Corruption in the courts: British Columbia

[Corruption in BC courts and registries]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

(ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA)

File number: FD-02394

BETWEEN:

Zoltan Andrew SIMON, Zuanhao ZHONG, and Jian Feng YE

Applicants
(Appellants)

and

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, represented by the Attorney General of Canada and

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia, represented by the Attorney General of British Columbia

(both of them in their representative capacity)

Respondents
(Defendants)

__________________________________________________________________

NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL

Pursuant to (sub)sections 40 (1), 43 (1), 48 (1), 61, and65.1 (1) of the Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, also sections 5.1 and 25 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156

__________________________________________________________________________________

Zoltan Andrew Simon, main applicant (self-represented)

72 Best Crescent

Red Deer, AB T4R 1H6

Phone number: none Fax: (403) 341-3300

Email address: zasimon@hotmail.com

TO: Attorney General of Canada, C/o Ms. Alison Brown, Counsel

British Columbia Regional Office

900 - 840 Howe Street, Vancouver, BC, V6Z 2S9

National Litigation Sector, Department of Justice

Phone: 604-775-6113 Fax: 604-666-4399

Email: Alison.Brown@justice.gc.ca and

Attorney General of British Columbia,

C/o Ms. Andrea K. Glen, Barrister and Solicitor

Civil Litigation Group, Legal Services Branch

Ministry of Attorney General

1301-865 Hornby Street, Vancouver, BC V6Z 2G3
Phone: 604-660-0669 Fax: 604-660-2636 Email: andrea.glen@gov.bc.ca

TAKE NOTICE that Zoltan Andrew SIMON applies for leave to appeal to the Court, under (sub)sections 40 (1), 43 (1), 48 (1), 61 and 65.1 (1) of the Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, and sections 5.1 and 25 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156, from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia, File 2018 BCCA 461, Docket: CA44805, made November 22, 2018, for an Order that the said judgment to be set aside or be stayed in its entirety, together with the two BCCA chambers judgments dated 2018 and in BC Supreme Court File No. 5675 (Golden Registry); for an Order establishing the total amount of the applicants’ damages, or, in the alternative, returning it to a 5-Justice Division of the BC CA, or to a jury in Vancouver, possibly as a class action; for an Order for costs, and for an Order allowing that the instant application to be converted into a Notice of Appeal pursuant to s. 61 of the Supreme Court Act since many errors in law are alleged or/and can be proved in the lower courts’ decisions;

AND FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that this application for leave is made on the following grounds:

