Canadian immigration law and the fall of a democracy: the policies dominate

by Zoltan Andrew Simon* (historian, amateur scholar) E-mail:

Twitter: @ZoltanAndrew



This paper contains the results of six years of legal research. It deals with the controversies between Canada’s laws and immigration policies. After examining the numerous unlawful elements in the treatment of the family class sponsors, it concludes that the same trend is valid for Canadian democracy. The transition to a totalitarian regime happens by reducing the powers of Parliament and the judges while the ministers’ unlawful policies grant excessive power to the administrators and registries.

The conclusion of the paper reveals the crisis of leadership in Canada, including the apparent corruption in the federal government and the federal court system.

A short form of this academic paper has been sent to many Canadian columnists and Calgary lawyers in November 2013, under the title “Crisis of power in Canada.”

Some say that judges hate hypothetical cases in pleadings. That may be a myth, so we start with such an example. The law is like a mathematical equation: it still must work if you use extreme facts and situations.


Keywords and abbreviations: agreement, British Columbia (BC), Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”), conspiracy, constitutional questions, contract, debt claim, debt provable, Federal Court (FC), Federal Court of Appeal (FCA), garnishee, “hermaphroditic” litigant, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), limitation period, ministerial certificate, Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), money extortion scheme, sponsorship debt, Supreme Court Act, Supreme Court of Canada (SCC).


*Address correspondence to the author at 6 Rutherford Drive, Red Deer, Alberta, Canada T4P3G9. Fax: (403) 341-3300; E-mail:  URL:



Family class sponsorship is common in Canada. Although most cases are different, the federal policies allow any ministry to take advantage of the re-victimized sponsors illegally. The following hypothetical case illustrates this social problem.


IMMIGRATION TO CANADA: Heaven or hell for sponsored family members

Celine Doe immigrated to Canada in 1986. She met the handsome Fred in one of the ex-colonies. He was the son of a tribal chief. He spoke both English and French quite well. Celine thought that he could become an asset both for her and Canada. Fred promised to marry her (but he never did). She sponsored Fred who arrived in Canada in 1990 with his daughters. Soon he changed, started to abuse her and moved out. Celine was left with Fred’s two daughters that were 17 years old and ten months old. She took good care of the girls and supported them. A year later a criminal kidnapped the baby Lisa. The local police could not locate them. Then Celine got a phone call from Fred who was studying at a university. He wanted to become a judge and said he had no money.

In reality, Fred applied for social benefits in 1990. He reported to the administrators that his wife had abused him. When they asked for details, he lied, “She told me that she hated me because my skin was too dark.” He also claimed that his two daughters were living with him and he was supporting them. The manager pacified him by stating, “You are now in a democratic country where no one can discriminate against you because of your race or ethnicity. We guarantee that you can study and choose a good profession.” The office granted him social benefits and sent him to a university. Celine did not suspect anything, since no government official had contacted her. Fred kept moving from province to province and applied for – and received – social benefits everywhere. (Fred often received large amounts of money at Western Union sent by his secretary in his old country. Canada had no idea about that. He lived with several rich women as a playboy then dropped out of the university, due to his drinking problems.)

In the meantime, Celine realized that she had been waiting for the return of her beloved Fred in vain. Fred’s older daughter was working non-stop from 1990 to 1998. Then she had an accident in the factory and lost her right hand. Celine had to support her. In 2008 Celine tried to sponsor an old friend from Europe who was interested in marrying her. The CIC was silent. In 2010 she received a letter stating that they were investigating her debts; she could not sponsor her new man. Even his visitors’ visa was refused.

Back in 1993, the RCMP found Lisa but they were unaware of Celine as her legitimate guardian so she was given to another couple. Five years later the police received information about Celine but did not want to create a legal dispute. They informed the ministry of human resources and families. The provincial ministry immediately found out the truth but maliciously decided not to inform Celine. A car hit Lisa in 2005 and the ministry paid the high costs of his hospitalization till she died at age of 24.

This was the strategic moment for the administrators to send a statement to Celine. It said that unfortunately Lisa was dead, but Celine owed the province over $1,300.000 – due to a default of her sponsorship obligations. (Since the province charged a compound interest of 6% till 2013, the ministry expected a better return by delaying her notification.)

In 2013 Celine received more surprise letters. The statements showed that she owed another debt of $800,000 to the governments, due to the social benefits paid to Fred from 1990 to 2000 in eight provinces. They threatened her that they half of her salary would be garnisheed if she did not pay her debts.

The oppressed but shy and frail Celine filed a statement of claim at the courts. The provincial court sent her to the federal court while the federal court sent her to the provincial court, both qualifying her as a vexatious litigant. Her tax account has always been garnisheed. She wanted to visit her fiancée but she could not afford it. She had no free time, working day and night for nothing, for the errors of the administrators.

When she considered settling abroad, a manager of Service Canada sent her a letter which said that her future pension benefits may be garnisheed without any procedure at the courts. Celine’s lawyer explained to her that the word “may” in the ministries means that her pension benefits shall be reduced, perhaps to zero. He showed Celine the Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, 2011 case as a rule for such interpretation.

Celine would be better off abroad as a political refugee, revoking her citizenship to protest. Here – in “the most livable country of the world” – she could only commit suicide, or turn into terrorist by burning down a government office to ashes. She could start a public hunger strike and notify the international media, or even handcuff her wrist and ankles to the steel fence of Parliament Hill on Canada Day. She cannot expect any help from the champions of red tape.



During his nine court cases (2007-2013) the author submitted the above test situation with 28 constitutional questions to the FC, FCA, and the SCC recently. The judges remained silent. Most of them held that they had no jurisdiction just because the recovery of the sponsorship “debt” was originally requested by a province, even if the federal CRA did the actual garnishment. Other judges found that pleadings without a claim for damages – only for restitution of moneys and declaratory relief – were unusual and unacceptable.   

Similar circumstances and questions may occur in any country, particularly where federal and provincial laws coexist. The basic dilemma is whether federal public servants need to observe the federal laws only while provincial employees should observe only the provincial laws. This question is often raised in garnishment law. Namely, what authority is responsible for observing the legislation if a province wants to garnishee unlawfully a firm or a person? If a province wants to proceed with the garnishment without any legal basis – like a ministerial certificate filed at a court – but the federal state allows such unlawful garnishment and puts it into practice, which one should bear the legal burden for the damages in tort? In general, on which side is the guilt and the legal responsibility in such improper garnishment cases in any country? Which side needs to verify that the debt is “provable” or only a baseless claim? The provincial authorities would answer that it is not punishable to ask a higher authority to start an illegal garnishment. They are just requesting the state to do something illegal. Canada has the responsibility of complying with the federal legislation regarding garnishment, they would say.

