AG Lametti & R Bilodeau end rule of law

Justine Trudeau's obstruction of justice again???

The Supreme Court of Canada (Cour suprême du Canada) is the highest court of Canada, the final court of appeals in the Canadian justice system. Its nine justices supposed to be the ultimate guardians of the Constitution, legislation, and common law. Since January 2019, these powers of the Supreme Court of Canada have been suspended or terminated by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Mr. David Lametti, Minister of Justice and Attorney General, at least in cases where the Federal Government massively contravenes the rule of law. The latter is Parliament's will. These two politicians raised themselves above the Supreme Court of Canada using an ingenious trick. Namely, they coerced a single administrator of the Registry, Ms. Tina Proulx, not to file two applications for leave to appeal. The first application was received by the Registry on 31 January 2019 while the second one on 18 March 2019. David Lametti, with P.M. Trudeau's approval, effectively placed registry officer Ms. Proulx above Mr. Roger Bilodeau, Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada. Ms. Proulx has no lawful jurisdiction to usurp the powers of the Registrar and the Supreme Court of Canada.

Ms. Proulx, Mr. Lametti, and P.M. Trudeau have contravened section 139 (2) of the Criminal Code by obstructing justice. That section states:

Every one who wilfully attempts in any manner other than a manner described in subsection (1) to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.

Any reasonable Canadian can conclude that Ms. Proulx, Mr. Lametti, and P.M. Justin Trudeau have obstructed, perverted or defeated the course of justice in the Supreme Court of Canada. Therefore, they are liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years. Suspending or terminating the powers of the Supreme Court of Canada and the rule of law is much more serious issue than Justin Trudeau's "blackface" or "browface" scandal. It hurts the interests of 36 million Canadians. The key question of our appeal pending in the Supreme Court of Canada since january 2019 is whether or not a single administrator of the government can declare any taxpayer a "debtor" without the involvement of any court.

PRIME MINISTER JUSTIN TRUDEAU SHOULD STATE OPENLY NOW IF HE HAS NOT APPROVED MR. LAMETTI'S CRIMINAL OFFENCES. If those happened without his approval, he should instruct Mr. Lametti to resign immediately. If the Prime Minister has approved these criminal offences for more than half a year, both P.M. Trudeau and Mr. David Lametti should resign before the upcoming election. In the unbelievable case if Mr. Lametti did not know about the habitual false statements of his several Counsel, he should find better ones in their positions and order the Registry of the Supreme Court of Canada to file the two appeal documents and make them available for the nine justices of the Supreme Court of Canada IMMEDIATELY.

[Perhaps Z.A. Simon, the owner of this web site is a dreamer but he firmly believes that there is at least a single Member of Parliament or/and a single news reporter in the country that cares about the rule of law in Canada and the dictatorial powers of any Prime Minister, belonging to any political party.]

VOTE CANADA 2019 and SAVE THE POWERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA NOW!!!

Returning to the sample pleadings the above public servants have prevented the nine justices of the Supreme Court of Canada to see the following documents. Please refer to the texts pasted below:

Ms. Proulx and Mr. Lametti, supported by PM Trudeau, prevented the filing of this document in the Supreme Court of Canada since January 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

(ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA)

File number:________________

BETWEEN:

Zoltan Andrew SIMON, Zuanhao ZHONG, and Jian Feng YE

Applicants
(Appellants)

and

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, represented by the Attorney General of Canada and

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia, represented by the Attorney General of British Columbia

(both of them in their representative capacity)

Respondents
(Defendants)

__________________________________________________________________

NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL

Pursuant to (sub)sections 40 (1), 43 (1), 48 (1), 61, and65.1 (1) of the Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, also sections 5.1 and 25 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156

__________________________________________________________________________________

Zoltan Andrew Simon, main applicant (self-represented)

72 Best Crescent

Red Deer, AB T4R 1H6

Phone number: none Fax: (403) 341-3300

Email address: zasimon@hotmail.com

TO: Attorney General of Canada, C/o Ms. Alison Brown, Counsel

British Columbia Regional Office

900 - 840 Howe Street, Vancouver, BC, V6Z 2S9

National Litigation Sector, Department of Justice

Phone: 604-775-6113 Fax: 604-666-4399

Email: Alison.Brown@justice.gc.ca and

Attorney General of British Columbia,

C/o Ms. Andrea K. Glen, Barrister and Solicitor

Civil Litigation Group, Legal Services Branch

Ministry of Attorney General

1301-865 Hornby Street, Vancouver, BC V6Z 2G3

Phone: 604-660-0669 Fax: 604-660-2636 Email: andrea.glen@gov.bc.ca

TAKE NOTICE that Zoltan Andrew SIMON applies for leave to appeal to the Court, under (sub)sections 40 (1), 43 (1), 48 (1), 61 and 65.1 (1) of the Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, and sections 5.1 and 25 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156, from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia, File 2018 BCCA 461, Docket: CA44805, made November 22, 2018, for an Order that the said judgment to be set aside or be stayed in its entirety, together with the two BCCA chambers judgments dated 2018 and in BC Supreme Court File No. 5675 (Golden Registry); for an Order establishing the total amount of the applicants’ damages, or, in the alternative, returning it to a 5-Justice Division of the BC CA, or to a jury in Vancouver, possibly as a class action; for an Order for costs, and for an Order allowing that the instant application to be converted into a Notice of Appeal pursuant to s. 61 of the Supreme Court Act since many errors in law are alleged or/and can be proved in the lower courts’ decisions;

AND FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that this application for leave is made on the following grounds:

That the 3-Justice Division of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact (introduced by Madam Justice Bennett) that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it about the alleged late filing of Z.A. Simon’s originating document appealing the decision of Mr. Justice Ball pronounced on August 16, 2017;
That the 3-Justice Division of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia erred in law on 22 November 2018 in finding that interpretation of s. 14 (2) of the Court of Appeal Act, RSBC 1996, c 77 was inoperative, or, the date of “filing” is “the point in time at which the Registry accepts the document and stamps it with the date”, or/and “the Registry is not obliged to accept for filing documents that it considers irregular.”;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the BCCA erred in law or in principle by undermining and collaterally attacking a prior governing decision of another 3-Justice Division of the same Court in R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII); disobeying the “stare decisis” rule was an error because “filing” is a point of time when a party submits its document to the Registry if its administrators do not refuse to accept it and do not send it out to the Court for direction either (as in the instant case at bar) without delay but they procrastinate for a week;
That the 3-Justice Division of the BCCA (the honourable justices Kirkpatrick, Goepel and Fenlon) had no jurisdiction to attack the Court’s order delivered in R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII) in a similar factual situation; only a Division consisting 5 or more justices have power to overturn an earlier order and principle declared by a Division, so the 22 November 2018 decision is a nullity;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the BCCA erred in law or in principle when ignored the “gap rule” with the relevant sub-rules 23-2 (5)(a) and (6) (a) and (b)(i) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009 [since the Registry failed to send the applicant a notice that his document had not been filed and the reasons for non-acceptance: a seven-day long silence is not a “notice”];
That the said 3-Justice Division of the BCCA erred in law or in principle when ignored the “gap rule” with the relevant sub-rules 22-3 (5)(a) and (6) (a) or (b)(i), and 22-4 (13)(a), (14) and (15) of the Supreme Court Family Rules, BC Reg 169/2009 [since the same principle shall apply for filing documents by express post, fax, and electronic filing];
That the said 3-Justice Division of the BCCA erred in law or in principle by ignoring sections 72 (1) and (2) of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106: Where a document is submitted for filing, the Administrator shall either (a) accept the document for filing; or (b) … refer the document without delay to a judge or prothonotary. Thus, the judge or prothonotary may direct the Administrator to (a) accept or reject the document; or (b) accept the document subject to conditions as to the making of any corrections or the fulfilling of any conditions precedent. [The nationwide rules do not grant a special power to a registrar to choose a third alternative such as a long silence or inactivity];
That the said 3-Justice Division of the BCCA erred in law on 22 November 2018 because their decision and its cornerstone, the alleged “operational” meaning of the word “filing”, are not supported by any other jurisprudence or legislation;
That the said 3-Justice Division erred by overlooking section 1 of the Court of Appeal Rules which states that “file” means file with the registrar in a registry of the court [emphasis added]; only parties can file documents with the registrar, not administrators with their own registrar (as in our case at bar): “to file” is a verb referring to a party’s duty involving the Registry, not a later action of stamping decided between two administrators without a Court;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the BCCA erred in law or in principle when remained insensitive to the fact that the Vancouver Registry, an extended arm of the Attorneys General, denied to grant the appellant an electronic services agreement and a “registered user” statusunder Rule 23-3 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009 for years, constituting a section 15 (1) and s. 12 Charter breach, resulting in an unusual or cruel treatment, and discrimination on the grounds of residency;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the BCCA and its single chambers judges involved misconstrued the facts by not noticing that the Registry failed to place a “received” stamp on the originating appeal document on 5 September 2017, and only “26 September 2017” was shown on it by a stamp when the Registry’s hesitation ended;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the BCCA erred in law or in principle when remained insensitive to the fact that the main appellant – due to the amounts of money spent on his legal proceedings for a decade – could not afford to pay for a phone line and number but the Registry was unwilling to contact him by other common means like mail, fax or email; This resulted that he kept receiving the Court’s decisions from the Registry by delays of weeks, such tort constituting a section 15 (1) and s. 12 Charter breach, an unusual treatment and discrimination on the grounds of impecuniousness compared to the wealth of the two opposing Crown parties;
That the BCCA’s decision of 22 November 2018 erred in law by failing to observe that both Mr. Justice Groberman and Madam Justice Bennett had acted without authority by contravening subsections 10 (2)(a) and 19 (1) of the Court of Appeal Act because single justices had no power to terminate an appeal on the grounds of merits or irregularity [as both of them did];
That the said November 22 decision failed to observe an error in law in the decision of Mr. Justice Groberman that refused to grant extension of time in a situation where the Vancouver Registry caused a 3-week delay in pronouncing Madam Justice Bennett’s Reasons for Z.A. Simon, while her “order” on a Form 25, pursuant to ss. 47 (3)(c) of the Court of Appeal Rules, did not exist at all so the time had not yet started to run: it is absurd to claim a delay without a starting point in time. Reasons, like those of Madam Justice Bennett, that contain explanations or lists of theoretical future possibilities without an order are not orders. Also, a “a possible future administrative decision” (like that of Madam Justice Bennett) cannot yet be challenged in a Court as concluded or confirmed in Simon v. Canada, 2014 FCA 47;
That the said November 22 decision of the BCCA failed to observe an error in law and a misconceived factual situation in the decision of Mr. Justice Groberman (that refused to grant extension of time for Z.A. Simon), because pursuant to ss. 21 (4) of the Court of Appeal Act, “If judgment has been reserved at the hearing, the registrar must give reasonable notice to all parties of the time and place where judgment will be delivered.” The judgment of Madam Justice Bennett was reserved until 16 February 2018 but the Registry failed to give any notice to the appellant about the delivery of the judgment, and then it mailed those Oral Reasons to him only on 14 March 2018. The Registry’s delay of four weeks caused the apparent delay;
That the November 22 decision of the BCCA erred in law and in principle by overlooking or skipping the appellant’s proofs (in his affidavits of service) and arguments that clearly demonstrated that the chambers judge(s) had erred in law, misconstrued the facts or/and was/were wrong in the legal sense;
That the said decision of the BCCA failed to observe a controversy between the different conclusions of the two chambers judges: while Madam Justice Bennett based her reasoning in para. [14] of her Reasons for Judgment on “unclear reasons” or assumptions in order to get a fictitious “late filing” scenario, Mr. Justice Groberman understood that Z.A. Simon submitted his appeal document in the Registry in a timely manner [10 days before September 15] and properly served it on the Respondents, so there was no actual delay involved, only technical irregularities;
That, though para. 8 of the Oral Reasons dated November 22 is correct about the dates, Kirkpatrick J.A. is wrong in law or in principle allowing administrators of a court registry to make arbitrary last-minute changes in documents such as: “…Zuanhao Zhong and Jianfeng Ye must be listed as plaintiffs only in the style of cause, and only you would be listed as appellant/plaintiff.” The BCCA has failed to support such new theory by enactments or case law. The Registry cannot act as an editor of a newspaper to re-write documents of a party;
That the BCCA erred in law by overlooking or ignoring section 54 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, “The registrar may refuse to accept a document for filing unless the document…” because in our case at bar the appellant’s submission satisfied all of the four criteria listed;
That the BCCA Division and its individual chambers judges erred in law when theoretically inserted a non-existing right of the Registry, granting it days or weeks of procrastination in placing a “filed” stamp on a document; the justices misconstrued the facts when (apparently) assumed that the registry’s administrators obeyed a court order but no such order existed;
That the Court of Appeal for British Columbia failed to observe principles of natural justice or otherwise acted beyond or refused to exercise its jurisdiction; in addition to, or in the alternative, its Division had the power to hear the case on its merits yet it has refused to exercise its jurisdiction, disobeying the “gap rule” and the object of Rules in Rule 1-3 (1): “The object of these Supreme Court Civil Rules is to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on its merits.” [Emphasis added.];
That the BCCA Division with its single justices involved, and Mr. Justice Ball, have all erred in law by ignoring and disobeying the objectives expressed in Rule 1-3 (2) of the above Rules, failing to conduct their proceedings in ways that were proportionate to (a) the amount involved in the proceeding, (b) the importance of the issues in dispute, and (c) the complexity of the proceeding;
That the BCCA Division and its single justices in chambers erred in principle and demonstrated a closed-mindedness or lack of independence by spending no time to apply the “plain and obvious test” before striking out the pleadings of the instant applicant, but simply echoed or repeated the sweeping or superficial conclusions of the previous justices starting with Madam Justice Donegan and both Crown counsel in 2014, forming a domino effect or avalanche;
That the BCCA Division and its single justices in chambers erred in law or principle when unreasonably punished a party who consciously and in good faith obeyed the unlawful or improper judgment issued by Mr. Justice Ball who had no jurisdiction to order that Z.A. Simon was not permitted to file any document in any court of British Columbia without an application and authorization of the Court: parties have immunity for the negative consequences of obeying a court order;
That the BCCA Division erred in principle or misconstrued the factual background ignoring the causal linkage of Mr. Justice Ball’s improper decision because if his wording reflected the limits of his jurisdiction the appellants’ originating document would not have contained the unnecessary words “application for leave” and the Registry would/should have accepted it as a “Notice of appeal” without any dilemma or delay;
That the BCCA Division erred in principle when ignored the fact that Madam Justice Bennett disagreed with the decision of Mr. Justice Ball regarding the need for the applicants’ filing and serving an application for leave to appeal first, but then she turned around and forgot his jurisdictional error concluding that the appeal of his order had no merit at all. Appeals proving jurisdictional errors have good chances to succeed;
That the BCCA Division erred in principle or in logic when it ignored the fact that Madam Justice Bennett referred to the 20 to 60 possible causes of action pleaded by the instant applicant, citing from Madam Justice Donegan (2015) and Mr. Justice Ball (2017), but soon all of them forgot those correct findings, simply equating 60 with zero cause of action and thus creating a controversial “oxymoron” situation;
That the BCCA Division and its single justices erred in principle when ignored the rule that the onus was on the defendant AGs to show that the plaintiffs did not have a “good arguable case” in their original notice of claim; the AGs or Counsel have been unable to show any evidence or legislation since 2007 except their habitual sweeping or false allegations;
That the BCCA Division and its single judges erred in principle by overlooking that, although part of the original claim may in fact ultimately fail, the action should have been allowed to proceed because the instant applicant had an “arguable case” in light of the facts and the applicable law; So far not a single justice has been able to pinpoint an incurable or fatal defect in his pleadings which would condemn the claim and the appeal to failure;
That the BCCA Division and the single justices involved erred in law or in principle when kept striking out the pleadings of the instant applicant on spurious or merely speculative grounds such as credibility or alleged vexatious behaviour, without seeing any evidence;
That the BCCA Division with its single judges, and Mr. Justice Ball, erred in principle when they attempted to solve 20 to 60 – now rather 60 to 80 – pure questions of law on motions to strike the applicants’ pleadings, without any proper hearing on the merits of those issues;
That the BCCA Division and its single justices erred in law and in principle by not applying the “stare decisis” principle; by failing to consider the relevant findings and follow the governing orders in leading authorities including Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII); Markevich v. Canada, [2003] 1 SCR 94, 2003 SCC 9 (CanLII); or Simon v. Canada, 2011 FCA 6 (CanLII): [“There is no suggestion that any garnishment order issued from a court of competent jurisdiction” in para. 12]; and “an error on the part of the judge” in para. [14] of Simon v. Canada, 2014 FCA 47 (CanLII);
That the BCCA Division and its single justices in chambers erred in law or in principle by ignoring or contravening sections 8, 11 (b), (d), 12, 15 (1), 24 (1) and 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, section 12 of the Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21, and section 8 of the Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996, c 238;
That the BCCA Division erred in law or in principle when it ignored that, in 2014 and 2017, the applicants made out a “good arguable case” by properly pleading 20 to 60 possible causes of action as serious questions of law to be tried but none of those questions have even been tried; Each justice guessed, without a foundation, that another judge have already tried them;
That the BCCA Division and its single justices previously involved erred in law or in principle when concluded by citing Mr. Justice Ball that the validity and provisions of the Criminal Code in civil proceedings were “not known to law” in British Columbia as the Honourable Madam Justice Donegan originally wrote in paras. [2] and [44] of her Oral Reasons; The applicant maintains that pleading (the related four) enactments of the Criminal Code do not constitute a nullity or abuse of process in civil cases in BC;
That the BCCA Division and the single justices involved erred in law or in principle by failing to observe and follow para. [14] of the order in Hayes Forest Services Ltd. v. Krawczyk, 2005 BCCA 17 (CanLII), under s. 19(1) of the Court of Appeal Act;
That they failed to observe the principles regarding the sufficiency of pleading an “arguable case” as set out in paras. [19], [20] and [56] of JTG Management Services Ltd. v. Bank of Nanjing Co. Ltd., 2015 BCCA 200; Madam Justice Kirkpatrick concurred with that order;
That the BCCA Division and the single justices previously involved erred in law or in principle when they failed to realize that none of the issues between the parties have ever been judicially determined: no lover court has ever issued a final order that determined, even if in part, the substantive rights of the parties to the controversies;

Dated at the City of Red Deer, the Province of Alberta this 24th day of January, 2019.

SIGNED BY

____________________________________ _____________________________________

Applicant (self-represented litigant) Agent (not applicable)

Zoltan Andrew Simon

72 Best Crescent,

Red Deer, AB T4R 1H6

Fax number: (403) 341-3300

Phone number: none

Email address: zasimon@hotmail.com

ORIGINAL TO: THE REGISTRAR (Supreme Court of Canada)

COPIES TO:

(a) The Attorney General of Canada C/o Ms. Alison Brown, Counsel, Department of Justice, 900 – 840 Howe Street, Vancouver, BC V6Z 2S9, Phone: (604) 775-6113, Fax: (604) 666-4399. Email: alison.brown@justice.gc.ca

(b) The Attorney General of British Columbia C/o Andrea K. Glen, Counsel, Ministry of Attorney General, Legal Services Branch – Civil Litigation, 1301 – 865 Hornby Street, Vancouver, BC V6Z 2G3, Phone: (604) 660-3093, Fax: (604) 660-3567, Email: Andrea.Glen@gov.bc.ca

NOTICE TO THE RESPONDENT OR INTERVENER: A respondent or intervener may serve and file a memorandum in response to this application for leave to appeal within 30 days after the day on which a file is opened by the Court following the filing of this application for leave to appeal or, if a file has already been opened, within 30 days after the service of this application for leave to appeal. If no response is filed within that time, the Registrar will submit this application for leave to appeal to the Court for consideration under section 43 of the Supreme Court Act.

Continuation of the above document that the Trudeau government is preventing the Supreme Court of Canada to read

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENT

PART I – A concise overview of the appellants’ position with issues of public importance

This is a case of extreme constitutional and social importance that has never been heard on its merits during the last twelve years. The three appellants form a family since 2006 but the governments of Canada and British Columbia keep separating them by force and unconstitutional means. So far the Crown parties did not in fact make any disclosure or give any credible and lawful explanation for the torts. It is inconceivable to assume that the Crown’s policies introduced in 2006 were aimed to destroy a single family, that of the instant appellants, because then the latter did not yet know each other. It seems that the Harper government, in January 2006, decided to “streamline” Canada and the laws of the land, by cutting corners, creating unconstitutional policies, and superimpose them over the legislation, Parliament’s will. One of them was the the Immigration Manual “IP 2 Processing Application to Sponsor Members of the Family Class”, in extensive use since 2006, and another one the MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) that the minister responsible for CIC signed with a CRA commissioner in June 2006. These federal policies knowingly mislead every public servant.
Each civil servant has been coerced to strictly obey them and ignore the relevant legislation since the policies contravened the laws. Section 146 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act [IRPA] clearly prescribes that, if a minister wants to garnishee a sponsorship debt claim of the provincial or federal Crown, he or she shall file and register a ministerial certificate in the Federal Court within 30 days after the sponsor’s default (when the sponsored person receives social assistance benefits for the first time). This basic obligation of the Crown is clear from s. 146 of the IRPA. The correct statutory interpretation has been examined and confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII). The said SCC case refers about seven times to the obligation or need for such ministerial certificate.
The manual or policy named IP 2 mentions five times that the sponsors in the family class sign a contract (not an agreement) when sponsoring a family member. Such claim or allegation is untrue since the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations is silent about any contract: its subsection 132 (4) only mentions the words “agreement” and “declaration” which are not contracts. The contents of the “Sponsorship Agreement” and “Undertaking” are harmonious with ss. 132 (4) of the IRP Regulations since they state that in case of a default, the minister may take the sponsor to a court of competent jurisdiction, represent the sponsored person, and sue the sponsor for damages. There is no lawful garnishment based on agreements without a court order. The Crown’s seizures have degenerated the IRPA into a money extortion scheme.
In practice, except perhaps a few cases like Manitoba v. Khaleghi-Hashemian, 2002 MBQB 1 (CanLII), no minister has ever taken the defaulting sponsors to court. The registries of the Federal Court do not even seem to have a book or an electronic file where such “ministerial certificates” could be filed or registered. The ministers, openly disobeying s. 146 of the IRPA and the SCC order in Mavi, supra, simply seize the amounts of their uncertified debt claims from the sponsors’ credit accounts with Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) without the involvement of the Federal Court, or any court.
As for the MOU, it purposefully misleads the public servants by a misrepresentation of s. 146 of the IRPA: by the removal of its heading, it gives them a false impression that a minister may take the sponsors monies by filing a ministerial certificate in the Federal Court (but he or she can do the same thing without any certification). Thus, the MOU is tortious by unlawfully removing an important part of the key sentence, in order to choose an interpretation which serves to nullify Parliament’s legislative intent.
One cannot see any difference between a money extortion scheme and the cruel ambitious extortion scheme of the Crown through its unlawful immigration policies. The effect is the same, regardless if one calls them civil, quasi-criminal, or criminal torts. In addition, as a result of the extortion scheme, the sponsored spouses, often with their children, are cruelly separated from their sponsors. This is a contravention of sections 8 and 12 of the Charter (Constitution Act, 1982). The forced separation of spouses and their children, or their collective punishment, is a contravention of several sections of the Geneva Conventions Act as well.
The Harper government killed two birds with one stone by such “streamlining” of immigration in the family class: (a) it unlawfully reduced the number of eligible immigrants in order to get more votes from some “old stock Canadians” and (b) sent the monies seized from the sponsors’ accounts with the CRA to provincial ministries as gifts, without any lawful explanation. Let alone that most of the re-victimized sponsors, after losing large amounts of money, would probably never sign another sponsorship agreement again. One may mention that the CRA, apparently under the Crown’s pressure, participates in a money laundering process as well, by claiming that it had to obey the orders of the provincial ministers when the CRA seized credit monies of the re-victimized sponsors. The CRA’s excuse is unsupported by any legislation.
The Crown denies issuance of Canadian immigrant visas in cases where sponsorship debt is suspected, regardless that it is unable to demonstrate any debt of the sponsors, or legal grounds for such debt claims. Thus, an ambitious and cruel money extortion scheme prevents the immigration of thousands of persons in the family class, who would be ideal new Canadians, ready to fit into society quickly by the help of their sponsors. The Harper government’s scheme, inherited by the Liberals, will cause serious difficulties for Canadians within a few decades when less tax dollars of less good immigrants should pay their pension benefits. On the other hand, the provincial ministries consider such scheme as a guaranteed investment: often they improperly pay unnecessary assistance for sponsored persons and then send the bills to the sponsors a decade later, adding interests based on unlawfully high interest rates. [Governments from political right to left accept the money extortion scheme due to greed.]
Allowing the CRA and CIC to operate a cruel money extortion and laundering scheme by the apparent approval of the Attorneys General and the ministers of finance will dwarf many provisions of the Charter, immigration law and financial law, by the elimination of the power of Canadian courts nationwide. “The genius of the nation” has placed the registrars and administrators of court registries above the courts themselves. For example, the Registrar of the SCC usurps the power of the 9-Justice Division: placing himself above the Supreme Court, he habitually prevented our filing of notices of appeal under s. 61 of the Supreme Court Act.

