid in our case and the Minister was a party to the Sponsorship Agreement and Undertaking, he should have signed those documents – what he failed to do. But if – despite his failure or omission related to subsection 153. (2) – he is still a party to those two documents, he and the provincial minister (and the sponsored person, Ms. Reyes) as “parties to the undertaking are jointly and severally or solidarily liable” for the “damages” done for BC. Please refer to ss. 153. (3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations. However, the CIC sponsorship undertaking documents did not specify that the sponsor and the sponsored person were “jointly and severally or solidarily liable” for any damage. Such silence was an incurable error in light of the policies.
90. As we have seen, subsections 132.(4) (a), (b) and (c ) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations clearly express that the Minister of the CIC (the Crown Defendant) has no contract with the sponsors in a regular situation in family class sponsorship. Therefore, the recurring statements in the IP 2 policy claiming a binding contract between the parties are fraudulent. Fraud is a punishable offence.
91. Also, the CIC Sponsorship Agreement form shows (at least) two lines for the signatures of the parties. One line is for the sponsor – let alone the co-sponsor – and a separate line is for the sponsored person. The same agreement – almost explicitly – states that the sponsor has an absolute obligation since he or she is financially responsible for 100% of the “damages.” This major controversy reveals a fraudulent intent of the CIC: if the sponsors’ absolute obligation is true and serious, showing a line for the signature of the sponsored person is fraudulent because that party has always zero responsibility. A bilateral agreement is different from a unilateral one – the latter category does not even exist.
92. The plaintiffs respectfully submit that Crown servants of the four federal ministries and four BC ministries (or agencies) involved have been parties to most of the crimes or offences committed against them. Pursuant to ss. 21. (1) (a), (b), and (c ) , also 21. (2) of the Criminal Code, they are all punishable by law for their participation …. Pursuant to ss. 22. (1) of the Criminal Code, the ministers of these ministries or government authorities have been parties to those offences and are punishable for counselling such offences. All these eight Crown authorities had and still have the common intention of obtaining profit or financial gain by the unlawful exploitation of the re-victimized sponsors that had been unaware of the problems. The Crown used a tortuous way that prevented the notification of some sponsors and the involvement of any Court during or before the garnishing procedure against those sponsors, including the plaintiff at bar.
93. Even if an Honourable Court would conclude that the ministers and their agents and administrators were only negligent, since they markedly departed from the standard of care required, the fact remains that their superiors – the ministers – involved were faulty and malicious, not only negligent. A perpetual system of governmental cover-ups for more than seven years cannot be called mere negligence. They did not participate in those cover-ups negligently. Rather, their participation was a state of art, a very carefully designed system of torts and fraud. But a “Swiss watch” of torts is still a tort. The more sophisticated is the least foolproof.
94. The federal forms (IP 2 and Sponsorship Agreement with Understanding) assume that only the Canadian sponsors could be guilty wrongdoers in 100% of the default cases, while every foreigner (and Canadian administrator) is obviously always innocent who never make mistakes, so they are not accountable. Such open expression of prejudice and discrimination based on nationality (and profession) would sufficiently deem those CIC forms illegal and invalid for him. In general, the public servants did not act bona fide, but with oppressive purpose.
95. Accordingly, if each sponsor has 100% financial responsibility and the Crown’s administrators have 0% – that is the Crown is not accountable – it can result basic injustice. Say, the administrators of the social benefits mixed up two single mothers with the same surname. One of them had one dependent child and the other four. The first one, who was a sponsored immigrant that separated from the sponsor, received too much money for several years. (The Crown’s administrators overpaid this person that, by mistake, received the benefits calculated for four dependent children.) A few decades later the Crown discovered the error and started to garnishee the innocent sponsor.
96. In January 1999, the plaintiff had no idea that he was signing a contract and he was taking 100% responsibility for the errors of the Crown’s administrators. He would not have signed a Sponsorship Agreement showing that condition explicitly. Such condition had been hidden in the CIC form. The Crown failed to reveal him an important material fact.
97. The plaintiff submits that he had no other choice but to sign the controversial Sponsorship Agreement in 1999 for Ms. Reyes unconsciously.
98. The concepts of unequal bargaining power and undue influence are also often linked to discussions of the fiduciary principle. Claims based on these causes of action, it is true, will often arise in the context of a professional relationship side by side with claims related to duty of care and fiduciary duty; see Horace Krever and Marion Randall Lewis, “Fiduciary Obligations and the Professions” in Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada, 1990, Fiduciary Duties, at pp. 291-93. Indeed, all three equitable doctrines are designed to protect vulnerable parties in transactions with others. However, whereas undue influence focuses on the sufficiency of consent and unconscionability looks at the reasonableness of a given transaction, the fiduciary principle monitors the abuse of a loyalty reposed; see G. H. L. Fridman, The Law of Contract in Canada (2nd ed. 1986), at pp. 301-11. Thus, while the existence of a fiduciary relationship will often give rise to an opportunity for the fiduciary to gain an advantage through undue influence, it is possible for a fiduciary to gain an advantage for him- or herself without having to resort to coercion; see Hospital Products, supra; and Canadian Aero Service Ltd. v. O'Malley, 1973 CanLII 23 (SCC), [1974] S.C.R. 592. Similarly, while the doctrine of unconscionability is triggered by abuse of a pre-existing inequality in bargaining power between the parties, such an inequality is no more a necessary element in a fiduciary relationship than factors such as trust and loyalty are necessary conditions for a claim of unconscionability.
99. In Bilson v. Kokotow, the Court stated that strangers to a contract cannot claim for damages. There are many similar common law cases. Since the Crown was not a signatory to any contract with the sponsors, it has no right to punish them, except for fraud.
100. The plaintiff submits that the Crown misinterprets the word “debt” in the IRPA in two steps. First of all, it is a fraud to insert words into the IRPA’s text. The Crown interprets ss. 145. (3), as “A debt or an uncertified debt claim may be recovered at any time.” Secondly, the Crown misinterprets the vague moral obligations of two parties as if it would be a certain amount agreed upon at the moment of signing the sponsorship agreements as a unilateral obligation of each sponsor.
101. In Coast Capital Savings Credit Union v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2011 BCCA 20 (CanLII), at paragraph [57], the Court noted: “… Rather, I would be content to adopt the definition of “debt” that appears in numerous Canadian and English cases, namely: A debt is defined to be a sum of money which is certainly, and at all events, payable without regard to the fact whether it be payable now or at a future time.”
102. In the case at bar, there was no sign or indication before 2007 regarding any defined sum of money involved.
103. The sponsorship agreement has a serious lack of definition of the crucial words “self-supporting,”  “absolute,” “unconditional,” or “basic necessities.” As a result of these failures, among others mentioned in these pleadings, the agreement is void due to vagueness. Further, the meaning of the word “recover” is – in the overwhelming majority of common law cases – is always associated with an action taken in a Court. Let alone that if the sponsor s have never seen or received any money from the Crown, and the moneys paid to the sponsored persons have been kept in secret from the sponsors (perhaps for decades), the word “recover” – and therefore ss. 145. (3) of the IRPA – are not applicable.
104. Theconcept of “needs” in the context of non-compensatory spousal support goes beyond basic necessities of life and varies according to the circumstances of the parties. As stated by Finch J.A. (as he then was) in Myers v. Myers 1995 CanLII 2274 (BC CA), (1995), 17 R.F.L. (4th) 298, 65 B.C.A.C. 226, at para. 10: “Need” or “needs” are not absolute quantities. They may vary according to the circumstances of the parties and the family unit as a whole. “Need” does not end when the spouse seeking support achieves a subsistence level of income or any level of income above subsistence. “Needs” is a flexible concept and is one of several considerations which a trial judge must take into account in deciding whether any order for spousal support is warranted.
105. The plaintiff respectfully submits that the standards of the Salvation Army or an average homeless shelter are applicable: they provide for the “essential needs” for any new immigrant if those standards must be acceptable for “old Canadians.” The legislation does not provide a Cadillac where a Ford would do, like sending a person for school or university needlessly for four or ten years.
106. J: Frustrated sponsorship agreement:
107. In J. Lauritzen AS v Wijsmuller BV (The Super Servant Two),[7] Bingham LJ set out five propositions which he regarded as the essence of the doctrine. The plaintiff submits that these key elements of the doctrine of frustration exist in the case at bar. Therefore, the IRPA that came into force on June 28, 2002, effectively killed his sponsorship agreement with Ms. Reyes. (The interpretation of the IRPA by every public servant – and some of the courts – is that the obligations of the sponsors are absolute while the sponsored persons have no obligations at law. In contrast, the sponsorship agreement is bilateral and requires an equal responsibility on the part of the sponsor and the sponsored person for the basic necessities of the latter.)
108. The several gradual but radical shifts in the legislation, policies and interpretation of the CIC sponsorship matters have caused the plaintiff’s sponsorship agreement of 1999 collapse. It became invalid at each step. In general, please refer to Frustrated Contract Act, RSBC 1996, c 166: 1 (1)(a); 2; 3; and 5 (3).
109. K: The Crown’s action is unlawful beyond the limitation period:
110. Since June 2008, the Minister of National Revenue and his administrators, also the managers of the RSBC, failed to apply section 32. of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act that was harmonious with sections 3.(5) and 9 (1) of the Limitation Act of British Columbia. They ignored and contravened, in bad faith and knowingly about the irreparable damages caused for the plaintiff’s family. They disobeyed the legally prescribed limitation period of 6 years that turned any claim for debt “statute-barred” if a self-help action had not occurred.
111. The instant case at bar is almost identical to Markevich v. Canada, 2003 SCC 9, [2003] 1 SCR 94. In it, an alleged tax debt in the amount of $770,583.42 was claimed by the Crown, including interest. In paragraph 44 of Markevich, supra, Canada acted as the agent of a province (BC), similarly to the instant case at bar. The Court dismissed the Crown’s appeal. The alleged debt was cancelled since the Crown had no court action or garnishment within the 6-year limitation period, just like here. Several enactments, for example related to student loan debts, have similar limitation periods. There was no legislation in 1999 and 2000 claiming that a sponsorship debt is above the limitation laws of Canada and its expiry date or garnishment procedure is much stricter than debts related to tax arrears, student loans, etc.
112. Several acts and regulations refer to a prescribed limitation period of six years. Not all of them because it is a clear and obvious rule, just like the rules to keep documents and receipts for at least six years. For example, pursuant to paragraph 258. of the Immigration andRefugee Protection Regulations, “No seizure may be made under subsection 140(1) of the Act in respect of the fraudulent or improper obtaining or use of a thing more than six years after that obtaining or use.” Similar limits are expressed in ss. 23.(4) of the Agricultural Marketing Programs Act, ss. 16.1 (1) of the Canada Student Financial Assistance Act, ss. 18. (2) of the Canada Student Loans Act, s. 113. of the Customs Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (2nd Supp), ss. 55.01 of the Patent Act, RSC 1985, c P-4, ss. 39. (1) and (2) of the Federal Courts Act, or 46.1 (4) of the Employment Insurance Act.
113. Another “untimely” factor may be mentioned here. Namely, the garnishing request [of the RSBC] was binding the CRA for 30 days only. The CRA violated that legislation. Pursuant to section 32. of the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act, “A garnishee summons served on the Minister has effect only if it is served on the Minister in the first thirty days following the first day on which it could have been validly served on the Minister.” These 30 days correspond exactly with the words in ss. 146. (1) (b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Would this be mere coincidence?
114. It was not compulsory but perhaps optional – or rather unlawful – to start garnishing the plaintiff’s tax credit funds after a delay of eight years or so. Thus, the CRA’s excuse that it had been a kind of victim – a garnishee – under the pressure of British Columbia by a lawful obligation to snatch the plaintiff’s monies seems like a b.s. – a baseless statement. Maybe the CRA concerned (?) that the Province of British Columbia may declare its separation from Canada if Zoltan A. Simon’s unlawful garnishment would not take place.
115. L: No contributory negligence on the plaintiffs’ behalf:
116. The Crown and its ministers or public servants have not tried to mitigate the alleged damages of British Columbia and the plaintiff since 2000. Counsel to the Crown in the IAD hearing of the plaintiff claimed that Z.A. Simon had not tried to mitigate the damages of the Province. One may pose a question here in a hypothetical case as follows. A criminal kidnaps the two minor children of a judge and keeps demanding a ransom, complaining that it is his financial loss to feed the children for months. The judge, instead of mitigation, takes the criminal to court. What is wrong in such conduct? Why should an innocent victim mitigate the losses of a criminal? (In the case at bar, the Crown acted like a professional criminal. Or, using the true wording, the Crown defendants, since 2006, acted as if they would be active participants of organized crime.)
117. M: The claim for misfeasance in public office:
118. Misfeasance in public office is an intentional tort. The tort is meant to provide a measure of accountability for public officials who do not exercise their duties of office in good faith. To make out this tort, the instant plaintiffs are demonstrating the four elements as follow: (a)                     The public officials deliberately engaged in unlawful conduct in the exercise of public functions. Namely, the ministers responsible for the lawful operation of the CRA and the CIC knowingly issued unlawful policies (IP 2 and MuO) in 2006), in order to mislead the public servants. They forced all of their employees to follow those rules while ignore the relevant legislation (the IRPA and its Regulations, the Interpretation Act, federal and provincial legislation related to garnishment, the laws regarding limitation of acts, etc.); (b)                     The public officials, including the ministers mentioned above plus the Minister of Justice, the minister responsible for Service Canada, and the Minister of Housing and Social Development, etc. (of BC) were aware since 2006 that the conduct was unlawful and was likely to injure the plaintiff and their class: the re-victimized sponsors. They admitted in print that the said two policies, at least the MoU, may not be valid before a Court. They indicated in the IMM 1344 C (02-98) E or/and IMM 1344 B (02-98) E forms that a court may – and probably would – find certain parts of the CIC sponsorship undertaking forms unlawful or unconstitutional and, therefore, severable from the agreements. [Please note that the severability clause seems to be missing from the modern versions of those forms.] The Minister of Justice knew that the IRPA prescribed the operation of a filing system in the Federal Court in order to keep track of sponsorship debts. However, he ignored the law and allowed or encouraged his employees to do the same by skipping the involvement of any Court in real practice. The plaintiff kept informing the top officials of Canada and BC about their unlawful policies. The leaders of Service Canada and its Minister knowingly intimidated the plaintiff by the false claim that his CPP pension benefits may be garnisheed before the involvement of any court. This was a conspiracy between Ms. Sharon Shanks and Minister Diane Finley. In a similar case, the Court ordered the Crown to pay Mr. Longley $55,000 in damages although there was no coercion or intimidating element: Longley v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), 1999. In the instant case at bar the silence of the CRA was intimidating, with the aim of coercion in order to get the monies of the concerned plaintiff by misquoting the laws. The plaintiffs submit that an item of $55,000 would apply in this case as shown in the table above. The officials of the four ministries involved acted dishonestly, in bad faith. As Iacobucci J. said in Odhavji, public officials who deliberately engage in conduct that they know to be inconsistent with the obligations of their office risk liability for the tort; (c)                      The public officials’ tortious conduct was the legal cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries. Namely, they conduct influenced the Immigration Officer in Hong Kong in the refusal to grant temporary resident visa to Ms. Zhong in April 2007. The honourable tortfeasors remained adamant in maintaining their systems of torts nationwide. These key factors resulted in the forced separation of Zoltan A. Simon from his family members: Ms. Zhong and Mr. Ye for more than seven years. This is a Charter violation as well: a cruel and unusual treatment of innocent and law-obedient human beings, by contravention of section 12. of the Charter.
119. The injuries suffered by the plaintiff are compensable in tort law because torts, frauds, deceit, misinterpretation, offences relating to public officers, breach of duty of care, breach of trust, misfeasance, conversion of chattels, intimidation, undue interference, conspiracy, money extortion schemes, laundering of proceeds of crime, terrorist activity and perjury or false statements are all crimes or indictable offences punishable by law. One can find detailed description of these torts and their punishments in the Criminal Code.
120. As Justice Iacobucci summarized: The tort of misfeasance in a public office is an intentional tort whose distinguishing elements are twofold: (i) deliberate unlawful conduct in the exercise of public functions; and (ii) awareness that the conduct is unlawful and likely to injure the plaintiff.
121. In general, see Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69 (CanLII),[2003] 3 S.C.R. 263 at para. 32, alsoSt. Elizabeth Home Society v. Hamilton (City), 2010 ONCA 280 (CanLII) that are applicable. The plaintiff submits that each element of the tort of misfeasance in a public office exists here, as set out at paragraph 23 in Odhavji Estate, supra.
122. In the case at bar, this tort of misfeasance concerns the unlawful conduct or omission by a public official who knows his or her actions are unlawful and likely to harm a specific person or group of people, here the re-victimized sponsors.  It contemplates an element of bad faith which has been established here by the unexplained and excessive delay of over seven years not providing the plaintiff a lawful explanation for the forced separation of his wife from him, let alone the extended cover-ups and the willful blindness of the top officials or ministers of the CRA, the CIC, the Ministry of Justice – both of Canada and BC – and the two or three other BC ministries involved, instead of admitting their errors and omissions.
123. Our case at bar is comparable well to Young v. Bella, 2006 SCC 3, [2006] 1 S.C.R. In that case, two ignorant university professors acted out of suspicion and lack of wisdom. They assumed that they were protecting society from an abusive young predator. Regardless their explicit lack of intention to hurt Ms. Young, the jury rewarded an amount of $839,400.00 in damages against them.
124. The instant plaintiffs respectfully submit that in the case at bar three persons of a family have been damaged intentionally for over seven years, by two governments that had almost endless financial resources. In the case of Young, supra, the damage lasted for two years (during which Ms. Young was unaware of the defamation actions against her). The tort was quite unintentional. Further, the financial means of two professors and/or a university were limited. Finally, Ms. Young was a young student and she was free to clarify her defamation, or, to start a different career. Zoltan A. Simon is 65 years old while Ms. Zhong is 51. They have irreversibly lost seven years of living together or cohabit, the ability to gender and raise a child together, and still being uncertain of their future: in which country can they unify their family, etc. The plaintiff may not survive in China. Thus, comparing the two cases, three times $839,400.00 ($2,818,200) would be a reasonable amount in punitive damages, due to the Crown’s torts connected with misfeasance in a public office.
125. N:Offences relating to Public Officer(s):
126. An unnamed officer or employee of the Government of Canada – perhaps Officer RS in the Case Processing Centre in Mississauga – knowingly made or issued a false statement and sent it to A. Chau, Designated Immigration Officer of the Consulate General of Canada in Hong Kong, falsely claiming that the plaintiff, Zoltan Andrew Simon, had a sponsorship debt in March or April 2007. That unnamed officer, employee of the Government of Canada, wilfully obstructed a public visa officer in the execution of his duty, since he or she knowingly made or issued a false document or statement to the immigration officer. Therefore, the unnamed public servant or employee of the Crown contravened subsection 129. (1) (a) and (d) of the IRPA, also ss. 129. (a), (d) of the Criminal Code, and committed an offence. He or she directly or indirectly misrepresented or withheld material facts relating to a relevant matter – in this case the application for Ms. Zhong for permanent residence, sponsored by Zoltan A. Simon – that induced an error in the administration of the IRPA, resulting in the unlawful refusal of Ms. Zhong’s visa by the said Immigration Officer. The unnamed Crown officer above may have seen the declaration of the “BC creditor” as a single page received by fax. That page only stated that it was confirming the MOU – that had no legal power before any Court – and remained silent of the fact that it failed to conform the IRPA. Both the sender and the receiver seems guilty in this tort that has resulted in the misleading of the Immigration Officer in Hong Kong.
127. As we have seen, there is no requirement in the IRPA, or, in its subsection 126. that the misrepresentation be intentional, deliberate or negligent. The unnamed officer knew or should have known that no ministerial debt certificate existed in the Federal Court against Z.A. Simon in or about April 2007. It was negligence on the Immigration Officer’s behalf not to investigate the status of the debt claim, and establish if the debt claim had been connected with a ministerial certificate filed in the Federal Court, or it had not.
128. In case if the unnamed servant of the Crown did not act knowingly, then his or her superior(s) – ultimately the Minister of CIC – acted knowingly or/and by willful blindness, by knowingly preventing the Crown’s administrators to learn about the correct status or debt of any sponsor in the Federal Court’s files. The Minister of the CIC knowingly isolated the unnamed public servant – and the Immigration Officer – from the true material facts on file in the Federal Court. If the Federal Court did not have such file in 2007 at all, the Minister of the CIC and the Minister of Justice are responsible for knowingly creating or accepting such unlawful situation in Canada that resulted in the regular and systematic violation of the IRPA’s relevant paragraphs and the distortion of the immigration system.
129. Finally, the plaintiff maintained frequent correspondence with the highest officers and authorities (in the CIC, IRB, IAD, CRA, Federal Court, Consulate General of Canada in Hong Kong, etc.) and kept informing them about the numerous illegal elements in the administration of the IRPA. It is clear and obvious that they all acted knowingly since none of them instructed their administrators to take a second look at the errors or omissions. No one apologized by a letter stating, say, “Unfortunately our administrators made a mistake in Mr. Simon’s case. It was only a single occurrence and an exceptional misunderstanding.” The late Mr. Brian P. Goodman and Mrs. Shari Stein were among the key persons (in the IRB) whom the plaintiff kept informing repeatedly about the CIC’s and CRA’s unlawful practices. Apparently, they did not have the power to influence their superiors or convince them to improve the situation.
130. The plaintiff respectfully submits that, pursuant to ss. 129. (d) of the Criminal Code, the proper punishment for the first element of tort in this case would be an imprisonment for a term of two years. Such term could reasonably be converted to a penalty of $100,000 for the damages of Ms. Zhong and Mr. Simon. The second element of this is the false statement or deposition of a document issued for the visa officer. This element of the tort is punishable by imprisonment for a term of fourteen years or less that may be converted the $700,000. The total of the two penalties would amount to $800,000 payable severally or solidarily by the Crown defendants for the plaintiffs for their damages.
131. O: Claim in tort for breach of duty of care:
132. The controversial and unlawful CIC forms constitute a marked departure from the standard care. The plaintiffs claim various breaches of duty of care toward and interference with the Crown's obligations to the sponsors, at least to the extent that the CIC sponsorship agreement and undertaking forms should have been free of torts such as fraud, misinterpretation, failure to reveal important material facts, violations of several Charter rights (such as discrimination between Canadian sponsors, sponsored aliens, and public servants of the Crown as three distinct groups of the society). Such violations of the sponsors’ Charter rights are not justified by section 1 of the Charter.
133. The common law cases of Just v. British columbia, [1989] 2 SCR 1228 or Stoney Band v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), 1997 CanLII 5022 (FC) dealt with issues related to breach of duty of care.
134. Since the Criminal Code is silent about duty of care or its punishment, the plaintiffs rely on the estimate of this Honourable Court regarding a possible award of an amount related to their damages under this heading.
135. P: Claim for breach of trust:
136. The plaintiffs claim that the Crown is responsible for their damages arising from breach of trust. Zoltan A. Simon signed a sponsorship agreement with and for Ms. M. Reyes in January 1999. He gave his signature only because he relied on the honesty of the Crown, the CIC forms and their texts, including the Crown’s obligation to solve financial controversies before a Court regarding defaults. Also, he relied on the severability clause of those CIC forms. These factors gave him the impression that the Crown was acting in good faith, without any fraudulent intent, during the compilation of the texts in these two CIC forms. After all, Canadians seemed to be the most honest nation on Earth in 1999.