That the 3-Justice Division of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact (introduced by Madam Justice Bennett) that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it about the alleged late filing of Z.A. Simon’s originating document appealing the decision of Mr. Justice Ball pronounced on August 16, 2017;
That the 3-Justice Division of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia erred in law on 22 November 2018 in finding that interpretation of s. 14 (2) of the Court of Appeal Act, RSBC 1996, c 77 was inoperative, or, the date of “filing” is “the point in time at which the Registry accepts the document and stamps it with the date”, or/and “the Registry is not obliged to accept for filing documents that it considers irregular.”;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the BCCA erred in law or in principle by undermining and collaterally attacking a prior governing decision of another 3-Justice Division of the same Court in R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII); disobeying the “stare decisis” rule was an error because “filing” is a point of time when a party submits its document to the Registry if its administrators do not refuse to accept it and do not send it out to the Court for direction either (as in the instant case at bar) without delay but they procrastinate for a week;
That the 3-Justice Division of the BCCA (the honourable justices Kirkpatrick, Goepel and Fenlon) had no jurisdiction to attack the Court’s order delivered in R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII) in a similar factual situation; only a Division consisting 5 or more justices have power to overturn an earlier order and principle declared by a Division, so the 22 November 2018 decision is a nullity;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the BCCA erred in law or in principle when ignored the “gap rule” with the relevant sub-rules 23-2 (5)(a) and (6) (a) and (b)(i) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009 [since the Registry failed to send the applicant a notice that his document had not been filed and the reasons for non-acceptance: a seven-day long silence is not a “notice”];
That the said 3-Justice Division of the BCCA erred in law or in principle when ignored the “gap rule” with the relevant sub-rules 22-3 (5)(a) and (6) (a) or (b)(i), and 22-4 (13)(a), (14) and (15) of the Supreme Court Family Rules, BC Reg 169/2009 [since the same principle shall apply for filing documents by express post, fax, and electronic filing];
That the said 3-Justice Division of the BCCA erred in law or in principle by ignoring sections 72 (1) and (2) of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106: Where a document is submitted for filing, the Administrator shall either (a) accept the document for filing; or (b) … refer the document without delay to a judge or prothonotary. Thus, the judge or prothonotary may direct the Administrator to (a) accept or reject the document; or (b) accept the document subject to conditions as to the making of any corrections or the fulfilling of any conditions precedent. [The nationwide rules do not grant a special power to a registrar to choose a third alternative such as a long silence or inactivity];
That the said 3-Justice Division of the BCCA erred in law on 22 November 2018 because their decision and its cornerstone, the alleged “operational” meaning of the word “filing”, are not supported by any other jurisprudence or legislation;
That the said 3-Justice Division erred by overlooking section 1 of the Court of Appeal Rules which states that “file” means file with the registrar in a registry of the court [emphasis added]; only parties can file documents with the registrar, not administrators with their own registrar (as in our case at bar): “to file” is a verb referring to a party’s duty involving the Registry, not a later action of stamping decided between two administrators without a Court;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the BCCA erred in law or in principle when remained insensitive to the fact that the Vancouver Registry, an extended arm of the Attorneys General, denied to grant the appellant an electronic services agreement and a “registered user” statusunder Rule 23-3 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009 for years, constituting a section 15 (1) and s. 12 Charter breach, resulting in an unusual or cruel treatment, and discrimination on the grounds of residency;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the BCCA and its single chambers judges involved misconstrued the facts by not noticing that the Registry failed to place a “received” stamp on the originating appeal document on 5 September 2017, and only “26 September 2017” was shown on it by a stamp when the Registry’s hesitation ended;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the BCCA erred in law or in principle when remained insensitive to the fact that the main appellant – due to the amounts of money spent on his legal proceedings for a decade – could not afford to pay for a phone line and number but the Registry was unwilling to contact him by other common means like mail, fax or email; This resulted that he kept receiving the Court’s decisions from the Registry by delays of weeks, such tort constituting a section 15 (1) and s. 12 Charter breach, an unusual treatment and discrimination on the grounds of impecuniousness compared to the wealth of the two opposing Crown parties;
That the BCCA’s decision of 22 November 2018 erred in law by failing to observe that both Mr. Justice Groberman and Madam Justice Bennett had acted without authority by contravening subsections 10 (2)(a) and 19 (1) of the Court of Appeal Act because single justices had no power to terminate an appeal on the grounds of merits or irregularity [as both of them did];
That the said November 22 decision failed to observe an error in law in the decision of Mr. Justice Groberman that refused to grant extension of time in a situation where the Vancouver Registry caused a 3-week delay in pronouncing Madam Justice Bennett’s Reasons for Z.A. Simon, while her “order” on a Form 25, pursuant to ss. 47 (3)(c) of the Court of Appeal Rules, did not exist at all so the time had not yet started to run: it is absurd to claim a delay without a starting point in time. Reasons, like those of Madam Justice Bennett, that contain explanations or lists of theoretical future possibilities without an order are not orders. Also, a “a possible future administrative decision” (like that of Madam Justice Bennett) cannot yet be challenged in a Court as concluded or confirmed in Simon v. Canada, 2014 FCA 47;
That the said November 22 decision of the BCCA failed to observe an error in law and a misconceived factual situation in the decision of Mr. Justice Groberman (that refused to grant extension of time for Z.A. Simon), because pursuant to ss. 21 (4) of the Court of Appeal Act, “If judgment has been reserved at the hearing, the registrar must give reasonable notice to all parties of the time and place where judgment will be delivered.” The judgment of Madam Justice Bennett was reserved until 16 February 2018 but the Registry failed to give any notice to the appellant about the delivery of the judgment, and then it mailed those Oral Reasons to him only on 14 March 2018. The Registry’s delay of four weeks caused the apparent delay;
That the November 22 decision of the BCCA erred in law and in principle by overlooking or skipping the appellant’s proofs (in his affidavits of service) and arguments that clearly demonstrated that the chambers judge(s) had erred in law, misconstrued the facts or/and was/were wrong in the legal sense;
That the said decision of the BCCA failed to observe a controversy between the different conclusions of the two chambers judges: while Madam Justice Bennett based her reasoning in para. [14] of her Reasons for Judgment on “unclear reasons” or assumptions in order to get a fictitious “late filing” scenario, Mr. Justice Groberman understood that Z.A. Simon submitted his appeal document in the Registry in a timely manner [10 days before September 15] and properly served it on the Respondents, so there was no actual delay involved, only technical irregularities;
That, though para. 8 of the Oral Reasons dated November 22 is correct about the dates, Kirkpatrick J.A. is wrong in law or in principle allowing administrators of a court registry to make arbitrary last-minute changes in documents such as: “…Zuanhao Zhong and Jianfeng Ye must be listed as plaintiffs only in the style of cause, and only you would be listed as appellant/plaintiff.” The BCCA has failed to support such new theory by enactments or case law. The Registry cannot act as an editor of a newspaper to re-write documents of a party;
That the BCCA erred in law by overlooking or ignoring section 54 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, “The registrar may refuse to accept a document for filing unless the document…” because in our case at bar the appellant’s submission satisfied all of the four criteria listed;
That the BCCA Division and its individual chambers judges erred in law when theoretically inserted a non-existing right of the Registry, granting it days or weeks of procrastination in placing a “filed” stamp on a document; the justices misconstrued the facts when (apparently) assumed that the registry’s administrators obeyed a court order but no such order existed;
That the Court of Appeal for British Columbia failed to observe principles of natural justice or otherwise acted beyond or refused to exercise its jurisdiction; in addition to, or in the alternative, its Division had the power to hear the case on its merits yet it has refused to exercise its jurisdiction, disobeying the “gap rule” and the object of Rules in Rule 1-3 (1): “The object of these Supreme Court Civil Rules is to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on its merits.” [Emphasis added.];
That the BCCA Division with its single justices involved, and Mr. Justice Ball, have all erred in law by ignoring and disobeying the objectives expressed in Rule 1-3 (2) of the above Rules, failing to conduct their proceedings in ways that were proportionate to (a) the amount involved in the proceeding, (b) the importance of the issues in dispute, and (c) the complexity of the proceeding;
That the BCCA Division and its single justices in chambers erred in principle and demonstrated a closed-mindedness or lack of independence by spending no time to apply the “plain and obvious test” before striking out the pleadings of the instant applicant, but simply echoed or repeated the sweeping or superficial conclusions of the previous justices starting with Madam Justice Donegan and both Crown counsel in 2014, forming a domino effect or avalanche;
That the BCCA Division and its single justices in chambers erred in law or principle when unreasonably punished a party who consciously and in good faith obeyed the unlawful or improper judgment issued by Mr. Justice Ball who had no jurisdiction to order that Z.A. Simon was not permitted to file any document in any court of British Columbia without an application and authorization of the Court: parties have immunity for the negative consequences of obeying a court order;
That the BCCA Division erred in principle or misconstrued the factual background ignoring the causal linkage of Mr. Justice Ball’s improper decision because if his wording reflected the limits of his jurisdiction the appellants’ originating document would not have contained the unnecessary words “application for leave” and the Registry would/should have accepted it as a “Notice of appeal” without any dilemma or delay;
That the BCCA Division erred in principle when ignored the fact that Madam Justice Bennett disagreed with the decision of Mr. Justice Ball regarding the need for the applicants’ filing and serving an application for leave to appeal first, but then she turned around and forgot his jurisdictional error concluding that the appeal of his order had no merit at all. Appeals proving jurisdictional errors have good chances to succeed;
That the BCCA Division erred in principle or in logic when it ignored the fact that Madam Justice Bennett referred to the 20 to 60 possible causes of action pleaded by the instant applicant, citing from Madam Justice Donegan (2015) and Mr. Justice Ball (2017), but soon all of them forgot those correct findings, simply equating 60 with zero cause of action and thus creating a controversial “oxymoron” situation;
That the BCCA Division and its single justices erred in principle when ignored the rule that the onus was on the defendant AGs to show that the plaintiffs did not have a “good arguable case” in their original notice of claim; the AGs or Counsel have been unable to show any evidence or legislation since 2007 except their habitual sweeping or false allegations;
That the BCCA Division and its single judges erred in principle by overlooking that, although part of the original claim may in fact ultimately fail, the action should have been allowed to proceed because the instant applicant had an “arguable case” in light of the facts and the applicable law; So far not a single justice has been able to pinpoint an incurable or fatal defect in his pleadings which would condemn the claim and the appeal to failure;
That the BCCA Division and the single justices involved erred in law or in principle when kept striking out the pleadings of the instant applicant on spurious or merely speculative grounds such as credibility or alleged vexatious behaviour, without seeing any evidence;
That the BCCA Division with its single judges, and Mr. Justice Ball, erred in principle when they attempted to solve 20 to 60 – now rather 60 to 80 – pure questions of law on motions to strike the applicants’ pleadings, without any proper hearing on the merits of those issues;
That the BCCA Division and its single justices erred in law and in principle by not applying the “stare decisis” principle; by failing to consider the relevant findings and follow the governing orders in leading authorities including Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII); Markevich v. Canada, [2003] 1 SCR 94, 2003 SCC 9 (CanLII); or Simon v. Canada, 2011 FCA 6 (CanLII): [“There is no suggestion that any garnishment order issued from a court of competent jurisdiction” in para. 12]; and “an error on the part of the judge” in para. [14] of Simon v. Canada, 2014 FCA 47 (CanLII);
That the BCCA Division and its single justices in chambers erred in law or in principle by ignoring or contravening sections 8, 11 (b), (d), 12, 15 (1), 24 (1) and 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, section 12 of the Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21, and section 8 of the Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996, c 238;
That the BCCA Division erred in law or in principle when it ignored that, in 2014 and 2017, the applicants made out a “good arguable case” by properly pleading 20 to 60 possible causes of action as serious questions of law to be tried but none of those questions have even been tried; Each justice guessed, without a foundation, that another judge have already tried them;
That the BCCA Division and its single justices previously involved erred in law or in principle when concluded by citing Mr. Justice Ball that the validity and provisions of the Criminal Code in civil proceedings were “not known to law” in British Columbia as the Honourable Madam Justice Donegan originally wrote in paras. [2] and [44] of her Oral Reasons; The applicant maintains that pleading (the related four) enactments of the Criminal Code do not constitute a nullity or abuse of process in civil cases in BC;
That the BCCA Division and the single justices involved erred in law or in principle by failing to observe and follow para. [14] of the order in Hayes Forest Services Ltd. v. Krawczyk, 2005 BCCA 17 (CanLII), under s. 19(1) of the Court of Appeal Act;
That they failed to observe the principles regarding the sufficiency of pleading an “arguable case” as set out in paras. [19], [20] and [56] of JTG Management Services Ltd. v. Bank of Nanjing Co. Ltd., 2015 BCCA 200; Madam Justice Kirkpatrick concurred with that order;
That the BCCA Division and the single justices previously involved erred in law or in principle when they failed to realize that none of the issues between the parties have ever been judicially determined: no lover court has ever issued a final order that determined, even if in part, the substantive rights of the parties to the controversies;

Dated at the City of Red Deer, the Province of Alberta this 24th day of January, 2019.

SIGNED BY

____________________________________ _____________________________________

Applicant (self-represented litigant) Agent (not applicable)

Zoltan Andrew Simon

72 Best Crescent,

Red Deer, AB T4R 1H6

Fax number: (403) 341-3300

Phone number: none

Email address: zasimon@hotmail.com

ORIGINAL TO: THE REGISTRAR (Supreme Court of Canada)

COPIES TO:

(a) The Attorney General of Canada C/o Ms. Alison Brown, Counsel, Department of Justice, 900 – 840 Howe Street, Vancouver, BC V6Z 2S9, Phone: (604) 775-6113, Fax: (604) 666-4399. Email: alison.brown@justice.gc.ca

(b) The Attorney General of British Columbia C/o Andrea K. Glen, Counsel, Ministry of Attorney General, Legal Services Branch – Civil Litigation, 1301 – 865 Hornby Street, Vancouver, BC V6Z 2G3, Phone: (604) 660-3093, Fax: (604) 660-3567, Email: Andrea.Glen@gov.bc.ca

NOTICE TO THE RESPONDENT OR INTERVENER: A respondent or intervener may serve and file a memorandum in response to this application for leave to appeal within 30 days after the day on which a file is opened by the Court following the filing of this application for leave to appeal or, if a file has already been opened, within 30 days after the service of this application for leave to appeal. If no response is filed within that time, the Registrar will submit this application for leave to appeal to the Court for consideration under section 43 of the Supreme Court Act.