A concise statement of the facts

The main appellant, Z.A. Simon, sponsored an ex-wife, Ms. M. Reyes, in January 1999. [He relied on the promises of the Sponsorship Agreement – not contract – that in case of a breach the Crown may take the sponsor to any court of competent jurisdiction. This was a “causa sine qua non” for him.] She arrived in Canada as a landed immigrant in December 1999. The sponsor could not fulfill her financial demands so she started to abuse him verbally and physically. He moved out in June 2000, losing his rent-to-own property, while she found a wealthier husband in the same apartment building. In the meantime, she applied for social benefits in BC. The administrators sent her to English courses for four years but never asked her (before 2005) to work. In October 2000, the sponsor defaulted on his sponsorship agreement but BC has never sent him a financial statement of the Crown’s assistance paid to Ms. Reyes, and never raised a debt claim against him. The default took place under ss. 135 (a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, and under s. 118 [originally s. 120] of the old Immigration Act, 1976, see https://pier21.ca/sites/default/files/gallery/12517/i-30456-069.jpg when the IRPA did not yet exist: it came into power in June 2002 while the default took place in October 2000. The provincial and federal Crown failed to file and register a ministerial certificate within 30 days after the default, under s. 146 of the (non-existent) IRPA, or take the sponsor to a court under the still governing Immigration Act, 1976.
Z.A. Simon divorced in 2002 and married the co-applicant Ms. Zhong in December 2006 in China. She was 44 and her son, Mr. Ye, was 15 years old when Z. A. Simon sponsored them in February 2007. In April 2007, a Canadian visa officer in Hong Kong refused to issue their Canadian landed immigrant visas, on the sole ground of subsection 133(1)(g)(i) of the IRP Regulations, the default of a sponsorship undertaking (in the previous Reyes sponsorship). The Crown has never revealed the source of the visa officer’s conclusion of Z.A. Simon’s alleged debt. It may have been the single page signed by a BC official, S. Postuk, submitting a false statement with an untrue allegation that the debt of Z. Simon was enforceable in March 2007;
Since 2007, the ministers of the Crown involved are adamant in punishing the family because they had revealed a profitable but quasi-criminal money extortion scheme that contravened c. 60 sections or subsections of the legislation. (In 2016, a Canadian visa officer in Hong Kong refused to issue her an immigrant visa after a decade-long marriage, claiming without any evidence that Ms. Zhong married Z.A. Simon only in order to enjoy the privileges in Canada.);
Seeing that the ministers of Canada and British Columbia are determined to separate family members by force and unlawful means endlessly, the only solution for the instant applicants is to sue the Crown’s tortfeasors for damages. Since the Federal Court’s Registry refused to file their appeal from a recent decision of the IRB/IAD, there is no way to file an application for judicial review, and s. 72 of the IRPA forbids an appeal in FCA. If the largest money extortion scheme in Canadian history is “too big to fail”, our claim like the one in Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., [2010] 3 SCR 585, 2010 SCC 62 (CanLII) could eventually succeed.
As for the actual material facts during 2017 and 2018, they are summarized well in the Oral Reasons for Judgment written by Kirkpatrick J.A. on 22 November 2018.
The Vancouver registry of the BC CA demonstrated a habitually negative attitude by the repeated violations of several court rules. Its administrators and registrars – particularly Ms. Littlejohn – kept acting as an extended arm of the Crown parties and as a wedge that forcefully separated the instant applicants from the Court(s). The Registry’s employees are smart and understand that both Crown counsel are unable to come up with any legally acceptable evidence or argument in order to defend efficiently the tortfeasors against the specific allegations. Thus, both Counsel (to the AGs) are allowed to sit back and relax, leave the “dirty work” to the Registry, and finally write a bill of costs against the applicant – as a routine part of a psychological warfare against Z.A. Simon and his family. But the proceedings are always tainted and procedural, not resembling judicial at all. Our appeal is confirming the rule that abuse of process – here constituted by the Crown parties – is almost always procedural. A breach or denial of procedural fairness typically results in a decision being fatally tainted.

PART II: A concise statement of the questions in issue

The questions in issue are constantly changing: the Crown’s issues are very different from the issues of the applicants. There were three further key issues for the Court: one for Madam Justice Bennett, one for Mr. Justice Groberman, and one for the 3-Justice Division of BCCA.
The applicants’ position is that parties do not fight against courts or registries but against each other. Courts do not suffer any damage if a party’s submission receives a stamp of the registry showing a delay of ten days or so. The courts in our case state that the Crown parties received copies of the originating appeal document in time and there was no prejudice for them.
The circumstance that more and more court registries in Canada wish to turn the courts into their playgrounds, by usurping the powers of the justices, played a key role here.
The Reasons of Bennett J.A. was unwilling to grant Z.A. Simon and extension of time to appeal when there was no need for any extension. (The Registry coerced him to file an application for extension of time, when the application for leave to appeal has already been filed. Simply, the Registry refused to accept the next document prescribed by the Rules. The Crown parties were silent and have not filed any motion in order to defeat the possible or alleged “irregularity.”)
In this procedural nightmare artificially created by the Assistant Registrar, the three “courts” arrived at three different conclusions. Bennett J.A. found that there was a ten-day delay “for unknown reasons.” Groberman J.A. found that there was no actual delay or prejudice, only “technical errors and deficiencies in the document” submitted to the registry. The 3-Justice Division improperly speculated that “It was entirely appropriate to accept that Mr. Simon’s arguments were raised before Madam Justice Bennett and were rejected.” The truth is that Bennett J.A. was so overwhelmed during the short hearing with 3 or 4 other motions that she had no time to examine the timeliness issue at all, so she referred to “unknown reasons.” Maybe she only asked the parties’ confirmation about the existence of an appeal document bearing a 26 September 2017 stamp, and all parties may have agreed on that fact that was unimportant.

PART III: A concise statement of argument

The BCCA Division introduced a third legal theory, claiming in para [12]: “The operative word is ‘filing’. That means the point in time at which the Registry accepts the document and stamps it with the date on which it becomes operative. The Registry is not obliged to accept for filing documents that it considers irregular.” Such “cherry picking” approach is erroneous in law or in principle, in light of R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII). The wording “accepts the document and stamps it with the date” is misleading because it refers to two dates: the Registry “accepted the document” of Z.A. Simon on 5 September 2017 but it remained silent for a week, between 5 and 12 of September. The Registry failed to issue a decision stating a refusal of filing. Thus, it had been accepted but – between 12 and 26 September – Ms. Littlejohn tried to coerce the applicants to delete the names of Ms. Zhong and Mr. Ye, or/and, the words “to proceed as an appeal” – from the style of cause unlawfully. Please refer to para. [8] (8) of the 22 November 2018 Oral Reasons for Judgment.
Only a BCCA Division of 5 or more justices has the power to undermine, overturn, or collaterally attack the key principle determined in a similar BCCA decision of three judges, in R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII). The three judges lacked jurisdiction in November 2018.
The second major question of law: Is a single justice or a Division allowed to disobey two sections of the Court of Appeal Act, namely sections 10 (2) (a) and 19 (1)? Are “technical errors or deficiencies” introduced by an administrator of a registry able to terminate an appeal in cases where the issues and controversies have never been heard on their merits? Should the answer be affirmative, was the Hayes Forest Services Ltd. v. Krawczyk, 2005 BCCA 17 (CanLII) wrongly decided? Again, a 3-Justice Division had no jurisdiction to decide on these.
The Crown has failed to reveal since 2007 whether it had denied the 20 to 60 breaches of the legislation, or, it had admitted such contraventions but considered all of them acceptable.
Now, the recurring and predetermined “lack of merit” allegation for the applicants’ pleadings: No Court of BC has ever determined any of the material facts. The Crown disagreed on all of our 193 material factual allegations pleaded in 2014, and all of the 347 paragraphs pleaded in 2017. Counsel’s habitual nondisclosure regarding the facts is the worst type of abuse of process, with their false or misleading statements. The Crown has never been able to propose a different version of material facts so the courts have always been kept in darkness. The decisions of the courts, accepting the Crown’s submissions and sweeping allegations, indicate that the Crown was always held credible but the Z.A. Simon and his family always unreliable.
Since 2007, several judges of the federal court system heard different aspects of the issues, mainly from the immigration point of view. Obviously, any of those courts would have been able to deliver a final judgment by granting a substantive right to the Crown against Z.A. Simon and his family members. Such order have never been issued. This is a clear and admirable indication of the seriousness and impartiality of each and every federal justice involved.
None of the federal justices involved have ever determined the fact if a “contract” has or has not existed between the Crown and Z.A. Simon. The only judge commenting on this crucial factor was the Honourable Mr. Justice Zinn in Simon v. Canada, 2010 FC 617 (CanLII), but he did not even mention the word “contract”, only “agreement.” Both federal and provincial judges have avoided this sticky issue because, on the authority of Duong v. Waterloo North Hydro Inc., 2004 CanLII 6241 (ON SC) and Bilson et al. v. Kokotow et al., 1978 CanLII 1632 (ON CA), or Bilson v. Kokotow et al., 1975 CanLII 771 (ON SC) one finds: “Under the long-established doctrine of privity of contract, only the original parties to a contract acquire or are exposed to liability.” The Crown has never been a signatory to any contract or agreement with Z.A. Simon. He signed an agreement with Ms. Reyes only. The Crown had the right to represent her at a court but failed to take any action against him within the (then) 6-year limitation period after the default in October 2000. If the Crown rightfully seized Z.A. Simon’s alleged but uncertified debt and separated the family members from each other for 12 years without any court order, then these three common law cases and Markevich v. Canada, [2003] 1 SCR 94, 2003 SCC 9 (CanLII) may have been wrongfully decided. That is very unlikely;
The applicant respectfully submits that if two to four ministers, both in the governments of BC and Canada, are entitled to enjoy a cruel game that serves the eternal punishment of the re-victimized sponsors and their family members, the Crown should eventually pay a price for such entertainment. If the money extortion and forced separation scheme need to survive, the Crown should assign a fund and compensate the most unfortunate victims or whistleblowers.
It needs to be mentioned that at the time of the default (October 2000) the old Immigration Act, 1976 and its former Immigration Regulations, 1978 S.O.R./78-172 were in effect, and by Ms. Reyes’ landing in Canada in December 1999 her immigration file was closed. There was no pending proceeding, matter, or immigration file under section 190 of the IRPA. The visa officer in 2007, when considering the debt claim originating in October 2000, should have considered the former legislation, not the IRPA and its IRP Regulations. The IRB was unwilling to reopen that issue as a denial of natural justice in 2007. Thus, our only remedy is a claim for damages.
The CRA, starting in June 2008, violated the federal and provincial limitation acts and s. 32 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, RSC 1985, c C-50. The latter act and the Limitation Act(s) prescribe that the Crown’s action “shall be taken within six years after the cause of action arose.” In our case at bar, CRA seized the applicant’s monies c. 8 years after the default.
The CRA and the Government of BC calculated an illegal compound interest of approximately 6.37% per annum, contrary to 5% in sections 3 and 4 of the Interest Act, RSC 1985, c I-15;
The BC justices involved have never utilized the “plain and obvious test”, perhaps due to their shortage of time. This leads us to the final question in issue: Are justices of British Columbia allowed to skip the plain and obvious test? Is the application of such test discretional for them?
The BC justices involved erred in law because none of the issues was res judicata since all of them remained unresolved, or the Court kept refusing to exercise its jurisdiction under the BC Supreme Court Act and the Court of Appeal Act on the basis of unconstitutional public policy. See the somewhat comparable C.M.S. v. C.J.S., 2002 BCSC 1314 (CanLII);
The BC justices involved, particularly the 3-Justice Division failed to observe a principle of natural justice or otherwise acted beyond or “refused to exercise its jurisdiction” as expressed on page 421 of Ex parte Kolot, 1973 CanLII 1411 (BC SC), in para. 36 of Mooring v. Canada (National Parole Board), 1994 CanLII 3359 (BC CA), in para. [19] of R. v. Henyu, 1979 CanLII 508 (BC CA), or in Re Jung et al. and Sam, 1975 CanLII 1016 (BC CA);
The BC justices involved misguidedly elevated form over substance, ignoring and disobeying the principle set by the Supreme Court of Canada that form or “procedure must not trump substance, otherwise justice could be set aside prior to complete or final analysis by procedural (or technical) sophism.” See Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, para. 23 of Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 SCR 643, 1985 CanLII 23 (SCC): “the denial of a right to a fair hearing must always render a decision invalid, whether or not it may appear to a reviewing court that the hearing would likely have resulted in a different decision.” Also, p. 1133 of Duquet v. Town of Sainte-Agathe, [1977] 2 SCR 1132, 1976 CanLII 13 (SCC); Construction Gilles Paquette ltée v. Entreprises Végo ltée, [1997] 2 SCR 299, 1997 CanLII 352 (SCC); R. v. Litchfield, 1993 CanLII 44 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 333, and Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., [2001] 2 SCR 460, 2001 SCC 44 (CanLII). The last two cases are very similar to our situation at bar. PLEASE NOTE THAT THE ONLINE SYSTEM RENUMBERED THE PARAGRAPHS ABOVE, STARTING FROM #1 AFTER EACH GAP. THIS IS PARAGRAPH 35 IN THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT.

The grounds of appeal are:

36. The decisions of three courts/justices contained several palpable and overriding errors, including errors in law, errors in principle, and misapprehension of the facts and evidence (if they considered any evidence at all when striking out the pleadings):

37. The Honourable Mr. Justice Groberman erred in law and principle when he

38. refused an extension of time for Z.A. Simon request to file his applications to vary an order of a justice, the alleged “order of Madam Justice Bennett” as cited from the November 22 decision, because such “Order” did not exist when Mr. Justice Groberman pronounced his decision, not even today, so time has not yet started to run regarding the 30 days limit;

39. overlooked the circumstance that a party cannot be “late” without an initiating point in time that supposed to start the reckoning of days;

40. overlooked the wording “after the order was made” in subsection 34 (1) of the Rules (which allows a party, “within 7 days after the order was made, prepare a notice of application…”) because no order was made and signed by Madam Justice Bennett before the issuance of the Honourable Mr. Justice Groberman’s Reasons;

41. overlooked the fact that none of the parties have drawn up an order, and completely overlooked subsection 47(3)(c) of the Court of AppealRules prescribing that an “order”“must”, “in the case of an order of a justice, be in Form 25.” (There was no such “order” in Form 25 before the Honourable Mr. Justice Groberman so time has not yet started to run.);

42. overlooked the crucial fact that the Vancouver Registry (BCCA) failed to mail a copy of the February 16 Oral Reasons of Madam Justice Bennett until March 14, and the main appellant received that document only on 20 March 2018;

43. paid little or no attention to the wording of ss. 34 (1) of the Court of AppealRules, “within 7 days after the order was made” that shall be interpreted as “within 7 days after the order was made available” for a party, pursuant to s. 12 of the Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21 and s. 8 of the Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996;

44. although he understood and correctly pointed out the technical irregularities during the filing, causing some delay, he exceeded his jurisdiction by acting against section 19 (1) the Court of Appeal Act, “No appeal to be defeated by irregularities… An appeal is not defeated by an irregularity or preliminary procedural objection” – and he forgot to mention as well that the irregularities were caused by the Registry and not by the appellant;

45. as a single judge, Mr. Groberman had no jurisdiction to defeat the appeal on the grounds of irregularities introduced by the Registry;

46. exceeded his jurisdiction and acted without jurisdiction, against 19 (1) of the Court of Appeal Act which does not allow irregularities to end an appeal, that renders his decision a nullity;

47. exceeded his jurisdiction or contravened 10 (2) (a) of the Court of Appeal Act since his order was not “incidental to the appeal or matter not involving a decision of the appeal on the merits”: The cornerstone of his decision was his assumption that the appeal had no merits;

48. if he had the opportunity to read the Oral Reasons of the Honourable Madam Justice Bennett which – just like the prior decisions of Donegan, J. and Ball J. – mentioned the 20 to 60 possible grounds of action disclosed in Z.A. Simon’s pleadings, it was patently unreasonable to assume that those 20-60 possible causes of actions constituted zero merit;

49. ignored a main principle as follow: As for the speedy determination of Z.A. Simon’s appeal, the so-called gap rule applies: namely, Rule 1-3 (1) and (2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009 prescribe, “The object of these rules is to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on its merits” with proportionality;

50. As a single Justice, he had no jurisdiction to create a situation that contravened sections 8, 11 (b), (d), 12, 15 (1), 24 (1) and 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, a.k.a. the Charter;

51. He had no jurisdiction to override or undermine section 12 of the Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21 “Every enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects”, and section 8 of the Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996, c 238, “Every enactment must be construed as being remedial, and must be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.” Since 2007, the Crown caused the injuries of the applicants and not the other way around, so the Act is remedial for that;

52. As a single Justice, he had no jurisdiction to ignore or override the decision of a three-justice Division of the BCCA in R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII), referred to by Z.A. Simon;

53. The above paragraphs clearly show that the chambers judge erred in law and principle, and was wrong in the legal sense. Disobeying subsections 19 (1) and 10 (2) (a) of the Court of Appeal Act, overlooking and ignoring subsections 34 (1) and 47 (3)(c) of the Court of Appeal Rules, let alone a few sections of the Constitution Act, 1982 (the Charter), with section 12 of the Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21 and section 8 of the Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996, c 238 constitute demonstrated cumulative palpable and overriding errors;

54. [Thus, the last sentences of the Summary on page 3 of the Oral Reasons for Judgment are wrong in fact and law. The Division made a decision in a hurry, without considering or examining the crucial facts and questions of law before them as if courts were horse races.];

55. [He] improperly speculated that “It appears to me, therefore, that Bennett J.A. must have considered the argument, determined that the tendered document was defective, and concluded that the Registry acted properly in rejecting it.” A Justice should not go by the “appearance”; his speculation is not supported by the audio record of the hearing before Bennett J.A.: she may have “concluded” that the Registry’s stamp showed the 26 September 2017 date and the parties agreed on that fact during the hearing. She was so overwhelmed by hearing the other lengthy motions of the parties that had no time to examine the alleged “late filing” issue at the hearing, but weeks later, as an afterthought, she looked at the date stamp and created a “late filing” theory without factual support; The ignored “extension of time” or “lateness” issue jumped to the first place from nowhere in her Oral Reasons, making the impression that the details of those issues have been heard on their merits during the hearing.

56. The Honourable Madam Justice Bennett erred in law and principle when she

57. refused an extension of time for Z.A. Simon request for extension of time to file his Notice of Appeal because he clearly indicated that there was no need for extension of time since the Registry admitted receipt of it on 5 September 2017; also see our para. 55 above;

58. overlooked or ignored the fact that Z.A. Simon has brought his appeal in a timely manner, pursuant to subsections 14 (1) (2) and (3) of the Court of Appeal Act, RSBC 1996, c 77;

59. apparently arbitrarily raised subsections 3 (b) and (c) of the Court of AppealRules above s. 14 of the Court of Appeal Act where the latter enactment does NOT require “filed copies”;

60. misconstrued the facts in her para. [13] because Z.A. Simon has never admitted that he had been late in filing his initiating document, only that the Registry prevented to put a “filed” stamp on it in a timely manner; failed to notify the appellant that she was not satisfied with the information provided during the hearing regarding the timeliness of the filing;

61. exceeded her jurisdiction by acting against section 19 (1) the Court of Appeal Act, “No appeal to be defeated by irregularities… An appeal is not defeated by an irregularity or preliminary procedural objection” – and she forgot to mention as well that the irregularities were caused by the Registry and not by the appellant;

62. wrote in her para. [14] about Z.A. Simon’s appeal documents “However, they were not filed in time for unclear reasons” then she built her further assumptions on those unclear reasons, incorrectly concluding that the alleged delay has been caused by the appellant. [Emphasis added.];

63. although she correctly explained in her para. [15] that “Mr. Simon filed a notice of application for leave to appeal because he did not want to be in contempt of the order of the chambers judge declaring him a vexatious litigant” then she unreasonably punished him for obeying the (improper) decision of Mr. Justice Ball; overlooked case law that granted immunity for a party for the negative consequences of obeying a decision of a Court;

64. erred in law by stating or implying that Mr. Justice Ball’s decision was correct and there was no merit in challenging it, although a bit earlier she correctly indicated that the proper way to proceed would have been by notice of appeal and not by application for leave to appeal – meaning or indicating that the decision of Mr. Justice Ball was improper;

65. failed to emphasize that the Honourable Mr. Justice Ball exceeded his jurisdiction when he ordered Z.A. Simon to proceed at every court, including the Court of Appeal, only by way of application for leave to appeal; failed to realize that the jurisdictional error of Mr. Justice Ball has caused Z.A. Simon a fatal prejudice because the applicant was unable to obey two lords – the Court of Appeal Act/Rules and the judgment of Mr. Justice Ball at the same time;

66. eventually punished Z.A. Simon for showing the words “to proceed as a notice of appeal” as a subtitle in his style of cause, despite confirming in her Oral Reasons that the proper way to proceed was by notice of appeal;

67. overlooked the circumstance that the administrators turning the Court into their playground was a factor beyond Z.A. Simon’s control;

68. overlooked the circumstance that there is no section in the BC Court of Appeal Act or Rules and in Canadian case law granting special rights to administrators of court registries allowing them to usurp the powers of the courts directly or indirectly;

69. assumed unreasonably that the Registry had a privilege to procrastinate and delay the filing of any document for a week without any reason if the document substantially complied with the forms prescribed by the Court of Appeal Rules, and without sending out the document immediately to the Court for direction;

70. assumed that in the case of a filing dilemma the Court does not need to issue directions to the Registry or the party, so an administrator without the Court’s involvement may do that;

71. erred in law when she overlooked the rare and unprecedented circumstance that an administrator of the Registry unlawfully coerced the appellant to remove the names of the two co-appellants from the style of cause: only the Court had authority to do that;

72. erred in law by assuming that the registrars had the power to do major editing in the style of cause and the text and/or refuse the filing of a document that complied with all of the requirements prescribed by ss. 54 (1)(a) to (d) of the Court of Appeal Rules;

73. erred in law by assuming that such editing and delaying tactics by the Registry, an extended arm of the Crown parties, was proper and acceptable without her intervention;

74. exceeded her jurisdiction and contravened 10(2)(a) of the Court of Appeal Act since his order was not “incidental to the appeal or matter not involving a decision of the appeal on the merits”; rather, a cornerstone of his decision was an assumption that the appeal had no merits;

75. exceeded her jurisdiction and acted without jurisdiction, against the Court of AppealRules, that renders her decision a nullity;

76. as she had the opportunity to read the Oral Reasons of the Honourable Madam Justice Donegan and/or the Honourable Mr. Justice Ball, both mentioning the 20 to 60 possible grounds of causes of action properly pleaded by Z.A. Simon, it was patently unreasonable to assume automatically that those 20-60 possible causes of actions constituted zero merit;

77. ignored a main principle as follow: As for the speedy determination of Z.A. Simon’s appeal, the so-called gap rule applies: namely, Rule 1-3 (1) and (2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009 prescribe, “The object of these rules is to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on its merits” based on proportionality;

78. As a single Justice, she had no jurisdiction to create a situation that contravened sections 8, 11 (b), (d), 12, 15 (1), 24 (1) and 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 (the Charter);