137. The Crown failed to reveal material information as follows: (A) There was no Court of competent jurisdiction in Canada assigned to severe portions of the CIC agreements. (B) The provincial authorities would not obey any law that would enforce the sponsored persons’ obligations in trying to find work and support themselves. (C) The sponsors accepted 100% responsibility for damages arising from any unlawful act, omission or neglect committed by the provincial public servants. (D) The provinces were more powerful than the Government of Canada, so they were allowed to garnish any sponsor at any time – even after decades of total silence – without any debt certificate filed at the Federal Court or the involvement of any Court, imposing compound interest at any rate. (E) Canada and its provinces had zero commitment to contact and inform any sponsor regarding radical changes in the relevant legislation and the Crown’s ever changing policies. Such scenario and conduct of Canada and BC was unimaginable for the plaintiff when he signed his agreement with Ms. Reyes.
138. Pursuant to section 122. of the Code, every official who, in connection with the duties of his office, commits fraud or a breach of trust is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, whether or not the fraud or breach of trust would be an offence if it were committed in relation to a private person.
139. A minister’s imprisonment for five years may reasonably be converted to an amount of $250.000 since a Minister of the CIC or CRA earns more than $50,000 per year. Also, the costs of his or her imprisonment would be an additional burden on Canada. Several ministers (or commissioners) of the CIC and the CRA have been involved in this tort so far: Ms. Finley, Mr. Kenney, and Mr. Alexander, let alone the ministers of Justice. All of them have approved the unlawful CIC forms. None of them raised any objection regarding their correctness. Therefore, the plaintiffs claim damages for breach of trust in the amount of $250,000, payable severally or solidarily by the defendants.
140. Q: Charge of fraudulent conversion of the plaintiff’s chattels:
141. Introduction: The Regulations Amending the Immigration Regulations, 1978  [dated 28 July or August 18, 1999 in Canada Gazette, Vol. 133, No. 17] states the following. Section 56 of the Immigration Regulations, 1978 is replaced as follows: “For the purposes of subsection 118(2) of the Act, payments that result from a breach of an undertaking and that are made directly or indirectly to an immigrant under an item described in column I of Schedule VI are payments that may be recovered from the person or organization that gave the undertaking as a debt due to Her Majesty in right of Canada or in right of any province to which the undertaking is assigned.” Near the end of this text published in the Canada Gazette, under “Compliance and Enforcement” it is added, “Whenever a sponsored immigrant obtains assistance payments of a described nature (those listed in Schedule VI of the Immigration Regulations, 1978), the federal government and a province with delegated authority are entitled to seek reimbursement (repayment) by taking that sponsor to court.” [Emphasis added.]
142. In 1999, the plaintiff’s interpretation of the prescribed procedure – taking the sponsor to a Court before reimbursement or garnishing – was the same as the Crown’s position in 1999, published in the Canada Gazette, as we demonstrated above. Starting in 2006, the Crown unilaterally changed its position, without informing the plaintiff. In the same year, the Limitation Act extinguished any claim of the Crown against the plaintiff.
143. Conversion is a tort committed by someone who deals with a chattel that does not belong to him or her in a manner inconsistent with the rights of the lawful owner, thereby depriving the owner of use and possession.
144. The conversion took place by wrongful acts by the CRA and the Province of British Columbia (the administrators of the RSBC) involving the goods of the plaintiff: his tax refunds for the years 2007 and 2008. The Defendants’ acts consisted of handling, transferring and disposing the funds in June 2008 and June 2009. The Defendants’ actions had the effect and intention of interfering with (and denying) the plaintiff’s right or title to his tax refunds in question.
145. In short, the CRA (Canada Revenue Agency) converted an instrument, namely the credit amounts of the plaintiff’s personal tax returns for 2007 and 2008, by dealing with them under the direction of one not authorized, by collecting it and making the proceeds available to someone other (the Province of British Columbia) than the person – the plaintiff – rightfully entitled to possession. The only authority authorizing the transaction (regarding the amounts involved in the conversion) should have been the Federal Court where, pursuant to ss. 146. (2) of the IRPA, the alleged debt of the plaintiff must have been registered and filed after the minister’s certification of the debt. In the case at bar, the CRA and the Province of BC committed the conversion by avoiding the Federal Court, or any Court, without obtaining the authorization of a Court, and contacting them for the purpose of registering the “debt.”
146. Further, the CRA and RSBC violated the federal and provincial garnishment rules set out in the acts and regulations related to garnishment and family support procedures.
147. The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) handled and disposed the plaintiff’s moneys wrongfully. They took and used the plaintiff’s chattels and exercised dominion over them that was inconsistent with the title of the owner. The plaintiff had the right to immediate possession of those funds. The agents or/and public officers employed by the CRA intentionally interfered with the plaintiff’s chattels. They converted payments, the credit balances of the plaintiff’s personal tax returns in June 2008 and June 2009, without colour of right, collected them and made the proceeds available to RSBC that had not been authorized to collect it since British Columbia only had a debt claim against the plaintiff at that time. The sponsorship debt claim had not been certified by the Minister, or registered and filed with the Federal Court, as prescribed by the IRPA and many similar or related enactments regarding lawful garnishment procedures. Thus, it was obviously not a debt in 2008 and 2009. Further, the RCA and RSBC have been aware of the fact that there had been no proper lawful way to certify, register, and file the debt claim after October 2006 when, pursuant to the Limitation Act of BC, such “debt” had been extinguished.
148. When the instant plaintiff signed the Sponsorship Agreement, the Immigration Act, 1976 was in effect. The default of October 2000 took place under the old Act as well. Its ss. 118.(2) and (3) did not state that the debt may be recovered at any time. Pursuant to ss. 134. (a) of the IRPA, “No person may be found guilty of an offence or subjected to a penalty for the contravention of a provision of a regulation that incorporates material by reference, unless it is proved that, at the time of the alleged contravention, (a) the material was reasonably accessible to the person. The plaintiff declares that the IRPA was not available for him in 1999 and in 2000 because it came to effect only in June 2002. Further, pursuant to ss. 11. (g) and (i) of the Charter, since the punishment for the offence has been varied between the time of commission [2000] and the time of sentencing [2008, the garnishment], the lesser punishment for the plaintiff would be the application of the Immigration Act, 1976, instead of the IRPA.
149. For theft or conversion please refer to ss. 322. (1), (2), (3) and (4) of the Criminal Code. In our case, there was fraudulent conversion and misappropriation of monies. Pursuant to 334. (a) (i) of the Criminal Code, the administrators and principals of the CRA and the RSBC are guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, where the value of what has been stolen does not exceed five thousand dollars (as in this case). Therefore, the plaintiffs respectfully submit, the Crown defendants shall pay them, severally or solidarily, an amount of $100,000 for theft or fraudulent conversion, assuming that a year of imprisonment corresponds to $50,000.
150. R: Charge for interference and failure to deliver monies:
151. This item is closely associated with theft or conversion and overlaps with those issues. The plaintiff has the right to sue in conversion because he had the right to immediate possession of the chattels involved. The CRA and the Revenue Agency of BC are liable for the conversion. The circumstances satisfy the criteria set in Columere Park Developments Ltd. v. Enviro Custom Homes Inc., 2010 BCSC 1248 (CanLII), or in Boma Manufacturing Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 1996 CanLII 149 (SCC).
152. In Columere Park, supra, para. [30], the Court describes a test and refers to an important point to be made before going further is that the subject chattel of the tort of conversion can be funds. This is made explicit in recent jurisprudence: Ast v. Mikolas, 2010 BCSC 127 (CanLII) at para. 128; Drucker, Inc. v. Gui, 2009 BCSC 542 (CanLII), 2009 BCSC 542 at para. 58; Dhothar v. Atwal, 2009 BCSC 1203 (CanLII), 2009 BCSC 1203 at para. 16. The apposite passage comes from Royal Canadian Legion, Branch No. 15 v. Burkitt, 2005 BCSC 1752 (CanLII), 2005 BCSC 1752 at para. 104. In Boma Manufacturing Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 1996 CanLII 149 (SCC), Iacobucci J. defined the test for conversion by a bank.
153. The instant plaintiff at bar is a victim of an extortion scheme through illegal garnishment. Similarly, in Kungl v. Great Lakes Reinsurance Company et al., [1969] R.S.C. 342 the plaintiff took a seizure by garnishment against G. L. and the agent of L. Both garnishees made a negative declaration which was contested. The Superior Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed the contestation of the garnishee’s declaration. The SCC dismissed the appeal as well. Another similar case is SMX Shopping Centre Ltd. v. Canada, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1870 (F.C.A.). The claims about the alleged debt of the plaintiff are void, improper, unlawful, unenforceable and of no force and effect, like in Vollant v. Canada 2009 FCA 185. In Desjardins v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004, the garnishment procedure of a disputed amount was invalid and unlawful. In Donohoe v. Hull, (1895), the judge wrote that if the alleged debt was not attachable, then the proceedings, being taken without authority, must fail. In [60] of Hanif v. TJM Management Consultants Ltd. (2011) the agreement was void for uncertainty.
154. The CRA’s actions had both the effect and intention of interfering with (or rather denying) the plaintiff’s right or title to the funds. The act of conversion done by the said agents or public officers of the CRA was so serious an interference with the rights of the plaintiff that it would require serious punishment. The public servants of the CRA and the RSBC refused and failed to deliver a certain sum to a person – the plaintiff – who was authorized to demand it and did demand it. Therefore, the CRA and the RSBC contravened section 337. of the Criminal Code [that is punishable by no more than 14 years in prison].
155. The plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Criminal Code’s prescribed terms of imprisonment indicated above, fourteen years, would reasonably apply in this case. An imprisonment for a term of 14 years, applying the usual amount of 50,000 per year, would yield $700,000. Therefore, the claim is for an amount of $700,000 payable severally or solidarily by the Crown defendants to the plaintiffs.
156. S: Charge for contravening several Acts of Parliament:
157. The officers (and ministers) of the CIC and the CRA or the Ministry of National Revenue violated ss. 146. (1) and (2) of the IRPA and, therefore, 126. (1) of the Criminal Code, “Every one who, without lawful excuse, contravenes an Act of Parliament by wilfully doing anything that it forbids or by wilfully omitting to do anything that it requires to be done is, unless a punishment is expressly provided by law, guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.”
158. The Registrar, the Deputy Registrar, and every administrator of the Registry of the Supreme Court of Canada have been involved in another crime or offence. Namely, they systematically, knowingly and maliciously, in bad faith, contravened sections 61., 40. (3), 43. (1), and 97. (3)of the Supreme Court Act.
159. Such act or rather systematic omission results in a significant distortion of the judicial system of Canada. It can be said that it scrambles the whole system of justice, indicating the end of democracy, constituting the first major milestone into a quasi-fascist dictatorship.
160. The plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Criminal Code’s prescribed terms of imprisonment indicated above, two years, are quite unreasonable for this huge offence against a free and democratic Canada. Despite of such argument, the prescribed imprisonment for a term of two years, applying the usual amount of 50,000 per year, would yield $100,000. However, there were three counts of this offence, namely: a long and continuous one contravening ss. 146. (1) and (2) of the IRPA by the CIC and the CRA, two counts (2012 and 2014) of contravening s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act by the SCC Registry’s administrators. This Honourable Court may consider punitive damages as well, or, in the alternative. Therefore, the claim is for an amount of $300,000 payable severally or solidarily by the Crown defendants to the plaintiffs.
161. T: Fraudulent conspiracy and attempt of conspiracy:
162. The administrators of and the Minister responsible for the CRA failed to follow their “Know Your Customer” policy, that they failed to investigate claims or transactions that they knew or ought to have known were suspicious, unusual or indicative of unusual activity and that it failed to comply with the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act. A somewhat similar case was Dupont Heating & Air Conditioning Limited v. Bank of Montreal, 2009 CanLII 2906 (ON SC).
163. The CRA and the CIC had a mutual MoU policy that facilitated the crime: it constituted a conspiracy to possess proceeds of crime. These two groups cannot claim that they have been unaware of their own acts and omissions that had undermined the relevant legislation.