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENT submitted to the Supreme Court

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENT

PART I – A concise overview of the appellants’ position with issues of public importance

This is a case of extreme constitutional and social importance that has never been heard on its merits during the last twelve years. The three appellants form a family since 2006 but the governments of Canada and British Columbia keep separating them by force and unconstitutional means. So far the Crown parties did not in fact make any disclosure or give any credible and lawful explanation for the torts. It is inconceivable to assume that the Crown’s policies introduced in 2006 were aimed to destroy a single family, that of the instant appellants, because then the latter did not yet know each other. It seems that the Harper government, in January 2006, decided to “streamline” Canada and the laws of the land, by cutting corners, creating unconstitutional policies, and superimpose them over the legislation, Parliament’s will. One of them was the the Immigration Manual “IP 2 Processing Application to Sponsor Members of the Family Class”, in extensive use since 2006, and another one the MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) that the minister responsible for CIC signed with a CRA commissioner in June 2006. These federal policies knowingly mislead every public servant.
Each civil servant has been coerced to strictly obey them and ignore the relevant legislation since the policies contravened the laws. Section 146 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act [IRPA] clearly prescribes that, if a minister wants to garnishee a sponsorship debt claim of the provincial or federal Crown, he or she shall file and register a ministerial certificate in the Federal Court within 30 days after the sponsor’s default (when the sponsored person receives social assistance benefits for the first time). This basic obligation of the Crown is clear from s. 146 of the IRPA. The correct statutory interpretation has been examined and confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII). The said SCC case refers about seven times to the obligation or need for such ministerial certificate.
The manual or policy named IP 2 mentions five times that the sponsors in the family class sign a contract (not an agreement) when sponsoring a family member. Such claim or allegation is untrue since the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations is silent about any contract: its subsection 132 (4) only mentions the words “agreement” and “declaration” which are not contracts. The contents of the “Sponsorship Agreement” and “Undertaking” are harmonious with ss. 132 (4) of the IRP Regulations since they state that in case of a default, the minister may take the sponsor to a court of competent jurisdiction, represent the sponsored person, and sue the sponsor for damages. There is no lawful garnishment based on agreements without a court order. The Crown’s seizures have degenerated the IRPA into a money extortion scheme.
In practice, except perhaps a few cases like Manitoba v. Khaleghi-Hashemian, 2002 MBQB 1 (CanLII), no minister has ever taken the defaulting sponsors to court. The registries of the Federal Court do not even seem to have a book or an electronic file where such “ministerial certificates” could be filed or registered. The ministers, openly disobeying s. 146 of the IRPA and the SCC order in Mavi, supra, simply seize the amounts of their uncertified debt claims from the sponsors’ credit accounts with Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) without the involvement of the Federal Court, or any court.
As for the MOU, it purposefully misleads the public servants by a misrepresentation of s. 146 of the IRPA: by the removal of its heading, it gives them a false impression that a minister may take the sponsors monies by filing a ministerial certificate in the Federal Court (but he or she can do the same thing without any certification). Thus, the MOU is tortious by unlawfully removing an important part of the key sentence, in order to choose an interpretation which serves to nullify Parliament’s legislative intent.
One cannot see any difference between a money extortion scheme and the cruel ambitious extortion scheme of the Crown through its unlawful immigration policies. The effect is the same, regardless if one calls them civil, quasi-criminal, or criminal torts. In addition, as a result of the extortion scheme, the sponsored spouses, often with their children, are cruelly separated from their sponsors. This is a contravention of sections 8 and 12 of the Charter (Constitution Act, 1982). The forced separation of spouses and their children, or their collective punishment, is a contravention of several sections of the Geneva Conventions Act as well.
The Harper government killed two birds with one stone by such “streamlining” of immigration in the family class: (a) it unlawfully reduced the number of eligible immigrants in order to get more votes from some “old stock Canadians” and (b) sent the monies seized from the sponsors’ accounts with the CRA to provincial ministries as gifts, without any lawful explanation. Let alone that most of the re-victimized sponsors, after losing large amounts of money, would probably never sign another sponsorship agreement again. One may mention that the CRA, apparently under the Crown’s pressure, participates in a money laundering process as well, by claiming that it had to obey the orders of the provincial ministers when the CRA seized credit monies of the re-victimized sponsors. The CRA’s excuse is unsupported by any legislation.
The Crown denies issuance of Canadian immigrant visas in cases where sponsorship debt is suspected, regardless that it is unable to demonstrate any debt of the sponsors, or legal grounds for such debt claims. Thus, an ambitious and cruel money extortion scheme prevents the immigration of thousands of persons in the family class, who would be ideal new Canadians, ready to fit into society quickly by the help of their sponsors. The Harper government’s scheme, inherited by the Liberals, will cause serious difficulties for Canadians within a few decades when less tax dollars of less good immigrants should pay their pension benefits. On the other hand, the provincial ministries consider such scheme as a guaranteed investment: often they improperly pay unnecessary assistance for sponsored persons and then send the bills to the sponsors a decade later, adding interests based on unlawfully high interest rates. [Governments from political right to left accept the money extortion scheme due to greed.]
Allowing the CRA and CIC to operate a cruel money extortion and laundering scheme by the apparent approval of the Attorneys General and the ministers of finance will dwarf many provisions of the Charter, immigration law and financial law, by the elimination of the power of Canadian courts nationwide. “The genius of the nation” has placed the registrars and administrators of court registries above the courts themselves. For example, the Registrar of the SCC usurps the power of the 9-Justice Division: placing himself above the Supreme Court, he habitually prevented our filing of notices of appeal under s. 61 of the Supreme Court Act.

A concise statement of the facts

10. The main appellant, Z.A. Simon, sponsored an ex-wife, Ms. Reyes, in January 1999. [He relied on the promises of the Sponsorship Agreement – not contract – that in case of a breach the Crown may take the sponsor to any court of competent jurisdiction. This was a “causa sine qua non” for him.] She arrived in Canada as a landed immigrant in December 1999. The sponsor could not fulfill her financial demands so she started to abuse him verbally and physically. He moved out in June 2000, losing his rent-to-own property, while she found a wealthier husband in the same apartment building. In the meantime, she applied for social benefits in BC. The administrators sent her to English courses for four years but never asked her (before 2005) to work. In October 2000, the sponsor defaulted on his sponsorship agreement but BC has never sent him a financial statement of the Crown’s assistance paid to Ms. Reyes, and never raised a debt claim against him. The default took place under ss. 135 (a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, and under s. 118 [originally s. 120] of the old Immigration Act, 1976, see https://pier21.ca/sites/default/files/gallery/12517/i-30456-069.jpg when the IRPA did not yet exist: it came into power in June 2002 while the default took place in October 2000. The provincial and federal Crown failed to file and register a ministerial certificate within 30 days after the default, under s. 146 of the (non-existent) IRPA, or take the sponsor to a court under the still governing Immigration Act, 1976.

11. Z.A. Simon divorced in 2002 and married the co-applicant Ms. Zhong in December 2006 in China. She was 44 and her son, Mr. Ye, was 15 years old when Z. A. Simon sponsored them in February 2007. In April 2007, a Canadian visa officer in Hong Kong refused to issue their Canadian landed immigrant visas, on the sole ground of subsection 133(1)(g)(i) of the IRP Regulations, the default of a sponsorship undertaking (in the previous Reyes sponsorship). The Crown has never revealed the source of the visa officer’s conclusion of Z.A. Simon’s alleged debt. It may have been the single page signed by a BC official, S. Postuk, submitting a false statement with an untrue allegation that the debt of Z. Simon was enforceable in March 2007;

12. Since 2007, the ministers of the Crown involved are adamant in punishing the family because they had revealed a profitable but quasi-criminal money extortion scheme that contravened c. 60 sections or subsections of the legislation. (In 2016, a Canadian visa officer in Hong Kong refused to issue her an immigrant visa after a decade-long marriage, claiming without any evidence that Ms. Zhong married Z.A. Simon only in order to enjoy the privileges in Canada.);

13. Seeing that the ministers of Canada and British Columbia are determined to separate family members by force and unlawful means endlessly, the only solution for the instant applicants is to sue the Crown’s tortfeasors for damages. Since the Federal Court’s Registry refused to file their appeal from a recent decision of the IRB/IAD, there is no way to file an application for judicial review, and s. 72 of the IRPA forbids an appeal in FCA. If the largest money extortion scheme in Canadian history is “too big to fail”, our claim like the one in Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., [2010] 3 SCR 585, 2010 SCC 62 (CanLII) could eventually succeed.

14. As for the actual material facts during 2017 and 2018, they are summarized well in the Oral Reasons for Judgment written by Kirkpatrick J.A. on 22 November 2018.