79. She had no jurisdiction to override or undermine section 12 of the Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21 “Every enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects”, and section 8 of the Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996, c 238, “Every enactment must be construed as being remedial, and must be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.”;

80. As a single Justice, she had no jurisdiction to ignore, override or collaterally attack two decisions of three-justice divisions of the BC Court of Appeal, properly referred to by the appellant, namely the governing and practically identical R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII) case and Hayes Forest Services Ltd. v. Krawczyk, 2005 BCCA 17 (CanLII), under s. 19(1) of the Court of Appeal Act;

81. The above paragraphs clearly show that the chambers judge erred in law and principle, and was wrong in the legal sense. Disobeying subsections 19 (1) and 10 (2) (a) of the Court of Appeal Act, overlooking and ignoring subsections 54 (1)(a) to (d) of the Court of Appeal Rules, let alone a few sections of the Constitution Act, 1982 (the Charter), with section 12 of the Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21 and section 8 of the Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996, c 238 constitute demonstrated cumulative palpable and overriding errors;

82. On 22 November 2018, a Division of three Honourable Justices (BCCA) erred in law and/or principle when they

83. repeated and/or confirmed the errors of the two previous justices as we referred them in our paragraphs from 37 to 84above;

84. uncritically echoed the long list of conclusions forming palpable and overriding errors of the previous two single BCCA justices and Mr. Justice Ball (BCSC), without examining the relevant legislation of BC and Canada, including several acts and rules; therefore, the last sentences of the Summary on page 3 of the Oral Reasons for Judgment pronounced on 22 November 2018 are wrong in fact and law because the three BC justices involved (in 2017 and 2018) erred in law, principle, misconstrued the facts and were wrong in the legal sense;

85. assumed the correctness of the order of Mr. Justice Ball related to section 18 of theSupreme Court Act, RSBC 1996, c 443 which goes, “If, on application by any person, the court is satisfied that a person has habitually, persistently and without reasonable grounds, instituted vexatious legal proceedings in the Supreme Court or in the Provincial Court against the same or different persons, the court may, after hearing that person or giving him or her an opportunity to be heard, order that a legal proceeding must not, without leave of the court, be instituted by that person in any court.” I.e., Mr. Justice Ball considered that two past court cases in BC constituted habitual and persistent vexatious legal proceedings: Z. A. Simon took Ms. Lipsack, an individual employee of the BC Crown, to the Provincial Court in 2009, then he filed a claim in 2014 at the Supreme Court in Golden but a formal Order of Madam Justice Donegan following the latter claim has never been issued and entered;

86. erred in law or in principle by supporting Mr. Justice Ball’s 2017 Order since an average intelligent person would say that a legal proceeding instituted, directly or indirectly, for a family’s reunification after a decade of forced separation is a proper ground. They failed to note that an informed outsider may find bias in Mr. Justice Ball’s order though Z. Simon does not claim it: he may have turned unreasonable under 12 years of psychological warfare;

87. overlooked the circumstance that the alleged “late filing” or the need for “extension of time” did not surface during the hearing before Madam Justice Bennett, and the appellant did not get any indication on that day that there would be a missing information, dilemma or “unclear reasons” before Bennett J.A., so he was not allowed and was unable to clarify the details of the unlawful interference and procrastination caused by the Assistant Registrar;

88. ignored that not allowing the appellant to clarify the alleged “unclear reasons” – that he has properly clarified in his pleadings and affidavits before the hearing – constituted a procedural unfairness against the appellant because he could not imagine during the hearing before Bennett J.A. that the unheard issues of “delay” due to “unclear reasons” would form the cornerstone of Madam Justice Bennett’s reasoning several weeks later – when she could not remember anymore each fading detail of the hearing clearly;

89. overlooked the critical fact that the two BC CA justices arrived to different conclusions: Madam Justice Bennett incorrectly assumed, based on her “unclear reasons”, that the delay in the filing was caused by Z.A. Simon, while Mr. Justice Groberman correctly concluded that there was no real delay in the filing and serving the initiating document, only a technical irregularity caused it – but he forgot to mention that the Registry has caused the irregularity;

90. relied on the following, in their para. [4], “Madam Justice Bennett concluded the appeal was meritless. That conclusion was fatal to the test to extend time to commence the appeal.”

91. unreasonably asserted that there was a delay in the filing on the appellant’s behalf, and speculated that the appeal was meritless;

92. unreasonably equated the words “asserted” and “concluded”, ignoring the important circumstance that Madam Justice Bennett has not examined the merits at all, only automatically echoed the opinion of Mr. Justice Ball, who followed the opinion of Madam Justice Donegan who, in turn, completely relied on both Counsel’s false statements of 2014;

93. ignored the facts and material factual allegations in the earlier notices of civil claims submitted by Z.A. Simon, explaining in 193 and 347 paragraphs the true facts, calling attention of the courts to the false statements and sweeping allegations of Counsel that intended to mislead the courts; the continuous tainted procedures have been ignored;

94. ignored the crucial circumstance that the appellants have never been allowed to show any evidence in any court; no Canadian court has ever determined the substantive rights between the parties at bar by any final judgment, so the Crown’s habitual false allegations about the appellant’s alleged abuse of process by “res judicata” have been absurd and untrue;

95. though the three honourable justices were correct in their paragraph [7], pronounced on 22 November 2018, “[I]f Mr. Simon had established before Madam Justice Bennett that his notice of appeal was filed within the 30 days mandated by s. 14(1) of the Court of Appeal Act, then no extension of time was required.” Yes, he has established that fact in his pleadings and affidavits that have been – or should have been – before Bennett J.A. She did not ask him during the hearing for further proofs, details or explanations about the filing issues, giving the impression for the parties that everything has been clear for her. A party has no right to be pushy and interrupt a justice by telling facts and answers without questions or invitations of the judge: that would be impolite and improper during a hearing;

96. though the three BCCA justices got the picture correctly in para. [8], they erred in assuming an “order” of Madam Justice Bennett: Oral reasons are comparable to a fetus that becomes an “Order” just like when a fetus becomes a “child.” As a store cannot sue a fetus in a court if the mother steals a cake to satisfy the craving of her fetus, a party cannot properly appeal Reasons for Judgment without a judgment. Reasons without orders are not orders at all;

97. The Registry mailed him the 16 February 2018 Oral Reasons of Madam Justice Bennett on 14 March 2108. He received it from his landlord on March 20. Not even Superman could appeal a decision in a timely manner if the Registry fails to mail it for 4 weeks. The earlier allegation of the Registry – that no one knew who Zoltan A. Simon was – is bizarre because that phone number belonged to his niece. Maybe the Registry dialed a wrong number once;

98. As for para. [9], he is able to explain the delay of the Registry: Counsel for the attorneys general were unable to come up with any reasonable defence or explanation since 2007, so the Crown utilizes the registries as its extended arms. Administrators of court registries receive their pay cheques from the governments, not from the courts. Thus, an average person understands the motives of the Registry in its habitual mala fide delays and procrastination;

99. As for para. [12], the three honourable justices allege that the operative word is “filing” but they seem to be wrong in law by writing, “That means the point in time at which the Registry accepts the document and stamps it with the date on which it becomes operative.” They do not support such theory by any common law or enactment. The “stamping” theory is not governing in Canadian case law precedents at all. While the date of the stamp is usually a good indicator, it is not determinative. See Groeneveld v. TransAlta Utilities Corporation, 1985 CanLII 1247 (AB QB) for a somewhat similar technical (stamping or filing) issue;

100. In our case, the Registry failed to stamp a date of receipt and a date of filing on the style of cause. Then, Madam Justice Bennett simply looked at it as an afterthought and – seeing the 26 Sept 2017 stamp only – apparently assumed that it referred to the date of the appeal document’s receipt by the Registry;

101. Since the Reasons of both justices, issued prior to the 22 November 2018 Oral Reasons for Judgment, have been made without legislative authority and by excess or lack of jurisdiction, both of them are nullities from the legal point of view, regardless their beautiful wording;

102. None of the justices involved have made an order or direction to the registry to allow electronic filing for the appellant. The Registry is adamant by its long silence. These circumstances constitute infringement of his equality rights guaranteed by the Charter: while other parties are allowed to submit documents electronically, he is not. It seems that he must suffer forever a discrimination based on residence, since he lives in Alberta, not in British Columbia. Even a delay of two or three days is fatal for the timely filing of his documents (that the registry supposed to stamp and return to him but such thing does not happen too often). Several months ago he included a prepaid, pre-addressed FEDEX box in his package sent to the Vancouver Registry but so far it has not been returned to him;

103. [The Division] improperly referred to “this protracted matter” in para [17] because so far no Canadian or BC court has heard any of the serious issues on their merits. The matter is “protracted” only procedurally but not judicially. Copying the wording “It has no merit” from earlier preliminary decisions does not mean at all that any justice has ever heard the many serious questions of law and issues of extreme social importance on their merits;

104. failed to observe the principles regarding the sufficiency of pleading an “arguable case” as set out in paras. [19], [20] and [56] of JTG Management Services Ltd. v. Bank of Nanjing Co. Ltd., 2015 BCCA 200; and Madam Justice Kirkpatrick has concurred with that order;

105. granted the appellant only 43 minutes to speak on 21 November 2018, and there were several more serious arguments of law and fact left out that he was not allowed to mention;

106. All of the British Columbia justices involved failed or refused to exercise their jurisdiction to hear the substance. See R. v. D.B.T., [1996] N.S.J. No. 11 (C.A.) (QL) and R. v. Thompson (1983), 1983 CanLII 547 (BC CA), 3 D.L.R. (4th) 642, at 651 (B.C.C.A.), and paras. [13] to [16] of Canada (Solicitor General) v. Subhaschandran, 2005 FCA 27 (CanLII); They all ignored the fact that a BC ministry admitted in 2012 that Z. Simon had no debt on record;

107. Regardless the unnecessary factual “fog” and controversies created in or by the two Reasons issued by the two chambers judges, the long list of palpable and overriding errors of law and principle remain before the Supreme Court of Canadaas a solid ground. The integrity of the whole BC Court of Appeal, the prevention of miscarriage(s) of justice, the possibility of bringing the administration of justice in disrepute, and creating a new fault line in the “stare decisis” principle (due to different interpretations of the single word “file”) militated for the intervention of a Division of 5 or 7 justices but Mr. Outerbridge, Registrar, prohibited Z.A. Simon from filing any further document, with or without the approval of the BC CA;

108. There is a “file” and at least one “filing” in each court case, and 36 million Canadians have the right to understand the real meaning of this word;

109. Since a 5-Justice Division of the BC CA is apparently unable or not allowed to decide whether there was an error in law or in principle in R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII), or such error in Simon v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 BCCA 461, the Supreme Court of Canada is the best and only forum to have the last word in the controversy;

110. Similarly, if a 5-Justice Division of the BC CA cannot hear and decide upon the pure question of law related to paragraph [14] of the order in Hayes Forest Services Ltd. v. Krawczyk, 2005 BCCA 17 (CanLII), under s. 19(1) of the (BC) Court of Appeal Act, the Supreme Court of Canada is the best and only forum to overturn the BCCA’s final decision that has terminated forever the appeals of the instant applicants in British Columbia;

111. All justices ignored para. [10] of International Taoist Church of Canada v. Ching Chung Taoist Association of Hong Kong Limited, 2011 BCCA 149 (CanLII), “An order striking a pleading could not be the basis for a res judicata defence in subsequent proceedings.”

PART IV: Submissions

112. Between 2012 and 2017, the Registry of the SCC (Mr. Roger Bilodeau or his administrative assistants) repeatedly refused to file the instant main applicant’s notices of appeal as of right, submitted clearly on three occasions under section 61 of the Supreme Court Act. Z.A. Simon always clearly referred to s. 61 and the circumstance that he alleged error in law in the lower court(s). Section 61 of the Act obliges a party to proceed automatically by a Notice of Appeal in such situations (and the submission of an application would indicate a party’s admission that no error in law took place in the lower courts). The SCC Registry always contravened s. 61, regardless Parliament’s clear legislative intent for a direct appeal: the Act does not authorize the Registrar to usurp the powers of a nine-justice division of the SCC;

113. Therefore, the appellants respectfully request this Honourable Court to convert the instant application for leave to appeal into a Notice of Appeal, pursuant to s. 61 of the Act;

114. In addition, the applicants respectfully request the Court to issue an order or direction to the Registry to return the attached $500 bank draft (security costs) to Z.A. Simon since all of the issues involved are related to important pure questions of law: a hearing is not required;

115. The applicant respectfully request the Court to grant his estimated costs in the SCC and the courts below, particularly if the SCC would not stay the BCCA and BCSC orders of 2017-8;

PART V: The order or orders sought, including the order sought with respect to costs

116. Pursuant to policies of the Court of Appeal, a declaration that that a division of three justices had no authority to ignore and disobey the earlier BC CA judgment in R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII) in a practically identical situation; only a Division of 5 or more justices are allowed to overturn an earlier decision, only if that was demonstrably wrong;

117. As a consequence of the previous paragraph, a mandamus that the whole matter to be returned to a BC CA Division of 5 or more justices for final determination of the damages, also the proper but improperly derailed appeal procedure in the BC CA to be reinstated and continued without the undue or unlawful interference of the Registry’s administrators;

118. An Order stating that the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice Ball in Simon v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 BCSC 1438 (CanLII), Docket 5675, to be stayed or set aside as a nullity because he acted beyond his jurisdiction when he ordered in his paras. [66] and 3 that “Zoltan Andrew Simon, must not, without first obtaining leave of this Court, institute or commence legal proceedings in any British Columbia court, or file applications in any existing legal proceedings in any British Columbia court”;

119. An Order that such Division of 5 Justices shall make a decision on the unsolved questions of law involving the 347 factual allegations in the case 2017 BCSC 1438 (CanLII), Docket 5675, and deliver a modified final order on the merits of the case that determines the substantive rights of the three parties involved, including damages;

120. In the alternative, an Order that the questions involving the 347 factual allegations in the 2017 BCSC 1438 (CanLII) case, Docket 5675, shall be decided on the merits of the case by a jury in Vancouver that to determine the substantive rights of the three parties involved, or that the original action shall be converted into a class action and to be decided on the merits;

121. Costs as assessed against the AGBC, or in the amount of minimum $2,100 in the BCCA, 50% of the applicant’s estimated costs in the SCC, including 50% of the main appellants’ filing and security costs in the SCC; plus his financial compensation by punitive damages caused by the Vancouver Registry’s undue, mala fide and unconstitutional delays;

122. Costs as assessed against the AGC, minimum $2,100 in the BCCA, 50% of the applicants’ estimated costs in the SCC, including 50% of the appellants’ filing and security costs there;

123. An Order stating that the Vancouver Registry to sign an “electronic services agreement” with Z.A. Simon as a “registered user” and allow him to submit his documents electronically a.s.a.p., pursuant to section 54.1 of the Court of Appeal Rules, BC Reg 297/2001;

124. An Order or Direction that would clarify the status of the Vancouver Registrar’s decision regarding costs which order has never been issued officially in the previous appeal to Z.A. Simon since March 2017, in Simon v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2016 BCCA 52 (CanLII) case; preventing him to apply to a justice for a review of the Registrar’s assessment of costs under section 10(3) of the Act and s. 70 of the Court of Appeal Rules, BC Reg 297/2001;

125. An Order for any further relief that this Honorable Court would find just and proper under these extraordinary circumstances that are unprecedented in Canadian legal history;

_________________________________

Zoltan Andrew Simon, Applicant

PART VI: A table of authorities, setting out the paragraph numbers in Part III where the authorities are cited

Case law precedent and neutral citation Our paragraph No. in Part III

Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),

1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 35

Bilson et al. v. Kokotow et al., 1978 CanLII 1632 (ON CA) 27

Bilson v. Kokotow et al., 1975 CanLII 771 (ON SC) 27

Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII) 2, 4

Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., [2010] 3 SCR 585, 2010 SCC 62 (CanLII) 13

Canada (Solicitor General) v. Subhaschandran, 2005 FCA 27 (CanLII) 107

Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 SCR 643, 1985 CanLII 23 (SCC) 35

C.M.S. v. C.J.S., 2002 BCSC 1314 (CanLII) 33

Construction Gilles Paquette ltée v. Entreprises Végo ltée, [1997] 2 SCR 299,

1997 CanLII 352 (SCC) 35

Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., [2001] 2 SCR 460, 2001 SCC 44 (CanLII) 35

Duong v. Waterloo North Hydro Inc., 2004 CanLII 6241 (ON SC) 27

Duquet v. Town of Sainte-Agathe, [1977] 2 SCR 1132, 1976 CanLII 13 (SCC) 35

Ex parte Kolot, 1973 CanLII 1411 (BC SC) 34

Groeneveld v. TransAlta Utilities Corporation, 1985 CanLII 1247 (AB QB) 99

Hayes Forest Services Ltd. v. Krawczyk, 2005 BCCA 17 (CanLII) 23, 82, 111

International Taoist Church of Canada v. Ching Chung Taoist Association

of Hong Kong Limited, 2011 BCCA 149 (CanLII) 111

JTG Management Services Ltd. v. Bank of Nanjing Co. Ltd., 2015 BCCA 200 105

Manitoba v. Khaleghi-Hashemian, 2002 MBQB 1 (CanLII) 4

Markevich v. Canada, [2003] 1 SCR 94, 2003 SCC 9 (CanLII) 27

Mooring v. Canada (National Parole Board), 1994 CanLII 3359 (BC CA) 34

Re Jung et al. and Sam, 1975 CanLII 1016 (BC CA) 34

R. v. D.B.T., [1996] N.S.J. No. 11 (C.A.) (QL) 107

R. v. Henyu, 1979 CanLII 508 (BC CA) 34

R. v. Litchfield, 1993 CanLII 44 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 333 35

R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII) 21, 22, 52, 82, 110

R. v. Thompson (1983), 1983 CanLII 547 (BC CA), 3 D.L.R. (4th) 642, at 651 (B.C.C.A.) 107

Simon v. Canada, 2010 FC 617 (CanLII) 27

Simon v. Canada, 2011 FCA 6 (CanLII) 32

Simon v. Canada, 2014 FCA 47 (CanLII) 32

PART VII – Enactments (printouts from statutes, regulations, and rules)....................... 92

Canada Revenue Agency Act, S.C. 1999, c. 17: sections 3, 5 (1)(a), 6 (1) and (2), 42 (1)...... 92

Constitution Act, 1982 (a.k.a. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms):

s. 7, 8, 11 (b), (d), 12, 15 (1), 24 (1)and 52 (1).................................................. 96

Court of Appeal Act, RSBC 1996, c 77: ss. 1 (order), 10 (2)(a), 14 (1) to (3), 19 (1)......... 100

Court of Appeal Rules, BC Reg 297/2001: ss. 1 (“bring an appeal” and “file”),

3 (b) and (c), 34 (1), 47 (3)(c), 54 (1)(a) to (d), 70............................................. 104

Court Order Enforcement Act, RSBC 1996, c 78: section 3 (under debts, obligations)......... 108

Court Order Interest Act, RSBC 1996, c 79: sections 5, 7 (1)...................................... 110

Courts Administration Service Act, S.C. 2002, c. 8: subsection 2 (b)............................. 112

Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46: ss. 19, 21 (1) and (2), 22 (1), 126 (1), 132,

134 (1), 322 (2) to (4), 337, 346 (1), 361 (1), 362 (2), 380 (1), 462.31 (1) and (2),

463, 585, 586..........................................................................................114

Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50: ss. 3 (b), 32........................ 129

Department of Citizenship and Immigration Act, S.C. 1994, c. 31: section 4................... 132

Employment and Assistance Act, SBC 2002, c 40: 8 (1)............................................. 134

Employment and Assistance Regulation, BC Reg 263/2002: ss. 1 (1) (“full-time

student”), 16 (1), 18 (1) to (3)...................................................................... 136

Family Maintenance Enforcement Act, RSBC 1996, c 127: ss. 1 (1) (“debtor”

and “maintenance order”), 14.5 (1) and (2), 15 (1) to (4), 16 (1) to (5),

17 (1) to (3), 18 (1)........................................................................................139

Family Maintenance Enforcement Act Regulation, BC Reg 346/88: subsection 6.1 (1)........ 146

Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 4

(2nd Supp.): sections 23 (1) (under “garnishable moneys” to “Minister”, “support

order” and “support provision”), 24, 26, 36, 37, 41, 45, 49................................. 148

Family Support Orders and Agreements Garnishment Regulations, SOR/88-181:

sections 3 (a) to (g), 6 (1), 8, 9, Schedule 2..................................................... 154

TABLE OF CONTENTS of VOLUME II

Federal Courts Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7: sections 19, 39 (Note: page 2 is omitted)............. 1

Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106: 449 (1) and (2), 451 (3), 452, 456 (3), 458 (2)............. 4

Financial Administration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-11: ss. 66 (Crown, Crown debt), 67............ 9

Frustrated Contract Act, RSBC 1996, c 166............................................................. 12

Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. G-2:

6 (1) and (2), 42 (1) (b)................................................................................ 14

Geneva Conventions Act, R.S.C/. 1985, c. G-3......................................................... 17

Immigration Act, 1976 [insured in 1978], in Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985, Vol. V:

section 118 [in another version section 120]...................................................... 21

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 [IRPA]: s. 72, s. 146, s. 190....... 24

Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations: subsections 132 (4), 133(1)(g)(i),

135 (a)................................................................................................... 32

Immigration Regulations, 1978 S.O.R./78-172....................................................... N/A

Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.): (sub)sections 223 (1), (2), (6), (7) and

(12), 223.1, 224 (1) and (1.2)....................................................................... 38

Interest Act, RSC 1985, c I-15: sections 3 and 4....................................................... 45

Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996: sections 8, 9, 12, 14................................................ 47

Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21: sections 8 (1), 12, 13, 14, 15 (2).......................... 49

Limitation Act, RSBC 1996, c 266: 3 (5), 6 (3) and (4), 9 (1) and (2).............................. 53

Limitation Act, SBC 2012, c 13: sections 1 (“limitation period”), 12 (2), 14, 21 (1) and (3).. 57

Personal Property Security Act, RSBC 1996, c 359: section 1 (1) (“debtor”)..................... 60

Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156: sections 77 and 78 (1)................. 62

Supreme Court Act, RSBC 1996, c 443: sections 1 (“court”), 17, 18.............................. 64

Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26: sections 52 and 61.......................................... 66

Supreme Court Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009: subsections 1-1 (2), 1-3 (1) and (2),

3-7 (3), (4), (6), (8), (9), (12), (15), (17)........................................................... 69

David Lametti and Ms. Proulx prevented the filing of this document in the Supreme Court of Canada since March 18, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

(ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL)

File number:________________

BETWEEN:

Zoltan Andrew SIMON

Applicant
(Appellant)

and

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA*

(in his or her representative capacity*)

Respondent
(Defendants)

__________________________________________________________________

NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL

Pursuant to (sub)sections 40 (1), 43 (1), 48 (1), and 61 of the Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, also sections 25 and 26 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156

_________________________________________________________________________________

Zoltan Andrew Simon, Appellant Attorney General of Canada

72 Best Crescent Department of Justice Canada

Red Deer, Alberta T4R 1H6 Edmonton Regional Office, EPCOR Tower

Telephone: not applicable 300, 10423 – 101 Street NW

Fax: (403) 341-3300 Edmonton, AB T5H 0E7

Email: zasimon@hotmail.com C/o Ms. Wendy Bridges, Counsel

or Mr. Keelan Sinnott, Counsel

Tel.: (780) 495-7801

Fax: (780) 495-3319

Email: wendy.bridges@justice.gc.ca

TO: Attorney General of Canada, C/o Ms. Wendy Bridges, Counsel

or Mr. Keelan Sinnott, Counsel

The Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Ottawa)

TAKE NOTICE that Zoltan Andrew SIMON applies for leave to appeal to the Court, under subsections 40 (1), 43 (1) (a) or (c), 48 (1), and 61 of the Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, from three decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal in Court File No.: A-123-18, all made on 8 February 2019 by three justices as follow:

(a) For an Order that the above decision (only a Reasons for Order without a signed or entered Order) of Stratas J.A., rendered on 8 February 2019, that declares Zoltan A. Simon a vexatious litigant in the FCA to be set aside in its entirety, together with a possible upcoming order related to his Reasons for Order;