164. In the case at bar, the plaintiffs respectfully submit, the subject-matter is $38,149.45. This is the original amount that the Crown (especially the RSBC) has attempted to take adamantly from the plaintiff, Zoltan A. Simon, by force and abuse of power, and conspiracy, primarily from his tax account with the CRA. Therefore, the plaintiffs respectfully submit that the responsible officers of the Crown defendant(s) involved are liable to imprisonment for 14 years. Converting those years by the usual $50,000 per year, the amount is $700,000 that is payable to them by the Crown defendants severally or solidarily.
165. U: Mental torture by conspiracies and an extortion scheme:
166. In the case at bar, torture by a conspiracy and fraudulent money extortion scheme is associated with mental torture. Several public servants (ministers, officers and administrators of the federal Crown) participated in the long-lasting mental torture of the plaintiff. Their degree of involvement and the cruelty of each participant may have been different. The plaintiff does not know the details and the names, only the devastating effects. An exception is the mental torture caused by the false testimony of Ms. Bridges at the SCC for which the details are shown under that claim (Perjury or False Testimony).  Perhaps the most heinous crime was the mental torture committed by the administrators of the FCA Registry in Edmonton. Between 2012 and 2014, they committed seven major errors against the plaintiff, probably by following the oral orders issued by the Head Office of the Courts Administration Service. The purpose of such conspiracy was to break the plaintiff mentally and spiritually, so he would give up his legal actions and quit for good.
167. Such mental torture during seven years, but particularly between 2012 and 2014, seemed for the Crown as an efficient weapon. It contributed to the fact that the plaintiff gradually became a nervous wreck. He hardly has a good sleep, due to sleeplessness. He has frequent nightmares or bad dreams – about filing deadlines, paragraphs, case law and unfriendly judges – and he is often more exhausted when he wakes up. He feels that his expected life expectancy became shorter by about seven years since he had spent the bulk of his last seven years by studying the law day and night by computers. Sometimes he has sharp pain in his heart, his eyesight became weaker, his hands tremble more. He hardly eats and his teeth are decaying because he had no money left for the maintenance of his body. He has little or no time to sleep or relax, cook, or buy groceries. He has lost the enjoyment of his life in Canada, he is tired of living alone. He has no time left to complete his various book manuscripts about world history (as some of his works are shown on his website www.correctingworldhistory.com) He has no time and energy left to contact publishers. This is a major loss of satisfaction and possible income for him as a writer and historian.
168. The plaintiff often feels fits of anger and anguish. For example, the seven cowardly administrative tortures during the seven (or so) procedural steps in the federal court system made him so furious that he often felt like being able to murder any public servant or become a terrorist – a mental syndrome. He has lost his identity as a good Canadian citizen that had always respected the government and its public servants everywhere.
169. Pursuant to ss. 269.1 (1) of the Criminal Code, “Every official, or every person acting at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of an official, who inflicts torture on any other person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment not exceeding fourteen years.”
170. Pursuant to ss. 380.1 (1.1) of the Criminal Code, Without limiting the generality of section 718.2, when a court imposes a sentence for an offence referred to in section 382, 382.1 or 400, it shall also consider as an aggravating circumstance the fact that the value of the fraud committed exceeded one million dollars.
171. The plaintiff believes that the grand total related to the monies of the re-victimized sponsors that have been garnisheed or soon become garnisheed (by the violation of more or less thirty paragraphs or subparagraph of Canada’s laws) seems to be in the ballpark of 800,000,000 dollars. (This is less than Canada’s security budget of the G-8 summit 2010.)
172. V: Corruption, fraud on the government:
173. Since the Registrar and the administrators of the SCC Registry have been adamant for two years (2012-2014) in obstructing justice by refusing to file two notices of appeal as of right, a reasonable person may arrive to the conclusion as follows. The Registrar himself prohibited for every administrator of the Registry to file such items because previously he has given a promise to one (or more) of his superiors to make such omission all the time. Since the Registrar of the SCC does not have many superiors, one may reasonably conclude that the Prime Minister or the (previous) Minister of Justice placed Mr. Roger Bilodeau in a “quid pro quo” situation. We follow below the logic of an average person: Mr. Bilodeau was appointed as the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada under a main condition. Namely, he had to give his promise or word of honour that he would consistently supress section 61. of the Supreme Court Act, by never allowing the filing for a non-criminal that is opposing the Crown: Otherwise, he would lose his position and job.
174. It is reasonably asserted that Mr. Bilodeau granted the favour of such regular omissions for the interests of his superior(s), practically by stealing power from the nine judges of the Supreme Court of Canada, and shifting that power to the Minister of Justice and the Prime Minister. By doing so, the Registrar of the SCC and his superior(s) in the Cabinet, as reasonably perceived, contravened ss. 121. (1) (a) (i), (ii), and (iv), 121. (1) (d) (i) and (ii) and 121. (1) (e) (i) and (ii) of the Criminal Code. It would appear, with high probability, to any reasonable person familiar with the material circumstances that Mr. Bilodeau offered for the benefit of a minister or several ministers of the Cabinet, including the Prime Minister, an advantage or benefit as consideration for cooperation, assistance, exercise of influence, or an act or omission. In the case at bar, the essential assistance of the Registrar was the regular omission of s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act. Such conspiracy between the Registrar and one (or more) minister(s) of the Cabinet was a fraud on the government.
175. The plaintiff claims that the Registrar accepted his appointment by one of his superiors under the condition of omission of section 61. of the Supreme Court Act, under the promise that he would always ignore and contravene the said section in order to obtain extra powers for himself and certain minister(s) or/and the Prime Minister by unlawful means. The plaintiff has no information whether the future superior(s) of Mr. Bilodeau approached him first or pressured him into the commitment of the said omission, or, Mr. Bilodeau made such offer to one of his future superiors before the day of his appointment as Registrar.
176. An essential element of Mr. Bilodeau’s fraudulent and corrupt conduct was the elimination of s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act from the Registry’s official website and a booklet entitled Representing Yourself in the Supreme Court of Canada, Volume I (a guide published by Mr. R. Bilodeau, or the Registry of the SCC) which has been issued for the wide use of the public and the SCC administrators.
177. Violations or offences under section 121. of the Criminal Code allow an imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years. Therefore, the plaintiffs claim an amount of $250,000 that is considered as reasonably equivalent with such prescribed sentence.
178. W: Terrorist activity:
179. Several acts and omissions of the Crown constitute “terrorist activity” even if that may seem fanciful for the Crown or its Counsel. Their activity fits the description in ss. 83.01 (1)(b) of the Criminal Code. The conspiracy by fraudulent means, acts and omissions – as masterminded by the honourable tortfeasors – is pointed towards the class of re-victimized sponsors, one of the most vulnerable sectors of Canada’s society. It occurs and has occurred in all material times in Canada – mainly Ottawa – since 2006, for a political purpose, and with the intention of intimidating a segment of the public, with regard to its security, including its economic security, and that endangers a person’s life, and includes a conspiracy, attempt or threat to commit such act or omission. It involved the top officials and offices of the CRA, the CIC, and the Registry of the Supreme Court of Canada, all located in Ottawa.
180. Pursuant to ss. 83.04 (a) of the Criminal Code, Every one who uses property, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out a terrorist activity, is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years. Since the honourable tortfeasors used Crown property – their offices and ministries – partly in order to facilitate their terrorist activities, an imprisonment for a term of ten years would be reasonable for the leader(s). The conversion of the years of sentence by the usual way to a dollar amount would yield $500,000. Thus, the plaintiffs, it is respectfully submitted, claim a penalty or damages in the amount of $500,000 against the Crown defendants, payable to them severally or solidarily.
181. X: Possession and laundering the proceeds of crime:
182. The CRA knowingly transferred the plaintiff’s monies to the RSBC twice. Both the CRA and the RSBC knew the money was the proceeds of crime after the CRA unlawfully deposited it into its own account. It was the product of their fraudulent money extortion scheme. In contravention of the laws against laundering money, and in order to induce money launderers – the other provinces – to deal with them deliberately, they failed to comply with the legislative scheme requiring information to be recorded, namely a ministerial certificate to be filed with the Federal Court, in breach of the requirement of the IRPA, ss. 146. (1) and (2).
183. The honourable tortfeasors and their agents did not complete the records required by the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act and in the course of doing so knowingly possessed the proceeds of crime, on a number of occasions. Both the CRA and the provincial revenue services (RSBC) should have known that the money – after their conversion – was the proceeds of crime. The conversion of monies was an offence in Canada at the relevant time. There are statutory provisions under which Canadian authorities can prosecute money laundering schemes like the one at bar. Pursuant to ss. 24. (1) of the Criminal Code, “Every one who, having an intent to commit an offence, does or omits to do anything for the purpose of carrying out the intention is guilty of an attempt to commit the offence…” The CRA and the RSBC have taken many preparatory steps, by their acts and omissions, in furtherance of the attempts and the money laundering acts. They successfully laundered the proceeds of crime obtained by the commission of the designated offences of torts, fraud, misrepresentation, misfeasance in public office and abuse of power.
184. One could reasonably infer that the RSBC was wilfully blind and knew that the money it received from the CRA had been the result of a money extortion scheme perpetrated by the CRA and the RSBC directed against the defenceless victims: the re-victimized sponsors. The plaintiff remembers the reasoning of the federal Crown’s defence, probably heard from a Counsel during a hearing or perhaps from a letter from the Crown to the plaintiff. It was a lame excuse claiming that the RCA itself had been a kind of victim as a garnishee because the Government of Canada (the CRA) had no other choice but to obey the garnishing order of BC. This argument is false since no one has seen a garnishing order issued by a Court. Also, the laws of Canada allow every garnishee to send a letter to the Court with an explanation that the petitioner’s request to garnishee him is unlawful: for example, it is beyond the prescribed limitation period.
185. In 2008 and 2009, the CRA took the monies that lawfully belonged to the plaintiff. The CRA held – possessed – the moneys for a short while then transferred them without colour of right to the RSBC. Thus, both the CRA and the RSBC knowingly contravened subsection 354. (1)(a) of the Criminal Code.
186. The plaintiff accuses the RSBC and the CRA with two counts of possession of the proceeds of crime as follows: Count 1: involves possession of proceeds of property, obtained or derived directly or indirectly by the commission of offence, to wit, tort, fraud, misrepresentation and conversion, on or about June 2, 2008, implicating the public servants of the CRA and the RSBC.  Count 2: involves possession of proceeds of property, obtained or derived directly or indirectly by the commission of an offence, to wit, tort, fraud, misrepresentation and conversion, on or about June 4, 2009, implicating the public servants of the CRA and the RSBC.     On both counts above, the CRA and the RSBC have been in possession of the proceeds of crime in the total amount of $3,542.11 ($3,441.68 plus $100.43), obtained or derived directly or indirectly from the commission of the designated offences of tort, fraud, misrepresentation and conversion, implicating the public servants of the CRA and the RSBC. It is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the monies mentioned above are proceeds of crime.
187. Halsbury’s Laws of Canada, HCR-375, defines “possession of property obtained by crime” as follows: Actus reus: …The offence of having in possession is complete when a person has, alone or jointly with another person, possession of or control over anything mentioned in those actions…
188. Both the CRA and the RSBC knew that it would be virtually impossible for the plaintiff – or for any re-victimized sponsor – to conduct lengthy and costly proceedings at the courts in order to recover their chattels from a province, particularly if they had to move to another province.
189. It seems that Canada and British Columbia had an agreement on how they would split the proceeds of crime, namely, Canada apparently allowed the Province(s) to use the monies unlawfully taken from the re-victimized sponsors by the CRA, in lieu of a certain percentage of the previous regular amount of yearly transfer payments to that Province (or any province). In other words, the Government of Canada transferred certain non-existing legal rights of the CIC and the CRA to the Province(s), by giving free hands to them in order to obtain monies originating from tort, fraud, misrepresentation and conversion.