15. The Vancouver registry of the BC CA demonstrated a habitually negative attitude by the repeated violations of several court rules. Its administrators and registrars – particularly Ms. Littlejohn – kept acting as an extended arm of the Crown parties and as a wedge that forcefully separated the instant applicants from the Court(s). The Registry’s employees are smart and understand that both Crown counsel are unable to come up with any legally acceptable evidence or argument in order to defend efficiently the tortfeasors against the specific allegations. Thus, both Counsel (to the AGs) are allowed to sit back and relax, leave the “dirty work” to the Registry, and finally write a bill of costs against the applicant – as a routine part of a psychological warfare against Z.A. Simon and his family. But the proceedings are always tainted and procedural, not resembling judicial at all. Our appeal is confirming the rule that abuse of process – here constituted by the Crown parties – is almost always procedural. A breach or denial of procedural fairness typically results in a decision being fatally tainted.

PART II: A concise statement of the questions in issue

16. The questions in issue are constantly changing: the Crown’s issues are very different from the issues of the applicants. There were three further key issues for the Court: one for Madam Justice Bennett, one for Mr. Justice Groberman, and one for the 3-Justice Division of BCCA.

17. The applicants’ position is that parties do not fight against courts or registries but against each other. Courts do not suffer any damage if a party’s submission receives a stamp of the registry showing a delay of ten days or so. The courts in our case state that the Crown parties received copies of the originating appeal document in time and there was no prejudice for them.

18. The circumstance that more and more court registries in Canada wish to turn the courts into their playgrounds, by usurping the powers of the justices, played a key role here.

19. The Reasons of Bennett J.A. was unwilling to grant Z.A. Simon and extension of time to appeal when there was no need for any extension. (The Registry coerced him to file an application for extension of time, when the application for leave to appeal has already been filed. Simply, the Registry refused to accept the next document prescribed by the Rules. The Crown parties were silent and have not filed any motion in order to defeat the possible or alleged “irregularity.”)

20. In this procedural nightmare artificially created by the Assistant Registrar, the three “courts” arrived at three different conclusions. Bennett J.A. found that there was a ten-day delay “for unknown reasons.” Groberman J.A. found that there was no actual delay or prejudice, only “technical errors and deficiencies in the document” submitted to the registry. The 3-Justice Division improperly speculated that “It was entirely appropriate to accept that Mr. Simon’s arguments were raised before Madam Justice Bennett and were rejected.” The truth is that Bennett J.A. was so overwhelmed during the short hearing with 3 or 4 other motions that she had no time to examine the timeliness issue at all, so she referred to “unknown reasons.” Maybe she only asked the parties’ confirmation about the existence of an appeal document bearing a 26 September 2017 stamp, and all parties may have agreed on that fact that was unimportant.

PART III: A concise statement of argument

21. The BCCA Division introduced a third legal theory, claiming in para [12]: “The operative word is ‘filing’. That means the point in time at which the Registry accepts the document and stamps it with the date on which it becomes operative. The Registry is not obliged to accept for filing documents that it considers irregular.” Such “cherry picking” approach is erroneous in law or in principle, in light of R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII). The wording “accepts the document and stamps it with the date” is misleading because it refers to two dates: the Registry “accepted the document” of Z.A. Simon on 5 September 2017 but it remained silent for a week, between 5 and 12 of September. The Registry failed to issue a decision stating a refusal of filing. Thus, it had been accepted but – between 12 and 26 September – Ms. Littlejohn tried to coerce the applicants to delete the names of Ms. Zhong and Mr. Ye, or/and, the words “to proceed as an appeal” – from the style of cause unlawfully. Please refer to para. [8] (8) of the 22 November 2018 Oral Reasons for Judgment.

22. Only a BCCA Division of 5 or more justices has the power to undermine, overturn, or collaterally attack the key principle determined in a similar BCCA decision of three judges, in R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII). The three judges lacked jurisdiction in November 2018.

23. The second major question of law: Is a single justice or a Division allowed to disobey two sections of the Court of Appeal Act, namely sections 10 (2) (a) and 19 (1)? Are “technical errors or deficiencies” introduced by an administrator of a registry able to terminate an appeal in cases where the issues and controversies have never been heard on their merits? Should the answer be affirmative, was the Hayes Forest Services Ltd. v. Krawczyk, 2005 BCCA 17 (CanLII) wrongly decided? Again, a 3-Justice Division had no jurisdiction to decide on these.

24. The Crown has failed to reveal since 2007 whether it had denied the 20 to 60 breaches of the legislation, or, it had admitted such contraventions but considered all of them acceptable.

25. Now, the recurring and predetermined “lack of merit” allegation for the applicants’ pleadings: No Court of BC has ever determined any of the material facts. The Crown disagreed on all of our 193 material factual allegations pleaded in 2014, and all of the 347 paragraphs pleaded in 2017. Counsel’s habitual nondisclosure regarding the facts is the worst type of abuse of process, with their false or misleading statements. The Crown has never been able to propose a different version of material facts so the courts have always been kept in darkness. The decisions of the courts, accepting the Crown’s submissions and sweeping allegations, indicate that the Crown was always held credible but the Z.A. Simon and his family always unreliable.

26. Since 2007, several judges of the federal court system heard different aspects of the issues, mainly from the immigration point of view. Obviously, any of those courts would have been able to deliver a final judgment by granting a substantive right to the Crown against Z.A. Simon and his family members. Such order have never been issued. This is a clear and admirable indication of the seriousness and impartiality of each and every federal justice involved.

27. None of the federal justices involved have ever determined the fact if a “contract” has or has not existed between the Crown and Z.A. Simon. The only judge commenting on this crucial factor was the Honourable Mr. Justice Zinn in Simon v. Canada, 2010 FC 617 (CanLII), but he did not even mention the word “contract”, only “agreement.” Both federal and provincial judges have avoided this sticky issue because, on the authority of Duong v. Waterloo North Hydro Inc., 2004 CanLII 6241 (ON SC) and Bilson et al. v. Kokotow et al., 1978 CanLII 1632 (ON CA), or Bilson v. Kokotow et al., 1975 CanLII 771 (ON SC) one finds: “Under the long-established doctrine of privity of contract, only the original parties to a contract acquire or are exposed to liability.” The Crown has never been a signatory to any contract or agreement with Z.A. Simon. He signed an agreement with Ms. Reyes only. The Crown had the right to represent her at a court but failed to take any action against him within the (then) 6-year limitation period after the default in October 2000. If the Crown rightfully seized Z.A. Simon’s alleged but uncertified debt and separated the family members from each other for 12 years without any court order, then these three common law cases and Markevich v. Canada, [2003] 1 SCR 94, 2003 SCC 9 (CanLII) may have been wrongfully decided. That is very unlikely;

28. The applicant respectfully submits that if two to four ministers, both in the governments of BC and Canada, are entitled to enjoy a cruel game that serves the eternal punishment of the re-victimized sponsors and their family members, the Crown should eventually pay a price for such entertainment. If the money extortion and forced separation scheme need to survive, the Crown should assign a fund and compensate the most unfortunate victims or whistleblowers.

29. It needs to be mentioned that at the time of the default (October 2000) the old Immigration Act, 1976 and its former Immigration Regulations, 1978 S.O.R./78-172 were in effect, and by Ms. Reyes’ landing in Canada in December 1999 her immigration file was closed. There was no pending proceeding, matter, or immigration file under section 190 of the IRPA. The visa officer in 2007, when considering the debt claim originating in October 2000, should have considered the former legislation, not the IRPA and its IRP Regulations. The IRB was unwilling to reopen that issue as a denial of natural justice in 2007. Thus, our only remedy is a claim for damages.

30. The CRA, starting in June 2008, violated the federal and provincial limitation acts and s. 32 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, RSC 1985, c C-50. The latter act and the Limitation Act(s) prescribe that the Crown’s action “shall be taken within six years after the cause of action arose.” In our case at bar, CRA seized the applicant’s monies c. 8 years after the default.

31. The CRA and the Government of BC calculated an illegal compound interest of approximately 6.37% per annum, contrary to 5% in sections 3 and 4 of the Interest Act, RSC 1985, c I-15;

32. The BC justices involved have never utilized the “plain and obvious test”, perhaps due to their shortage of time. This leads us to the final question in issue: Are justices of British Columbia allowed to skip the plain and obvious test? Is the application of such test discretional for them?