(b) In the alternative, for an Order that the above decision (without an Order posted online) issued by the Honourable Mr. Justice Stratas to be stayed until the Tax Court of Canada makes a decision in Z.A. Simon’s pending appeal and enters a final order declaring that it has no jurisdiction in that matter regarding the Crown’s seizure of Z.A. Simon’s monies in June 2008 (or the delivery of those monies to the wrong addressee), and to be further stayed until the FCA or the SCC posts a final decision in that matter that is not appealed by any party according to the court rules;

(c) For an Order that the decision – that is unknown for the Federal Court of Appeal and CanLII in their websites – allegedly rendered without Reasons by a three-member panel (Gauthier J.A., Stratas J.A. and Webb J.A.) on 8 February 2019 to be set aside in its entirety because two of the FCA justices were unable to see or “hear” the appeal meaningfully within a few minutes in the absence of the appellant and his submissions, and their alleged but usurped signature is a nullity due to an administrative error or misunderstanding;

(d) In the alternative, for an Order or Direction for the Registrar to inform the appellant in writing as soon as possible about the date of posting that alleged order of the said 3-Justice Panel – if applicable at all – or/and of the correct date on which the time to appeal starts to run, pursuant to subsections 58 (1) (a) or (b)of theSupreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, with the applicable deadline to appeal it in the SCC;

(e) for an Order allowing that the instant application to be converted into a Notice of Appeal by the SCC pursuant to s. 61 of the Supreme Court Act since many errors in law are alleged or/and can be proved in the lower courts’ decisions;

(f) for a final order of the Supreme Court of Canada involving our single factual situation with one or more related questions of law regarding the power of federal and provincial tribunals – particularly CRA and Service Canada – to seize monies of Canadians without a garnishing order or any prior involvement of a court, in light of s. 12 of the Constitution Act, 1982;

(g) in the alternative, an Order for the Federal Court of Appeal to continue the interrupted procedure in file A-123-18 pursuant to sections 343 (3) through 348 (1) of the Federal Courts Rules till a final decision is reached by a differently constituted three- or five-justice panel of the FCA, should the Supreme Court of Canada have a shortage of justices or man-hours so could not make any decision on the merits of the issue(s);

(h) for an Order that the name of the Minister of National Revenue to be restored and added in the style of cause in the SCC, or, for a Declaration that the removal of that name by Stratas J.A. on 8 February 2019 does not constitute a change or create a new situation in which the appellant would forfeit his rights against that federal entity by the removal of its name;

(i) for an Order or Declaration stating that the combination of Stratas J.A.’s decisions into a single order on 8 February 2019 regarding two separate and distinct applications for judicial review filed by Z.A. Simon does not, per se, take away the appellant’s rights to pursue appeals in the Supreme Court of Canada in both cases: one against the RCA (Minister of National Revenue) and one against the CIC (Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship);

(j) for an Order regarding the fate and the proper appeal procedure for the recent (2018) immigration file of the appellant, his wife and stepson that has never been assigned any file number in the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal;

(k) for an Order, if applicable, granting the Appellant, his wife and stepson an extension of time for the judicial review of the April 2007 refusal of visa officer A. Chau to issue landed immigrant visa to Ms. ZuanHao Zhong because it was based on fraud and breach of natural justice, and direct the Federal Court’s Registry to accept their application for judicial review that would deal with both visa refusals simultaneously: the decision of 2007, and the decision of an unnamed visa officer in 2016 and it appeal in the IRB/IAD (Mr. Tucci) in 2018;

(l) or, in the alternative, for a Direction or Order that would somehow clean up or reduce this unprecedented procedural mess (created by the Crown, some registry administrators and/or Zinn J.) in any or all of these appeals and applications for judicial reviews;

(m) for an Order or Direction that, despite the arbitrary combination/conflation of three appeals of very different nature into one by the Federal Court of Appeal on 8 February 2019: (a) the immigration appeal of the three appellants (Simon, Zhong and Ye) should proceed separately from Z.A. Simon’s instant (A-123-18) appeal originating from the MNR/CRA decision, and (b) the time to appeal in the former case should start running from the day after an Order is posted on the FCA’s website and made available for Z.A. Simon, the Canadian appellant;

(n) An Order or Direction for any further relief that this Honourable Court may find just and applicable.

AND FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that this application for leave is made on the following grounds:

That the 3-Justice Division of the Federal Court of Appeal based its decision of 8 February 2019 on erroneous findings of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it, or rather, there was no material before two justices at all;
That there is no cognizable (signed and entered) order related to Zoltan Andrew Simon under the decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal since the 14 December 2018 hearing, neither on the Court’s website, nor in www.canlii.org, only a Reasons for Order written by Stratas J.A.;
That the 3-Justice Division of the Federal Court of Appeal erred in law or in principle on 8 February 2019 in assuming that there was a legislative ground to render a “summary judgment” or “summary dismissal” in the appeal stage. The intention of Parliament expressed in the Act and its Rules restricted the rendering of a summary dismissal of claims only to the Federal Court but not in the appeal stage in the Federal Court of Appeal;
That the 3-Justice Division of the Federal Court of Appeal erred in law in failing to specify a section of the legislation that would have granted them jurisdiction to quash or strike out the appeal in a summary way. [There is no such legislation.] For example, sections 215 (2)(b) or 221 (1) of the Federal Courts Rules are applicable only for claims in the Federal Court and not for appeals in the Federal Court of Appeal, since appeals are not “pleadings”, and appeal hearings are not “trials” but trials of the decisions of the courts below;
That the 3-Justice Division of the Federal Court of Appeal erred in law in overlooking that ss. 18.4 (1) of the Federal Court Act, related to summary hearings, is under the “Jurisdiction of the Federal Court” and not under the“Jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Appeal”;
That the 3-Justice Division of the Federal Court of Appeal erred in overlooking the law and not raising objections against the decisions of Gleason J.A. and Stratas J.A., e.g., the Order of Gleason J.A. “ordered” every justice of the FCA to disobey s. 40 (1) of the Federal Courts Act by deleting the words “on application” and inserting the words “on motion”;
That The Honourable Mr. Justice Stratas erred in law or in principle when he blindly obeyed the Order of Gleason J.A. while disobeyed s. 40 (1) of the said Act; it is an error in law to consider an improper order of a colleague in the same court as the “stare decisis” principle because the Act always overrules bad decisions of single judges;
That the 3-Justice Division of the Federal Court of Appeal erred in law or in principle on 8 February 2019 in assuming that three prior irregular FCA decisions* with reasons for order written by the same single justice, Stratas J.A., were able to contravene or override the Federal Courts Act and its Rules in any appeal. Note for the *: Lee v. Canada (Correctional Service), 2017 FCA 228 at paras 14-15; Fabrikant v. Canada, 2018 FCA 224 at para. 26; Forner v. Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada, 2016 FCA 35, all of these three cases have been decided on a motion by a single justice without jurisdiction, contrary to s. 40 (1) of the Federal Courts Act;
That the 3-Justice Division of the Federal Court of Appeal erred in law or in principle on 8 February 2019 in assuming that the three common law cases above were similar enough to the appeal of Zoltan Andrew Simon because the appeal was struck in the early stage of the appeal in Lee, supra. In Zoltan A. Simon’s case, the appeal was in an advanced stage: the appellant has already served and filed his appeal book. [The order of Gleason J.A. goes, “…settle the contents of the appeal book filed.”] The Forner case, supra, is not comparable to ours because we have filed a notice of appeal in the FCA, not an application for judicial review. Our appeal is not premature, either;
That the 3-Justice Division of the Federal Court of Appeal erred in disobeying the “stare decisis” rule by disregarding the Court’s decision in Exeter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FCA 178 (CanLII), in a very similar dismissal request case where the Crown alleged Ms. Exeter’s improper conduct while the latter “stated a number of grounds of appeal”, comparable to Z.A. Simon’s “48 grounds of appeal” in the Panel’s Order of February 8, 2019;
That the 3-Justice Division of the Federal Court of Appeal erred in law or in principle on 8 February 2019 when, ignoring the applicable law and not having any updated material before it, violated the sound principle expressed in para. [2] of Forner v. Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada, 2016 FCA 35 (CanLII): “The Court must be satisfied that the application should be struck out on the basis of the material before it and the applicable law”;
That the 3-Justice Division of the Federal Court of Appeal erred in law or in principle on 8 February 2019 when it approached the issues of fact and law with closed-mindedness, without applying any test. They ignored the principles of “clear and obvious test”, the “audi alteram partem” and “stare decisis” principles, the “palpable and overriding error standard”, the test for procedural fairness (“standard of correctness”) and the “standard of a closed mind.” Such oversimplification of the laws of Canada seemed superficial, substandard or unprofessional, in light of ;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the Federal Court of Appeal erred in fact when assumed in the alleged Order that “this Court has read the written representations of the parties” because updated representations of the parties did not exist. The 17 July 2018 the Order of Gleason J.A. prohibited for Z.A. Simon to take further steps in his appeal including the serving and filing the four documents prescribed by sections 343 (3) through 348 (1) of the Federal Courts Rules. Such prohibition, skipping the procedural steps required by law, constituted a breach of natural justice or obstruction of justice;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the FCA erred in law or in principle when ignored and disobeyed those relevant sections 343 (3) through 348 (1) of the Federal Courts Rules that obliged the parties to serve and file several crucial documents before appeal hearings: the Court and/or its Registry prevented the instant applicant from filing such required documents so those documents have not been before the FCA on 8 February 2019;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the FCA erred in law or in principle in allowing or introducing a “salami tactics” in order to stop an innocent victim, a whistle blower, in order to create an avenue for the circumvention of the rightful appeal process prescribed by sections 343 (3) through 348 (1) of the Federal Courts Rules;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the Federal Court of Appeal erred in fact if it assumed that proper notice and an opportunity to be heard – even in writing – had been given to the appellant and he received a notice of the 8 February 2019 “hearing” that was required by the audi alteram partem principle;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the Federal Court of Appeal erred in law by disobeyingsection 16 (1) of the Federal Courts Act. That section goes, “Except as otherwise provided in this Act or any other Act of Parliament, every appeal and every application for leave to appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal, and every application for judicial review or reference to that court, shall be heard in that court before not fewer than three judges sitting together…” [Emphasis added.] There was no hearing, or, if there has been one, the appellant has not received a prior notification about it. If the Panel interpreted the word “hearing” that three justices hear each other’s voices in a room without the presence of the parties, such interpretation was an error of law;
That the rules of natural justice or standards of procedural fairness were breached because the applicant before a tribunal or administrative agency, whose interests will be affected by the decision that is to be made, was deprived of the right to be heard by the FCA Division on 8 February 2019;
That the appellant identified several breaches of procedural fairness in his Notice of appeal, demonstrating that Manson J. and the 3-Justice panel were not allowed to read the required material. Thus, their hasty findings were not properly based on the material facts or evidence not properly admitted or dealt with, resulting in unreasonable findings and conclusions, or on unreasonable penalty. It was patently unreasonable to grant costs to a party whose Counsel habitually misled the courts by her false or sweeping statements since 2012 and fails to make any disclosure. The elements of procedural fairness in the context of administrative law were articulated in Baker v. Canada [Minister of Citizenship & Immigration], 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] S.C.J. No. 39, 174 D.L.R. 193. For other cases, see para. [153] of Swart v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of P.E.I., 2014 PECA 20 (CanLII), and [21] of WCAT-2015-02098 (Re), 2015 CanLII 96856 (BC WCAT). These decisions stated that individuals affected should have the opportunity to present their case fully and fairly, and have a decision affecting their rights, interests, or privileges made using a fair, impartial and open process, appropriate to the statutory, institutional and social context of the decisions. The general common law principle called the duty of procedural fairness applies to every administrative body making a decision affecting the rights, privileges or interests of an individual. It also states that administrative bodies which adjudicate formal appeals, like WCAT, are generally required to adhere to particularly high standards of procedural fairness (sometimes referred to as the “rules of natural justice”). The duty to act fairly consists of four basic elements, including: (a) the right to be heard, (b) the right to a decision from an unbiased decision maker, (c) the right to a decision from the person who hears the case, and (d) the right to reasons for the decision. Since all the FC and FCA justices were “tribunals” in light of s. 2 (1) of the Federal Courts Act since they were “other than the Tax Court of Canada or any of its judges”, the obligation of procedural fairness applied to them. The Order of the 3-Justice panel denied three of these four procedural rights. They may have been unbiased but two of them could not learn the substance and details of the case. Their signatures were usurped;
That the 3-Justice Division of the FCA (the honourable justices Gauthier, Stratas and Webb J.A.) offended the audi alteram partem principle if a very short “hearing” took place at all on February 8, because two of them were busy with the Elson case in the morning of the same day. It was a physical impossibility for them to read, examine, and seriously consider the facts, the law, and the merits of the “48 grounds of appeal” and Z.A. Simon’s “notice of constitutional questions raising 78 questions” (as cited from their “Order”). The case was complex and serious, and would have required a significant amount of neutral “intake” time, unlike in R. v. Collins; R. v. Pelfrey, [1995] 2 SCR 1104, 1995 CanLII 114 (SCC). Gauthier and Webb JJ. A. were not allowed to have such “intake” time;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the FCA erred in law or in principle in assuming that their “hearing” on 8 February 2019 was “based on written submissions” – without allowing the appellant to submit anything in writing – was supported by the legislation and governing common law of Canada: there was no similar procedural step accepted in Canadian history;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the FCA erred in law or in principle when fell into the procedural trap designed by the AGC or her Counsel, and delivered its Order without an actual hearing, and without allowing the parties to file any relevant and updated submission in writing;
That the 3-Justice Division of the FCA erred in fact and law or principle in assuming that the original application for judicial review on appeal was related only to pure “administrative law”, just like in Mount Sinai Hospital Center v. Quebec: many branches of law have been involved and many sections of several laws contravened in constitutional law, tort law, contract law, garnishment law, administrative law, tax law, immigration law, quasi-criminal law, seizure law, etc.;
That the 3-Justice Division of the FCA erred in fact and in law when superficially concluded that, addressing the 48 grounds of appeal and 78 constitutional questions raised, “many of these concern decisions of the Federal Court Registry not to file his documents and, thus, are collateral attacks against these decisions…” Such conclusion is absurd, untrue, and patently unreasonable because (a) none of the above 78 questions raised referred to the Federal Court’s Registry. (b) Seizure or garnishment of alleged debts by CRA without a court’s involvement, particularly beyond the lawful limitation period, is justiciable and state a cognizable ground for appeal. (c) The Registry’s decisions not to file properly submitted documents are appealable and justiciable since such appeals are not “collateral attacks” but allowed, involving procedural unfairness: the Registry prevented Manson J. to consider crucial issues and submissions. If a Registry’s sabotage to file documents is an “order”, it is an “other disposition of a tribunal” in the Rules;
That the 3-Justice Division of the FCA – and Manson J. of the Federal Court – erred in law in demanding “any cognizable administrative law claim” in an application for judicial review because the legislation was silent about such requirement: statements of claim must contain a claim but applications are petitions for – not necessarily purely administrative – relief. Sections 300, 301, and Form 301 do not require a party to specify any (cognizable administrative law) claim, rather a decision or lack of decision of a tribunal;
That the 3-Justice Division of the FCA (and Manson J.) erred in law in holding that the “remaining” of the 78 constitutional questions and the 48 grounds of appeal were “vague, not justiciable” because they were not beyond the competence of a court of law to adjudicate, unlike in Canada v. Operation Dismantle Inc., 1983 CanLII 3008 (FCA). They erred in fact in vaguely surmising those 78+48 unanswered issues. Such vague wording in not intelligible for the appellant and for the SCC, and constitute inadequate reasons;
That my application raised “issues that are justiciable”, similarly to paras. [58] and [15] of Wenham v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 199 (CanLII) where Stratas J.A. and his colleagues allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Federal Court, and granting the motion for certification as a class proceeding – such solution could apply in our case, too;
Paras. [91] to [94] of S.A. v. Metro Vancouver Housing Corp., 2019 SCC 4 (CanLII) or [171] and [774] of Tsleil-Waututh Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 153 (CanLII) give further examples for alleged “not justiciable” issues;
They erred in law in deciding (indirectly) that legislative intention made a policy decision of CRA immune from judicial review, because para. [72] of R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2011] 3 SCR 45, 2011 SCC 42 (CanLII) adds, “There is also general agreement that governments may attract liability in tort where government agents are negligent in carrying out prescribed duties”. Also, Parliament has not created any enactment granting the Crown rights to snatch monies of 36 million Canadians without the involvement of any Court;
That the 3-Justice Division of the FCA (and Manson J. of the Federal Court) erred in law in holding that prima facie violations of sections 8 and 12 the Charter, listed in the Application for judicial review and the 78 constitutional questions, were not justiciable. They erred in law or in principle in failing to apply the justification test under s. 1 of the Charter and s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. In Gosselin v. Québec (Attorney General), [2002] 4 SCR 429, 2002 SCC 84 (CanLII), the Court stated, “The role of the courts as interpreters of the Charter and guardians of its fundamental freedoms requires them to adjudicate such rights‑based claims”. The orders of Stratas J.A. and the Division, dated 8 February 2019, were based on stereotyping: Z.A. Simon and his “behaviour” at the courts were equated to Mr. Olumide and his behaviour but nothing seemed similar between the two persons and their cases. Thus, Stratas J.A. erred in overlooking the Court’s statement in Canada v. Olumide, 2017 FCA 42 (CanLII), “As long as the purposes of section 40 are kept front of mind and the hallmarks or badges are taken only as non-binding indicia of vexatiousness, they can be quite useful”;
In the Nelles case, Ms. Nelles allegedly had no cause of action, because the Crown enjoyed absolute immunity. The motion was allowed both at first instance and on appeal, but that decision was set aside by the Supreme Court of Canada as against the Attorney General;
The Division and Manson J. erred in supposing a section in the ITA that allowed CRA to seize Z.A. Simon’s monies. If there was such a section, it violated sections 8 and 12 of the Charter and was of no force or effect, pursuant to s. 52 of the Charter. See Baron v. Canada, [1993] 1 SCR 416, 1993 CanLII 154 (SCC);
That the 3-Justice Division erred in fact, in law and in principle in surmising that the “issues related to garnishment were not in issue below” because a search for the word “garnish” yields 13 matches within the application for judicial review. The factual decision regarding the lack of garnishing order stated in Simon v. Canada, 2011 FCA 6 (CanLII) was ignored;
That the decision of the Division was tainted by several palpable and overriding errors;
That the 3-Justice Division had the power to hear the case on its merits yet it has refused to exercise its jurisdiction, disobeying the “gap rule” and the related object of the [BC] Supreme Court Civil Rules in Rule 1-3 (1). The latter goes: “The object of these Supreme Court Civil Rules is to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on its merits.” [Emphasis added.];
That the FCA Division and its single justices involved erred in law, pursuant to the “gap rule”, by ignoring and disobeying the objectives expressed in Rule 1-3 (2) of the above Rules, failing to conduct their proceedings in ways that were proportionate to (a) the amount involved in the proceeding, (b) the importance of the issues in dispute, and (c) the complexity of the proceeding;
The FCA Division and Manson J. erred in law in holding that an unclear or unlawful “gap rule” overruled the Federal Courts Rules when that served the Crown’s interests, but a similar “gap rule” did not apply when it protected the applicant and the public regarding proportionality and expeditiousness as granted by the Supreme Court Civil Rules of British Columbia. Thus, Manson J. decided without jurisdiction when struck out my application for judicial review without an enactment enabling him to make such radical step, only based on an alleged gap in the legislation;
That Manson J., Gleason J.A., Stratas J.A., and the 3-Justice Division erred in law by relying heavily on the “gap rule” or sections 4, 5 [or 54 or 55] of the Federal Courts Rules. “On motion, the Court may provide for any procedural matter not provided for in these Rules or in an Act of Parliament by analogy to these Rules…” because the Crown failed to serve and file such specific motion. The AGC has never filed a motion for an order to “vary a rule or dispense with compliance with a rule”, and that provision does not authorize the Court to override a section of the Federal Courts Act;