The federal authorities claim that the responsibility lies with the provincial government that requested the garnishment. Thus, the provincial and federal governments are blaming each other for such tort situations. The innocently suffering firms or individuals are facing insurmountable difficulties and uphill battles at the courts against the joint tortfeasors commonly called “red tape.”

Who is guilty in any tort, generally speaking, if a party requests another party to do something unlawfully, or commit a crime? Are they joint tortfeasors? If one of the parties is innocent in the money extortion scheme, which one is that?

This conflicting picture may remind us to a military airplane that is flying upside down. Such situations do happen in real life sometimes. The pilots do not trust the instruments, only their own confused senses. The senior pilot thinks that the junior pilot is controlling the plane while the junior believes that the first pilot controls everything. The result is the crashing of the airplane. In our case, the instruments and gauges of the plane correspond to the legislation.



Let us return to the twenty-eight constitutional questions that have been before eleven federal judges. None of them was able – or allowed – to answer any of the following 28 questions:

  1. Does an extreme interpretation of ss. 145.(3) of IRPA (Assented to 2001-11-01) and s. 5.23 of a federal policy named “IP 2”, resulting in a new punishment by inserting the words “at any time” (also beyond the prescribed limitation period, till the death of the sponsor) violate the rights in s. 8. [unreasonable seizure] and 11.(b) of the Charter, s. 32. of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, subsections 39. (1) and (2) of the Federal Courts Act, s. 134. of IRPA, subsections 3.(5) and 9.(1) of the Limitation Act (of British Columbia), and attack collaterally the Court’s order set out in Markevich v. Canada, 2003 SCC 9, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 94, Sherman v. The Queen, 2008 TCC 487, Bentley v. Canada (Employment Insurance Commission), 2000 CanLII 15758 (F.C.), where a former Act governed, and Hupe et al. v. Government of Manitoba, 2007 MBQB 195, at least for sponsors that signed their CIC forms before June 2002? [In our case and in Markevich v. Canada (supra), Canada was “agent of the Province.”]
  2. Is it possible that in the category of “other than tax” debts – including student loans, pursuant to ss. 16.1(1) and 16.2(1) of the Canada Student Financial Assistance Act, ss. 18.(2) of the Canada Student Loans Act, and in cases related to rent – the legally prescribed limitation period applies everywhere except for alleged sponsorship debts where the self-help action or the Minister’s certification of debt may legally take place after several decades of silence?
  3. Shall the meaning of “debt” in s. 145.(3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act include any uncertified debt claim or “alleged debt”?
  4. Shall the word “recover” in s. 145.(3) of IRPA include automatic garnishment without any previous contract between the sponsor and any federal or provincial ministry, without the involvement of any court, and without sending any garnishee summons, similar documents or court order to the alleged debtor before garnishment?
  5. If both answers to questions 3 and 4 are affirmative, shall ss. 145.(3) of IRPA vitiate subsections 11.(a) and (g) of the Charter as Part I of the Constitution Act (1982), subsection 146.(1)(b) of IRPA, sections 12. and 15.(2)(a) of the Interpretation Act, s. 118.(2) of the old Immigration Act, ss. 449.(1)(b) and (2) of the Federal Courts Rules, s. 27. of the Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act, sections 32., 45. and 52. of the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act, ss. 135.(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, s. 9. and Schedule II of the Family Support Orders and Agreements Garnishment Regulations, ss. 76.(1)(b) of the Financial Administration Act, and ss. 42.(1) of the Canada Revenue Agency Act, at least in cases of sponsors that signed their CIC sponsorship agreement or undertaking forms before 2002? [Subsection 118.(2) of the Immigration Act goes, “Any payment of a prescribed nature… may be recovered… in any court of competent jurisdiction as a debt due to Her Majesty in right of Canada…”]
  6. Should the answers to questions 3 and 4 be affirmative, is ss. 145.(3) of IRPA of no force or effect because it contravenes subsections 15.(1) and 52.(1) of the Charter?
  7. Since here the sponsorship agreement obligation is a liability not arising out of trust or contract – only an agreement between two persons – and judgment has not been recovered on it, does the federal policy that ignores the formal requirements prescribed by federal and provincial laws regarding garnishment or attachment also violate s. 3.(1) the Court Order Enforcement Act [RSBC 1996]?
  8. If the CIC forms promise three different things to three groups – the sponsors, the sponsored persons, and the provinces – and contain fatal contradictions, claiming in paragraph 9 of the Sponsorship Agreement that “The Sponsor’s (and Co-signer’s) obligation is limited to providing for the shortfall only” while paragraph 11 claims that the same obligation is at least 100%, can it be assumed that the sponsors as reasonable persons have understood the essence of those sponsorship documents and the entrapments in them?
  9. If such rigid interpretation of a gentlemen’s agreement (paragraph 11. of the CIC Sponsorship Agreement form, “It is further agreed that damages will not be less than the total of all amounts actually received by the immigrant…”) and the words “the sponsor is considered to be in default” in the federal CIC-CRA policy named MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) always result in an absolute and unconditional 100% financial responsibility of each sponsor while promises 0% responsibility for every sponsored person and public servant, is it an assumption by prejudice that Canadians – the sponsors – are always guilty and accountable in every default while aliens and public servants are always innocent and not accountable for their actions? Would such baseless prejudice, stereotyping and discriminative approach satisfy the tests cited at [70] of R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 and Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143 and constitute an infringement on s. 15.(1) of the Charter, thus rendering those CIC forms invalid? The sponsors’ already disadvantaged position within Canadian society resulting in substantively differential treatment between the sponsors – as a group of Canadians by nationality and residence – and the aliens (that are always non-Canadians by nationality and residence when they apply and receive the promises of Canada), unjustly shifting the whole burden to the sponsors by avoiding the courts.
  10. Similarly to question 9, if such misinterpretations are acceptable in the policies, so the requirement for a summons at a Court or filing the Minister’s certification for a debt is skipped in practice, could that undermine pages 684-691 of Donohoe v. Hull, 24 SCR 683 and vitiate the following sentence in the sponsor’s CIC “Undertaking” form: “The Minister has a right of legal action in a court of law for the debt against the Sponsor alone, the Sponsor’s spouse (if Co-signer) or against both of them,” contradicting paragraphs 11. and 18. of the Sponsorship Agreement? [Regarding the sponsored person’s “action in a court of law against the Sponsor” where the Crown may only represent the sponsored person. The legal action, just like at paragraph 27 in Canada v. Mavi, does not guarantee success.]
  11. Does the words “the Minister” in ss. 146.(1) refer to (a) the federal minister in the Cabinet or Privy Council responsible for the administration of the same Act or a related field; (b) to any minister of any province or country; (c) a minister of a church to which the sponsor or the sponsored person belongs?  