33. The BC justices involved erred in law because none of the issues was res judicata since all of them remained unresolved, or the Court kept refusing to exercise its jurisdiction under the BC Supreme Court Act and the Court of Appeal Act on the basis of unconstitutional public policy. See the somewhat comparable C.M.S. v. C.J.S., 2002 BCSC 1314 (CanLII);

34. The BC justices involved, particularly the 3-Justice Division failed to observe a principle of natural justice or otherwise acted beyond or “refused to exercise its jurisdiction” as expressed on page 421 of Ex parte Kolot, 1973 CanLII 1411 (BC SC), in para. 36 of Mooring v. Canada (National Parole Board), 1994 CanLII 3359 (BC CA), in para. [19] of R. v. Henyu, 1979 CanLII 508 (BC CA), or in Re Jung et al. and Sam, 1975 CanLII 1016 (BC CA);

35. The BC justices involved misguidedly elevated form over substance, ignoring and disobeying the principle set by the Supreme Court of Canada that form or “procedure must not trump substance, otherwise justice could be set aside prior to complete or final analysis by procedural (or technical) sophism.” See Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, para. 23 of Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 SCR 643, 1985 CanLII 23 (SCC): “the denial of a right to a fair hearing must always render a decision invalid, whether or not it may appear to a reviewing court that the hearing would likely have resulted in a different decision.” Also, p. 1133 of Duquet v. Town of Sainte-Agathe, [1977] 2 SCR 1132, 1976 CanLII 13 (SCC); Construction Gilles Paquette ltée v. Entreprises Végo ltée, [1997] 2 SCR 299, 1997 CanLII 352 (SCC); R. v. Litchfield, 1993 CanLII 44 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 333, and Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., [2001] 2 SCR 460, 2001 SCC 44 (CanLII). The last two cases are very similar to our situation at bar.

The grounds of appeal are:

36. The decisions of three courts/justices contained several palpable and overriding errors, including errors in law, errors in principle, and misapprehension of the facts and evidence (if they considered any evidence at all when striking out the pleadings):

37. The Honourable Mr. Justice Groberman erred in law and principle when he

38. refused an extension of time for Z.A. Simon request to file his applications to vary an order of a justice, the alleged “order of Madam Justice Bennett” as cited from the November 22 decision, because such “Order” did not exist when Mr. Justice Groberman pronounced his decision, not even today, so time has not yet started to run regarding the 30 days limit;

39. overlooked the circumstance that a party cannot be “late” without an initiating point in time that supposed to start the reckoning of days;

40. overlooked the wording “after the order was made” in subsection 34 (1) of the Rules (which allows a party, “within 7 days after the order was made, prepare a notice of application…”) because no order was made and signed by Madam Justice Bennett before the issuance of the Honourable Mr. Justice Groberman’s Reasons;

41. overlooked the fact that none of the parties have drawn up an order, and completely overlooked subsection 47(3)(c) of the Court of AppealRules prescribing that an “order”“must”, “in the case of an order of a justice, be in Form 25.” (There was no such “order” in Form 25 before the Honourable Mr. Justice Groberman so time has not yet started to run.);

42. overlooked the crucial fact that the Vancouver Registry (BCCA) failed to mail a copy of the February 16 Oral Reasons of Madam Justice Bennett until March 14, and the main appellant received that document only on 20 March 2018;

43. paid little or no attention to the wording of ss. 34 (1) of the Court of AppealRules, “within 7 days after the order was made” that shall be interpreted as “within 7 days after the order was made available” for a party, pursuant to s. 12 of the Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21 and s. 8 of the Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996;

44. although he understood and correctly pointed out the technical irregularities during the filing, causing some delay, he exceeded his jurisdiction by acting against section 19 (1) the Court of Appeal Act, “No appeal to be defeated by irregularities… An appeal is not defeated by an irregularity or preliminary procedural objection” – and he forgot to mention as well that the irregularities were caused by the Registry and not by the appellant;

45. as a single judge, Mr. Groberman had no jurisdiction to defeat the appeal on the grounds of irregularities introduced by the Registry;

46. exceeded his jurisdiction and acted without jurisdiction, against 19 (1) of the Court of Appeal Act which does not allow irregularities to end an appeal, that renders his decision a nullity;

47. exceeded his jurisdiction or contravened 10 (2) (a) of the Court of Appeal Act since his order was not “incidental to the appeal or matter not involving a decision of the appeal on the merits”: The cornerstone of his decision was his assumption that the appeal had no merits;

48. if he had the opportunity to read the Oral Reasons of the Honourable Madam Justice Bennett which – just like the prior decisions of Donegan, J. and Ball J. – mentioned the 20 to 60 possible grounds of action disclosed in Z.A. Simon’s pleadings, it was patently unreasonable to assume that those 20-60 possible causes of actions constituted zero merit;

49. ignored a main principle as follow: As for the speedy determination of Z.A. Simon’s appeal, the so-called gap rule applies: namely, Rule 1-3 (1) and (2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009 prescribe, “The object of these rules is to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on its merits” with proportionality;

50. As a single Justice, he had no jurisdiction to create a situation that contravened sections 8, 11 (b), (d), 12, 15 (1), 24 (1) and 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, a.k.a. the Charter;

51. He had no jurisdiction to override or undermine section 12 of the Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21 “Every enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects”, and section 8 of the Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996, c 238, “Every enactment must be construed as being remedial, and must be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.” Since 2007, the Crown caused the injuries of the applicants and not the other way around, so the Act is remedial for that;

52. As a single Justice, he had no jurisdiction to ignore or override the decision of a three-justice Division of the BCCA in R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII), referred to by Z.A. Simon;

53. The above paragraphs clearly show that the chambers judge erred in law and principle, and was wrong in the legal sense. Disobeying subsections 19 (1) and 10 (2) (a) of the Court of Appeal Act, overlooking and ignoring subsections 34 (1) and 47 (3)(c) of the Court of Appeal Rules, let alone a few sections of the Constitution Act, 1982 (the Charter), with section 12 of the Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21 and section 8 of the Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996, c 238 constitute demonstrated cumulative palpable and overriding errors;

54. [Thus, the last sentences of the Summary on page 3 of the Oral Reasons for Judgment are wrong in fact and law. The Division made a decision in a hurry, without considering or examining the crucial facts and questions of law before them as if courts were horse races.];

55. [He] improperly speculated that “It appears to me, therefore, that Bennett J.A. must have considered the argument, determined that the tendered document was defective, and concluded that the Registry acted properly in rejecting it.” A Justice should not go by the “appearance”; his speculation is not supported by the audio record of the hearing before Bennett J.A.: she may have “concluded” that the Registry’s stamp showed the 26 September 2017 date and the parties agreed on that fact during the hearing. She was so overwhelmed by hearing the other lengthy motions of the parties that had no time to examine the alleged “late filing” issue at the hearing, but weeks later, as an afterthought, she looked at the date stamp and created a “late filing” theory without factual support; The ignored “extension of time” or “lateness” issue jumped to the first place from nowhere in her Oral Reasons, making the impression that the details of those issues have been heard on their merits during the hearing.

56. The Honourable Madam Justice Bennett erred in law and principle when she

57. refused an extension of time for Z.A. Simon request for extension of time to file his Notice of Appeal because he clearly indicated that there was no need for extension of time since the Registry admitted receipt of it on 5 September 2017; also see our para. 55 above;

58. overlooked or ignored the fact that Z.A. Simon has brought his appeal in a timely manner, pursuant to subsections 14 (1) (2) and (3) of the Court of Appeal Act, RSBC 1996, c 77;

59. apparently arbitrarily raised subsections 3 (b) and (c) of the Court of AppealRules above s. 14 of the Court of Appeal Act where the latter enactment does NOT require “filed copies”;

60. misconstrued the facts in her para. [13] because Z.A. Simon has never admitted that he had been late in filing his initiating document, only that the Registry prevented to put a “filed” stamp on it in a timely manner; failed to notify the appellant that she was not satisfied with the information provided during the hearing regarding the timeliness of the filing;

61. exceeded her jurisdiction by acting against section 19 (1) the Court of Appeal Act, “No appeal to be defeated by irregularities… An appeal is not defeated by an irregularity or preliminary procedural objection” – and she forgot to mention as well that the irregularities were caused by the Registry and not by the appellant;

62. wrote in her para. [14] about Z.A. Simon’s appeal documents “However, they were not filed in time for unclear reasons” then she built her further assumptions on those unclear reasons, incorrectly concluding that the alleged delay has been caused by the appellant. [Emphasis added.];

63. although she correctly explained in her para. [15] that “Mr. Simon filed a notice of application for leave to appeal because he did not want to be in contempt of the order of the chambers judge declaring him a vexatious litigant” then she unreasonably punished him for obeying the (improper) decision of Mr. Justice Ball; overlooked case law that granted immunity for a party for the negative consequences of obeying a decision of a Court;

64. erred in law by stating or implying that Mr. Justice Ball’s decision was correct and there was no merit in challenging it, although a bit earlier she correctly indicated that the proper way to proceed would have been by notice of appeal and not by application for leave to appeal – meaning or indicating that the decision of Mr. Justice Ball was improper;