They erred in overlooking the decision in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 2 FC 447, 1994 CanLII 3450 (FCA). “The gap rule cannot be invoked where no gap exists or where the result would be to effect an amendment to those Rules… it is well established that Rule 5 the gap rule cannot be resorted to where no gap exists in the Federal Court Rules or where the result would be to effect an amendment to those Rules. R. v. CAE Industries Ltd., [1977] 2 SCR 566, 1977 CanLII 221 (SCC) confirms this, “We are unable to agree with the contention of the respondents that under Rule 5 of the Federal Court Rules resort may be had to provincial practice and procedure … to cover what is alleged to be a gap in the Federal Court Rules. We do not construe those Rules as revealing a gap in this case, and, in any event, resort to Rule 5 cannot be had to effect amendments to Rules…”
That the Division and Stratas J.A. erred in law and in principle in failing to apply the “standard of correctness” test accepted in Housen v. Nikolaisen. They built their reasoning on evidentiary gaps or a factual vacuum while have not given a single correct answer to the 78 constitutional questions and the many questions of law in the original application;
That the 3-Justice Division of the FCA erred in fact or in law by assuming that Z.A. Simon’s originating document filed in December 2017 failed to “meet the requirements set out in Rule 301 of the Federal Courts Rules”. In fact, his application for judicial review satisfied all subsections from (a) to (f) of that Rule, clearly and precisely setting out the first (June 2008) and last (September to December 2017) decisions of the tribunals – CRA and the minister responsible for it – though a minister’s long silence cannot be dated accurately;
That the FCA’s 3-Justice Division erred in fact, in law, and principle by copying a phrase from the FC: it “is an abuse of process and fails to state any cognizable administrative law claim or otherwise meet the requirements set out in Rule 301 of the Federal Courts Rules”;
That Manson J. and the 3-Justice Division of the FCA erred in fact and in law in denying jurisdiction of the Federal Court because regarding the main relief pleaded by Z.A. Simon – for an Order to issue a writ of mandamus – the Federal Court had exclusive original jurisdiction (so the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction);
That the 3-Justice Division of the FCA erred in principle in failing to express its position whether Manson J. did or did not err in denying jurisdiction of the Federal Court;
That Manson J. and the 3-Justice Division of the FCA erred in law and in fact in failing to apply a test resulting that the Federal Court had statutory and constitutional jurisdiction over Z.A. Simon’s originating proceeding becauseall three branches of the test in ITO-International Terminal Operators were met;
That Manson J. and the 3-Justice Division of the FCA erred in law or in fact in disregarding para. [21] of Simon v. Canada, 2011 FCA 6 (CanLII) where the Court authorized Z.A. Simon to proceed and “to file an application for judicial review” in the Federal Court, without a specified deadline. Manson J. had no jurisdiction to overrule that decision or direction of the FCA. A Court’s authorization to proceed with a certain document is a valid ground;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the FCA erred in law or in principle when ignored the established common law that required the courts to provide Reasons for their orders. They failed to satisfy the standard of reasonableness without issuing Reasons for its order and, therefore, the order is lacking justification, transparency and intelligibility See R. v. Sheppard, [2002] 1 SCR 869, 2002 SCC 26 (CanLII). They created a fog for the SCC in failing to state the substance of the originating application and the notice of appeal, without giving a single example out of the 48 grounds of appeal or the 78 questions of law, as it they were about toothpicks or paper clips. Sections 3 and 4 of the Federal Courts Act state that the FC and the FCA were created “for the better administration of the laws of Canada.” Query: Is it a better administration if certain justices ignore the existence of the enactments?
In Baker v. Canada (1999), D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.) the Supreme Court of Canada at par. 39 stated: Reasons, it has been argued, foster better decision-making by ensuring that issues and reasoning are well articulated and, therefore, more carefully thought out. The process of writing reasons for decision by itself may be a guarantee of a better decision. Reasons also allow parties to see that the applicable issues have been carefully considered, and are invaluable if a decision is to be appealed, questioned, or considered on judicial review: R. A. Macdonald and D. Lametti, “Reasons for Decision in Administrative Law” (1990), 3 C.J.A.L.P. 123, at p. 146;
That Manson J., Stratas J.A., and the said 3-Justice Division of the FCA made overriding and palpable errors of fact and law in their decisions, and those errors had a cumulative effect;
They erred in overlooking the facts that, since 2007, the appellant has never been allowed to show any evidence while the Crown has been unable and unwilling to make any disclosure, so Z.A. Simon’s pleadings were habitually struck out in the preliminary stage without any final judgment as defined by s. 2 (1) of the Federal Courts Act. Although discoveries benefit litigants and the Court by isolating and focusing issues, no discovery has ever taken place in any of Z.A. Simon’s court cases in British Columbia and the federal court system;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the FCA erred in law or in principle in paying little or no attention to the wording of s. 360 of the Federal Courts Rules, “No notice of motion may be filed unless it is expressly made returnable” at sittings, at a time and place appointed, or, in writing under rule 369. Counsel to AGC has failed to satisfy any of those conditions and the Crown, the Court, or the Registry did not notify the appellant about the upcoming “hearing” scheduled to February 8, 2019. Counsel did not make it expressly returnable at any date or place – or in writing – so the appellant was unable to respond to such non-existing motion;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the FCA erred in law by not observing sections 363, 364, 365 and 369 (1) through (4) of the Federal Courts Rules which implied that Z.A. Simon should have been served with the Crown’s motion following the 8 February 2019 decision of Stratas J.A., but he has not received any cognizable new motion requesting the abrupt termination of the appeal itself;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the FCA erred in law or in principle when failed to consider section 37 of the Federal Courts Rules. (“Where at a hearing the Court considers that any person to whom notice of the hearing has not been given ought to have had such notice, the Court may adjourn the hearing or dismiss the proceeding or motion.”) Knowing that the appellant had not received a notice of the 8 February 2019 “hearing”, the FCA panel should have dismissed the motion of the AGC, or adjourned it to a later date;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the Federal Court of Appeal erred in law on 8 February 2019 because their decision and its apparent cornerstones – the vexatious litigant orders against a party, here Zoltan Andrew Simon, declared in British Columbia and on February 8 in the federal court system – cannot result in the automatic dismissal of his current appeals: such oversimplified procedure is not supported by any other jurisprudence or legislation;
That the said 3-Justice Division erred in overlooking the word “only” in section 40 of the Court of Appeal Act which clearly demanded a consent form signed by a specific single person, the Attorney General of Canada, but that condition of law has not been fulfilled;
That the said 3-Justice Division of the FCA and its single chambers judge(s) erred in misconstruing the facts and being insensitive to the fact that Counsel to the Attorney General was simply unable to find any reasonable explanation in order to protect the Minister of National Revenue and the CRA for the mysterious disappearance of Z.A. Simon’s credit monies. Thus, the only strategic solution for the AGC remained the disqualification of the appellant by mala fide means including the submission of a plethora of false or sweeping allegations that could mislead the courts (that closed their eyes and ears to the repeated written and verbal statements of the appellant). In our case, just like in para. [15] of Baric v. Tomalk, 2006 CanLII 21773 (ON SC), “it was a strategic motion by the Attorney General in the litigation chess game.” Also, it was a David and Goliath event;
That the erred in law in assuming that the Federal Courts Act contained a provision to allow single justices. The Act grants no jurisdiction for a single justice to decide the fate of applications; only panels consisting of three or more justices can do that. Generally speaking, a reasonable person can reconstruct Parliament’s will regarding the structure of the courts nationwide, based on a factor of three between any two levels of the courts as follow: in the Federal Court and its corresponding court in a province a single justice delivers final judgments. In the courts of appeal three justices, sitting together, can deliver final judgments. In the Supreme Court of Canada, nine judges deliver final judgments;
That the said 8 February 2019 decision of the 3-Justice panel failed to state whether the cornerstones of the April 2018 Order and Reasons of Manson J.’s have been correct or incorrect in law, so the Division’s Order is vague and inconclusive;
That the said 8 February 2019 decision of the 3-Justice panel of the FCA failed to observe one or more errors in law and a misconceived factual situation in the decision of Manson J.;
That the said 8 February 2019 decision of the 3-Justice panel of the FCA ignored the appellant’s clear demonstration that the chambers judge(s) erred in law, misconstrued the facts or/and was/were wrong in the legal sense on 11 April 2018;
That the Federal Court of Appeal failed to observe principles of natural justice or otherwise acted beyond or refused to exercise its jurisdiction;
That the 3-Justice panel erred in not giving an opportunity for the applicant to appeal the Order of Stratas J.A. to a 3-Justice panel that did not include him. Pursuant to section 16 (4) of the Federal Courts Act, “A judge shall not sit on the hearing of an appeal from a judgment he or she has pronounced.”
That the FCA Division and its single justices in chambers erred in principle and demonstrated a closed-mindedness or lack of independence by spending no time to apply the “plain and obvious test” before striking out the documents of the instant applicant, but simply echoed or repeated the sweeping or superficial conclusions of the previous justices starting with a single justice of British Columbia in 2015 and both Crown counsel in 2014, forming a domino effect or avalanche;
That the FCA Division and its single justices in chambers erred in law or principle when unreasonably punished a party who consciously and in good faith always obeyed the relevant acts and rules while three counsel to the AGC habitually disobeyed the requirements of the Federal Courts Act and Federal Courts Rules – including the duty regarding deadlines and disclosure – the Crown has been unable to produce any relevant material fact or evidence before the courts since 2008;
That the FCA Division and its single justices in chambers erred in law or principle when ignored the appellant’s clear submissions revealing the repeated sweeping allegations and false submissions of three counsel to the AGC between 2012 and 2018, in order to mislead several courts;
That the FCA Division erred in principle or in logic when it ignored the fact that three justices of British Columbia (Donegan J., Ball J. and Bennett J.A.) referred to the 20 to 60 possible causes of action pleaded by the instant applicant, but soon all of them forgot those correct findings, simply equating 60 with zero cause of action and thus creating a controversial “oxymoron” situation;
That the FCA Division and its single justices erred in law or in principle when ignored the rule that the onus was on the defendant AGC to show that the plaintiff did not have a “good arguable case” or a simple “factual situation” in his original Application for judicial review in December 2017; accordingly, the Court erred in shifting that onus or burden arbitrarily to the appellant;
That the FC, the FCA Division and its single judges erred in principle in overlooking that, although part of the original application may in fact ultimately fail, the application should have been allowed to proceed because the instant applicant had an “bona fide arguable case” and a “factual situation” in light of the facts and the applicable law; So far not a single justice has been able to pinpoint an incurable or fatal defect in his pleadings which would condemn the application and the appeal to failure;
That the FC, the FCA Division and the single justices involved erred in law or in principle when kept striking out the pleadings of Z.A. Simon on spurious or merely speculative grounds such as credibility or alleged vexatious behaviour, without seeing any evidence supporting the AGC’s sweeping allegations;
That the FC, the FCA Division and Stratas J.A. erred in principle in overlooking the fact that Z.A. Simon had a strong prima facie case, and holding that the burden of proof was always on the victim. It is common sense that a party is unable to prove his innocence and non-vexatious conduct. One cannot prove the non-existence of an enactment that would allow CRA to seize monies of taxpayers. In both areas, the onus was on the Crown but it failed to show a single section of any legislation to support its position;
That Stratas J.A. erred in law or in principle in failing to apply the “non-frivolous or non-vexatious” test. See Horvath v. Syncrude Canada Ltd., 2006 ABQB 185 (CanLII), at para 7; J.M. (Litigation Guardian of) v. Regina Roman Catholic Separate School Division No. 81 (1994), 1994 CanLII 4591 (SK CA), 128 Sask.R. 206, at para 2 (Sask. CA); and Valley Equipment Ltd. v. John Deere Ltd., (1996) 1996 CanLII 11283 (NB QB), 171 N.B.R. (2d) 300, at para 4 (NBQB). He did not realize that a vexatious litigant order in a province has no correlation with Z.A. Simon’s conduct in the FCA, and a vexatious litigant order effected the merits of his appeal in the FCA. These leaps in logic constituted an error of principle;
The text [of] The Law of Evidence in Canada, Second Edition, Toronto: Butterworths, 1999, states at p. 155: Simply put, the trier of fact must find that “the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” Conversely, where a party must prove the negative of an issue, the proponent must prove its absence is more probable than its existence;
Counsel, with the justices of FC and FCA, erred in principle in ignoring the above standard;
That the FC, the FCA Division and its single justices erred in law or in principle in disregarding the “stare decisis” principle. They erred in failing to consider the relevant findings. The courts below erred in disobeying the governing decisions as follow. Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII); Markevich v. Canada, [2003] 1 SCR 94, 2003 SCC 9 (CanLII), and Simon v. Canada, 2011 FCA 6 (CanLII). The latter goes in para. [12], “There is no suggestion that any garnishment order issued from a court of competent jurisdiction”. They ignored “an error on the part of the judge” in para. [14] of Simon v. Canada, 2014 FCA 47 (CanLII). Thus, Stratas J.A. erred in ignoring the fact that CanLII.org shows only Z. Simon’s four cases in the FCA before 2019, and in two of those – in 50% of the cases – the FCA pointed out an error in the FC order;
The FCA relied on para. [34] of the Olumide (2016) case where Stratas J.A. concluded that a motion … “is indistinguishable from a stand-alone application.” A motion is always distinguishable from an application because the Federal Courts Act and Rules (?) clearly separate them: Part V deals with applications while Part %% with motions. Applications are originating documents (with separate file numbers) while motions are not originating documents, within the same file. Thus, the Olumide case, supra, contains an error in law that cannot be imported into our case at bar;
The FCA Division and Stratas J.A. erred in principle in contradicting the statements pronounced in paras. [32] through [44] of Olumide v. Canada, 2016 FCA 287 (CanLII). In it, Stratas J.A. correctly stated that a notice of application was an originating document but a motion was not, and that a document floating in the Court’s Registry, without a court file, created an irregular situation so the Registry was ordered to open a new file for the (separate) application;
The FCA and the justices involved (Gleason and Stratas JJ.A.) erred because they have, in the oft-repeated phrase, compared apples and oranges;
That the Order of Stratas J.A. and the Order of the 3-Justice Division – if those orders dated 8 February 2019 exist officially at all – lack “reasonable objectivity”;
That the honourable justices Manson J., Stratas J.A., and the 3-Justice Division of the FCA erred in law or in principle by ignoring the fact that the Respondent contravened sections 8, 12, 15 (1), 24 (1) and 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 (a.k.a. the Charter), and section 12 of the Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21;
That they erred in law or in principle when they ignored the 48 pleaded grounds of appeal and the seventy-eight constitutional questions of Z.A. Simon. Each justice guessed, without any factual foundation, that another judge has already dealt with those issues and questions;
That they failed to observe the principles regarding the sufficiency of pleading an “arguable case” as set out in paras. [19], [20] and [56] of JTG Management Services Ltd. v. Bank of Nanjing Co. Ltd., 2015 BCCA 200;
That the FCA Division and the single justices previously involved erred in law or in principle when they failed to realize that none of the issues between the parties have ever been judicially determined: no lover court has ever issued a final order that determined, even if in part, the substantive rights of the parties to the controversies;
That the FCA Division and the single justices involved erred in law or in principle by assuming that the parties had agreed on the basic facts and relevant pure questions of law;
That the FCA Division and the single justices involved erred in law or in principle by ignoring and undermining the factual findings of two earlier court orders: (a) that of the FCA in para. [12] of Simon v. Canada, 2011 FCA 6 (CanLII): “There is no suggestion that any garnishment order issued from a court of competent jurisdiction. … The propriety of the Canada Revenue Agency’s treatment of monies otherwise owing to Mr. Simon unquestionably falls within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court. It follows, in my respectful view, that the Federal Court erred in law by concluding that none of the matters complained of by Mr. Simon fell within its jurisdiction”; and (b) “…the actual garnishment was made by the Defendant” (Canada) in para. [11] of Simon v. Canada, 2011 FC 582 (CanLII);
That the FCA Division and the single justices involved erred in law or in principle when they allowed or created a material factual vacuum accompanied by an alleged legislative vacuum before rendering a decision;
That the FCA Division and the single justices involved erred in law or in principle in speculating, without clarifying the facts and the applicable law;
That Manson J., the FCA Division and its single justices erred in law or in principle in assuming that a Court has previously addressed the 78 constitutional questions submitted by Zoltan A. Simon, although those questions have properly been before Manson J.;
That the Order or draft order of Stratas J.A. dated 8 February 2019 but not listed or recognized by the Federal Court of Appeal on its official website under its recent decisions, to be set aside or stayed;
That the justices involved erred in law or in principle in ignoring the Court’s findings in Canada (Attorney General) v. Jagpal, [2008] 4 FCR 339, 2008 FCA 38 (CanLII): submitting new facts sufficient to make arguable case to re-open previous Board decision;
That Manson J. and the Division erred in law in disregarding the FCA’s finding in paras. [5] to [8] of Martin v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), 1999 CanLII 9245 (FCA): [In our case, Manson J.] “went much further than merely considering whether an arguable case or question of law or jurisdiction had been raised and instead considered whether the appellant could succeed on the merits. This is an error of law.”;
That Manson J. and the Division erred in law or in principle in disregarding paras. [8] to [13] of Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development) v. Rafuse, 2002 FCA 31 (CanLII). Since this matter came before the Judge as an application for judicial review, and not as an appeal, he had no power to substitute her view for that of the Board on the proper disposition of the leave application. This is simply not a remedial power that subsection 18.1(3) of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, affords to the Court…On an application for judicial review the role of the Court with respect to a tribunal’s findings of fact is strictly circumscribed. In the absence of an error of law in a tribunal’s fact-finding process, or a breach of the duty of fairness, the Court may only quash a decision of a federal tribunal for factual error if the finding was perverse or capricious or made without regard to the material before the tribunal: Federal Court Act, paragraph 18.1(4)(d). Hence, if, as a result of an error of law, a tribunal has omitted to make a relevant finding of fact, including a factual inference, the matter should normally be returned to the tribunal to enable it to complete its work. [I our case, the CRA and the Minister omitted to make a relevant finding of fact and Manson J. had no power to assume facts.]
That Manson J. and the Division erred in law or in principle in ignoring paras. [22] to [26] of Jakutavicius v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FCA 289 (CanLII) in a similar case: the FCA should have exercised its discretion de novo.
As in para. [3] of The Wellcome Foundation Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., 2004 FCA 161 (CanLII), “The standard for finding an arguable case on appeal is low and is met in this case.” Just like in para. [8] of Wihksne v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 FCA 356 (CanLII), “the appellant’s claim was examined by decision makers using an improper test. It may be said, in that regard, that the appellant never had a real opportunity to present his case, be it before the Review Tribunal, the Board member or the Motions Judge.” Here Z.A. Simon never had a real opportunity to present his case on any of the three levels;
In para 30 of Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1986] 2 SCR 607, 1986 CanLII 6 (SCC) it was stated: “While Thorson is referred to as a taxpayer’s suit, what was really recognized was citizen's standing in certain circumstances to challenge the constitutionality of legislation. This was acknowledged by Martland J. in the passage which I have quoted above from Borowski, where he said that it is sufficient for a plaintiff to show, among other things, that he has “a genuine interest as a citizen in the validity of the legislation”. [In its para. 24: “What is at stake is the right of the citizens of Canada to have the Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada applied in accordance with the law.”] The SCC decision in Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 SCR 177, 1985 CanLII 65 (SCC) by the courts in our case, although there only a single section of the Charter was violated;
The AGC only requested the FCA to terminate the appeal “on a preliminary basis” but the Division rewarded her by the termination of the whole appeal on a final basis. Such generous gift of the FCA is capricious because it means that the instant Simon case constitutes a milestone case law precedent: from now on the CRA and the AGC got free hands to seize any money from any Canadian without the involvement and approval of any court;
The FCA Division and Stratas J.A. erred in law and in principle in mixing apples and oranges under a single file number A-123-18 on 8 February 2019, conflating three distinct major issues as follow. The issues are (a) Z.A. Simon’s application for judicial review regarding a single decision (or lack of decision) of the MNR and CRA and an appeal of the subsequent decision of Manson J., (b) the Crown’s motion for an order to declare Z.A. Simon a vexatious litigant, and (c) the 2016 decision of a visa officer refusing the reunification of Ms. Zhong and her husband, Z.A. Simon, followed by an IRB decision and a Direction of Zinn J. in a file without a file number. It is a flagrant violation of the laws and procedural unfairness because a self-represented litigant (or the best counsel of the Crown) would be unable to condense its “Parts I to V of the memorandum of argument” into 20 pages as required by 25 (2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada. While the issues (a) and (be) could be combined, it is procedurally unfair to conflate with them a much larger and more complex issue involving three applicants and the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship.