  12. Could a vague sentence about an unspecified future punishment in the same CIC “Undertaking” form claiming that “The Minister may take other actions to recover the debt from the Sponsor or the Sponsor’s spouse (if Co-Signer)” include “other, illegal actions” and render any “Undertaking” void ab initio?
  13. Similarly to question 9, if such misinterpretation governs – assuming a collective guilt or offence of every sponsor in the federal forms and policies in cases when the sponsored persons unnecessarily apply for social benefits – and leaves only one secure prevention for the sponsors, namely to subject the new immigrants to forcible confinement, violating subsections 279.(2), 279.01(1) and 279.011(2) of the Criminal Code RSC 1985 and seriously offending law and public policy, would such fatal error render those CIC agreements null and void?  
  14. Can the absence of any reference in the federal legislation to the ability or necessity of the provincial governments to sign contracts with the sponsors – in the days when the sponsored persons apply for or receive social benefits – be interpreted that Parliament had prohibited for the provinces to sign such contracts?
  15. Can any party claim for damages in connection with a sponsorship undertaking if the party has not been a signatory to any related contract, and so undermine the Court’s decision in Bilson et al. v. Kokotow et al., 23 O.R. (2d) [1978]?
  16. Can any provincial or federal ministry treat new sponsored immigrants as permanent residents differently than other Canadian citizens and landed immigrants when applying for free social benefits – by turning those free universal benefits (including tuition or medical benefits, or compensations for injuries at work) into “sponsorship debts” that often remain in their families as debt burdens and punishment – without violating ss. 15.(1) of the Charter?
  17. Does an assumption based on stereotyping and prejudice – that Canadian citizens or permanent residents, after having been in the work force only for two years, are not a burden for the society and cannot cause damages for a province through social or medical benefits, while family class immigrants sponsored by them constitute a burden for the society, causing damages after nine years of hard work, applying for such benefits in the tenth year – undermine ss. 15.(1) of the Charter so it is invalid? [In the former Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, the requirement to support the sponsored immigrants in the family class was ten years but in IRPA only three years.]
  18. Where the direct consequence of the arbitrary extrapolations and misrepresentation of the legislation in the policies results in a long forceful separation of innocent families (for five years or more), constituting cruel and unusual treatment or punishment without reasonable explanation, have their rights under sections 7 and 12 of the Charter been infringed?
  19. If the CIC sponsorship forms fail to specify whether a Minister is party or signatory to the agreements or not, fail to disclose material facts – that the Ministers’ plan is to disregard the federal limitation, contract and garnishment laws of Canada and the Charter in their policies and in practice – and mislead the sponsors by the false promise of a lawful court procedure in case of defaults, also offer an impracticable severability clause through a non-existing court while not specifying any amount or interest rate on the debt, can it be reasonably concluded that – despite of these crucial legal errors going to the heart of the agreements – “a meeting of the minds” or be ad idem existed between the sponsors and any Minister, so the signatures of the sponsors are always valid, and their personal agreements can be handled as valid contracts with a Minister?
  20. Is it justifiable to claim in a federal policy (paragraph 5.18 of the “IP 2”) that a “binding contract” exists between the sponsors and the Minister of CIC, in order to mislead every civil servant, allowing them to do automatic garnishments without court procedures, so the contradicting IP 2 shall override ss. 132.(4)(a) to (c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations? [The latter only specifies statements and declarations, not contracts. Several laws allow such garnishment based on contracts but not agreements.]
  21. Since the rights and obligations of the sponsors changed radically in 2001 by the introduction of IRPA and the federal ministries ignore the fact that the earlier sponsorship agreements were signed under the former Immigration Act (that respected the limitation and garnishment laws through the involvement the courts), is it possible to claim – in light of Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Duffet, 2004 NLSCTD 30 or Bank of Nova Scotia v. Antoine, 1998 CanLII 14918 (ON SC) – that each sponsorship agreement and undertaking signed on CIC forms before June 2002 (when IRPA came into force) has become a “frustrated agreement” that is null and void?
  22. If the former Immigration Act is determinative and applicable for such agreements signed before 2001, and section 4.(3) of its Immigration Regulations, 1978 is applicable in such cases, could the exclusion of the disqualified sponsored spouses mean that their sponsors are not sponsors in the family class from the legal point of view and, therefore, a non-sponsor could not have any sponsorship debt, so the debt belongs to the disqualified spouse? [Section 4.(3) states, “The family class does not include a spouse who entered into the marriage primarily for the purpose of gaining admission to Canada as a member of the family class and not with the intention or residing permanently with the other spouse.”]
  23. If the answer is positive to the previous question – in order to interpret the minimum period for which a sponsored spouse should have resided “permanently” with the sponsor – does ss. 5.(1) of the Immigration Regulations, 1978 offer a guideline as “1 year”?    
  24. Was the intention of Parliament to prohibit the Federal Court dealing with the severability issues of the CIC Sponsorship Agreement and Undertaking forms, by granting such jurisdiction only for the provincial courts to severe the invalid and illegal terms of those federal forms related to immigration, a strictly federal jurisdiction?
  25. If arbitrary and capricious interpretation of the legislation by the policies is allowed, can they vitiate the constitutional applicability of ss. 23.(2.1) of the Financial Administration Act, or s. 26. of the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act?
  26. If the sponsorship and undertaking documents on the CIC forms do not explain the term “not self-supporting” and are silent about common situations where the sponsored persons simply want to become independent from their sponsors, or, when the province unilaterally removes them from the work force by sending them to schools for years, can those gaps in the agreements be arbitrarily filled by the administrators at the expense of the sponsors?
  27. If persons are usually not responsible for the unexpected actions of their dogs which are their properties, can the same persons be held fully liable for the unpredictable actions and debts created by their spouses – that are not their properties but totally independent legal persons – and can a vague Canadian legislation change this principle to undermine universal jurisprudence that worked well for thirty-eight centuries since the laws of Hammurabi?
  28. If the sponsorship obligations are equally valid to every sponsor, is it possible that in cases like this one – where Canada sponsored a Convention refugee who received some welfare benefits in the decade after his landing –, may a province recover such “debts” from Canada forever, without a certificate of a Minister or court procedures, only by administrative set-offs?