65. failed to emphasize that the Honourable Mr. Justice Ball exceeded his jurisdiction when he ordered Z.A. Simon to proceed at every court, including the Court of Appeal, only by way of application for leave to appeal; failed to realize that the jurisdictional error of Mr. Justice Ball has caused Z.A. Simon a fatal prejudice because the applicant was unable to obey two lords – the Court of Appeal Act/Rules and the judgment of Mr. Justice Ball at the same time;

66. eventually punished Z.A. Simon for showing the words “to proceed as a notice of appeal” as a subtitle in his style of cause, despite confirming in her Oral Reasons that the proper way to proceed was by notice of appeal;

67. overlooked the circumstance that the administrators turning the Court into their playground was a factor beyond Z.A. Simon’s control;

68. overlooked the circumstance that there is no section in the BC Court of Appeal Act or Rules and in Canadian case law granting special rights to administrators of court registries allowing them to usurp the powers of the courts directly or indirectly;

69. assumed unreasonably that the Registry had a privilege to procrastinate and delay the filing of any document for a week without any reason if the document substantially complied with the forms prescribed by the Court of Appeal Rules, and without sending out the document immediately to the Court for direction;

70. assumed that in the case of a filing dilemma the Court does not need to issue directions to the Registry or the party, so an administrator without the Court’s involvement may do that;

71. erred in law when she overlooked the rare and unprecedented circumstance that an administrator of the Registry unlawfully coerced the appellant to remove the names of the two co-appellants from the style of cause: only the Court had authority to do that;

72. erred in law by assuming that the registrars had the power to do major editing in the style of cause and the text and/or refuse the filing of a document that complied with all of the requirements prescribed by ss. 54 (1)(a) to (d) of the Court of Appeal Rules;

73. erred in law by assuming that such editing and delaying tactics by the Registry, an extended arm of the Crown parties, was proper and acceptable without her intervention;

74. exceeded her jurisdiction and contravened 10(2)(a) of the Court of Appeal Act since his order was not “incidental to the appeal or matter not involving a decision of the appeal on the merits”; rather, a cornerstone of his decision was an assumption that the appeal had no merits;

75. exceeded her jurisdiction and acted without jurisdiction, against the Court of AppealRules, that renders her decision a nullity;

76. as she had the opportunity to read the Oral Reasons of the Honourable Madam Justice Donegan and/or the Honourable Mr. Justice Ball, both mentioning the 20 to 60 possible grounds of causes of action properly pleaded by Z.A. Simon, it was patently unreasonable to assume automatically that those 20-60 possible causes of actions constituted zero merit;

77. ignored a main principle as follow: As for the speedy determination of Z.A. Simon’s appeal, the so-called gap rule applies: namely, Rule 1-3 (1) and (2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009 prescribe, “The object of these rules is to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on its merits” based on proportionality;

78. As a single Justice, she had no jurisdiction to create a situation that contravened sections 8, 11 (b), (d), 12, 15 (1), 24 (1) and 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 (the Charter);

79. She had no jurisdiction to override or undermine section 12 of the Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21 “Every enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects”, and section 8 of the Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996, c 238, “Every enactment must be construed as being remedial, and must be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.”;

80. As a single Justice, she had no jurisdiction to ignore, override or collaterally attack two decisions of three-justice divisions of the BC Court of Appeal, properly referred to by the appellant, namely the governing and practically identical R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII) case and Hayes Forest Services Ltd. v. Krawczyk, 2005 BCCA 17 (CanLII), under s. 19(1) of the Court of Appeal Act;

81. The above paragraphs clearly show that the chambers judge erred in law and principle, and was wrong in the legal sense. Disobeying subsections 19 (1) and 10 (2) (a) of the Court of Appeal Act, overlooking and ignoring subsections 54 (1)(a) to (d) of the Court of Appeal Rules, let alone a few sections of the Constitution Act, 1982 (the Charter), with section 12 of the Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21 and section 8 of the Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996, c 238 constitute demonstrated cumulative palpable and overriding errors;

82. On 22 November 2018, a Division of three Honourable Justices (BCCA) erred in law and/or principle when they

83. repeated and/or confirmed the errors of the two previous justices as we referred them in our paragraphs from 37 to 84 above;

84. uncritically echoed the long list of conclusions forming palpable and overriding errors of the previous two single BCCA justices and Mr. Justice Ball (BCSC), without examining the relevant legislation of BC and Canada, including several acts and rules; therefore, the last sentences of the Summary on page 3 of the Oral Reasons for Judgment pronounced on 22 November 2018 are wrong in fact and law because the three BC justices involved (in 2017 and 2018) erred in law, principle, misconstrued the facts and were wrong in the legal sense;

85. assumed the correctness of the order of Mr. Justice Ball related to section 18 of theSupreme Court Act, RSBC 1996, c 443 which goes, “If, on application by any person, the court is satisfied that a person has habitually, persistently and without reasonable grounds, instituted vexatious legal proceedings in the Supreme Court or in the Provincial Court against the same or different persons, the court may, after hearing that person or giving him or her an opportunity to be heard, order that a legal proceeding must not, without leave of the court, be instituted by that person in any court.” I.e., Mr. Justice Ball considered that two past court cases in BC constituted habitual and persistent vexatious legal proceedings: Z. A. Simon took Ms. Lipsack, an individual employee of the BC Crown, to the Provincial Court in 2009, then he filed a claim in 2014 at the Supreme Court in Golden but a formal Order of Madam Justice Donegan following the latter claim has never been issued and entered;

86. erred in law or in principle by supporting Mr. Justice Ball’s 2017 Order since an average intelligent person would say that a legal proceeding instituted, directly or indirectly, for a family’s reunification after a decade of forced separation is a proper ground. They failed to note that an informed outsider may find bias in Mr. Justice Ball’s order though Z. Simon does not claim it: he may have turned unreasonable under 12 years of psychological warfare;

87. overlooked the circumstance that the alleged “late filing” or the need for “extension of time” did not surface during the hearing before Madam Justice Bennett, and the appellant did not get any indication on that day that there would be a missing information, dilemma or “unclear reasons” before Bennett J.A., so he was not allowed and was unable to clarify the details of the unlawful interference and procrastination caused by the Assistant Registrar;

88. ignored that not allowing the appellant to clarify the alleged “unclear reasons” – that he has properly clarified in his pleadings and affidavits before the hearing – constituted a procedural unfairness against the appellant because he could not imagine during the hearing before Bennett J.A. that the unheard issues of “delay” due to “unclear reasons” would form the cornerstone of Madam Justice Bennett’s reasoning several weeks later – when she could not remember anymore each fading detail of the hearing clearly;

89. overlooked the critical fact that the two BC CA justices arrived to different conclusions: Madam Justice Bennett incorrectly assumed, based on her “unclear reasons”, that the delay in the filing was caused by Z.A. Simon, while Mr. Justice Groberman correctly concluded that there was no real delay in the filing and serving the initiating document, only a technical irregularity caused it – but he forgot to mention that the Registry has caused the irregularity;

90. relied on the following, in their para. [4], “Madam Justice Bennett concluded the appeal was meritless. That conclusion was fatal to the test to extend time to commence the appeal.”

91. unreasonably asserted that there was a delay in the filing on the appellant’s behalf, and speculated that the appeal was meritless;

92. unreasonably equated the words “asserted” and “concluded”, ignoring the important circumstance that Madam Justice Bennett has not examined the merits at all, only automatically echoed the opinion of Mr. Justice Ball, who followed the opinion of Madam Justice Donegan who, in turn, completely relied on both Counsel’s false statements of 2014;

93. ignored the facts and material factual allegations in the earlier notices of civil claims submitted by Z.A. Simon, explaining in 193 and 347 paragraphs the true facts, calling attention of the courts to the false statements and sweeping allegations of Counsel that intended to mislead the courts; the continuous tainted procedures have been ignored;

94. ignored the crucial circumstance that the appellants have never been allowed to show any evidence in any court; no Canadian court has ever determined the substantive rights between the parties at bar by any final judgment, so the Crown’s habitual false allegations about the appellant’s alleged abuse of process by “res judicata” have been absurd and untrue;

95. though the three honourable justices were correct in their paragraph [7], pronounced on 22 November 2018, “[I]f Mr. Simon had established before Madam Justice Bennett that his notice of appeal was filed within the 30 days mandated by s. 14(1) of the Court of Appeal Act, then no extension of time was required.” Yes, he has established that fact in his pleadings and affidavits that have been – or should have been – before Bennett J.A. She did not ask him during the hearing for further proofs, details or explanations about the filing issues, giving the impression for the parties that everything has been clear for her. A party has no right to be pushy and interrupt a justice by telling facts and answers without questions or invitations of the judge: that would be impolite and improper during a hearing;