Dated at the City of Red Deer, the Province of Alberta this 11th day of March, 2019.

SIGNED BY

____________________________________ _____________________________________

Applicant (self-represented litigant) Agent (not applicable)

Zoltan Andrew Simon

72 Best Crescent, Red Deer, AB T4R 1H6

Fax number: (403) 341-3300

Phone number: none

Email address: zasimon@hotmail.com

ORIGINAL TO: THE REGISTRAR (Supreme Court of Canada)

COPIES TO:

Sample Memorandum of Argument submitted to the Supreme Court of Canada (under the pressure of David Lametti and PM Trudeau, an administrator of the Registry prevented its filing since March 18, 2019)

[Continuation of the document posted above]

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENT

PART I – A concise overview of the applicant’s position with issues of public importance

In most of his previous court cases, a miscarriage of justice took place where a procedural blemish made those judicial procedures at issue not a judicial procedure at all. In three of his appeals to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Registrar unlawfully prevented the filing of his documents submitted under s. 61 of the Supreme Court Act. Registrars are not courts, and their personal letter terminating an appeal in the SCC is not a “final judgment”; see s. 2(1) of the Federal Courts Act. The AGC desperately pressured her Counsel, the registrars and the courts to create a case law precedent that would grant absolute rights to the Crown, its public servants and tribunals, in sizing monies of 36 million Canadians without a lawful garnishment procedure at any court;
The issues raised in Z.A. Simon’s appeals are of national or public importance. Most of the justices, under actual or perceived pressure, managed to stop him, an innocent whistle blower. They failed to apply many well-established legal principles or standards, or any test, including the “plain and obvious test”, the “audi alteram partem”, the test for mandamus, a test for statutory interpretation [see Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27, 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC)], the standard of correctness, the “matters similar” test to a comparable fact situation, etc. Many of them misapplied irrelevant decisions or judgments that openly violated the Charter, the Interpretation Act or other enactments. However, the amazing fact is that none of those justices granted any right to the Crown against Z. Simon to allow the seizure of his moneys, indicating their high integrity;
If the above standards, tests, and hundreds of relevant court decisions including Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 (CanLII) or Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33 are not applicable anymore, this Honourable Court could render a decision stating that the enactments of Canada – Parliament’s will – are not compulsory for public servants but they only constitute a “guidelines”. Such order could result in the termination of the majority of judicial jobs in the courts because if the enactments, acts and rules cease to have power, there would not be less or no need for judges. Registrars are smart persons that would understand which pleading is unfavourable for a Minister, so they could simply prevent the filing of such document, with or without the help of a single judge who can do the “rubber stamping”. Their directions would not be appealable and would terminate every issue without an actual hearing. Mr. Harper would smile seeing that his policies “streamlining” Canada and its legal system were efficient. The reduction of the number and the powers of the justices that respect the rule of law could result in huge savings for Canada. Our country may turn into one of the world’s cruelest dictatorships at the stroke of a pen by two justices;
In December 2017, the applicant submitted to the FC an application for judicial review of the MNR’s decision (long silence) requesting a mandamus order regarding his taxation year 2007;
Having a “public legal duty” is the first part of the test for mandamus as set out in Apotex Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1993 CanLII 3004 (FCA), [1994], the test for mandamus is met. CRA had a public legal duty to forward the correct credit amount of a taxpayer to him and his address but it failed to do so. Z. Simon kept submitting new facts and evidence to CRA with no success. See Canada (Attorney General) v. Jagpal, [2008] 4 FCR 339, 2008 FCA 38;
Justice Snider set out the well-known grounds for mandamus in Vaziri v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1159 (CanLII), [2006] FCJ No 1258 at paragraph 38: The equitable remedy of mandamus lies to compel the performance of a public legal duty that a public authority refuses or neglects to carry out when called upon to do so. Mandamus can be used to control procedural delays (Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission) 2000 SCC 44 (CanLII), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307 at para. 149). The test for mandamus is set out in Apotex Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1993 CanLII 3004 (FCA), [1994] 1 F.C. 742 (C.A.), aff'd 1994 CanLII 47 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1100 (and, more recently, discussed in the immigration context in Dragan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 211 (CanLII), [2003] 4 F.C. 189 (T.D.), aff'd [2003] F.C.J. No. 813, 2003 FCA 233 (CanLII);
The eight factors are satisfied in our case: There was a public legal duty of CRA to act. There was a prima facie duty owed to the applicant, Z.A. Simon. There was a clear right to the performance of that duty, meaning that: the Applicant has satisfied all conditions precedent and there was a prior demand for performance – repeatedly between June 2008 and December 2017 – that offered 9.5 years to comply with the demand. There was outright refusal since 2008 and an implied refusal through unreasonable delay by the Minister of National Revenue in 2017. No other adequate remedy was available to Z.A. Simon. The Order sought was of great practical value or effect, ultimately the family reunification of the applicant and recovery of his monies seized unlawfully by CRA in 2008. There is no equitable bar to the relief sought. On a balance of convenience, mandamus should lie;
Paras. [1] and [2] of the Reasons for Order of Stratas J.A. refer to two motions of the AGC: one for a vexatious litigant order and one for dismissing the appeal. The applicant has never received the second motion so he was unable to defend himself. Stratas J.A. amended the style of cause, contrary to the form in his several past orders, but neither of the parties requested that;
Para. [3] of the said Reasons for Order goes, “The motions were assigned to a single judge of this Court.” Section 14(2)(c) of the Federal Courts Act prescribes that such non-judicial assignment is the responsibility of the Judicial Administrator, namely, “arranging from time to time for the establishment of any panels of judges of the court that are necessary”;
Para. [4] of the said Reasons for Order gives the impression regarding the motion to dismiss that “full submissions in writing have been made on it.” Maybe Stratas J.A. received a full submission from Counsel but Z.A. Simon has not been served with any submission regarding the Crown’s alleged second motion at all. Stratas J.A. wrote, “I will direct that it will be treated as a motion in writing. I will adjourn it to a three-person panel of this Court.” This text was written and entered on 8 February 2019 in a future tense. Even if the adjournment took place on the same day, and the other two justices received it with the alleged “full submissions” within the Attorney General’s “motion in writing” on February 8, the appealing party had no opportunity to file and serve any responding document before that date. He has been disabled to do so, due to procedural unfairness. He did not know that the first motion of the Crown was converted into a (second) motion “in writing” that would be heard on February 8, 2019;
Thus, the Honourable Justices Gauthier J.A. and Webb J.A. have been unable to hear or read the arguments of both parties. As a factual prerequisite going to the Court’s very ability to proceed with the second motion on February 8, the submissions of both parties must be formally before the Court, i.e., filed. (I used the wording of Stratas J.A.) The formal submissions of the parties were not before the Division of the Court on 8 February 2019. [The hearing of 14 December 2019 was limited strictly to the vexatious litigant motion that has little or nothing to do with the merits of the pending appeal. The apples of the vexatious motion and the “oranges” of the appeal’s final determination were not allowed to mix on December 14, 2018.] Someone, maybe an administrator of the Court, disobeyed the order of Gleason, J.A. by eliminating the time interval required by her order. The result is that the two “hearings” and “orders” took place on the same day, became contemporary, and did not properly follow each other in time;
Since the decision of Stratas J.A. reached Z.A. Simon only on 11 February 2019, there was no cognizable “second motion” available for the applicant on February 8, 2019 that prevented him to submit any updated submission to the three-justice panel;
Pursuant to section 16 (1) of the Federal Courts Act, “Except as otherwise provided in this Act or any other Act of Parliament, every appeal and every application for leave to appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal, and every application for judicial review or reference to that court, shall be heard in that court before not fewer than three judges sitting together…” [Emphasis added.] The decision of Stratas J.A. did not refer to any Act of Parliament that would have “otherwise provided” so it that exemption did not apply in our case. The Act required the parties “shall be heard in that court”, instead of their absence. The word “shall” means an obligation, not a choice;
The appellant has not been “heard” at all, not even in writing, because the Registry has refused to file his motion book in the autumn of 2018. The Court remained silent forever regarding the contents of the Motion Book, although the appellant submitted a motion on June 11, 2018, requesting an order to determine the contents of the motion book. Consequently, Zoltan A. Simon was not allowed to file his appeal book, his Appellant’s memorandum, his Requisition for hearing, and his book of authorities. See sections 343 (3), 344, 346 (1), 347 (1) and 348 of the Federal Courts Rules that have been disregarded and violated by the participants other than the appellant. Those four documents are crucial and must be before the Court when rendering an order. There was a drastic and unprecedented change by the July 2018 Order of Madam Justice Gleason. Since the April 2018 Order of Mr. Justice Manson, ten months – more than a human gestation period – have passed until February 8, 2019. During those ten months the issues and the very nature of the appeal has changed dramatically but the appellant was not allowed to file any update, additional argument, supporting legislation or case law at all. It is clear that a party’s response to a motion to declare him a vexatious litigant has a completely different scope than his arguments supporting the merits of his appeal at bar. The former may – and did – include several decisions of different courts in the past decade(s) while the latter may concentrate on a single factual situation with a pure question of law, just like in our case. Stratas J.A. improperly mixed apples and oranges when he conflated the two procedures with very different issues;
All these irregularities constitute a marked procedural unfairness for the appellant, with s. 8, 12, 15 (1), 24 (1) and 52 (1) Charter violations. The latter states, “The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.” The Honourable Justices Stratas and Gleason do not refer to any legislation allowing a cruel treatment or punishment of Z.A. Simon. It is a leap in logic to equate the punishment/stigmatizing a person and his appeal;
The appellant respectfully submits that an applied piecemeal strategy or salami tactics against him is unlawful and has no roots in Canada’s legislation. (That tactics is also known as the salami-slice strategy or salami attacks that is a divide and conquer process of threats and alliances used to overcome opposition. With it, an aggressor can influence and eventually dominate a landscape, typically political, piece by piece. In this fashion, the opposition is eliminated “slice by slice” until one realizes, too late, that it is gone in its entirety.);
In our appeal, Madam Justice Gleason ordered that nothing to be done in the appeal process before the vexatious litigant issue is decided. Such order is unusual and unparalleled in Canadian law. Then Mr. Justice Stratas considered her order as his main authority, besides the order of Mr. Justice Ball’s vexatious litigant order in BC. Stratas J.A. concluded that the order of Gleason J.A. was compulsory for him and the Court: the vexatious litigant issue had to be determined first, then the substantial issue under appeal only after such determination. Yet, Stratas J.A. changed his mind in the last minute, or someone in the court administration made a similar change, resulting that the (alleged) determination of the substantial issue took place on the same day but well before the issuance of the Strates J.A.’s Reasons for Order regarding the vexatious litigant matter;
The unpublished Order of Stratas J.A. goes, “AND WHEREAS the motion to declare the appellant a vexatious litigant and related relief should be granted and the motion to dismiss the appeal adjourned and referred to a panel of this Court.” Thus, Mr. Justice Stratas decided only on 8 February 2019 that the appeal to be referred to a panel of the Court. Therefore, without such order, there was no cognizable instruction before the Judicial Administrator or the Registry to appoint a panel of three justices of the Federal Court of Appeal before February 8. Justices of the courts are reasonable persons overloaded by judicial work. No reasonable person can assume that justices of the FCA waste their precious time, without a formal assignment, on issues of a party that has been declared a vexatious litigant and whose claims and appeals have been dismissed by most of the courts below alleging no merit;
A concise statement of the facts [subtitle]. The subject matter of the instant appellant’s originating document filed in December 2017 in the Federal Court was extremely simple as follows:
The single issue in that “Application for Judicial review” was whether the Canada Revenue Agency [“CRA” below] can or cannot lawfully seize credit amounts of Canadians from their tax accounts with CRA without a relevant provision of the legislation and without the involvement of a court, especially the Federal Court of Canada;
CRA – with the approval of the Minister of National Revenue – is sizing such credit monies of Canadian taxpayers without any garnishing order issued by a Court, apparently since 2006;
Z. Simon is one of the innocent victims of such unlawful seizure against s. 8 of the Charter;
The applicant, Z.A. Simon, sponsored an ex-wife, Ms. M. Reyes, in January 1999. [He relied on the promises of the Sponsorship Agreement – not contract – that in case of a breach the Crown may take the sponsor to any court of competent jurisdiction. This was a “causa sine qua non” for him.] She arrived in Canada as a landed immigrant in December 1999. The sponsor could not fulfill her financial demands so she started to abuse him verbally and physically. He moved out in June 2000, losing his rent-to-own property, while she found a wealthier man in the same apartment building. In the meantime, she applied for social benefits in BC. The administrators sent her to English courses for four years but never asked her (before 2005) to work. In October 2000, the sponsor defaulted on his sponsorship agreement but the Crown has never sent him a financial statement about the assistance paid to Ms. Reyes, and never raised a debt claim against him. The default took place under ss. 135 (a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, and under s. 118 [originally s. 120] of the old Immigration Act, 1976 when the IRPA did not yet exist. The provincial and federal Crown failed to file and register a ministerial certificate within 30 days after the default, pursuant to s. 146 of the (non-existent) IRPA, or take the sponsor to a court under the still governing Immigration Act, 1976;
The Crown or its Counsel has never revealed the source of the CRA’s wrong conclusion regarding Z.A. Simon’s alleged debt in June 2008 when his monies were sent to a BC ministry, apparently as a gift. It may have been the single page signed by a BC official, S. Postuk, submitting a false statement with an untrue allegation that the debt of Z. Simon was enforceable in March 2007. RCA has the power to take that person or third party to court but that matter would be irrelevant to the strange disappearance of Z.A. Simon’s credit monies for taxation year 2007;
The two parties involved agree on the fact that Z.S. Simon’s monies somehow ended up in a ministry of British Columbia in 2008. The parties disagree on the material facts whether the Crown signed a contract or an agreement with Z.A. Simon. The Crown has never revealed if it claimed a debt from Z.A. Simon on the grounds of contract or damages. The Crown has never made any disclosure. It could not produce a garnishment order of ministerial certificate;
As for the actual material facts from 2008 to 2017, they are summarized well in Z.A. Simon’s Appeal Book submitted to the Federal Court of Appeal in the fall of 2018. However, the Court Registry has refused its filing while the Court was reluctant to issue any Direction regarding its content, despite the appellant’s motion served and filed at that time for that purpose. Therefore, the FCA had no updated submission before it on behalf of the appellant at all. This means that the FCA panel made its Order without being able to learn the facts in a hearing. The resulting Order of the three-justice panel is not resting on any evidence or factual finding, only on factual vacuum or darkness. (The Order and Reasons of the Honourable Mr. Justice Stratas did not contain the most relevant facts regarding the originating application for judicial review and the appeal itself, except a few issues related to his vexatious litigant order. The latter order is silent about the fact that in December 2017 the instant appellant applied for a judicial review of the seizure or disappearance of his credit monies at or by the FCA in 2008.);
The applicant has not been given an opportunity to respond in writing to the alleged second motion that simply did not exist before 8 February 2019, and only became an official motion by the vexatious litigant order dated February 8, 2019. It is impossible to respond to a non-existing motion within eight hours or so, on February 8, if that party receives a copy of the decision later;
The second Order dated 8 February 2019 says, “AND WHEREAS this motion has come before this panel of the Court and this Court has read the written representations of the parties.” [Emphasis added.] However, that Honourable Court could not have read the written representations of the “parties” because Z.A. Simon received from the Registry the February 8 Order of Stratas J.A. only on February 11, 2019 and had no opportunity to submit any written representation to the Court before February 8, the date of the panel’s Order;
Governing case law suggests that abuse of process, here constituted by the Crown and its administrators, is almost always procedural. A breach or denial of procedural fairness typically results in a decision being fatally tainted. The applicant respectfully submits that a miscarriage of justice took place because the procedure at the FCA was not a judicial procedure at all. The appeal was decided on a few points of law or fact that Z.A. Simon did not have an adequate opportunity to address at the December 2018 hearing and the alleged hearing on 8 February.

PART II: A concise statement of the questions in issue

30. The questions in issue are constantly changing: the Crown’s issues are very different from the issues of the applicants. The Crown has never addressed the seizure issue and the law;

31. Are justices of the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal free to re-write the enactments, that is the intention of Parliament? Is the legislation only a “guidelines” for them?

32. Are justices of those two courts free to ignore the rules or principles of “plain and obvious test”, the “stare decisis”, the “audi alteram partem”, and not required to apply any test established by leading authorities? Can they ignore the applicable standards of review as discretionary?

PART III: A concise statement of argument

33. Stratas J.A. exceeded or lacked jurisdiction on February 8, 2019 by declaring Z.A. Simon a vexatious litigant because he arbitrarily removed two words (“on application”) from subsection 40 (1) of the Federal Courts Act and inserted the words “on motion” there, while he removed a word (“only”) from subsection 40 (2) of the same Act;

34. The Crown has never been able to propose a different version of material facts so the courts have always been kept in darkness. The decisions of the courts, accepting the Crown’s submissions and sweeping allegations, indicate that the Crown was always held credible but the Z.A. Simon always unreliable. The credibility of the parties cannot be decided on striking out pleadings;

35. Since 2007, several judges of the federal court system heard different aspects of the issues, mainly from the immigration point of view. Obviously, any of those courts would have been able to deliver a final judgment by granting a substantive right to the Crown against Z.A. Simon and his family members. Such order has never been issued. This is a clear and admirable indication of the seriousness and impartiality of each and every federal justice involved in the past;

36. None of the federal justices involved has ever determined the fact if a “contract” has or has not existed between the Crown and Z.A. Simon. The only judge commenting on this crucial factor was the Honourable Mr. Justice Zinn in Simon v. Canada, 2010 FC 617 (CanLII), but he did not even mention the word “contract”, only “agreement.” Both federal and provincial judges have avoided this sticky issue because, on the authority of Duong v. Waterloo North Hydro Inc., 2004 CanLII 6241 (ON SC) and Bilson et al. v. Kokotow et al., 1978 CanLII 1632 (ON CA), or Bilson v. Kokotow et al., 1975 CanLII 771 (ON SC) one finds: “Under the long-established doctrine of privity of contract, only the original parties to a contract acquire or are exposed to liability.” The Crown has never been a signatory to any contract or agreement with Z. Simon, the instant applicant. The Crown had the right to represent Ms. Reyes at a court but it failed to take any action against him within the 6-year limitation period after the default in October 2000. If the Crown rightfully seized Z. Simon’s alleged but uncertified debt without any court order, then these common law cases and Markevich v. Canada, [2003] 1 SCR 94, 2003 SCC 9 (CanLII) may have been wrongfully decided. That is very unlikely. In Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII) the Court repeatedly confirmed s. 146 of the IRPA and the need for ministerial certification in the FC. The Crown has disobeyed the clear SCC order;

37. The AGC and the public servants involved simply asserted that ministers related to immigration, taxation, finance, and justice) were above the law;

38. At the time of the default (October 2000) the old Immigration Act, 1976 and its former Immigration Regulations, 1978 S.O.R./78-172 were in effect. By Ms. Reyes’ landing in Canada in 1999 her immigration file was closed. There was no pending proceeding, matter, or immigration file under section 190 of the IRPA. Thus, the former Act applied. It was the CRA’s error to identify Ms. Reyes with HMTQ, because she was not allowed to wear the Crown Jewels or sign treaties;

39. The CRA, starting in June 2008, violated the federal and provincial limitation acts and s. 32 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, RSC 1985, c C-50. The latter act and the Limitation Act(s) prescribe that the Crown’s action “shall be taken within six years after the cause of action arose.” In our case at bar, CRA seized the applicant’s monies c. 8 years after the default;

40. The CRA (and the Government of BC) calculated an illegal compound interest of c. 6.37% per annum, contrary to 5% in sections 3 and 4 of the Interest Act, RSC 1985, c I-15;

41. The federal justices involved since 2017 erred in law because none of the issues was res judicata by a final judgment, see ss. 2 (1) of the F. C. Act, since all of them remained unresolved, or the Court kept refusing to exercise its jurisdiction regarding an unconstitutional public policy;

42. They misguidedly elevated form over substance, ignoring and disobeying the principle set by the Supreme Court of Canada that form or “procedure must not trump substance, otherwise justice could be set aside prior to complete or final analysis by procedural (or technical) sophism.” See Baker v. Canada, supra; also, p. 1133 of Duquet v. Town of Sainte-Agathe, [1977] 2 SCR 1132, 1976 CanLII 13 (SCC); Construction Gilles Paquette ltée v. Entreprises Végo ltée, [1997] 2 SCR 299, 1997 CanLII 352 (SCC); R. v. Litchfield, 1993 CanLII 44 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 333, and Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., [2001] 2 SCR 460, 2001 SCC 44 (CanLII). The last two cases are quite similar to our situation at bar regarding procedural unfairness;

The grounds of appeal are:

43. The decisions of the courts/justices involved contained several palpable and overriding errors, including errors in law, errors in principle, and misapprehension of the facts and evidence (if they considered any evidence at all when striking out the pleadings and the appeal);

44. The Honourable Mr. Justice Manson erred in law and in principle in

45. acting without jurisdiction because the Act or the Rules had no provision to strike out an application for judicial review in the Federal Court. The “gap rule” cannot be invoked where no gap exists or where the result would be to effect an amendment to those Rules;

46. refusing to exercise his jurisdiction as an “other tribunal”. [He was not a justice of the Tax Court]. See ss. 18.1 (4) of the Federal Courts Rules: “The Federal Court may grant relief under subsection (3) if it is satisfied that the federal board, commission or other tribunal (a) acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its jurisdiction or refused to exercise its jurisdiction”. Subsection 28 (2) of those Rules states that the FCA has the same jurisdiction as the FC. Both the MNR (CRA), Manson J. and Gleason J.A. clearly failed to exercise their jurisdiction that was an error. A remedy is “available to any party where a judge simply refuses to deal with a matter before him either permanently…”, see para. [15] of Canada (Solicitor General) v. Subhaschandran, 2005 FCA 27 (CanLII), Roberval Express v. Transport Drivers Union, [1982] 2 SCR 888, 1982 CanLII 34 (SCC), Gralewicz et al. v. R., [1980] 2 SCR 493, 1980 CanLII 43 (SCC), Vasquez Pacheco v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), 1990 CanLII 8004 (FCA), and Nishri v. Canada, 1997 CanLII 5955 (FCA). Similarly, Gleason J.A. refused to deal with the motion requesting an order regarding the contents of the motion book. She managed to put all issues in “hibernation” without specifying a date for the Crown to act. She gave permission to other judges, allowing or ordering them to violate s. 40 of the Federal Courts Act and proceed on motion;

47. misconstruing the facts and erring in law and in principle in holding that the substance of Z. Simon’s originating application, including the issuance of a mandamus, the amount to be paid, or any question of law, fact or mixed law and fact all belonged to the Tax Court of Canada, because subsections 18 (1) (a) and 17 (3) of the Federal Courts Act, the Federal Court had “exclusive original jurisdiction” in those matters, resulting that the TCC had no jurisdiction in them;

48. For the errors of Manson J. as grounds of appeal please refer to p. 28 in Volume II;

49. Stratas J.A. and the FCA’s 3-Justice Panel erred in law and in principle in

50. conflating “motion” with “application” and in concluding, in para. [3] of the Reasons for Order, “A single judge of this Court can determine a motion to declare a litigant vexatious.” Subsection 40 (1) of the Federal Courts Act prescribes such declaration only “on application”, not “on motion”. Only a panel of three or more FCA justices has such power on application;

51. exceeding exceeded their jurisdiction and acted without jurisdiction, against s. 40 and other sections of the Federal Courts Act that renders both decisions a nullity. In Canadian Association of Film Distributors, 2014 FCA 235, the Court at paras. [85-86] referred to a decision rendered without jurisdiction, where substantive legal issues were disposed without the input of the parties, and the decision did not meet the transparency and intelligibility criteria required by Dunsmuir;

52. writing in para. [4] of the Reasons for Order directing that the [AGC’s 6 months old] motion “will be treated as a motion in writing and promises, I will adjourn it to a three-person panel of this Court.” In his para. [30], he added in future tense, “The Attorney General’s motion to dismiss this appeal will be referred to a panel of this Court for determination.” He did not order a 3-Justice panel to make a decision on the same day but an unnamed person disobeyed his order;

53. erring in fact and in law in assuming in the Analysis, “Mandatory prerequisite satisfied”. Subsection 40 (2) of the Federal Courts Act prescribes, “An application under subsection (1) may be made only with the consent of the Attorney General of Canada…” Stratas J.A. overlooked and ignored the word “only” that constituted an error in law. The applicant politely reminded him on December 14 that the word “only” in the Act, supported by dictionaries of law, meant that only one person, namely the AGC, was allowed to sign that consent form. He raised his objections to the fact that the Court and the appellant has not received a valid consent form signed by the Attorney General of Canada. Stratas J.A. disregarded that objection. In light of the above legislation, the vexatious litigant order of February 8 is invalid in law;

54. assuming by stereotyping that the cases of Olumide were almost identical to those of Z.A. Simon, and/or the “ungovernable” behavior of Mr. Olumide to “exhibit vexatious characteristics” was identical to that of Z.A. Simon. His Reasons for Order is a philosophical dissertation about the Olumide cases at the courts: its pages 3 to 8 – the bulk of his 9 full pages – deal with the court cases and Olumide’s behaviour. Apparently, he forgot the fact that he was writing his Reasons about Simon and not about Olumide. Para. [6] of Olumide v. Canada, 2016 FC 1106 (CanLII) states, “Since 2013, Mr. Olumide has filed 14 applications and actions before the Federal Court and the Tax Court of Canada, 15 proceedings before the Federal Court of Appeal, 5 applications for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Canada and at least 10 proceedings before the Ontario courts. …he has been unsuccessful in all his proceedings…” This yields at least 44 proceedings nationwide. For comparison, Z.A. Simon had a case at the BC Provincial Court in 2009 and one in the Superior Court of BC in 2014, resulting in a vexatious litigant order issued by the latter in 2017 that is now under appeal in the SCC. He had 4 proceedings in the FC, 4 in the FCA, 2 in the SCC, and a pending appeal in the TCC. Z. Simon was successful in two cases (50%) in the sense that the FCA stated the errors in law in the Federal Court. Olumide and Simon are clearly like apples and oranges that are not comparable. The mere number of the previous court cases has no bearing on a vexatiousness issue. [Say, a First Nation woman was denied a job on the ground of her immorality just because she had four children by four different fathers but the HR manager ignored the fact that all of those children were born due to rape and incest];

55. assuming in para. [8] that “…the threshold for declaring a litigant vexatious is governed by the rationales for the declaration.” In reality, ss. 40 (1) of the Federal Court Act defines a vexatious litigant that “has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings or has conducted a proceeding in a vexatious manner, it may order that no further proceedings be instituted by the person in that court…” Inserting the names of courts of a province or foreign countries in addition to “that court” would yield absurd results: if a person or company had dozens of court cases abroad but none in the FCA, the latter court can declare him/it a vexatious litigant. Maybe Stratas J.A. felt that “tougher regulatory measures are needed” for Canadians that recklessly defend the rule of law in Canada, the Charter, and the powers of the Supreme Court of Canada and other Canadian courts from usurpers. Additionally, Stratas J.A. erred in ignoring the serious issue test. In para. [26] of Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. B479, 2010 FC 1227 (CanLII), the Honourable Mr. Justice Zinn stated: For these reasons, I am of the view that the serious issue test is to be measured on the standard set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Manitoba (Attorney General) v. Metropolitan Stores Ltd., 1987 CanLII 79 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110 and RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, namely whether “there is a serious question to be tried as opposed to a frivolous or vexatious claim”;

56. surmising that the “issues related to garnishment were not in issue below”: a search for the word “garnish” yields 13 matches within the application for judicial review], and assuming that each of the 78 constitutional questions of the appellant (on 67 pages) constituted zero merit;

57. guessing that the 78 constitutional questions were not before the Federal Court: untrue;

58. ignoring or overruling section 12 of the Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21: “Every enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects”. Since 2007, the Crown caused the injuries of the applicant so the latter Act was remedial for him. The Crown had no injury. The FCA erred in the legal sense ignoring the pleaded violations of Z. Simon’s Charter rights, too;

59. speculating that the law allowed a single federal justice to consider the order of a provincial court declaring a person vexatious litigant as an important factor when declaring the same person vexatious in the federal courts. Stratas J.A. misconstrued Parliament’s intention clearly expressed in section 40 (1) of the Act, “If the Federal Court of Appeal or the Federal Court is satisfied, on application, that a person has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings or has conducted a proceeding in a vexatious manner…” Then the text mentions twice the words “in that court”;

60. exceeding his jurisdiction in creating a situation that contravened s. 8 and 12 of the Charter;

61. ignoring the stare decisis principle in the similar case of in Exeter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FCA 178 (CanLII), in a very similar dismissal request case where the Crown alleged Ms. Exeter’s improper conduct while the latter “stated a number of grounds of appeal”, comparable to Z.A. Simon’s “48 grounds of appeal” in the Panel’s Order of February 8, 2019. It was an error ignoring the Court’s conclusion inKallaba v. Bylykbashi, 2006 CanLII 3953 (ON CA) regarding the lack of jurisdiction of a single judge in making a vexatious litigant order;

62. granting the appellant less than two hours to speak on 14 December 2018, since there were several more serious arguments of law and fact left out that he could not mention. Also, the Court and Counsel were free to ask additional questions from him but that did not take place. It seemed that everyone in the courtroom understood Z.A. Simon’s facts and submissions of law. Finally, it is nonsensical to refer to “not justiciable” issues in decisions without specifying those issues;

63. The 3-Justice Panel of the Federal Court of Appeal erred in law and in principle in

64. ignoring and disobeying the rules and principles for a denial of a right to a fair hearing and the “audi alteram partem”. See A. (L.L.) v. B. (A.), [1995] 4 SCR 536, 1995 CanLII 52 (SCC); Old St. Boniface Residents Assn. Inc. v. Winnipeg (City), [1990] 3 SCR 1170, 1990 CanLII 31 (SCC); Telecommunications Workers Union v. Canada (Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission), [1995] 2 SCR 781, 1995 CanLII 102 (SCC); Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution, 1985 CanLII 23 (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643, [1985] S.C.J. No. 78 (QL); Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières v. Larocque, 1993 CanLII 162 (SCC), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 471, [1993] S.C.J. No. 23 (QL); Stone Container (Canada) Inc. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 894,(1997), 192 N.B.R. (2d) 1, [1997]; Supermarchés Jean Labrecque Inc. v. Flamand, [1987] 2 SCR 219, 1987 CanLII 19 (SCC). In Newfoundland Telephone Co. v. Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities), [1992] 1 SCR 623, 1992 CanLII 84 (SCC), the Court stated, “A denial of a right to a fair hearing cannot be cured by the tribunal’s subsequent decision. A decision of a tribunal which denied the parties a fair hearing cannot be simply voidable and rendered valid as a result of the subsequent decision of the tribunal. The damage created by apprehension of bias cannot be remedied. The hearing, and any subsequent order resulting from it, must be void.” As in para [180] of Continuing Care Employers’ Bargaining Association v. AUPE, 2002 ABCA 148 (CanLII), in our case the chambers judges and the Division, though motivated only by a sincere and commendable desire to move the proceedings along, inadvertently and uncharacteristically conveyed the mistaken impression that they had made up their minds on certain contested issues before argument had been heard; a cornerstone of their decision – that was an echo of the previous decision(s) – was their assumption that the appeal had no merits;

65. making a decision in a hurry, being occupied with the Elson v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FCA 27 case on the same day, without examining the crucial facts and questions of law as if courts were horse races. The same Division had no time to write any Reasons for the Order, either;

66. repeating and/or confirming the errors of previous orders in rush and, therefore, without having the benefit of reading Stratas J.A.’s Reasons for Order because the latter was entered in the J. & O. Book (Volume 305) later than the Division’s order;

67. echoing uncritically the long list of conclusions forming palpable and overriding errors of the previous two justices involved (Manson J. and Stratas J.A.); erred in law, principle, misconstrued the facts and were wrong in the legal sense;