The author was born in Hungary, in 1949. He fled to Canada in 1976 when it was still a free and democratic country.

In 1999, he sponsored a woman who – six months after her landing – wanted to become independent so they divorced. She found a wealthier man while BC paid her welfare for five years by mistake. Then she accepted the first job offered her by BC’s administrators. The author remarried in China in 2006 but the Crown refused to grant any visa for his wife and her student son. Alberta’s workforce would need both of them but Canada’s tort prevails. The federal government had failed to instruct the visa officer about the applicable limitation period and the related federal and provincial legislation. [Pursuant to rule 135.(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, the “default” of his previous sponsorship undertaking took place in October 2000.] The Immigration and Refugee Board’s Immigration Appeal Division held that the visa officer had not made any mistake. An appeal to the Federal Court was dismissed. The immigration aspect has been closed, pursuant to subsection 72.(2)(e) of IRPA. Such forceful separation of innocent families constitutes a cruel punishment. It also causes economic losses for Canada. Instead of getting needed immigrants, part of the sponsors’ money is spent abroad.

As another punishment, the federal CRA started to garnishee his tax account in 2008, beyond the limitation period of six years, by illegal and unconstitutional means without colour of law, by conspiracy, misrepresentation of the laws of Canada, breach of trust and wrongful conversion. Finally, Service Canada informed him that they may garnishee his future pension benefits without any court proceeding, due to his alleged debts. If he moves abroad, he would lose his old age benefits and supplements as well.

His questions were related to contract, garnishment, and limitation laws and the irreconcilable controversies between the will of Canada’s Parliament with the contradicting policies of the federal ministries. (About thirty-five paragraphs of Canada’s laws have been contravened.) His last court cases were related to a federal money extortion scheme and the unconstitutional garnishment of the family class sponsors without the courts’ involvement and without filing a ministerial certificate about their alleged debts. The Province of BC officially admitted in writing that no such certificate had existed in his case. When he learnt this fact, it meant exceedingly rare circumstances. Since the SCC’s Registrar could not see such rare circumstances, it means that probably thousands of Canadian families suffer the same fate.

The author – as plaintiff – fell in a trap at the beginning of the pleadings in 2012. Although the only defendant was HMTQ (Her Majesty the Queen), two defense counsel sprang up. One represented the Crown and another counsel the Registrar (the “SCC Party”). Such trick – forcing him to fight two parties – tried to ruin him financially and mentally. On 5 July 2012, he tendered an Amended Statement of Claim for filing. Mr. Prothonotary Lafrenière, in his directions, instructed the Registry to reject it, based on Bruce v. John Northway & Sons Ltd., [1962] OWN. 150. The Federal Court Rules allow the appeal of an order of a Prothonotary but it is silent about appealing his direction. (A Registrar would refer to such silence and refuse its filing.)

The writer was planning to discontinue his pleadings when unexpectedly received a double court order. Section 34.(1) of the Federal Court Rules goes, “General sittings of the Federal Court for the hearing of motions shall be held, except during the Christmas or summer recess...”  A sitting of the FC is the same as the sitting of a judge. Thus, it was hard to believe that the judge delivered her two orders on 20 July 2012 while she was standing. One order was regarding the Crown, another one about the person that approved the SCC’s [tortious] website That person turned out to be the Registrar of the SCC, so apparently the silly plaintiff had sued the SCC – through one of its members with absolute immunity – at the Federal Court. Since the author’s last appeal, the said website – with the Rules and the Act – has been removed, only the remained.

In the orders, Madame Justice Tremblay-Lamer concluded that a possible future administrative decision or allegations regarding hypothetical decisions did not disclose a reasonable cause of action so the action cannot succeed. (Recently, it seems, the Crown caused her orders removed from the website.)

In R. v. McCraw, [1991] 3 SCR 72, the appellant wrote to three cheerleaders, “…even if I have to rape you.” The Court held that it had been a threat to cause serious bodily harm. Mr. McCraw’s possible future decision was punishable which fact contradicts Madame Justice’s reasoning above. As for the tortious silence of Service Canada or a Minister, it is comparable to Longley v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), 1999 CanLII 5750 (BC SC). The Crown remained silent about a tax loophole. The Court awarded $55,000 to Mr. Longley in damages.

Let us illuminate such tortious silence by a hypothetical situation. Say, two ministers decide to spend their vacations in Hawaii with their husbands, parents and children. They buy the tickets from Canadair in January for their flights in August. They send a letter to Canadair requesting details about the safety policies. The general manager replies them in January, “…In case of emergency, the pilot may order the passengers to throw out excess weight. Persons over 65 and girls under the age of 10 belong to that category.” The ladies urge the company to explain such unlawful policy. The management remains silent. In July, the ministers buy new tickets from Korean Air and sue Canadair for tort. The latter firm pleads innocent while they resell the seats for others.

Have the ministers breached their contracts with Canadair? Are they bound to lose at the Court because they cannot sue a possible future administrative decision of the pilot? A reasonable person would strongly disagree.

The first difficulties originated by the improper refusal of the plaintiff’s Reply for filing. The Registry deemed the date of the Purolator driver’s delivery to a post office as the date of service on the plaintiff, although the documents were held by a postmaster during a weekend. The refusal has caused irreversible losses and prejudice for the appellant since the unfiled pleadings cannot be referred to anymore. An administrator’s menacing the plaintiff added insult to the injury: she wrongfully claimed that the only solution for the Registry was either to shred his Reply, or, return its five copies by mail. Many weeks after the dismissal of the plaintiff’s document for filing, the Court admitted that the document’s filing should have been accepted.

Then further mistakes happened. Namely, the refusal of the Appeal Book’s filing, claiming that a Motion for Extension of Time had to be filed first since the rule regarding Christmas recess days did not apply for the appellant. The volumes of his Memorandum were not accepted for filing because several documents or exhibits lacked signature and seal. (The administrator assumed that they belonged to an affidavit although the affidavit clearly stated that it had no exhibits at all.) Later the Court concluded that it had been improper to deny the filing of both documents.

The appellant has served and filed his Book of Authorities on February 15, 2013. He served his 4th Motion Record on 3 April 2013 when he found a package sent by the FCA Registry containing all the five sets of pages 37-60 of the Appeal Book. The cover letter falsely claimed that they were obeying the 22 March 2013 Order of the Court by extracting those pages. By that act, the Registry’s aim was to destroy properly filed documents, in order to blind the judges of the FCA and the SCC, preventing them from seeing the full picture. The said Order was silent about extraction of pages 37-60 and did not intend to violate s. 344.(1) (d) of the Rules by omitting a crucial document for good. It ordered that the Appeal Book had to be filed, without saying, “except pages 37-60.” It emphasized that “the expeditious, fair, and efficient conduct of this appeal will not be served by returning these documents to Mr. Simon…”

However, the administrator disobeyed the Order and returned part of the documents by truncating and altering the Appeal Book without justification. The Judge only ordered that [pages 37-60] “are not to be referred to…” which referred to the parties. He did not prohibit for the three judges of the FCA to take a second look at that issue. He added that “pages 37-60… are struck…” However, the Registry misinterpreted the word “struck.”

Common law confirms that the words “struck” or “strike/struck out” pages of a document do not mean “destruct,” “shred” or “return to the sender.” Krpan v. The Queen, 2006 TCC 595 and British Columbia (Civil Forfeiture) v. Vo, 2012 shows that if parts of a document were “struck out” there were crossed by horizontal lines. “Struck” does not mean that the parts of a document must be erased by eraser. The courts struck out thousands of claims but those documents shall remain in the court files, not returned to the senders without a trace in the court system.