96. though the three BCCA justices got the picture correctly in para. [8], they erred in assuming an “order” of Madam Justice Bennett: Oral reasons are comparable to a fetus that becomes an “Order” just like when a fetus becomes a “child.” As a store cannot sue a fetus in a court if the mother steals a cake to satisfy the craving of her fetus, a party cannot properly appeal Reasons for Judgment without a judgment. Reasons without orders are not orders at all;

97. The Registry mailed him the 16 February 2018 Oral Reasons of Madam Justice Bennett on 14 March 2108. He received it from his landlord on March 20. Not even Superman could appeal a decision in a timely manner if the Registry fails to mail it for 4 weeks. The earlier allegation of the Registry – that no one knew who Zoltan A. Simon was – is bizarre because that phone number belonged to his niece. Maybe the Registry dialed a wrong number once;

98. As for para. [9], he is able to explain the delay of the Registry: Counsel for the attorneys general were unable to come up with any reasonable defence or explanation since 2007, so the Crown utilizes the registries as its extended arms. Administrators of court registries receive their pay cheques from the governments, not from the courts. Thus, an average person understands the motives of the Registry in its habitual mala fide delays and procrastination;

99. As for para. [12], the three honourable justices allege that the operative word is “filing” but they seem to be wrong in law by writing, “That means the point in time at which the Registry accepts the document and stamps it with the date on which it becomes operative.” They do not support such theory by any common law or enactment. The “stamping” theory is not governing in Canadian case law precedents at all. While the date of the stamp is usually a good indicator, it is not determinative. See Groeneveld v. TransAlta Utilities Corporation, 1985 CanLII 1247 (AB QB) for a somewhat similar technical (stamping or filing) issue;

100. In our case, the Registry failed to stamp a date of receipt and a date of filing on the style of cause. Then, Madam Justice Bennett simply looked at it as an afterthought and – seeing the 26 Sept 2017 stamp only – apparently assumed that it referred to the date of the appeal document’s receipt by the Registry;

101. Since the Reasons of both justices, issued prior to the 22 November 2018 Oral Reasons for Judgment, have been made without legislative authority and by excess or lack of jurisdiction, both of them are nullities from the legal point of view, regardless their beautiful wording;

102. None of the justices involved have made an order or direction to the registry to allow electronic filing for the appellant. The Registry is adamant by its long silence. These circumstances constitute infringement of his equality rights guaranteed by the Charter: while other parties are allowed to submit documents electronically, he is not. It seems that he must suffer forever a discrimination based on residence, since he lives in Alberta, not in British Columbia. Even a delay of two or three days is fatal for the timely filing of his documents (that the registry supposed to stamp and return to him but such thing does not happen too often). Several months ago he included a prepaid, pre-addressed FEDEX box in his package sent to the Vancouver Registry but so far it has not been returned to him;

103. [The Division] improperly referred to “this protracted matter” in para [17] because so far no Canadian or BC court has heard any of the serious issues on their merits. The matter is “protracted” only procedurally but not judicially. Copying the wording “It has no merit” from earlier preliminary decisions does not mean at all that any justice has ever heard the many serious questions of law and issues of extreme social importance on their merits;

104. failed to observe the principles regarding the sufficiency of pleading an “arguable case” as set out in paras. [19], [20] and [56] of JTG Management Services Ltd. v. Bank of Nanjing Co. Ltd., 2015 BCCA 200; and Madam Justice Kirkpatrick has concurred with that order;

105. granted the appellant only 43 minutes to speak on 21 November 2018, and there were several more serious arguments of law and fact left out that he was not allowed to mention;

106. All of the British Columbia justices involved failed or refused to exercise their jurisdiction to hear the substance. See R. v. D.B.T., [1996] N.S.J. No. 11 (C.A.) (QL) and R. v. Thompson (1983), 1983 CanLII 547 (BC CA), 3 D.L.R. (4th) 642, at 651 (B.C.C.A.), and paras. [13] to [16] of Canada (Solicitor General) v. Subhaschandran, 2005 FCA 27 (CanLII); They all ignored the fact that a BC ministry admitted in 2012 that Z. Simon had no debt on record;

107. Regardless the unnecessary factual “fog” and controversies created in or by the two Reasons issued by the two chambers judges, the long list of palpable and overriding errors of law and principle remain before the Supreme Court of Canadaas a solid ground. The integrity of the whole BC Court of Appeal, the prevention of miscarriage(s) of justice, the possibility of bringing the administration of justice in disrepute, and creating a new fault line in the “stare decisis” principle (due to different interpretations of the single word “file”) militated for the intervention of a Division of 5 or 7 justices but Mr. Outerbridge, Registrar, prohibited Z.A. Simon from filing any further document, with or without the approval of the BC CA;

108. There is a “file” and at least one “filing” in each court case, and 36 million Canadians have the right to understand the real meaning of this word;

109. Since a 5-Justice Division of the BC CA is apparently unable or not allowed to decide whether there was an error in law or in principle in R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII), or such error in Simon v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 BCCA 461, the Supreme Court of Canada is the best and only forum to have the last word in the controversy;

110. Similarly, if a 5-Justice Division of the BC CA cannot hear and decide upon the pure question of law related to paragraph [14] of the order in Hayes Forest Services Ltd. v. Krawczyk, 2005 BCCA 17 (CanLII), under s. 19(1) of the (BC) Court of Appeal Act, the Supreme Court of Canada is the best and only forum to overturn the BCCA’s final decision that has terminated forever the appeals of the instant applicants in British Columbia;

111. All justices ignored para. [10] of International Taoist Church of Canada v. Ching Chung Taoist Association of Hong Kong Limited, 2011 BCCA 149 (CanLII), “An order striking a pleading could not be the basis for a res judicata defence in subsequent proceedings.”

PART IV: Submissions

112. Between 2012 and 2017, the Registry of the SCC (Mr. Roger Bilodeau or his administrative assistants) repeatedly refused to file the instant main applicant’s notices of appeal as of right, submitted clearly on three occasions under section 61 of the Supreme Court Act. Z.A. Simon always clearly referred to s. 61 and the circumstance that he alleged error in law in the lower court(s). Section 61 of the Act obliges a party to proceed automatically by a Notice of Appeal in such situations (and the submission of an application would indicate a party’s admission that no error in law took place in the lower courts). The SCC Registry always contravened s. 61, regardless Parliament’s clear legislative intent for a direct appeal: the Act does not authorize the Registrar to usurp the powers of a nine-justice division of the SCC;

113. Therefore, the appellants respectfully request this Honourable Court to convert the instant application for leave to appeal into a Notice of Appeal, pursuant to s. 61 of the Act;

114. In addition, the applicants respectfully request the Court to issue an order or direction to the Registry to return the attached $500 bank draft (security costs) to Z.A. Simon since all of the issues involved are related to important pure questions of law: a hearing is not required;

115. The applicant respectfully request the Court to grant his estimated costs in the SCC and the courts below, particularly if the SCC would not stay the BCCA and BCSC orders of 2017-8;

PART V: The order or orders sought, including the order sought with respect to costs

116. Pursuant to policies of the Court of Appeal, a declaration that that a division of three justices had no authority to ignore and disobey the earlier BC CA judgment in R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII) in a practically identical situation; only a Division of 5 or more justices are allowed to overturn an earlier decision, only if that was demonstrably wrong;

117. As a consequence of the previous paragraph, a mandamus that the whole matter to be returned to a BC CA Division of 5 or more justices for final determination of the damages, also the proper but improperly derailed appeal procedure in the BC CA to be reinstated and continued without the undue or unlawful interference of the Registry’s administrators;

118. An Order stating that the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice Ball in Simon v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 BCSC 1438 (CanLII), Docket 5675, to be stayed or set aside as a nullity because he acted beyond his jurisdiction when he ordered in his paras. [66] and 3 that “Zoltan Andrew Simon, must not, without first obtaining leave of this Court, institute or commence legal proceedings in any British Columbia court, or file applications in any existing legal proceedings in any British Columbia court”;

119. An Order that such Division of 5 Justices shall make a decision on the unsolved questions of law involving the 347 factual allegations in the case 2017 BCSC 1438 (CanLII), Docket 5675, and deliver a modified final order on the merits of the case that determines the substantive rights of the three parties involved, including damages;

120. In the alternative, an Order that the questions involving the 347 factual allegations in the 2017 BCSC 1438 (CanLII) case, Docket 5675, shall be decided on the merits of the case by a jury in Vancouver that to determine the substantive rights of the three parties involved, or that the original action shall be converted into a class action and to be decided on the merits;