190. The RSBC and the CRA committed offences because they had in their possession a property or thing or any proceeds of any property or thing knowing that all of the property or thing or of the proceeds was obtained by or derived directly or indirectly from the commission in Canada of tort, fraud, misrepresentation and conversion, offences punishable by indictment. Therefore, the RSBC and the CRA have violated subsection 354. (1) (a) of the Criminal Code.
191. Further, pursuant to ss. 462.31 (1) (a) and (2) (a) of the Criminal Code, also s. 2., ss. 73.1 (1) and (2) of Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, S.C. 2000, c. 17, “The maximum penalty for a violation [laundering proceeds of crime] is $100,000 if the violation is committed by a person and $500,000 if the violation is committed by an entity. (Note: the Government of Canada and the Government of British Columbia are two separate entities because they are organizations.)
192. Pursuant to ss. 355. (a) or (b) (i) of the Criminal Code, the penalty of this punishment is 2 years of imprisonment because the subject-matter of the offence was below $5,000. However, the tortfeasors’ adamant intention is – and has been – to launder $38,149.45 by taking it unlawfully from the plaintiff: that would be punishable by imprisonment for 10 years or less. The plaintiff respectfully submits that the proposed penalty for this tort (for the two governments) would be between $200,000 and $1,000,000, using our regular conversion. Perhaps an amount of $250,000 against British Columbia, and $250,000 against Canada would be reasonable. Or, in the alternative, an amount of $500,000 severally or solidarily payable by the defendants to the plaintiffs.
193. Y: Claims for damages arising from unjust enrichment:
194. On or about February 15, 2007, the plaintiff sent a bank draft to CIC in the amount of $1,190.00 (as the total of immigration and visa fees) that the Crown is still utilizing. Sending a payment to the Crown was a service on the plaintiff’s part. Since 2007, the Crown has not provided any useful service in exchange, only torts and offences. This constitutes a financial loss for the plaintiff while an unjust enrichment for the Crown.
195. Therefore, the plaintiffs are seeking a judgment against the defendants, jointly and severally, for an amount of $1,190.00, with compound interest since February 20, 2007 on that amount pursuant to the Court Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 79.
196. For the taxation years 2009 to 2013, the plaintiff was unable to file his personal tax returns due to the CRA’s money extortion scheme and the lack of a regulating verdict of a Court. Thus, the Defendant enjoys unlawful enrichment by using the monies of the plaintiff’s tax account at his expense; those amounts had been assigned by federal law to the supported wife and stepson of the plaintiff through his tax credits. Within this period, the plaintiff would have needed to produce his current federal “Notice of Assessment” from the CRA in order to apply for a group housing association. He was unable to do so because, due to the Crown tort, his only solution was not to file tax returns for 5 years. The estimated amount of the plaintiff’s loss – and accordingly the unjust enrichment of the Crown (CRA) – for the taxation years between 2009 and 2013 is about $12,500. The plaintiff could present an exact amount before the hearing.
197. For this reason, the plaintiff seeks an Order against the Crown defendants, jointly and severally, for an additional amount of $12,500, with compound interest as applicable, on the yearly tax credit amounts still being held by CRA, pursuant to the Court Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 79.
198. The test for unjust enrichment has three elements: an enrichment of the defendant, a corresponding deprivation of the plaintiff, and an absence of juristic reason for the enrichment: Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co., 2004 SCC 25 (CanLII), 2004 SCC 25, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 629 at para. 30.
199. The plaintiff submits that the required three criteria have been satisfied in this case: an enrichment of the Crown; a corresponding deprivation of the plaintiffs, and an absence of juristic reasons for the enrichment. The plaintiff has shown that there was no juristic reason within the established categoriesto deny recovery to him the credit amounts taken unlawfully and fraudulently from his personal tax returns in June 2008 and June 2009 by the CRA and the RSBC. The Crown alleges that there is and has been a contract between the plaintiff and the Crown (a minister of CIC) but such claim cannot be substantiated. There was no contract or agreement between the plaintiff and any minister. If there was a contract, the plaintiff has never received or signed a copy of it. Further, such contract could not override the legislation.
200. The plaintiff did not have a donative intent either. In 2008, he immediately protested to the RSBC against the unconstitutional garnishment of his tax account. There is no common law case listed by CanLII that involves a garnishment of a sponsor without obtaining a ministerial certificate first, then having it registered and filed with the Federal Court, requirements established by the SCC in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, 2011 SCC 30, [2011] 2 SCR 504. In the latter, none of the eight sponsors alleged that those administrative steps had been missing in their cases. (Perhaps their lawyers have overlooked that circumstance.)
201. There has been no equitable or statutory obligation of Zoltan A. Simon towards the Crown without a contract, a valid legal cause, or a court order. The plaintiff claims that he has made out a prima facie case under the juristic reason component of the analysis. The plaintiff’s facts clearly display an enrichment of the Crown (both Canada and the Province but mainly the latter), a corresponding deprivation of the two plaintiffs (Z.A. Simon and Ms. Zhong), and the absence of any juristic reason for the Crown’s enrichment. The Crown – the Government of British Columbia – had an obligation to pay social benefits to Ms. Reyes because it failed to advise her to return to her husband and failed to inform the husband regarding the state of affairs for almost eight years. Thus, Ms. Reyes was no different, based on s. 15. (1) of the Charter and the laws of Canada, from any other Canadian that applied for social benefits. There is no federal or BC law that would make discrimination between old Canadians and new immigrants when they apply for social benefits. It there would be such discriminative law, the said section of the Charter (the Constitution Act, 1982) would render it invalid and unconstitutional. In other words, the government of British Columbia, under legislation, was obliged to pay social benefits to Ms. Reyes because their Ministry reduced her to a “not self-supporting” status.
202. It would be too lengthy to list the plaintiff’s losses due to his costs (printing, binding. ExpressPost, travel expenses, cost of a consultation with a lawyer, filing fees at the courts, and the amounts of the several court orders that all ended up in the nowhere since the SCC Registry unlawfully silenced them. The plaintiff has paid those amounts to the Crown – except the last few due to his bankruptcy – and the Registrar unlawfully prevented his appeals to the SCC. Therefore, he has lost the chance to retrieve those amounts from the Crown. Many of these resulted in Canada’s enrichment by unlawful and tortious ways. This Honourable Court may find sufficient details and numbers in the table of the plaintiff’s damages above on page 22.
203. Z: Claim for defrauding the public by deceit or falsehood
204. The plaintiff respectfully submits that the Crown defendants – both Canada and the Province of British Columbia – defrauded the instant plaintiff and the public, namely the sponsors in the family class, of their monies. Pursuant to 380. (1) (a) of the Criminal Code, both defendants are guilty of an indictable offence and liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding fourteen years, where the subject-matter of the offence is a testamentary instrument or the value of the subject-matter of the offence exceeds five thousand dollars.
205. An unknown percentage of the above mentioned estimated $700,000,000 seems to be above $5,000. The governments of Canada and British Columbia defrauded the public, the re-victimized sponsors, by hundreds of millions of dollars, through deceit and falsehood, taking their monies unlawfully.
206. The plaintiffs respectfully submit that a fine against the Crown in the amount of $700,000 would be reasonable, considering the unprecedented size of the fraud or deceit. This seems to be the largest government fraud case in Canada’s history since 1867. This claim is distinguishable from the one above-mentioned “fraud and false pretences” category because it would punish the entire power pyramid of fraud itself.
207. This pyramid of frauds is comparable well to the case of Mr. Madoff. He only cheated a few thousand very rich, naïve, and greedy persons. Poor Bernie Madoff got a jail sentence of 150 years. In comparison, the Canadian version of the pyramid is much more ambitious, more reckless, and far crueler.
208. Claim for violations of the plaintiffs’ Charter rights, mental suffering:
209. A definition of offence is a conduct prohibited by law on pain of punishment. The word “offence” means conduct (truly, culpable misconduct) defined and prohibited by law, which, if found beyond a reasonable doubt to have been committed in fact, is punishable by fine, imprisonment or other penalty imposed according to law upon the culpable miscreant, the offender. The word “offence” includes offences against an Act of the Legislature of the province or a regulation, by-law or other instrument having the force of law in the province. “Offence” means (a) for Canada, an offence created by a law of Parliament that may be prosecuted upon indictment, or an offence created by the Legislature of a Province.
210. The heading “Proceedings in criminal and penal matters” at s. 11. of the Charter should be interpreted liberally, pursuant to s. 12. of the Interpretation Act. Also, the word ”offence” must be interpreted liberally and remedially. The same rule is valid for the word “penal” because the re-victimized sponsors are penalized by cruel financial means and by a forced separation from their spouses. The plaintiff respectfully submits that the above mentioned section 12., with sections 15. (1) and 52. (1) of the Charter, override a narrow interpretation of s. 11. of the Charter. Thus, it is a falsehood to claim that s. 11. of the Charter applies only for criminals and not for innocent victims of torts that have been punished or penalized as if they were criminals. Further, the word “offences” should be interpreted as both proven offences and offence allegations, including unpaid debt claims related to a province. Paras. [24] to [29] in Dhanani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 169 (CanLII) may apply here regarding financial issues or impediments that can be interpreted in different ways.
211. Since 2012, the plaintiff has been denied his Charter rights and procedural fairness in the Courts (FCA and SCC) by the registries and the Courts Administration System. The most shocking violation of Canada’s laws was the SCC Registrar’s repeated denial to file his two notices of appeal under s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act since 2012, and his latest Motion to the C.J. in the spring of 2012. (Such motion should have been accepted for filing regardless the fate of his Notice of Appeal as of Right.) In Canada (Attorney General) v. Matthews, 1997 CanLII 5879 (FC): the Court stated, “… That would be an application of the principle that form should not take precedence over substance. A camouflage to deprive a person of a protection given by statute is hardly tolerable.”
212. In para. 25 of R. v. Wigglesworth, 1987 CanLII 41 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541, Wilson, J. dealt with the definition of “offence” in s. 11. She said: “a. The rights guaranteed by s. 11 of the Charter are available to persons prosecuted by the state for public offences involving punitive sanctions, i.e., criminal, quasi-criminal and regulatory offences, either federally or provincially enacted.” In In para. 32 Wilson, J. says: a.      In my view, if a particular matter is of a public nature, intended to promote public order and welfare within a public sphere of activity, then that matter is the kind of matter which falls within s. 11.  It falls within the section because of the kind of matter it is.
213. The instant plaintiffs respectfully submit that Madam Justice Wilson’s reasoning should apply here and the issues fall within s. 11. of the Charter. Here the “matter is of public nature, intended to promote public order and welfare within a public sphere of activity.” The Crown has been prosecuting them for over seven years based on their alleged “quasi-criminal and regulatory offences” in such public sphere like persons that were in arrears in paying their overdue tickets issued by a municipality for parking violations.
214. Pursuant to s. 15.(1) of the Charter, Canadian sponsors should have equal rights than new Canadian aliens. A new Canadian, after three years of work in Canada may sponsor a spouse that escapes from him or her immediately. The Crown pays benefits for that sponsored person improperly, by sending him/her to universities for 10 years, without ever notifying the sponsor. [Such sponsored persons – arriving from a Third World country where they cannot afford to buy milk, bread, or rice – living on the government’s support in Canada, attending university for many years free of charge, while walking on the streets of beautiful Vancouver that are covered with pink petals of the Japanese cherry trees cannot be called “disadvantaged individuals or groups.”] Now, after a silence of 40 years and without a court hearing, the Crown starts to garnishee their sponsor, charging him/her an extremely high compound interest. This scenario cannot be imagined in any civilized country but it is the routine in the Canadian Government since 2006. The obvious interpretation is that, since 2006, Canada is not a civilized country. At least not from the re-victimized sponsors’ point of view since the Crown is destroying their lives.