68. supporting the 8 February 2019 decision of Stratas J.A. since an informed right-thinking person would say that a legal proceeding instituted for a family’s reunification after a decade of forced separation is a proper ground. The same person(s) would find reasonable apprehension of bias in the February 2019 decision(s) though Z. Simon does not claim it: he may have turned into an unreasonable zombie under 12 years of psychological warfare and oppression by the Crown;

69. failing to realize the unlawful interference caused by an administrator, the Judicial Administrator, or another authority acting behind the scenes;

70. ignoring the documents calling for the attention of the courts to the false statements and sweeping allegations of Counsel that habitually intended to mislead the courts but the continuous tainted procedures have been ignored; ignoring the special circumstance that the Crown has been unable to refer to any legislation or common law supporting its case so its motion was strategic;

71. ignoring the crucial circumstance that the appellant have never been allowed to show any evidence in any court since 2007; no Canadian court has ever determined the substantive rights between the parties by any final judgment, so the Crown’s habitual false allegations about the appellant’s alleged abuse of process by “res judicata” have been absurd and untrue;

72. ignoring the facts in the documents before them. Stratas J.A. did not ask Z.A. Simon during the hearing for further proofs, details or explanations, giving the impression that everything has been clear for him. He honestly expressed once or twice during the hearing that he clearly or completely understood the submissions and position of the appellant from his written and verbal submissions. A party has no right to be pushy and interrupt a justice by telling facts and answers without questions or invitations of the judge: that would be impolite and improper during a hearing. Stratas J.A. asked the appellant the hearing about his opinion on Counsel’s allegations in order to declare him a vexatious litigant: Z.A. Simon answered that such claim was absurd. Stratas J.A. also asked him twice in the courtroom, “What would you say in supporting your contention that you have not been a vexatious litigant?” – This is not cited letter by letter. Such question of a justice is improper because (a) the appellant has submitted many pages arguing and proving that he had not been a vexatious litigant and (b) the burden to prove the vexatious conduct of a litigant is always on the moving party. It is an error in principle to force a party to show proof for the non-existence of a thing since the opposing party has the duty to prove its existence. (One cannot prove the non-existence of, say, UFOs or angels. Rather, the opponent needs to prove their existence.);

73. ignoring the fact that Z.A. Simon’s application gave a long list of enactments with 40+ sections ignored or violated by the Crown, including s. 67 of the Financial Administration Act: Crown debt is not assignable [to BC]. They erred in holding that an applicant must plead one cognizable administrative law claim. An applicant is not obliged to assess which one of the over 40 contraventions of the laws of Canada or British Columbia by CRA were the most unlawful;

74. ignoring the fact that so far no court of Canada or British Columbia has heard the central issue (seizure of monies) or the other serious issues on their merits. Echoing the phrases “It is an abuse of process” or “It has no merit” from preliminary decisions does not mean a Court has ever heard the serious questions of law or issues of great social importance on their merits; failing to observe the principles regarding the sufficiency of pleading an “arguable case” as set out in JTG Management Services Ltd. v. Bank of Nanjing Co. Ltd., 2015 BCCA 200. CRA had similar obligations than a bank in Vuckovich v. Royal Bank of Canada, 1998 CanLII 2398 (ON CA). In para. [38] of Sherman v. The Queen, 2008 TCC 487 (CanLII) the Court condemned seizure;

75. The orders dated 8 February 2019 have been made without legislative authority and without referring to any enactment, by excess or lack of jurisdiction, are void from the legal point of view;

76. The Honourable Mr. Justice Zinn erred in fact, in law and/or in principle in

77. prohibiting the filing of Z.A. Simon’s application for judicial review of the 2018 decision of Mr. Tucci (IRB/IAD) that failed to overturn an unnamed visa officer’s 2016 decision. Zinn J. misconstrued the fact or the law because the originating document submitted to the FC for filing requested the judicial review of a single IRB/IAD decision only. Z.A. Simon’s request FOR AN EXTENSUION OF TIME to file a separate application to review an earlier decision was NOT AN APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW. It was his error to conflate two different categories;

78. camouflaging his final order as a “direction” is a collateral attack against s. 12 of the Charter, constituting a cruel and unusual treatment or punishment that separates family members from each other forever, without a fair hearing. The lawful step would have been to order the Registry to file the proper originating document and give the parties an opportunity to be heard;

79. For the complete list of grounds to appeal his direction please refer to p. 73 in Volume II;

80. In general, the justices involved failed or refused to exercise their jurisdiction to hear the substance. See R. v. D.B.T., [1996] N.S.J. No. 11 (C.A.) (QL) and R. v. Thompson (1983), 1983 CanLII 547 (BC CA), 3 D.L.R. (4th) 642, at 651 (B.C.C.A.), and paras. [13] to [16] of Canada (Solicitor General) v. Subhaschandran, 2005 FCA 27 (CanLII); They all ignored the fact that a BC ministry officially admitted in 2012 in writing that Z. Simon had no debt on record. Regardless the unnecessary factual “fog” and controversies maintained by the Reasons, the several palpable and overriding errors of law and principle are visible for the SCCas a solid ground. The integrity of the federal court system, the prevention of miscarriage of justice, the possibility of bringing the administration of justice in disrepute, or creating new fault lines by questioning Parliament’s supremacy, are extremely important issues Canada-wide. See para. [64] of Lin v. Tang et al. (1997), 1997 CanLII 2675 (BC CA), 93 B.C.A.C. 57, citing Robins v. National Trust [1927];

81. The principle of innocent until proven guilty is valid for every Canadian but the justices ignored it. In 2016, the ex-AGC approved a beautification of the enactments (“New Layout for Legislation”) in the website https://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/. The new layout results in Canada’s scrambled enactments, without Parliament’s approval, with a potential result of billion-dollar suits against the Crown. The original and governing bilateral version of the enactments have millions of marginal notes that are not part of the enactments, pursuant to s. 14 of the Interpretation Act. “Marginal notes … in an enactment form no part of the enactment, but are inserted for convenience of reference only.” She unlawfully shifted these references into the enactments: the marginal notes became binding legislation. Thus, ss. 11 (b) of the Charter originally referred to every Canadian, especially in criminal context. It allowed every citizen “to be tried within a reasonable time” but Z.A. Simon was never allowed to have a “trial” where he could show evidence. Anyway, ss. 15 (1) of the Charter gives equal rights to criminals and innocent victims of torts to have a trial;

82. A 3-Justice Division of the FCA is apparently unable or not allowed to decide, due to lack of time, whether CRA’s “sponsorship debt program” (a policy contravening the laws of Canada) is a proper substitute for Parliament’s will and thus section 1. of the Charter overrides its section 8 that condemns seizure. Thus, the SCC is the best forum to have the last word in the controversy;

83. It would be bizarre to let the FCA decision stand. Then any counsel to the Crown would refer to this case as follows: “A certain Z.A. Simon was so unprepared in law and so vexatious at the courts that he lost his case against Canada, resulting that from now on any minister or ministerial administrator, including in CRA and Service Canada, can seize monies of every Canadian without any court order.” Such decision would constitute an extremely cruel treatment because the instant appellant wants to make Canada a more livable country and not a dictatorship;

84. All justices ignored para. [10] of International Taoist Church of Canada v. Ching Chung Taoist Association of Hong Kong Limited, 2011 BCCA 149 (CanLII), “An order striking a pleading could not be the basis for a res judicata defence in subsequent proceedings.”;

85. Most of the justices of the previous courts ignored a main principle of law. As for the speedy determination of Z.A. Simon’s appeal, the so-called gap rule applies: namely, Rule 1-3 (1) and (2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009 prescribe, “The object of these rules is to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on its merits” with proportionality. It is an abuse of process on the FCA’s behalf to waste the Court’s resources for 54 days on an issue to deter and stigmatize an innocent whistle blower but allow only a few minutes for a “hearing” and an “Order” that ambitiously tries to terminate the rule of law in Canada;

PART IV: Submissions

86. The applicant respectfully requests the Court to issue an order or direction to the Registry to return the attached $500 bank draft (security costs) to Z.A. Simon since all of the issues involved are related to important pure questions of law: a hearing is not required;

87. The applicant request the Court to assess and grant his costs in the Supreme Court of Canada and the courts below;

88. The applicant respectfully requests the SCC to order the separation of three independent issues conflated by the decision(s) dated February 8, 2019, including the immigration appeal of the family (Z. Simon, Z. Zhong, and J. Ye) that has no file number in the FC and the FCA.

PART V: The order or orders sought, including the order sought with respect to costs: for

89. A declaration that the factual finding in the order delivered by three justices of the Federal Court of Appeal in Simon v. Canada, 2011 FCA 6 (CanLII) is correct regarding the lack of garnishing order against him, and only a Division of 5 or more justices could overturn such earlier decision but – after eight years of silence – it is too late to appeal that order;

90. As a consequence of the previous paragraph, a mandamus that the monies in the amount of $3,441.68 taken from Zoltan A. Simon by seizure on 2 June 2008, without a garnishing order or a ministerial certificate in the Federal Court, to be returned to him by the Canada Revenue Agency without delay, with pre-judgment and post-judgement interest;

91. In the alternative, the matter to be returned to a division of five or more justices of the Federal Court of Appeal for final determination of the amounts payable to Zoltan Andrew Simon without delay, and that Court shall deliver a modified final order on the merits of the case that determines the substantive rights of the two parties involved;

92. An Order stating that the vexatious litigant order of Stratas J.A. in Simon v. Attorney General of Canada (Citation 2019 FCA 28, Docket: A-123-18)to be stayed or set aside because he acted beyond his jurisdiction by hearing that issue on a motion, whereas ss. 40 (1) of the Federal Courts Act prescribed that it should have been heard by a 3-Justice panel only on an application, and the judgement is invalid without a consent signed personally by the AGC;

93. In the alternative, for an Order that the above decision (without an Order posted online) issued by the Honourable Mr. Justice Stratas to be stayed until the Tax Court of Canada makes a decision in Z.A. Simon’s pending appeal and enters a final order declaring that it has no jurisdiction in that matter regarding the Crown’s seizure of Z.A. Simon’s monies in June 2008 (or the delivery of those monies to the wrong addressee), and to be further stayed until the FCA or the SCC posts a final decision in that matter that is not appealed by any party according to the court rules;

94. For an Order that the decision – that is unknown for the Federal Court of Appeal and CanLII in their websites – allegedly rendered without Reasons by a three-member panel (Gauthier J.A., Stratas J.A. and Webb J.A.) on 8 February 2019 to be set aside in its entirety because two of the FCA justices were unable to see or “hear” the appeal meaningfully within a few minutes or hours in the absence of the appellant and his submissions, and their alleged but usurped signature is a nullity due to an administrative error or misunderstanding;

95. In the alternative, for an Order or Direction for the Registrar to inform the appellant in writing as soon as possible about the date of posting that alleged order of the said 3-Justice Panel – if applicable at all – or/and of the correct date on which the time to appeal starts to run, pursuant to subsections 58 (1) (a) or (b)of theSupreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, with the applicable deadline to appeal it in the Supreme Court of Canada;

96. For a final order involving our simple factual situation with one or more related questions of law regarding the power of federal and provincial tribunals – particularly CRA and Service Canada – to seize monies of Canadians without a garnishing order or any prior involvement of a court, in light of s. 12 of the Constitution Act, 1982;

97. In the alternative, an Order for the Federal Court of Appeal to continue the interrupted procedure in file A-123-18 pursuant to sections 343 (3) through 348 (1) of the Federal CourtsRules till a final decision is reached by a differently constituted three- or five-justice panel of the FCA, should the Supreme Court of Canada have a shortage of justices or man-hours so could not make any decision on the merits of the issue(s);

98. For an Order granting the conversion of the instant application into a Notice of Appeal pursuant to s. 61 of the Supreme Court Act due to errors in law are alleged in the previous decisions;

99. For an Order that the name of the Minister of National Revenue to be restored and added in the style of cause in the SCC, or, for a Declaration that the removal of that name by Stratas J.A. on 8 February 2019 does not constitute a change or create a new situation in which the appellant would forfeit his rights against that federal entity by the removal of its name;

100. For an Order or Declaration stating that the combination of Stratas J.A.’s decisions into a single decision on 8 February 2019 regarding two separate and distinct applications for judicial review filed by Z.A. Simon does not, per se, take away the appellant’s rights to pursue appeals in the Supreme Court of Canada in both cases: one against the RCA (Minister of National Revenue) and one against the CIC (Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship);

101. For an Order regarding the fate and the proper appeal procedure for the recent (2018) immigration file of the appellant, his wife and stepson that has never been assigned any file number in the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal, or, for a Direction that would somehow clean up or reduce this unprecedented procedural mess (created by the Crown, some registry administrators and/or Zinn J.) in any or all of these appeals and applications for judicial reviews;

102. For a Direction that three distinct files cannot be conflated into one, because the party gets only 20 pages for his Memorandum of Argument, instead of 80, and in order to remedy such disadvantage, some of the material on pages 2 through 21 in the Notice of Application for Leave to Appeal above to be considered aspart of Z.A. Simon’s Memorandum of Argument;

103. Costs as assessed against the AGC, or $2,000 plus the amount of costs requested by the AGC, and the appellants’ filing and security costs in the SCC as well;

104. An Order for any further relief that this Honorable Court would find just and proper under these extraordinary circumstances that are unprecedented in Canadian legal history;

All of this is respectfully submitted to the Supreme Court of Canada on March 11, 2019.

_________________________________

Zoltan Andrew Simon, Applicant

PART VI: A table of authorities, setting out the paragraph numbers in Part III where the authorities are cited

Case law precedent and neutral citation Our paragraph No. in Part III

A. (L.L.) v. B. (A.), [1995] 4 SCR 536, 1995 CanLII 52 (SCC) 64

Apotex Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1993 CanLII 3004 (FCA), [1994] 1 F.C. 742,

[1993] F.C.J. No. 1098 (C.A.) (QL) 5, 6

Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC),

[1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 42

Bilson et al. v. Kokotow et al., 1978 CanLII 1632 (ON CA) 36

Bilson v. Kokotow et al., 1975 CanLII 771 (ON SC) 36

Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] 2 SCR 307,

2000 SCC 44 (CanLII) 6

Canada (Attorney General) v. Jagpal, [2008] 4 FCR 339, 2008 FCA 38 (CanLII) 5

Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII) 36

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. B479, 2010 FC 1227 (CanLII) 55

Canada (Solicitor General) v. Subhaschandran, 2005 FCA 27 (CanLII) 46, 79

Canadian Association of Film Distributors and Exporters v. Society for Reproduction

Rights of Authors, Composers and Publishers in Canada (SODRAC) Inc.,

2014 FCA 235 (CanLII) 51

Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution, 1985 CanLII 23 (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643,

[1985] S.C.J. No. 78 (QL) 64

Construction Gilles Paquette ltée v. Entreprises Végo ltée, [1997] 2 SCR 299,

1997 CanLII 352 (SCC) 42

Continuing Care Employers’ Bargaining Association v. AUPE, 2002 ABCA 148 (CanLII) 64

Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., [2001] 2 SCR 460, 2001 SCC 44 (CanLII) 42

Dragan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] 4 FC 189,

2003 FCT 211 (CanLII) 6

Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 (CanLII), [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190) 3, 51

Duong v. Waterloo North Hydro Inc., 2004 CanLII 6241 (ON SC) 36

Duquet v. Town of Sainte-Agathe, [1977] 2 SCR 1132, 1976 CanLII 13 (SCC) 42

Elson v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FCA 27 (CanLII) 65

Exeter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FCA 178 (CanLII) 61

Gralewicz et al. v. R., [1980] 2 SCR 493, 1980 CanLII 43 (SCC) 46

Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33 (CanLII), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235 3

International Taoist Church of Canada v. Ching Chung Taoist Association of Hong Kong

Limited, 2011 BCCA 149 (CanLII) 83

JTG Management Services Ltd. v. Bank of Nanjing Co. Ltd., 2015 BCCA 200 73

Kallaba v. Bylykbashi, 2006 CanLII 3953 (ON CA) 61

Lin v. Tang et al. (1997), 1997 CanLII 2675 (BC CA), 93 B.C.A.C. 57 79

Manitoba (Attorney General) v. Metropolitan Stores Ltd., 1987 CanLII 79 (SCC),

[1987] 1 S.C.R. 110 55

Markevich v. Canada, [2003] 1 SCR 94, 2003 SCC 9 (CanLII) 36

Newfoundland Telephone Co. v. Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of Public

Utilities), [1992] 1 SCR 623, 1992 CanLII 84 (SCC) 64

Nishri v. Canada, 1997 CanLII 5955 (FCA) 46

Old St. Boniface Residents Assn. Inc. v. Winnipeg (City), [1990] 3 SCR 1170,

1990 CanLII 31 (SCC) 64

Olumide v. Canada, 2016 FCA 287 (CanLII) 54

Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27, 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC) 2

RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC),

[1994] 1 S.C.R. 311 55

Roberval Express v. Transport Drivers Union, [1982] 2 SCR 888, 1982 CanLII 34 (SCC) 46

Robins v. National Trust Co., 1927 CanLII 469 (UK JCPC), [1927] 2 D.L.R. 97 (P.C.),

affing (1925), 57 O.L.R. 46 (C.A.) 79

R. v. D.B.T., [1996] N.S.J. No. 11 (C.A.) (QL) 79

R. v. Litchfield, 1993 CanLII 44 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 333 42

R. v. Thompson (1983), 1983 CanLII 547 (BC CA), 3 D.L.R. (4th) 642, at 651 (B.C.C.A.) 79

Sherman v. The Queen, 2008 TCC 487 (CanLII) 73

Simon v. Canada, 2010 FC 617 (CanLII) 36

Simon v. Canada, 2011 FCA 6 (CanLII) 88

Stone Container (Canada) Inc. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 894,

(1997), 192 N.B.R. (2d) 1, [1997] N.B.J. No. 360 (C.A.) (QL) 64

Supermarchés Jean Labrecque Inc. v. Flamand, [1987] 2 SCR 219, 1987 CanLII 19 (SCC) 64

Telecommunications Workers Union v. Canada (Radio-television and Telecommunications

Commission), [1995] 2 SCR 781, 1995 CanLII 102 (SCC) 64

Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières v. Larocque, 1993 CanLII 162 (SCC),

[1993] 1 S.C.R. 471, [1993] S.C.J. No. 23 (QL) 64

Vasquez Pacheco v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration),

1990 CanLII 8004 (FCA) 46

Vaziri v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1159 (CanLII),

[2006] FCJ No 1258 6

Vuckovich v. Royal Bank of Canada, 1998 CanLII 2398 (ON CA) 73

____________________________________________

Zoltan Andrew SIMON, Applicant (Self-represented)

PART VII – Enactments (statutes, regulations, and rules*)........................................ 83

Note for the * above: the Crown ignored or contravened most of these enactments

Canada Revenue Agency Act, S.C. 1999, c. 17: sections 3, 5 (1)(a), 6 (1) and (2), 42 (1)..... 83

Constitution Act, 1982 (a.k.a. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms):

s. 7, 8, 12, 15 (1),and 52 (1)........................................................................ 87

Court Order Enforcement Act, RSBC 1996, c 78: section 3 (1) (under debts, obligations)..... 91

Courts Administration Service Act, S.C. 2002, c. 8: subsection 2 (b)............................. 93

Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46: ss. 19, 21 (1), 22 (1), 126 (1), 322 (2) to (4), 337,

.... 346 (1), 361 (1), 380 (1), 462.31 (1) and (2), 463, 585, 586................................ 95

Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50: ss. 3 (b), 32....................... 106

Department of Citizenship and Immigration Act, S.C. 1994, c. 31: section 4.................. 109

Family Maintenance Enforcement Act, RSBC 1996, c 127: ss. 1 (1) (“debtor” and “main-tenance order”), 14.5 (1) and (2), 15 (1) to (4), 16 (1) to (5), 17 (3), 18 (1)................. 111

Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 4

(2nd Supp.): sections 23 (1) (under “garnishable moneys” to “Minister”, “support

order” and “support provision”), 24, 26, 36, 37, 45, 49.................................... 116

Family Support Orders and Agreements Garnishment Regulations, SOR/88-181:

subsections 3 (a) to (g), 6 (1), 8, 9, Schedule 2.............................................. 121

Federal Courts Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7: subsections 2 (1) “final judgment”,

17 (1) to (5), 18 (1) and (2), 18.1 (3) and (4), 18.4 (1), 19, 40 (1) and (2).............. 127

Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106: ss. 63 (1)(d), 64, 215 (2) and (3), 216 (1), (5), (6)

and (7), 220 (1), 221 (1) and (2), 301 (a) to (f), 303 (1), 449 (1) and (2), 451 (3),

456 (3), 458 (2)..................................................................................... 135

Financial Administration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-11: ss. 66 (Crown, Crown debt), 67....... 145

Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. G-2:

6 (1) and (2), 42 (1) (b)............................................................................ 148

Immigration Act, 1976 [insured in 1978], in Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985, Vol. V:

section 118 [in another version section 120]................................................... 151

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 [IRPA]: (sub)sections 3 (1)(d),

124 (1) and (2), 125 (a), 126, 145 (1), 146 (1) to (2), 190................................. 154

Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations: subsections 132 (4), 135 (a)............. 160

Immigration Regulations, 1978 S.O.R./78-172...................................................... N/A

Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.): (sub)sections 223 (1), (2), (3), (6),

(7) and (12), 223.1, 224 (1) and (1.2)........................................................... 163

Interest Act, RSC 1985, c I-15: sections 3 and 4................................................... 170

Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21: sections 8 (1), 12, 13, 14, 15 (2)...................... 172

Limitation Act, RSBC 1996, c 266: 3 (5), 9 (1) and (2)............................................ 176

Limitation Act, SBC 2012, c 13: sections 1 (“limitation period”), 21 (1) and (3)............. 179

Personal Property Security Act, RSBC 1996, c 359: section 1 (1) (“debtor”).................. 181

Supreme Court Act, RSBC 1996, c 443: sections 1 (“court”), 17, 18........................... 183

Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26: sections 52 and 61...................................... 185

Supreme Court Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009: subsections 1-3 (1) and (2),

3-7 (3), (4), (6), (8), (9), (12), (15), (17)....................................................... 188

=================================================================================

AG LAMETTI AND ROGER BILODEAU TERMINATING THE RULE OF LAW:

NOTICE OF MOTION TO A JUDGE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

(ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA AND THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL)

File number(s): 38747

FD-02394

FD-02480

BETWEEN:

Zoltan Andrew SIMON

Applicant (Applicant/Appellant)

and

The Attorney General of Canada

Representing Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada

and

The Attorney General of British Columbia

Representing Her Majesty the Queen in Right of British Columbia

Respondents (Respondents/Defendants)

_________________________________________________________________________

NOTICE OF MOTION TO A JUDGE

(OR THE COURT)

WRITTEN & SUBMITTED FOR FILING BY ZOLTAN ANDREW SIMON,

APPLICANT

(Pages 1 to 16 with cover page)

Pursuant to sections 48 (1), 52, 61, and 97 (1) of the Supreme Court Act (Loi sur la Cour supreme), R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, and sections 3 (2), 47, 52 (1), 78 (1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada (Règles de la Cour suprême du Canada), SOR/2002-156, section 139 (2) of the Criminal Code, and sections 8, 12, 15 (1), 24 (1), and 52 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, particularly the Canadian Charter to Rights and Freedoms.

_________________________________________________________________________

TAKE NOTICE that Zoltan Andrew SIMON applies to a Judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, under sections sections 48 (1), 52, 61, and 97 (1) of the Supreme Court Act (Loi sur la Cour supreme), R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, and sections 3 (2), 47, 52 (1), 78 (1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada (Règles de la Cour suprême du Canada), SOR/2002-156, and sections 8, 12, 15 (1), 24 (1), and 52 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, from the decision of Mr. Roger Bilodeau, Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada that was issued on 31 March 2020 in form of correspondence, under (SCC) file number(s) 38747, FD-02394, and FD-02480, and for an order or direction(s) for the next steps in order to end the procedural limbo in the Registry lasting longer than a year; Or, he is seeking any further or other order that the Justice or the Court may deem appropriate, including extension of time for the Crown to serve and file response(s).