The next issue was a procedural situation so far unknown in Canada. Rule 346.(2) of the Federal Courts Rules states, “Within 30 days after service of the appellant’s memorandum of fact and law, the respondent shall serve and file the respondent’s memorandum of fact and law.” The Respondent Crown physically received the appellant’s Memorandum on February 15, 2013. Thus, the appellant should have received the Crown Respondent’s Memorandum of Fact and Law by March 17, 2013. However, the Crown misunderstood the Rules and served its Memorandum on the appellant by a delay of thirty-three days: sixty-three days after the service, instead of thirty.

Rule 3 states, “These Rules shall be interpreted and applied so as to secure the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination of every proceeding on its merits.” Regardless these two rules and Rule 72.(3), both the Registry and the Judge accepted the late filing of the respondent Crown’s Memorandum without hesitation. For comparison, in Abdessadok v. Canada (Canada Border Services Agency), 2006 FC 236, the applicant misunderstood the Rules and exceeded the time limit by 24 hours. Therefore, his application was dismissed.

The order of 30 May 2013, gave the following reason: “The Court has no cognizance of an appellant’s memorandum until it is filed, and in that sense a respondent has nothing to respond to until the appellant’s memorandum is filed. It would be absurd to construe the Rules to require the Crown respondents to file their memorandum 30 days after it was served on them (i.e. March 17, 2013) when the appellant’s memorandum had not been accepted for filing on that date.”

An examination of the entire Rules sheds light on the legislative intent. Many paragraphs in these Rules reveal that the expeditious proceedings were Parliament’s main consideration. Sometimes a party is losing millions of dollars per week. In every court case, the issues are between opposing parties. A party is not fighting against the Court or the Registry. Thus, the parties shall communicate and serve each other in a timely manner at each procedural step. The timely service on the Registry is less important because the Court does not get involved before the actual hearing. Thus, the above order of Madam Justice was patently unreasonable. The instant author appealed it on June 8, 2013. (At the same time, he requested the Court to interpret the direction of Mr. Justice Nadon, for its two paragraphs contradicted each other.) Earlier, on 27 March 2013, he served his Requisition for Hearing on both Crown defendants. He had simply followed paragraph 347.(1) of the Federal Courts Rules. The Court should not penalize him by costs of $500 for obeying the law. The Rule goes, “Within 20 days after service of the respondent’s memorandum of fact and law or 20 days after the expiration of the time for service of the respondent’s memorandum of fact and law, whichever is the earlier, an appellant shall serve and file a requisition in Form 347 requesting that a date be set for the hearing of the appeal.” The court, apparently Chief Justice Blais, remained silent. But what does silence mean?

Silence after an appeal means unfinished business. (What would a judge do if a heart surgeon would take a long vacation and leave the chest of the judge’s son or daughter open forever?) The next judge, ignoring the silence and the lack of a final judgment, treated the pending matters as a resolved one against the appellant. Thus, she ordered the author to pay $1,000 immediately, qualifying his pleadings as vexatious. She did this although counsel had emphasized that the Crown had not applied to have the author declared a vexatious litigant.

So far the appellant author had been denied of his right for a fair hearing. However, the Federal Court of Appeal finally scheduled a hearing for the case: in the morning of 26 November 2013 in Calgary. If the judges would not remain silent again but finally would be able to make a decision the trial will be a turning point in Canada’s history. Canadians could learn if the country would proceed further towards fascism based on abuse of power and extortion schemes, or, we may safely return to a free and democratic society.

Canada looks like a great and free country on the map, or, from a bird’s eye view. Birds include eagles and doves that fly freely sky high while surveying or supervising a country from ocean to ocean. Others are parrots that are sadly chirping with their wings trimmed, in a very limited space, say, a cage in a basement. Those pets receive more bird food if they keep repeating the four-letter words of their owners. Our judges have more rights than birds do. It is the free choice of any judge to which category to belong.

Mr. Duplessis was Prime Minister and Attorney-General of Quebec half a decade ago. In Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121, the A.G. lost his case. Today, we believe, Mr. Roncarelli may not succeed against an A.G. at any court. The judge may conclude that he does not have a scintilla of chance to win. However, judges could not write in their Reasons that “the plaintiff’s action could not succeed because every judge is biased in dictatorships.”

The appellant author filed for bankruptcy protection in March 2013 at BDO Canada Ltd. The excellent RBC Bank and Canada are his creditors, let alone BC’s $38,000 claim related to his alleged sponsorship debt. Following his desperate step, the Crown planned to eliminate him as an incompetent party without any right. Canada wanted to dismiss his pleadings or claimed that it was permissible for a creditor to be both the plaintiff and defendant in the same action (the so-called “hermaphroditic litigant”). Section 38. of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act was never intended to be used as a litigation tactic for short-circuiting the need to defend a valid cause of action. The law of bankruptcy does not recognize the right of a potential defendant (and creditor of the bankrupt) to become both the plaintiff and the defendant in the same action. In Isabelle v. The Royal Bank of Canada, 2008 NBCA 69 the Bank persisted with its argument that the law fully accepted such concept, referring to R.M. Jackson “The Hermaphroditic Litigant: Suing Yourself Under Section 38 of the BIA.”

In Deloitte, Haskins & Sells Limited v. Graham, 1983, the judge wrote, “In any event, under the Alberta legislation there is no entitlement, no right, but merely a hope that the court will exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant spouse.” Regarding “things in action” or “choses in action”, the judge added, “My conclusion is supported by the French version of s. 2 of the Bankruptcy Act. There, the word ‘biens’ (which corresponds to ‘property’) is defined as including ‘droits incorporels’ (corresponding to ‘things in action’). It is clear that in French what contemplated by that phrase is ‘rights’ and not merely a hope of favourable exercise of judicial discretion.” The Court held that the author’s pleadings were vexatious so it is clear that he had no “rights” in choses in action. The trustee cannot take away a non-existing right from a bankrupt.

Recently an interlocutory order of the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown’s motion to dismiss the author’s appeal because he had claimed damages for undue influence and intentional infliction of mental suffering.  

Finally, two extremely interesting tort cases could be mentioned. In Young v. Bella, 2006 SCC 3, two professors assumed that a student was an abuser of children. They ruined her career by their silly and ignorant attitudes. A jury awarded her $839,400 in damages.

The other example is a huge conspiracy case that helped to change Brazil’s face. Over 380,000 documents and 857 persons – judges, politicians, bankers, generals, etc. – have been involved. See Gosman (2000) and Stokland (2003). They smuggled the drugs by military helicopters. (José Carlos Gratz, ex-president of the legislative assembly in Vitória, was boss of the author’s girlfriend. He often stated, “I am the law.” Finally, he tried to escape to overseas but he was arrested at the airport and ended up in jail for several years.)



[The real scene of this law research article is Canada but judges in other countries may face similar constitutional questions one day.]