215. Section 7. of the Charter applies in this exceptional case, considering the “thin skull” principle. If the plaintiff would become a discharged bankrupt in April 2015, and would file a new application for the immigration of his wife (Ms. Zhong) and her son, it may take another 2.5 years for the CIC or the IRB to grant him a hearing, just like earlier. (Or, as a revenge of the CIC, it may take 3 or 4 years. Also, the waiting list is longer than in 2007.) There could be another six months from the hearing to the panel’s decision. Thus, the verdict may say, “Now we are in 2018 and the sponsor, Mr. Simon, is 69 years old. By law, he is not allowed to work beyond the age of 70. Service Canada has indicated that his future pension benefits may be garnisheed without any procedure in a court. It is plain and obvious for the panel that the sponsor would be unable to support his wife and stepson beyond the year 2019. Therefore, the application for the permanent residency of Ms. Zhong and her son is dismissed.”
216. Considering such probable scenario, the plaintiff’s life, liberty, and security are at play. If his family cannot live in Canada, his best chance is to apply for political asylum in China as a Canadian refugee. If he would succeed – it is quite unlikely because China usually does not accept immigrants – he would be at the mercy of China’s government and communist party. If Canada would garnishee, say, 50% of his pension benefits, he could not support his family and pay their dwelling costs. He would not have any medical coverage and he hardly speaks Chinese. Without an efficient hospitalization, he may pass away soon.
217. After this long introduction, the plaintiff submits that his Charter rights set in sections 7., 8., 11. (a), (b), and (e), 12., and 15. (1) have been violated. He submits that his family – particularly his person – has been subject to unusual and cruel treatment and punishment, also excessive stress since 2006. Pursuant to s. 8. of the Charter, “Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.” The plaintiff submits that the snatching of his tax credit amounts in 2008 and 2009 by the CRA and the RSBC were “unreasonable seizures.” He was charged with the offence of a major debt but the Crown failed to inform him without unreasonable delay – that is maximum 30 days – of the specific offence, and avoided to take him to a trial within the same reasonable time. Therefore, the Crown infringed his Charter rights regarding ss. 11. (a) and (b). Also, applying the liberal and remedial reading of the Interpretation Act, he was denied reasonable bail without just cause. Namely, Ms. P. Lipsack, Counsel and representative of the British Columbia ministry involved, denied him a reasonable payment plan that would have been equivalent with a bail. Therefore, ss. 11. (e) of the Charter was contravened as well. A “bail” – by $200 monthly payments – was allowed for a Vietnamese man that owed over $101,000 to British Columbia.
218. In Solis v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 CanLII 69721 (CA IRB), the appellant was allowed to repay his debt (about $15,700) at a rate of $200 per month. (He appealed the visa officer’s refusal to issue the permanent resident visa for his wife in El Salvador. His appeal was allowed.)
219. In another judgment, Manitoba v. Khaleghi-Hashemian (2002) the Court held that the province cannot charge any debt amount to a sponsor before the sponsor’s effective notification by a letter. This case is quite an important authority and it is applicable to Zoltan A. Simon’s situation. He has received from the Crown the first notification in 2007 about the debt of Ms. Reyes. Therefore, based on the analogy with Manitoba v. Khaleghi-Hashemian, supra, the instant plaintiff’s sponsorship debt is zero. Another case is Hagos v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 CanLII 93849 (CA IRB) in which Mr. Hagos, who was 60 years old and legally blind Ethiopian man, succeeded in sponsoring his second wife despite of his earlier sponsorship debt.
220. The plaintiffs request this Honourable Court to consider the IAD’s decision in Forrest v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2006] Collison, July 18, 2006 IAD TA4-19352. The appellant in Forrest found herself in circumstances similar to those of the appellant in that she has sponsored a parent and siblings to Canada who subsequently each received social assistance benefits and whose combined debt was also very large (exceeding $130,000). Ms. Forrest was also a single mother who had six children. She succeeded in her appeal.
221. Still another case is Dzihic v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 in which Mr. Dzihic succeeded as well when sponsored his second wife despite of his earlier sponsorship debt. In the instant case at bar, the CIC and IAD (IRB) and the federal courts adamantly refused the family unification of a Chinese and a Hungarian citizen. It appears that Canada’s authorities have a racial discrimination against Chinese and Hungarian people, based on nationality. The words of the Tribunal in Dzihic, supra, apply for the instant plaintiffs as well, “The facts of this matter clearly would excite in a reasonable man in a civilized community a desire to relive the misfortunes of another.”
222. In Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Manitoba v. Barkman et al., 2007, the defendant relied upon the following excerpt from the plaintiff’s policy – an internal memorandum – in this area: … IMMIGRANTS    … immigrants enter Canada on the basis of another person or an organization sponsoring … into the country.  The sponsor undertakes to financially provide for the sponsored person(s) … various lengths of time.  Under the current federal legislation, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, when a sponsorship is in place it may be for a period of one to ten years.  13.3.2 APPLICATIONS FROM IMMIGRANTS   When a person who has been in Canada for less than 10 years applies for EIA benefits, it is necessary to determine if there is an active sponsorship for that person or any of the dependants for whom EIA benefits are being requested.  …  If a review of the immigration documents indicates that an active sponsorship is in place, EIA staff must determine why the person finds it necessary to apply for assistance as the sponsor has a legal obligation to provide for their basic needs.  The applicant must sign a release that authorizes EIA to contact the defaulting sponsor, authorizes the sponsor to provide information relevant to the person’s application for assistance, and to advise the applicant that the Department may take legal action against the sponsor to recover any assistance that is provided for the applicant and his/her dependants (if dependants are also sponsored).  EIA staff must contact the sponsor and explore the sponsor’s ability to honour the legal undertaking.  Please note that the requirement for staff to contact the sponsor may be deferred by the EIA Social Services Program Manager when the situation suggests that there is “risk of harm” to the applicant/children, by the sponsor.  If the applicant’s sponsor contends they are unable or unwilling to honour the sponsorship undertaking, and the applicant is otherwise eligible for assistance, the EIA Social Services Program Manager may approve enrollment.  13.3.3 RECOVERY OF ASSISTANCE FROM DEFAULTING SPONSOR OF IMMIGRANTS   Immediately following enrollment, the EIA Social Services Program Manager must send, by registered mail, a letter to the recipient’s sponsor (with faxed copy to Immigration Canada) advising that legal action may be taken to recover assistance issued as a result of the sponsor’s breach of the Sponsorship Undertaking.  The approved letter must be used, and staff must verify from the Acknowledgement of Receipt Card issued by Canada Post that the correct person received the letter.  The acknowledgment card must be retained.  If the sponsor did not sign the acknowledgment card, efforts must be made to contact the sponsor to confirm that s/he received the letter and understands the contents.  If the sponsor denies having received the letter, the EIA staff must advise the sponsor of the purpose and general contents of the letter and make arrangements to ensure that the sponsor receives an additional copy of the registered letter.  Information regarding the date of contact with the sponsor and any outcomes are to be entered on the EIA participant’s SAMIN case note.
223. Until the end of 2007, Zoltan A. Simon has never received such letter advising that legal action may be taken against him due to his alleged breach of sponsorship undertaking.
224. It is clear that the plaintiffs (Mr. Simon and Ms. Zhong) have suffered significant damages as a result of the Crown’s torts, frauds, and breach of contract (if a contract has ever existed).
225. The plaintiffs in the case at bar have established that (a) the law in question created an adverse distinction based on an enumerated or an analogous ground and (b) the impact of the distinction perpetuated disadvantage, prejudice or stereotyping for them:Quebec (Attorney General) v. A, 2013 SCC 5 (CanLII), 2013 SCC 5 at para 324. The plaintiff may reasonably claim for damages under this heading: discrimination based on nationality as a violation of s. 15 of the Charter. However, his table on page 22 is complete and the insertion of a line now would scramble his whole document and ruin the dollar figures.
226. Claim for breach of fiduciary duties:
227. The plaintiff submits that CRA holds the Canadian taxpayers’ monies in trust as a trustee or a bank and owes a reasonable fiduciary duty to them against crimes or misadministration. He submits that the sponsors have been at the mercy of the Crown’s discretion when they signed their sponsorship agreements. Further, he submits that the Crown (the CRA) should have handled and held his tax funds as a trustee.
228. In Guerin v. The Queen,1984 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 at 384, Dickson J. used the following definition of fiduciary duty:
229. Professor Ernest Weinrib maintains in his article The Fiduciary Obligation (1975), 25 U.T.L.J. 1, at p. 7, that “the hallmark of a fiduciary relation is that the relative legal positions are such that one party is at the mercy of the other’s discretion.” Earlier, at p. 4, he puts the point in the following way: Where there is a fiduciary obligation] there is a relation in which the principal's interests can be affected by, and are therefore dependent on, the manner in which the fiduciary uses the discretion which has been delegated to him. The fiduciary obligation is the law’s blunt tool for the control of this discretion.
230. For example, “Although the Crown in many instances does owe a fiduciary duty to aboriginal people, it is the nature of the relationship, not the specific category of actor involved, that gives rise to a fiduciary duty.” In Authorson (Guardian of) v. Canada (Attorney general), 2002 CanLII 23598 (ON CA), the Court stated that the Crown had a fiduciary duty to pay interest on the funds of veterans. The taxpayers are in a similar situation and the CRA has to pay them interest as one of its fiduciary duties. In the circumstances of the instant case at bar, it is plain and obvious that only a Court could decide if a fiduciary duty can or cannot exist. There is a serious question of law as to whether or not a fiduciary duty exists here.
231. Madam Justice Wilson of the Supreme Court of Canada in Frame v. Smith 1987 CanLII 74 (SCC), (1987), 42 D.L.R. (4th) 81 at 98‑99 (S.C.C.), stated: [T]here are common features discernible in the contexts in which fiduciary duties have been found to exist and these common features do provide a rough and ready guide to whether or not the imposition of a fiduciary obligation on a new relationship would be appropriate and consistent. Relationships in which a fiduciary obligation has been imposed seem to possess three general characteristics: (1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power.  (2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests.  (3) The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power.
232. The plaintiffs submit that, in the case at bar, the three elements listed by Madam Justice Wilson are and have been present between the parties so some fiduciary duty existed. But, again, it is too late to insert another line and amount in the table above (p. 22).
233. A concise summary of the legal basis for the relief sought:
234. It is not beyond all doubt that the plaintiffs’ claim is clearly impossible to success. British Columbia is under a Liberal government that is careful in observing the laws of Canada and the Province. The court system of BC is not as corrupt as the federal one, particularly keeping the Courts Administration Service in mind. It is not certain that this matter would get into the hands of judges that are corrupt, biased, or not independent. Therefore, the plaintiffs respectfully submit that they have more than a scintilla of chance to succeed.
235. By and large, the (Conservative) Crown’s typical tricks are as follow: Through silencing and eliminating a paragraph “A” that a minister or a registrar does not like while arbitrarily extrapolating a bit similar paragraph “B” beyond logic, against the Interpretation Act. The final result is that paragraph “A” disappears and the modified paragraph “B” is exactly the opposite of the original purpose of paragraph “A.” Thus, the minister defeats the legislation and Parliament’s will by fraud.
236. In the case at bar, the Crown (CIC, CRA, and RSBC) eliminates section 146. of the IRPA while misinterprets its section 145. (3) by unlawful extrapolation. Similarly, the Registrar of the SCC and his administrators eliminate section 61. of the Supreme Court Act and unlawfully extrapolate its ss. 40. (1). By doing this, they arbitrarily add a condition (automatic appeal applies in certain criminal cases only) and remove a condition (that when errors in law are alleged, the appeal is automatic).
237. In addition, the Registrar of the SCC ignores and contravenes s. 52. of the Supreme Court Act, “52. The Court shall have and exercise exclusive ultimate appellate civil and criminal jurisdiction within and for Canada, and the judgment of the Court is, in all cases, final and conclusive.” The Registrar is not a judge but he usurps the role of the SCC and asserts that the last word belongs to him. In other words, he acts as he would be the “exclusive ultimate appellate” jurisdiction in Canada: a major fraud. His fraud and the conspiracy in his Registry makes Canada seem like an airplane flying upside down. [NOTE: FOR OUR DIAGRAM WITH THE CIRCLES SHOWING THE SCC REGISTRY'S TORT PLEASE REFER TO THE OTHER TABS.]
238. Relevant enactments (most of them contravened or neglected by the Defendants):