AND FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that the motion shall be made on the following grounds:

(a) Several employees of the SCC Registry, including the Registrar, have repeatedly contravened several sections of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada and the Supreme Court Act as indicated in the Memorandum of Argument below;

(b) They, or at least one of the, communicated false and incomplete information for a Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, and therefore, mislead the Court;

(c) They, or at least one of them, knowingly and repeatedly contravened section 139 (2) of the Criminal Code, section 12 of the federal Interpretation Act and sections 8, 12, 15 (1), 24 (1), and 52 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, particularly the Canadian Charter to Rights and Freedoms.

Dated at the City of Red Deer, the Province of Alberta, this 3rd day of April, 2020.

[Names and contact info of the tortfeasors' counsel are removed from here]

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENT

Part I - Overview of the applicant’s position with respect to issues of public importance

The existence or non-existence of the rule of law, the powers of Parliament, the Supreme Court of Canada and the lower courts are the most crucial issues in a healthy society. Since 2006, there is an increasing menace undermining those principles and powers nationwide. In 2006, three federal ministers (immigration, revenue, and justice) agreed upon the creation of policy that overruled and defeated the legislation, Parliament's will. A sophisticated money extortion scheme was created including the policies named MOU and IP 2, for the systemic contraventions of the Charter, the IRPA, the IRP Regulations and several other federal acts and rules, let alone key decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. Apparently, the scheme has been accepted by each provincial government due to greed, regardless political orientation. Employees of the federal ministries are pressed to accept the decision of a single provincial public servant creating "sponsorship debts" without the involvement of any court that are excluded and their powers curtailed. This is an open contravention of s. 146 of the IRPA that prescribes a pre-condition in creating “sponsorship debtors”: such debts cannot exist without a ministerial debt certificate against a sponsor, filed and registered in the Federal Court. The FCA concluded in Simon v. Canada, 2011 FCA 6 (CanLII), “There is no suggestion that any garnishment order issued from a court of competent jurisdiction.”
The federal ministries, without a garnishment order or a ministerial certificate, prohibit the family reunification of the sponsors that are suspected debtors. This is a violation of s. 3 of the IRPA that aims at the unification of families. Canadians are facing growing financial difficulties year by year by the shortage of qualified immigrants in the family class that provides good and reliable immigrants. Sponsors would not invite criminals or terrorists in their homes, rather help the quality immigrants to become part of society and the work force. Instead of them, Canada often grants residence to unknown criminals and potential terrorists. The cruel separation of family members and collective punishment violate the principles of the Geneva Convention and sections of the Geneva Conventions Act.
The “honourable tortfeasors” (public servants of Canada and British Columbia) prevented the immigration of Z.A. Simon’s sponsored wife and her son for 13 years, without providing any lawful explanation for the tort. There are hundreds, or thousands, of broken families of innocent sponsors Canada-wide, thanks to the cruel and unconstitutional federal policies.
The applicant kept pleading an additional issue in several courts as follows: the federal (CIC) “Guide 3900” and the related family class sponsorship form, under its question 9, unlawfully prohibit the immigrants or sponsors to submit an application in cases when a previously sponsored person received social assistance. It is unlawful: a sponsor may have repaid the amount, became discharged bankrupt, etc.) I sent a letter in 2016 to a minister of immigration, calling his attention to the unlawfulness of the form and the guide. It resulted in revenge a few months later when an unnamed visa officer in Hong Kong refused to issue landed immigrant visas to my wife and her son. Her grounds of refusal were that we belonged to different cultures, spoke different languages, and had a 13-year age gap, meaning that our marriage was not genuine. The visa officer concluded, without any basis, that my wife just married me in order to enjoy the privileges in Canada. Such grounds constitute open violations of the equality provisions of the Charter. [None of Canada’s tribunals could prove with 100% probability that their spouses did not marry them by the primary purpose of gaining more privileges, higher rank, or better financial circumstances.]
Another significant issue for every Canadian is the accelerated erosion of the powers of the Supreme Court of Canada and other independent courts and the uncontrolled increase of the administrators’ powers. Such problem have never been addressed or resolved. In general, the powers of the "officers of the court" are exponentially increasing. Namely, certain registry officers and counsel to ministers have more and more courage to submit misleading and false statements for the courts, virtually on every level. Their actions and omissions seem to be coordinated with those of the registry officers who simply refuse to file documents revealing the wrongdoings of the ministers, including attorneys general. Thus, the resolution of the legal controversies between parties actually happens by the officers of the courts but the courts are not allowed to learn of those issues. If courts are unaware of major legal or constitutional issues, they are obviously unable to solve those hidden problems that may poison the society and ruin the country on the long run. If officers of the court are allowed to apply torts routinely without condemnation and find solutions through them, the society would get the impression that there is no need for courts at all since the officers of the courts can run the country without the judges. Finally, if a court gives up its powers gradually to the ministers and their extended arms - the officers of the court - there is no guarantee that years or decades later when the country becomes completely corrupt the justices could not find any means or opportunity to regain those lost powers. Eventually, the Crown may stay with a few rubber-stamping judges, maybe one in each major city. Such trend could accompany the public's growing distrust in and disrespect towards judges.

Part II - A statement on the questions in issue, and questions of the constitutional validity or applicability of statutes, regulations and common law rules and their inoperability

6. The applicant served and filed all of his four applications for leave to appeal well before the deadline specified in the Rules. Thus, the issue of the winter or Christmas recess does not need to come into play or be considered. However, s. 5.1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly states that the time period from December 23 to January 3 must be excluded from the computation of days in our case. Nothing in s. 58 of the Supreme Court Act indicates that it invalidates Rule 5.1. Rather, the Rules Committee found a gap in the Act regarding the winter recess and filled that gap. Further, s. 1 of the Rules implies that the Registry is obliged to observe every rule, “Except as otherwise provided by the Act or any other Act of Parliament, these rules apply to all proceedings in the Court.” The Interpretation Act is “another Act of Parliament.” Its s. 12 prescribes, “Every enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.” One cannot assume that Parliament or any legislator created s. 5.1 of the Rules in orderto mislead Canadians so if they rely on it and the Interpretation Act, they would remain separated from their spouses and children forever: this is a section 12 contravention of the Charter.

7. In short, the pressure of the AGC, Ms. Proulx, or/and two counsel is effectively prohibiting the SCC Registrar from obeying four provisions of Canadian law regarding Christmas recess. It is plain and obvious that the SCC Registry would accept, without hesitation, any document for filing if the Crown would rely on Rule 5.1. Should any court make an order declaring s. 5.1 invalid and not applicable, hundreds of federal and provincial counsel would be deprived of their deserved Christmas breaks and may be required to work hard during the holidays. It is unlikely that the lawmakers intended to punish counsel and civil servants.

8. It is even more disturbing that the Registrar and the employees of the SCC Registry are not allowed to observe section 61 of the Supreme Court Act. Since 2012, Z.A. Simon submitted at least three times his notices of appeal, alleging errors in law, but their filing was habitually refused. Thus, s. 61 of the Act is clearly impracticable. Maybe the Registrar and his officers have been under the real or imagined pressure of counsel, Ms. Proulx, the AGC, or other ministers. They disobey s. 61 because they do not wish to lose their jobs. Therefore, the intention of Parliament has been routinely ignored, compromised, disobeyed and abused. My four applications for leave to appeal belonged to the s. 61 class since I showed a long list or errors in law in each of them. However, the repeated refusal by the Registry in the past forced me to file them as applications and not notices: when the Registry makes a decision, it is too late for a party to serve and file a modified submission. This is a serious contravention of sections 12 and 24 (1) of the Charter for victims of torts. The Registry's refusal reduces their chances of success to practically zero in the Supreme Court of Canada because the registry officers force them to the improper category: parties submitting documents in the application for leave to appeal indirectly admit that the lower court did not commit any error of law. It is unconstitutional on the registry officers' behalf to assume that judges of the lower courts appealed from are unable to make any error in law. The applicant respectfully submits that Ms. Proulx’s reliance on her own absolute powers is misplaced. The Act and the Rules grant zero (nada, niente, zilch) power or authority to individual registry officers other than the Registrar. She had no right to assume that Z.A. Simon’s second application for leave to appeal shall not be filed since she was unable to understand if it included or not the appeal of Mr. Justice Zinn’s direction that sealed a family’s fate. Parties are not obliged to wrestle with an administrator’s baseless and conflicting demands.

9. As for the powers of the Registrar, they are not absolute. Registrars are not above the courts that lead the judges. Rather, their duty is to help the justices, instead of obstructing justice. It is reasonable to read s. 19 (2)(a) of the Rules (about power to ”accept or reject” a document for filing) as having been adopted by the legislators in light of sections 8 (2) and 78 (3) of the Rules. Reading these three in conjunction, it is clear that the only reason to refuse the filing of a document is (a) its non-compliance with the Rules regarding service, or (b) its non-compliance with an order of the Court, a judge or the Registrar. An open-minded and well-informed person can see at the first glance that the filing and the service of Z.A. Simon's complied with the Rules in every aspect and detail. Although counsel alleged that the service took place beyond the deadline, they have been unable to support such false and sweeping allegation by any affidavit or evidence during the last 14 months. The Registry has been unable to find and prove any fault in the first two applications for leave to appeal. The Registrar, and both counsel belong to the group of the most experienced and best paid lawyers of the Crown. All of them had over fourteen months under pressure of the respondents to find any non-compliance with the Rules in Z.A. Simon's first two applications but they were unable to find and show any. A mere suspicion that somewhere there might be such shortcoming hiding in them does not justify the Registry's failure to assign them proper file numbers and submit them to the Court in a timely manner. In short, sleeping on the job for over a year and not permitting the Court to get any information for such a long time is a flagrant contravention of subrule 32 (1)(a)(ii) of the Rules. Pursuant to that rule, the Registrar should have submitted to the Court for consideration the first two applications for leave to appeal more than a year ago. Sitting back comfortably and remaining silent for about half a year, the Registrar practically accepted both applications for filing. More than fourteen months have passed since the Registry received the first application for leave to appeal. So far, the parties have not received any order or judgment from him containing the refusal of the first one's filing. Such long silence means for a reasonable person that the document has been accepted and was in the Registry's files. Similarly, under Rule 64 (1), both counsel had the opportunity for 14 months to make a motion to the Registrar for the dismissal of the application(s) for leave to appeal as abandoned. Neither of those two expert lawyers of the Crown has submitted such motion, knowing well that both applications have been served and filed properly on the applicant's behalf. Parties are not responsible for a Registry’s fiddling with fabulous “internal reference numbers” or their possible conversion into “regular” or “final” file numbers. During such long hocus-pocus, the SCC Registry failed to consider the most relevant case law: R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII), paras. 10-29.

10. I list only two more examples showing that the attorneys general involved do no respect the SCC: Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, 2011 SCC 30 states the Crown’s obligation to file a ministerial certificate before garnishment or seizure; Markevich v. Canada, 2003 SCC 9 (CanLII), [2003] 1 SCR 94 obliges the Crown to obey the six-year limitation period.

Part III - A concise statement of argument

11. Since this Honourable Court was not allowed to learn the key material facts, this is a continuation of events described at paragraph 4. I appealed the visa officer's decision to the IRB (IAD). In 2018, the Tribunal concluded that our marriage was not genuine because I kept supporting my Chinese wife despite of her statement that she was able to survive without my support by her work. 90% of persons living in any country would not instruct their spouses, “please stop sending me more money because I have too much.” I appealed the Panel’s decision but the FC Registry was unwilling to file it, so Mr. Justice Zinn issued a direction in 2018 not to file it. He did not show a file number on his direction. In 2019, the FCA confirmed his decision without reasoning, in a short sentence in a different file.

12. Tina Proulx, a registry officer of the SCC Registry, assigned an "internal reference number" to that (second) application for leave to appeal. She acknowledged its receipt in her letter dated before the end of March 2019. The number assigned to it was effectively a file number. Both de facto and de jure, my second application has been properly filed and served, but Ms. Proulx had a second thought many weeks later. She alleged that my application was improper since it contained a vagueness regarding my appeal of Mr. Justice Zinn’s direction. She pressed me to submit a corrected application. She acted without jurisdiction so her suggestion or instruction was a nullity in law. I explained that I had no obligation to bend under her pressure and submit a new application. Simply, I was unable to find a remedy: a party cannot invent a file number for a direction if a judge decided not to assign a file number to it. Also, the FCA decision was mixing apples and oranges by squeezing an immigration-related issue into a file dealing with contract law, torts and debts. A party has no authority or ability to correct irregular, incomplete or formally defective decisions of the lower courts. The Act and the Rules have no provision about the powers of administrators of the Registry. If a single registry officer cannot understand a sentence in a submission, it does not follow that the document is improper and its filing shall be prohibited. Justices will understand everything, or, could skip a vague point. During the first part of 2019 the Registrar and the Deputy Registrar remained silent and failed to obey s. 32 (1) (a)(ii) of the Rules. The Registry failed to submit my first four (4) applications for leave to appeal between January 2019 and January 2020 to the Supreme Court of Canada, by contravention of the said rule. It is not an excuse for the Registrar that Ms. Proulx assigned only an “internal reference number” to the first two applications. The Act or the Rules silent of any internal reference number. Such manipulation if effectively a contravention of s. 139 (2) of the Criminal Code. It served as a tort in order to prevent the Supreme Court to see the first two applications. It was an obstruction of justice by perverse means, an offence.

13. On or about 31 January 2019, the Registry received the required number of bound sets of my first application for leave to appeal. Ms. Proulx’s 8 February 2019 letter acknowledged receipt of the submission. The applicant's phone call to the Registry in those days meant a confirmation of their receipt in good condition. Thus, the Registry received my affidavits of service before the deadline, for all of my four applications for leave to appeal. The Respondents have never served any proper response on the applicant for any of the four applications, let alone Counsel’s complains to the Registry by letters that Z.A. Simon’s document or its filing was improper. For example, both counsel alleged, without showing evidence, that the filing of the first application was out of time, by seven or eight days. The applicant immediately defended himself. His affidavits and their exhibits clearly indicate that there was no delay involved in any of his four filings and services.

14. The applicant successfully demonstrated that he filed and served his applications in a timely manner. One of the exhibits showed that the BC CA order was entered in the Vancouver Registry on December 14, 2018. He showed that the letter dated February 8, 2019 had proved that the SCC Registry had his first application on file and with a number assigned to it. One does not need to be a rocket scientist to figure out the number of days between those two dates. It is clear that the interval is shorter than the prescribed 60 days. Section 80 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada is a general rule and applies to every Registrar. It clearly states that a judgment taken under reserve shall take effect from the date on which it is disposed with the Registrar. The BC Court of Appeal reserved its judgment, issued its reason at the end of November 2018, and entered it in the records of the Vancouver Registry. Their stamps of December 14 and 18 on the order indicate this.

15. From the aforesaid submissions it seems clear for any person versed in law that it was an unnecessary step and the Registry's abuse of process to make a detour involving a single judge. Such detour maneuver seemed smart at the beginning: based on the sweeping allegations of Ms. Proulx and Counsel, someone sent a letter to the Honourable Mr. Justice Rowe. It seems that the letter was a laconic one, falsely alleging that a certain Z.A. Simon disobeyed the Registry’s instructions how to modify his improper documents and submit a motion for extension of time. The Registry did not send the first two applications to him. Registries do not send unfiled documents for a judge or a court. Thus, the Honourable Mr. Justice Rowe was forced to make a decision in a factual vacuum or darkness, only based on the untrue allegations of one or more officers of the Court. Thus, the Registry bought time for the Crown’s tortfeasors but without the expected outcome. It is not as easy to mislead a single judge as any officer of the Court may believe. The Registrar prevented him to read the applicant’s subsequent submission with the clarifications. Thus, the Honourable Mr. Justice Rowe had no means to make a judgment that could determine the next step. Seemingly, the Registrar has managed to wrestle away the authority of a justice, continued his work, and sealed the fate of the applicant’s related document without proper explanation.

16. The interpretation of the above-mentioned three provisions read in conjunction shall apply regarding the Registrar’s powers. Otherwise, taking s. 19 (2) of the Rules out of context while extrapolating it beyond recognition, granting unlimited powers to a Registrar to reject the filing of a document without any reason, section 52 of the Act would become inoperable. Section 52 states, "The Court shall have and exercise exclusive ultimate appellate civil and criminal jurisdiction within and for Canada, and the judgment of the Court is, in all cases, final and conclusive." The Act and the Rules contains dozens of rules, conditions, limitations or requirements regarding the operation and decisions of the Court, so it is inconceivable that the powers of a Registrar are unlimited. That distorted interpretation would mean that a Registrar has the power of refusing the filing of every document containing extremely important questions of law that are crucial for the country while allow the Court only to deal with issues of minor importance like tooth picks and paper clips.

17. So far, since January 2019, the Registrar and the Deputy Registrar have remained silent regarding the filing status of Z.A. Simon's four separate applications for leave to appeal properly served and filed in the SCC Registry. They were unable to explain how, where, or at what point did any of those documents failed comply with the Rules, or with any order. There was no order previous to the submission of any of those four original documents. Thus, the situation described in Rule 78 (1) of the Rules clearly does not apply for them.

18. Section 19 of the Rules does not contain a further option for the Registrar such as remain silent and do no nothing for several months. It is respectfully submitted that a reasonable interpretation of that Rule is that if the Registrar does not refuse the filing of a document within 60 days after its receipt by the Registry, and does not direct the submitting party to make any change in it, the document is deemed to be filed on the date of the receipt.

19. The Rules does not contain any provision for the case of the Registry’s procrastination.

20. Pursuant to s. 3 (1) of the Rules, the Court has the power to give directions to the Registry and the parties how to continue the procedural steps in such a limbo or gridlock situation.

21. The Registrar created a procedural loophole or cul-de-sac in mid-2019. The applicant's motion for the termination of the limbo ended up on the desk of the Honourable Mr. Justice Rowe who directed the applicant to serve and file a motion for extension of time and the submission of proper applications for leave to appeal. His judgment is impartial and unassailable: the applicant himself could not have written a better decision.

22. The judgment of Mr. Justice Rowe does not contain any specific detail or restriction regarding those two requirements. It does not order that the served and filed document(s) must bear a certain date (in November or December 2019). They have been served before.

23. Two possible scenarios may exist in respect to the involvement of the Honourable Mr. Justice Rowe. In the first scenario, the Registry did not allow him to read the “unfiled” documents in question. He may have asked a registry officer about the applicant’s documents and the officer may have told him, “-Your Honour, there is no document in the file of Zoltan A. Simon at all in the year 2019.” In that case, Mr. Justice Rowe was forced to make a judgment in a factual vacuum, relying only on Counsel’s one-sided and unproven allegations. In the alternative scenario, Mr. Justice Rowe was allowed to see and read many of the “unfiled” documents. A few weeks later he may have been ready to work on an order but the Registrar saw from his facial expressions that it may not be as favourable for the AGC as the latter hoped. Therefore, the Registrar saw no other choice to save the AGC than quickly and bravely issuing a letter to the applicant that his motion related to the order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Rowe cannot be filed. (A justice cornered into such unusual situation may remain silent and would not issue his intended order. Mr. Justice Rowe, as a gentleman, probably would not wish to destroy Mr. Bilodeau’s reputation. (If he would issue any order now, it would reveal for the world that something is “not kosher” in the operation of the Registry. Making an order regarding a submission that has not been filed would raise many eyebrows in the community of judges and lawyers. It would make an impression that the Registry of the Supreme Court of Canada is corrupt.)

24. In any case, there is no judgment issued by a justice of the SCC. Maybe the Registrar generously “granted” involvement for a judge but later took away the right of decision-making from him, interrupting the work of a justice. Important work, energy and man-hours of the Court have been wasted. This is an abuse of process caused by the Registry. Further, there is no judgment about the status of Z.A. Simon’s four applications for leave to appeal. All of those four applications are still alive, in a limbo. The stubborn fact remains that the Registrar still has an obligation to submit all the four of them to the Court for consideration if he wants to avoid the trap of section 139 (2) of the Criminal Code. The Registrar is free to grant the prescribed period of time allowing Counsel to submit their responses if they wish.

25. It was an error in law on the Registry’s behalf to let Ms. Proulx to grant the Respondents exemption from the Rules. A registry officer has no authority to grant a party such privilege.

26. The Registrar, under pressure or acting freely, created a procedural cul-de-sac in which captured him. The Act or the Rules contain no specific provision allowing a Registrar to interrupt the work of a judge, by pushing him aside when the outcome is not promising for the Registrar’s superior. Such partisan attitude of the agent of an AG is not supported by any legislation. In general, there is no provision allowing an officer to issue a false statement alleging that a party has failed to obey an order of a judge when the party had obeyed that order. Only the justice involved (or the Court) can state that his or her order has not been complied with. Even if a registrar would have such power, his recent refusal to file Z.A. Simon’s submission of December 2019 related to Mr. Rowe’s judgment does not affect the overall picture. It does not reduce the Registrar’s obligations or the parties’ rights to be heard. Anyone would admit that Mr. Bilodeau considers the “internal reference numbers” FD-02394 and FD-02480 as file numbers. His text reads, “File Nos.: 38747, FD-02394, FD-02480.” This reveals the sincerity of Mr. Bilodeau. In his mind, these three numbers are file numbers, disagreeing with the omnipotent Ms. Proulx whose logic is weaker at this point.

Part IV - Submissions in support of the order sought concerning costs: The AGC has vicarious liability for the errors, omissions and torts of the SCC Registry’s employees.

Part V - The order(s) sought, including an order concerning costs: (a) An order or direction for Mr. Proulx (or the Deputy Registrar) to file Z. Simon’s 4+1 pending applications; (b) A direction for the Court to join or combine them under a single file number if possible;

(d) A direction about Ms. Proulx’s unfulfilled promise to return the filing fees paid ($500 each).

(e) Any other or further relief that this Honourable Court finds fair, due to COVID-19 and service; granting the filing of this motion without a draft order. (It is too hard for the applicant.)

All of this is respectfully submitted on this third day of April, 2020.

______________________________________

Zoltan Andrew Simon, Applicant to the motion

Part VI - A table of Authorities with hyperlinks (if applicable) and setting out the paragraph numbers in Part III where the authorities are cited

Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, 2011 SCC 30 10

Markevich v. Canada, 2003 SCC 9 (CanLII), [2003] 1 SCR 94 10

R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII) 9

Simon v. Canada, 2011 FCA 6 (CanLII): 1

Part VII - Printouts of provisions (statutes, regulations and rules)

The printouts of all provisions referred to, and have been submitted previously, are in the possession of the Registry. Should the Registry be unwilling to make them available for this Honourable Court, the applicant would be glad to resubmit them if so directed. The Act and the Rules are “in their little finger” of each SCC judge, so to speak. Therefore, the inclusion and re-submission of photocopies of the Supreme Court Act and its Rules seems unnecessary here. (Ms. Proulx may refuse the filing of this humble submission anyway, and the applicant has no money to waste.)

Documents, including affidavits

The SCC Registry has a plethora of the instant applicant’s affidavits and affidavits of Registrar, under pressure or acting freely, created a procedural cul-de-sac in which captured him. The Act or the Rules contain no specific provision allowing a Registrar to interrupt the work of a judge, by pushing the judge to the sidelines when his or her involvement is not promising for the superior of the Registrar. Such partisan attitude of the agent of an attorney general is not supported by any legislation. The Act or the Rules have no specific provision allowing an officer to issue a false statement alleging that a party has failed to obey an order of a judge when the party had obeyed that order. Only the justice involved (or the Court) can state that his or her order has not been complied with. Even if a registrar would have such power, his recent refusal to file Z.A. Simon’s submission of December 2019 related to Mr. Rowe’s judgment does not affect the overall picture. It does not reduce the Registrar’s obligations and the parties’ rights to be heard. Anyone would admit that Mr. Bilodeau considers the “internal reference numbers” FD-02394 and FD-02480 as file numbers. His text reads, “File Nos.: 38747, FD-02394, FD-02480.” This reveals the sincerity of Mr. Bilodeau. In his mind, these three numbers are file numbers, disagreeing with the omnipotent Ms. Proulx whose logic is weaker at this point. service on file. Therefore, only one document is enclosed here: the correspondence of Mr. Roger Bilodeau, Registrar, dated to March 31, 2010. (It is probably on file as well.) The essential facts and law have not changed significantly since the applicant’s previous submission.

Attachments:

Hereby the applicant is attaching a money order as this motion’s filing fee. A CD containing the electronic file is enclosed in the same envelope as well, with three sets of this motion.

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