The alleged corruption issue of Canadian senator Mike Duffy is only a tip of the iceberg. It may be covered up by a mat but an iceberg cannot be swept under that. I mean the present fragile state of Canada. A huge fault line is dividing the country: Parliament and Canada’s impartial judges on one side while some cabinet ministers and the federal public servants on the other. (Every Canadian judge is independent: the majority from the government and the minority from justice.) The cabinet granted to its bureaucrats endless power, taken from Parliament and the SCC judges. The latter two suffered a “short circuit” and gradually became redundant. Our top federal judges may be excellent but the nation’s problems simply cannot get before them. The ministers keep pressuring the court registries not to file pleadings that would expose their torts.

Many Canadians feel that most of their judges are corrupt and crazy that protect the criminals but ignore the safety of the public and the police. Such view is wrong. The real reason lays at a tortious website, “Representing Yourself in the Supreme Court of Canada.” In it, the Registrar simply silences s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act that would allow appeals if errors in law are claimed at the lower courts. Instead, he is raising its s. 40.(1) and the Rules to exclusive power. See Figure 1.




Figure 1 (1A and 1B) above demonstrates the great difference between Parliament's will and the opposite policy of the honourable white collar tortfeasors, represented by the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada.

The result is devastating for Canada’s court system. A single administrator is usurping the power of the nine SCC judges. (The SCC considers between 400 and 600 applications for leave to appeal each year.) People think that the judges are too liberal with the criminals. Such explanation is misleading since the tort was invented by the conservatives, not the Liberal Party.

The Registar of the SCC, Mr. Bilodeau, is guarding the key for the “ivory tower” of the nine SCC judges, just like St Peter the alleged keys of heaven, at least in a popular old belief.

You may own a big company that suffered losses in millions of dollars due to federal torts. The administrators of the SCC Registry would stop your appeal as of right, since you are not a criminal. The Chief Justice needs to find only another judge who sides with the Crown. Then your firm would not get a hearing by the panel of nine judges. If you file an application for reconsideration, the final decision comes – as it happened in my case – from the Registrar, “In my opinion, your motion does not reveal the exceedingly rare circumstances which would warrant reconsideration by this Court.” The Registrar, who is not a judge, gave the final verdict.

Perhaps this whole streamlining started on Mr. Harper’s birthday in 2006. Maybe he did not want a cake, only favours from four of his ministers to cut some corners. The four cornerstones had sharp corners, indeed. In seven years, the administrators managed to grind them into ball shape. But how could one build a fortress on such globular keystones?

One of the cornerstones was immigration. In 2006, Canada started to enforce two unlawful policies named IP 2 (Processing Applications to Sponsor Members of the Family Class) and MOU (Memorandum of Understanding). The purpose was streamlining. The cabinet did not care that it resulted in dozens of violated paragraphs of the legislation. These policies decided that, in case of social benefits paid to new immigrants, the fault was always at the sponsor. Thus, the immigrants and the administrators were always innocent. The mislead sponsors were assured that in case of default they could be heard by a Court – that is not the case. The IP 2 claims that a Sponsorship Agreement and an Undertaking are “contracts” but the sponsors are unaware of that. It’s not in the title. Also, no one has signed those on a minister’s behalf. 132.(4) of IRPA’s Regulations shows that the sponsors have not signed contracts. By misrepresentation, the ministers call them contracts because then the CRA can garnishee the alleged debts without a ministerial certification prescribed by s. 146. of IRPA.

If your firm signs a document with Canada and later it comes to the Crown’s obligations, it was a vague agreement – without amounts – that was not enforceable. But if it comes to your obligations, it was a binding contract. The main issues are, in a nutshell, that Canada’s ministers and public servants equate agreements with contracts. Also, they do not differentiate between a “debt provable” and a “debt claim.”

The Federal Court should – but does not – maintain a file about the certified debts of the sponsors. The governing case is Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi (2011). The judges and their order state many times that the Crown must certify the debts at the Federal Court, before any garnishment. The Chief Justice agreed with this judgment but when it came to its application in 2012, she put her honourable foot in her honourable mouth, disregarding the verdict. Our ministers openly ignore the laws of Canada. The cabinet’s money extortion scheme destroys thousands of innocent families, often without gaining much. [The alleged total debt of the family class sponsors is just a fraction of the security costs of Canada’s G-8 Summit 2010.]

This is an open rebellion and conspiracy of Canada’s ministers and administrators against Parliament’s will. Perhaps Mr. Harper’s cabinet should propose a new retroactive paragraph, hidden in another omnibus bill, stating that the laws of Canada are only guidelines that are not applicable for ministers and public servants. (In the author’s case, the federal registries in Edmonton made seven errors in law at seven procedural steps in 2012-3.)

If the administrators can lead our short-circuited country forever, we need only Mr. Harper – often called King Stephen – without paid members of Parliament. If no judges can hear us, we do not need paid judges either. In such hocus-pocus, we should look at the south. In Brazil, Venezuela and Ecuador, the extreme rightist regimes have lost their credibility and supremacy for good. And, yes, this shift to the centre-left has happened in the US as well. Canada could have such coalition government in 2015 if our conservatives have no plan to behave and survive lawfully. Mr. Harper has guided his party to the edge of a political ravine. He is just half a step away from it. Every Canadian should urge him to make his last step in the same direction.

Roman Emperor Caligula wanted to appoint his horse as a senator. In Canada, out of the 99 Canadian senators, 52 (!) are appointed by Mr. Harper, our Wg. Hon. Chief Comedian, while the remaining 47 by the previous prime ministers. In November 2013 he pressed the Senate – where his “bodyguards” were in majority – to get rid of three good but independent senators (Pamela Wallin, Mike Duffy, and Patrick Brazeau) for two years. He closed their e-mail accounts, so the public cannot reach them. Are they in Siberia? This is Harper’s promised “transparency.” 

Most Canadians stands with the three victim senators. The Senate was wrong: they should have suspended Harper for two years without pay and could have proposed to the Rt. Hon. Governor General to appoint the independent Ms. Wallin as Canada’s interim prime minister. (Mr. Harper is the first prime minister since 1867 that has openly turned against the laws of Canada – Parliament’s will – on every level, by massive and intentional torts.) The Senate should consider changing a few words in our national anthem, by removing “the True North” from it, to make it “Stephen Harper strong and free.”

Canada turned into a big circus where, in general, the tails are wagging the dogs. The criminals are at the top and everyone else is at the bottom of the pyramid. People say that the Pamela Wallin Drive in Wadena, Sask., should be renamed. We agree: it should be called Pamela Wallin Avenue or Boulevard, if not Highway. Ten or hundred thousands of Canadian businessmen can claim 100% of their private expenses (car, hotel, meals, office in home) as business expenses yearly, without being punished. The border between private and business expenses is not a bright line. Let alone the 16-dollar orange beverage of ex-minister Bev Oda that has caused her retirement. From the country of the thousand lakes and islands, Canada became the land of one million hypocrites. A federal minister deserves a 16-dollar orange juice if that is its normal price in her hotel abroad. It is the utmost stupidity to punish a minister for that.    