     Agricultural Marketing Programs Act: ss. 23.(4)

     BC Benefits (Income Assistance) Act, [RSBC 1996] CHAPTER 27 – Bill 14 [valid until September 30, 2002]: ss. 4 (a); 9 (1)(a) ; s. 14 [“debtor”]; ss. 15 (1)(a)(i), 15 (1)(b)(i), 15 (1)(c)(i), 15 (1)(d), 15 (3) and 17 (1): [See: http://leg.bc.ca/36th1st/1st_read/gov14-1.htm]

     Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-44:   ss. 2. (1)

     Canada Disability Savings Act, SC 2007, c 35, s 136: ss. 12. (1), (2) and (3); 14. (1) and (3)

     Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-8:   23. (1), 66. (2), 66. (2.01), 66. (2.2), 66. (2.3) and 66. (2.6)

     Canada Revenue Agency Act, S.C. 1999, c. 17:     ss. 42. (1) (a) and (b)

     Canada Student Financial Assistance Act, S.C. 1994, c. 28:    ss. 16.1 (1)

     Canada Student Loans Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-23:      ss. 18. (2)

     Constitution Act, 1982 (Part I: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms): s. 7; 8; ss. 11 (a), (b), (d), (g) and (i); 12; 15 (1); 24 (1) and (2); 52 (1).

     Court Order Enforcement Act [RSBC 1996] Chapter 78:   ss. 3 (1).