121. Costs as assessed against the AGBC, or in the amount of minimum $2,100 in the BCCA, 50% of the applicant’s estimated costs in the SCC, including 50% of the main appellants’ filing and security costs in the SCC; plus his financial compensation by punitive damages caused by the Vancouver Registry’s undue, mala fide and unconstitutional delays;

122. Costs as assessed against the AGC, minimum $2,100 in the BCCA, 50% of the applicants’ estimated costs in the SCC, including 50% of the appellants’ filing and security costs there;

123. An Order stating that the Vancouver Registry to sign an “electronic services agreement” with Z.A. Simon as a “registered user” and allow him to submit his documents electronically a.s.a.p., pursuant to section 54.1 of the Court of Appeal Rules, BC Reg 297/2001;

124. An Order or Direction that would clarify the status of the Vancouver Registrar’s decision regarding costs which order has never been issued officially in the previous appeal to Z.A. Simon since March 2017, in Simon v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2016 BCCA 52 (CanLII) case; preventing him to apply to a justice for a review of the Registrar’s assessment of costs under section 10(3) of the Act and s. 70 of the Court of Appeal Rules, BC Reg 297/2001;

125. An Order for any further relief that this Honorable Court would find just and proper under these extraordinary circumstances that are unprecedented in Canadian legal history;

_________________________________

Zoltan Andrew Simon, Applicant

PART VI: A table of authorities, setting out the paragraph numbers in Part III where the authorities are cited

Case law precedent and neutral citation Our paragraph No. in Part III

Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),

1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 35

Bilson et al. v. Kokotow et al., 1978 CanLII 1632 (ON CA) 27

Bilson v. Kokotow et al., 1975 CanLII 771 (ON SC) 27

Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII) 2, 4

Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., [2010] 3 SCR 585, 2010 SCC 62 (CanLII) 13

Canada (Solicitor General) v. Subhaschandran, 2005 FCA 27 (CanLII) 107

Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 SCR 643, 1985 CanLII 23 (SCC) 35

C.M.S. v. C.J.S., 2002 BCSC 1314 (CanLII) 33

Construction Gilles Paquette ltée v. Entreprises Végo ltée, [1997] 2 SCR 299,

1997 CanLII 352 (SCC) 35

Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., [2001] 2 SCR 460, 2001 SCC 44 (CanLII) 35

Duong v. Waterloo North Hydro Inc., 2004 CanLII 6241 (ON SC) 27

Duquet v. Town of Sainte-Agathe, [1977] 2 SCR 1132, 1976 CanLII 13 (SCC) 35

Ex parte Kolot, 1973 CanLII 1411 (BC SC) 34

Groeneveld v. TransAlta Utilities Corporation, 1985 CanLII 1247 (AB QB) 99

Hayes Forest Services Ltd. v. Krawczyk, 2005 BCCA 17 (CanLII) 23, 82, 111

International Taoist Church of Canada v. Ching Chung Taoist Association

of Hong Kong Limited, 2011 BCCA 149 (CanLII) 111

JTG Management Services Ltd. v. Bank of Nanjing Co. Ltd., 2015 BCCA 200 105

Manitoba v. Khaleghi-Hashemian, 2002 MBQB 1 (CanLII) 4

Markevich v. Canada, [2003] 1 SCR 94, 2003 SCC 9 (CanLII) 27

Mooring v. Canada (National Parole Board), 1994 CanLII 3359 (BC CA) 34

Re Jung et al. and Sam, 1975 CanLII 1016 (BC CA) 34

R. v. D.B.T., [1996] N.S.J. No. 11 (C.A.) (QL) 107

R. v. Henyu, 1979 CanLII 508 (BC CA) 34

R. v. Litchfield, 1993 CanLII 44 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 333 35

R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII) 21, 22, 52, 82, 110

R. v. Thompson (1983), 1983 CanLII 547 (BC CA), 3 D.L.R. (4th) 642, at 651 (B.C.C.A.) 107

Simon v. Canada, 2010 FC 617 (CanLII) 27

Simon v. Canada, 2011 FCA 6 (CanLII) 32

Simon v. Canada, 2014 FCA 47 (CanLII) 32

PART VII – Enactments (printouts from statutes, regulations, and rules)....................... 92

Canada Revenue Agency Act, S.C. 1999, c. 17: sections 3, 5 (1)(a), 6 (1) and (2), 42 (1)...... 92

Constitution Act, 1982 (a.k.a. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms):

s. 7, 8, 11 (b), (d), 12, 15 (1), 24 (1)and 52 (1).................................................. 96

Court of Appeal Act, RSBC 1996, c 77: ss. 1 (order), 10 (2)(a), 14 (1) to (3), 19 (1)......... 100

Court of Appeal Rules, BC Reg 297/2001: ss. 1 (“bring an appeal” and “file”),

3 (b) and (c), 34 (1), 47 (3)(c), 54 (1)(a) to (d), 70............................................. 104

Court Order Enforcement Act, RSBC 1996, c 78: section 3 (under debts, obligations)......... 108

Court Order Interest Act, RSBC 1996, c 79: sections 5, 7 (1)...................................... 110

Courts Administration Service Act, S.C. 2002, c. 8: subsection 2 (b)............................. 112

Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46: ss. 19, 21 (1) and (2), 22 (1), 126 (1), 132,

134 (1), 322 (2) to (4), 337, 346 (1), 361 (1), 362 (2), 380 (1), 462.31 (1) and (2),

463, 585, 586..........................................................................................114

Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50: ss. 3 (b), 32........................ 129

Department of Citizenship and Immigration Act, S.C. 1994, c. 31: section 4................... 132

Employment and Assistance Act, SBC 2002, c 40: 8 (1)............................................. 134

Employment and Assistance Regulation, BC Reg 263/2002: ss. 1 (1) (“full-time

student”), 16 (1), 18 (1) to (3)...................................................................... 136

Family Maintenance Enforcement Act, RSBC 1996, c 127: ss. 1 (1) (“debtor” and

“main-tenance order”), 14.5 (1) and (2), 15 (1) to (4), 16 (1) to (5), 17 (1) to (3), 18 (1).. 139

Family Maintenance Enforcement Act Regulation, BC Reg 346/88: subsection 6.1 (1)........ 146

Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 4

(2nd Supp.): sections 23 (1) (under “garnishable moneys” to “Minister”, “support

order” and “support provision”), 24, 26, 36, 37, 41, 45, 49................................. 148

Family Support Orders and Agreements Garnishment Regulations, SOR/88-181:

sections 3 (a) to (g), 6 (1), 8, 9, Schedule 2..................................................... 154

TABLE OF CONTENTS of VOLUME II

Federal Courts Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7: sections 19, 39 (Note: page 2 is omitted)............. 1

Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106: 449 (1) and (2), 451 (3), 452, 456 (3), 458 (2)............. 4

Financial Administration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-11: ss. 66 (Crown, Crown debt), 67............ 9

Frustrated Contract Act, RSBC 1996, c 166............................................................. 12

Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. G-2:

6 (1) and (2), 42 (1) (b)................................................................................ 14

Geneva Conventions Act, R.S.C/. 1985, c. G-3......................................................... 17

Immigration Act, 1976 [insured in 1978], in Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985, Vol. V:

section 118 [in another version section 120].......................................................21

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 [IRPA]: s. 72, s. 146, s. 190....... 24

Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations: subsections 132 (4), 133(1)(g)(i),

135 (a).................................................................................................... 32

Immigration Regulations, 1978 S.O.R./78-172....................................................... N/A

Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.): (sub)sections 223 (1), (2), (6), (7) and

(12), 223.1, 224 (1) and (1.2)........................................................................ 38

Interest Act, RSC 1985, c I-15: sections 3 and 4....................................................... 45

Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996: sections 8, 9, 12, 14................................................. 47

Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21: sections 8 (1), 12, 13, 14, 15 (2).......................... 49

Limitation Act, RSBC 1996, c 266: 3 (5), 6 (3) and (4), 9 (1) and (2)............................... 53

Limitation Act, SBC 2012, c 13: sections 1 (“limitation period”), 12 (2), 14, 21 (1)

and (3).................................................................................................... 57

Personal Property Security Act, RSBC 1996, c 359: section 1 (1) (“debtor”)...................... 60

Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156: sections 77 and 78 (1).................. 62

Supreme Court Act, RSBC 1996, c 443: sections 1 (“court”), 17, 18............................... 64

Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26: sections 52 and 61........................................... 66

Supreme Court Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009: subsections 1-1 (2), 1-3 (1) and (2),

3-7 (3), (4), (6), (8), (9), (12), (15), (17)........................................................... 69

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