Not every Canadian is blind. When an antifascist league or coalition would form the new government in 2015, their first action could be a nationwide referendum. A question would ask the voters whether (a) they want to dissolve the Senate for good, (b) or dissolve the present Senate altogether but constitute a brand new Senate by democratically elected senators, or, (c) they allow the four parties of the coalition to appoint over 100 new senators. [For example, the NDP and The Liberal Party each could nominate 52 new senators.]       

Now the executive power in Canada is controlled by a trio (the A.G., Chief Justice, and Registrar of the SCC) supporting Harper’s cabinet. They are the cronies of the dictator. They effectively control the Supreme Court, also several registries of the lower courts that easily block the filing of a statement of claim against the regime. The leaders of any country may successfully copy Canada’s evil recipe how to turn any democracy into dictatorship. The conservatives believe that King Harper is perfect, innocent, and has no idea about these problems, as a victim of his unruly ministers. The Emperor’s new clothes, written by Andersen, may come to our mind.

We may compare the modern social logic of our Canadian leaders with that of the “primitive” Aztecs. The latter could not understand the reasons of eclipses, while the West and China were much superior in astronomy. The Aztecs originally sacrificed captives during solar eclipses, in order to give a refreshing drink to the darkening Sun, using human blood. They believed that they were saving mankind by doing that. In contrast, Canada sacrifices the lives of some of its vulnerable sectors of its society. One of them is the innocent sponsors as victims of the government’s fraud. Canada and its government know that many illegal and immoral things are happening but no one stands up for their protection and democracy.

Recently this picture is changing. The author e-mailed the draft of this paper to every second M.P. in the House of Commons (Ottawa), mainly for the opposition. He received several praising and enthusiastic replies regarding the importance of the issues. Thus, Canada may wake up from its nightmarish sleeping beauty stage before 2015, from her coast-to-coast coffin.



We can place the cabinet’s shuffle of July 14/15, 2013 in historical perspective as part of Mr. Harper’s political engineering. Four of those moves seem to be the results of the instant writer’s latest two court cases: Rob Nicholson, Jason Kenney, Gail Shea, and Diane Finley ceased to be ministers of the embattled departments. A reasonable person would find it plain and obvious that Mr. Harper was aware of the insurmountable difficulties of the four Crown counsel involved. He is a good planner. He must have been concerned that his ministers’ conspiracy against the laws of Canada may fail. In order to save face of his corrupt conspirators, he simply gave them new portfolios but kept them in his cabinet.

Any realistic person can see his primary aim that is to gain absolute personal power by ruthless and unlawful means. It seems obvious that his political engineering tries to divert the attention from the criminal charges at the courts developing against him and four of his ministers. Is he planning with Mr. Nicholson – his minister of defence – to escape overseas by a military plane before the RCMP would try to arrest them? But to which dictator would they flee?

It would be absurd to claim that our federal ministers, judges, and public servants are corrupt per se. However, since 2006, a person or a factor is forcing them to become corrupt and to develop a criminal attitude. First the civil servant, judge or minister is asked to perform minor favours like cover up the errors of other public servants, ministers or judges, often simply to stay silent and do nothing when a solution or decision is required. Then, the civil servant or judge becomes more compromised, gradually losing his or her integrity, so it is willing to commit larger and larger crimes for the dictator. Their usual approach is to arbitrarily pick a single paragraph or sub-paragraph from the legislation, then extrapolate it by inserting a few words, or, removing a word from it. At the same time, they ignore other paragraphs that clearly contradict the misinterpretation of the first paragraph. This method is no other than fraud.

If Mr. Harper and his cronies, including Mr. Bilodeau, are right to shortcut or eliminate the panel of nine judges at the Supreme Court of Canada, the country does not need to maintain that court. Further, if the corruption in the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal are so widespread that involves many judges, not only the chief justices, those federal courts should be dissolved. (We are not saying that the Supreme Court of Canada does not have three or four judges with integrity that respect Parliament’s will. However, if the independent judges cannot form a majority, the SCC is just like a Russian roulette where the innocent victims never win.)

Investigating corrupt courts may be wasted time. (If you see that your apple has several rotten spots with mould on them, you would not try to save the good part but simply throw the whole apple to the garbage.) Parliament could order the R.C.M.P. to investigate each court, while cutting 50% of their staff. If each judge needs to write a list of the known unconstitutional errors and biases of every other judge, they would try to save their own jobs and blame the crooked ones. (There is a good chance that the majority of the judges would mark the names Ms. McLachlin, Mr. Blais, Mr. Nicholson, or Mr. Harper as the sources of the pressure and corruption.) By these means, the R.C.M.P. and Canada could remove the corrupt judges.

As a rule of thumb, the majority of the judges are not corrupt. Usually, the corruption begins at any chief justice. In the instant writer’s case, in the summer of 2013, the order of a judge was patently wrong since she tried to reinterpret several words of the legislation where a clear interpretation was present. The author appealed her decision. He understands that Madam Justice intended to revise her judgment but the chief judge instructed everybody to simply ignore the appeal. Such silence is unprecedented in case law in any serious country. It is a good indication of corruption. This example is to illustrate that corruption is detectable.     

Comparing our top public servants to Bernie Madoff, the latter person seems much more innocent and sympathetic. He relied on the confidence of investors that were too greedy. He used a financial pyramid scheme. On the other hand, our cabinet is utilizing a political and legal pyramid scheme with torts, pressure and extortions. Many of our ministers and civil servants take advantage of the fact that our citizens rely on the integrity of Canada as a country. The latter do not suspect that they sign contracts with a bunch of criminals, and that a paper marked “Canada” in front of them is a fraud. If the R.C.M.P. investigates the criminal charges, our honourable tortfeasors may face longer sentences in jail than Mr. Madoff.

Another example is the case of R. v. Critton, 2002 CanLII 3240 (ON SC). In 1971, Patrick Critton, a teacher, hijacked an aircraft to Cuba. He used a dummy grenade. He was a polite and friendly hijacker. He did not harm or threaten the crew and became upset when money was offered to him He was sentenced to three years imprisonment. Mr. Critton is much more sympathetic than Harper and his four corrupt ministers with their cruel extortion schemes and terrorist acts. It is a larger crime to hijack a country than hijack a plane.

The sentencing of our white-collar criminals should be longer than the 162-year prison term of the 18-year old Quartavious Davis in Florida. It is a major crime to conspire against a serious country – Canada – and turn it into a zoo using a system of torts and massive corruption.     