     Courts Administration Service Act, S.C. 2002, c. 8:    ss. 2. (b)

     Criminal Code: 21. (1); 22. (1) and (2); 24. (1); 83.01 (1) (b) (i) (A) and (B); 83.01 (b) (ii) (B), (C), and (E); 121. (1) (e); 122.; 126. (1); 129. (a), (c) to (e); 131. (1); 132.; 134. (1); 137.; 139. (2); 269.1 (1) and (3); 279. (2); 322. (1), (2), (3) and (4); 337.; 346. (1); 354. (1) (a); 355. (a) or (b); 362. (1) (a) and (2) (b); 380. (1)(a); 380.1 (1) (a) to (d) and (f); 380.1 (1.1); 462.3(1); 462.31 (1) and (2); 463. (a) and (b); 464. (a) or (b); 585. (a), (b), (c) and (d); 586.

     Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, RSC 1985, c C-50:  ss. 3. (b)(i) and (ii); 32.; 35. (1)

     Customs Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (2nd Supp): 113.

     Employment and Assistance Act [SBC 2002] Chapter 40 [Assented to May 30, 2002]: ss. 5 (1) and (2); 8 (1).

     Employment Insurance Act, SC 1996, c 23: 46.1 (4)

     Family Maintenance Enforcement Act [RSBC 1996] Chapter 127: ss. 1 (1) [“debtor”]; ss. 15 (1); 16 (2) and (4).

     Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 4 (2nd Supp.): 23. (1) [“Minister”]; 32.; 45.; 50.

     Family Support Orders and Agreements Garnishment Regulations, SOR/88-181:  s. 8. and 9.

     Federal Courts Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7:    ss. 39. (1) and (2)

     Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106      ss. 449. (2) (b)

     Financial Administration Act [RSBC 1996] Chapter 138: ss. 80 (2); s. 84.

     Financial Administration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-11: 17. (4); 23.(1) [“other debt”]; 23.(2.1);  67. (a)

     Frustrated Contract Act, RSBC 1996, c 166: 1 (1)(a); 2; 3; and 5 (3).

     Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. G-2:  ss. 6. (2); 32. (2); 42. (1) (b) and 42. (2)    

     Immigration Act, 1976 [Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985 – Volume V]:      ss. 118. (2) and (4)

     Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27: ss. 3. (1) (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (j); 4. (1); and (1.1); 124. (1); 126.; 127. (a) and (b); 128. (a); 129. (1) (a) and (d); 131.; 134.; 145. (1) (a) and (b); 145. (2); 145. (3); 146. (1) and (2); 191.

     Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227: ss. 132.(4)(a),(b),(c); 133. (1)(g)(i); 135. (a)(i); 135. (b)(ii); 153. (3); 258.; 318.; 348. (6)

     Immigration Regulations, 1978, SOR/78-172: ss. 2. (1) [“debt obligation”];  4. (3); 5. (2) (iii); 6.1 (2)

     Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp):   ss. 223. (2) and (3)

     Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996, c 238:  s. 8; 12; 14 (1)

     Interpretation Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-21:  s. 12.; 13.; 14.; 15. (2); 42. (1)

     Limitation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 266 [Repealed]     ss. 3 (1); 3 (5); 9 (1); 9 (3)

     Old Age Security Act, R.S.C., 1985, c O-9:  ss. 37. (2) to (2.01); 37. (2.2) to (2.5)

     Patent Act, RSC 1985, c P-4: ss. 55.01

     Personal Property Security Act [RSBC 1996], Chapter 359: ss. 1 (1) [“debtor” (a), “default” and “certificated security”].

     Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, S.C. 2000, c. 17: s. 2. [“money laundering offence” means an offence under subsection 462.31(1) of the Criminal Code; “violation” by an entity]; 73.1 (1) and (2).

     Regulations Amending the Immigration Regulations, 1978 [28 July or August 18, 1999 in Canada Gazette, Vol. 133, No. 17]

     Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada    : 3.(1); 6.(1); 7.(2); 78.(1)

     Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26: ss. 2. (1): “judge” and “Registrar” (interpretation); 40.(1); 40.(3); 43.(1)(a); 52.; 61.; 97. (3)

      

     POLICIES:

     IP 2 – Processing Applications to Sponsor Members of the Family Class. 2006.

     MuO (or Memorandum of Understanding between the CIC and the CRA. 2006.

     Representing Yourself in the Supreme Court of Canada, Volume I (a guide published by Mr. R. Bilodeau, Registrar)

      

     Common law authorities:

     Agricultural Marketing Programs Act, SC 1997, c 20: 23.(4)

     Amankwah v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 CanLII 69745 (CA IRB)

     A.M. Matthews, 2003 ABQB 942 (CanLII)

     Bhaiyat v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 CanLII 48219 (CA IRB)

     Bilson (et al.) v. Kokotow (et al.) (1978) 23 O.R. (2d), C.A. [April 28, 1978]

     Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, 2011 SCC 30, [2011] 2 SCR 504

     Coast Capital Savings Credit Union v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2011 BCCA 20 (CanLII)

     Dzihic v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 CanLII 75576 (CA IRB)

     Forrest v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2006] Collison, July 18, 2006 IAD TA4-19352.

     Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Manitoba v. Barkman et al., 2007 MBQB 54 (CanLII)

     Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Manitoba v. Kabamba et al., 2006 MBQB 201 (CanLII)

     Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 SCR 1130

     Krpan v. The Queen, 2006 TCC 595 (CanLII)

     Lee v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 CanLII 34328 (CA IRB)

     Longley v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), 1999 CanLII 5750 (BC SC)

     Mahali v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 CanLII 68211 (CA IRB)  [she had a debt for an immigration loan but the application was approved]

     Manitoba v. Khaleghi-Hashemian, 2002 MBQB 1 (CanLII)

     Markevich v. Canada, 2003 SCC 9, [2003] 1 SCR 94

     McMaster v. Canada, 2009 FC 937 (CanLII)  [misfeasance in public office, he succeeded]

     Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121

     R. v. McCraw, [1991] 3 SCR 72

     R. v. Pilarinos, 2002 BCSC 452 (CanLII)

     R. v. Théroux, [1993] 2 SCR 5

     Runcer v. Gould, 2000 ABQB 25 (CanLII)

     Solis v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 CanLII 69721 (CA IRB)

     Tieu, Tu Le v. M.C.I. (IAD  VA3-01729), Clark, [RefLex decisions: May 11, 2004]

     Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., 2002 SCC 18, [2002] 1 SCR 595

     Young v. Bella, 2006 SCC 3, [2006] 1 S.C.R.

      

     Bibliography:

     Cassels, Jamie, and Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey. Remedies: The Law of Damages (Second Edition). Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2008.

     Furmston, Michael. Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston’s Law of Contract. Oxford, 2007.

     Waddams, S. M. The Law of Damages (Third Edition). Toronto: Canada Law Book Inc., 1997.

     Williams, Glanville L. Joint Obligations. London: Butterworth & Co. Publishers Ltd., 1949.

      

     ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

     Dated on this 23rd day of May, 2014, in the City of Red Deer, the Province of Alberta.

      

     __________________________________________________

     Zoltan Andrew Simon, Plaintiff (Self-represented)

      

      

     ___________________________________________________

     Zuan Hao ZHONG, Plaintiff (Represented by Zoltan A. Simon)

      

     Plaintiff’s address for service:

     72 Best Crescent

     Red Deer, Alberta  T4R 1H6    

      

     Fax number address for service: (403) 341-3300

     E-mail address for service: zasimon@hotmail.com

     Place of trial: Kelowna (or Vernon)

      

     The address of the registry is:

     Supreme Court of British Columbia

     837 Park Drive

     P.O. Box 1500

     GOLDEN, BRITISH COLUMBIA

     V0A 1H0

     TEL: (250) 344-7581

     FAX: (250) 344-7715

      

      

     Date:   23 / 05 /2014	.................................................................................
     	Signature of        [ x ] plaintiff(s)       [  ] lawyer for plaintiff(s)
     	ZOLTAN ANDREW SIMON
     .......................................................................................

     Rule 7-1 (1) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules states:

     (1) Unless all parties of record consent or the court otherwise orders, each party of record to an action must, within 35 days after the end of the pleading period,

     (a) prepare a list of documents in Form 22 that lists

     (i) all documents that are or have been in the party's possession or control and that could, if available, be used by any party at trial to prove or disprove a material fact, and

     (ii) all other documents to which the party intends to refer at trial, and

     (b) serve the list on all parties of record.

      

     Appendix

     [The following information is provided for data collection purposes only and is of no legal effect.]

     Part 1: CONCISE SUMMARY OF NATURE OF CLAIM: Several tort claims (including fraud and misinterpretation) against the Government of Canada and the Government of British Columbia for unlawfully garnishing the main plaintiff’s tax account and preventing (since 2007) his Chinese wife to immigrate and live in Canada. The basic issue is the a previous sponsorship agreement (1999) that is invalid and void ab initio, for unconscionability and fatal errors in the CIC forms. These controversies are related to the IRPA and its Regulations. The second issue is the arbitrary actions and omissions of the SCC Registrar who, by the violation of s. 52 of the Supreme Court Act, prevents crucial cases to reach the panel of nine judges. Thus, the Registrar is usurping the supreme power in Canada.

      

     Part 2: THIS CLAIM ARISES FROM THE FOLLOWING:

     A personal injury arising out of:

     [ ] a motor vehicle accident

     [ ] medical malpractice

     [x] another cause

     A dispute concerning:

     [ ] contaminated sites

     [ ] construction defects

     [ ] real property (real estate)

     [x] personal property

     [ ] the provision of goods or services or other general commercial matters

     [ ] investment losses

     [ ] the lending of money

     [ ] an employment relationship

     [ ] a will or other issues concerning the probate of an estate

     [ ] a matter not listed here

     Part 3: THIS CLAIM INVOLVES:

     [ ] a class action

     [ ] maritime law

     [ ] aboriginal law

     [x] constitutional law

     [x] conflict of laws

     [x] none of the above

     [ ] do not know

     Part 4:

     Immigration and Refugee Protection Act: ss. 3. (1) (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (j); 4. (1); and (1.1); 124. (1); 126.; 127. (a) and (b); 128. (a); 129. (1) (a) and (d); 131.; 134.; 145. (1) (a) and (b); 145. (2); 145. (3); 146. (1) and (2); 191.

     Criminal Code [several sections and subsections regarding torts, fraud, conversion, corruption]

     Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26: 52.; 61.; 97. (3)