One cannot deny the genius behind such massive system of federal torts on the websites that define the duties of every public servant. They must obey the ministers while ignore and contradict the nearly perfect laws of Canada. In real practice they obey the actual policies of the federal ministries that are even more distorted than their written policies. The result is a marked departure from the ideal of “free and democratic society.” Canada has shifted towards a totalitarian dictatorship where the cabinet can successfully bypass both Parliament [by proroguing it repeatedly] and the excellent judges of the courts. Comparing the tort situation to an electrical circuit, the cabinet ministers have created a parallel second line to the original main circuit and may make “short circuits” whenever they wish. Is it possible that the days of Canada’s Parliament and its Supreme Court are numbered? Dictatorships do not need good judges only a dozen of yes-men.

The courts of Germany could not stop the Holocaust. If the important issues cannot reach a panel of nine judges, Canada’s court system does not work. A good example is that the Supreme Court of Canada is unable to stop the prosecution of the re-victimized sponsors. Here the sponsors are victims of a federal tort masterminded by the CIC and completed by the CRA. It is a federal money extortion scheme that helps the provinces. Are the provinces guilty by accepting such gifts due to a federal abuse of power? The readers know the answers and probably agree on our conclusion that “there is no perfect tort” that could escape punishment forever.



Not too many Canadians are familiar with the upcoming court case, scheduled to Jan. 15, 2014, between the government of Quebec and that of Canada. It is the legal and constitutional controversy about the appointment of Marc Nadon by Mr. Harper to the Supreme Court of Canada. The Quebec National Assembly condemned Nadon’s appointment in a unanimous resolution. Quebec’s objection is well-founded. Justice Marc Nadon seems to be a puppet and a biased judge that serves the personal interests of Mr. Harper only. He does not represent Parliament’s will, neither for Quebec, nor for the rest of Canada. He is vague, controversial and unprofessional as a judge. The readers would understand this from the few paragraphs below.

The 26 April 2013 Direction of Mr. Justice Nadon, issued by the Federal Court of Appeal, goes,

“I do not see any basis for the acceptance for filing of the material which the appellant has submitted to the Court’s Registry including the Rule 347 Requisition and the Rule 255 Request to Admit. Would you therefore return all of the material to the appellant as soon as it is convenient for the Registry to do so.

“I would point out to the appellant that the only documents that can be filed on the appeal, other than the particular motions are the parties’ respective memorandum of fact and law and in due course the Requisition for Hearing which must be made in accordance with Rule 347 which the Court invites the appellant to read carefully.”

Now, the above Direction reveals that its extremely vague first paragraph contradicts its second paragraph. Thus, Mr. Nadon offers an absolute freedom for the registry personnel what to do. (And many of them, through a pressure from the Court Administration Service – Mr. Gosselin and Ms. Brazeau – are eventually acting in order to cover up Mr. Harper’s torts.)

The oracles of Dodona in ancient Greece were deliberately couched in ambiguous language so that the words could be twisted to correspond to one of several futures. If someone asked, “Who will win the war?” the oracle might reply symbolically, or phrase the answer in such a way that both sides could argue that it favoured them in battle. Then, whichever side actually won, the oracle could claim prior knowledge of its success. The following paragraph deal with similar features in the Direction of Mr. Justice Nadon.

The laconic and controversial Direction of Mr. Justice Nadon dated 26 April 2013 contradicts itself, due to its vagueness. It fails to identify the individual names of each document that he wanted to be returned to the appellant author. It does not specify them by their filing dates either. Thus, it would even allow the Registry to return every copy of the Notice of Appeal and the unlawfully mutilated Appeal Book to the appellant. (The Registry here means the one in Edmonton. The Registry of Calgary has not participated in the torts but always acted fairly.)

The hearing before the Supreme Court of Canada on January 15, 2014 will be a turning point in Canada’s history. In the present lawless state of Canada, Quebec is in the unique position to save the ideal of the “free and democratic society” for the whole country.

Quebec should argue not only by the fact that Nadon is “insufficiently Quebecois” but refer to the unprofessional nature of Mr. Nadon’s previous judgments, his vague and biased decisions. Perhaps Mr. Nadon would be able to find a job at the Small Claims Court of Ottawa but he has not deserved to become a judge of the Supreme Court of Canada. It seems that he would be unable to show any credential other than Mr. Harper’s recommendation. Clearly, he is far below the level of earlier SCC judges like La Forest, Gouthier, L’Heureux-Dubé, Bastarache, Arbour, LeBel, Sopinka, Iacobucci, Cory, Major, Stevenson and Binnie JJ., or Lamer C.J.

If Mr. Harper is allowed to disobey dozens of laws, Quebec can ignore one law. Thus, Quebec should stand up and warn Ottawa before the trial that their province would cease to respect any future judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada if Mr. Nadon’s appointment is not cancelled and he is not replaced by their rightful candidate. Quebec has got a window of opportunity to publish such declaration, perhaps till March 2014. Their province has never agreed to lose the status of a free and democratic society and become subject of a mad dictator comparable to Augusto Pinochet, Ferdinand Marcos, or Nicolae Ceausescu. As Canada’s society has split bitterly between the centre and the extreme right, now Quebec would make the wisest choice to declare itself a sovereign state before a civil war would break out in the rest of Canada.

Quebec has nothing to do with those problems of the other provinces. If the rest of Canada wants dictatorship, Quebec should not suffer for their decision. Francophone Canadians have voted for a free and democratic society. Our Anglophones preferred a dictatorship. This indicates that Francophone voters are reasonable persons while the rest of Canadians are treasonable.

Originally, victims of torts took their cases to the courts. Since 2006, most of the torts are emanating from the federal courts, or, the court administration service. Worse, Mr. Harper has removed the Hon. Mr. MacKay from his post in the Ministry of Defence. Canada has lost a well-qualified military leader who is now replaced with Mr. Nicholson that has virtually zero military experience. Right now Canada is vulnerable to any foreign aggression. Our army under the new minister would be unable to occupy Quebec while controlling a civil war in the rest of Canada. (Query: Did Mr. Harper take the title “Sexiest Male MP” from Peter MacKay and gave it to Mr. Nicholson as part of his new portfolio?)

None of the four opposition parties offer a serious and detailed platform on the Internet, only generic dreams. They promise more possibilities for every Canadian, a better life, more affordable homes and learning but they do not say how. Who will pay the bills? Why do not they promise to overhaul the Ministry of Injustice and the court system, also reduce the number of corrupt administrators on every level? The country should not pay administrators that keep abusing the laws of Canada. The traitors should lose their jobs and find employment in factories, stores or other services. A corrupt bureaucrat may become a good nurse or bus driver.

The new government would be wise not to touch the existing corrupt court system. The media would sharply attack them, claiming that they want to reduce the number of forums where innocent victims could be heard. It would be wiser to keep the corrupt judges and chief judges everywhere by now. However, the new government should create a new Constitution Court that would be parallel with the Supreme Court of Canada. It may belong to the SCC but under an independent Chief Justice that would report directly to Parliament, not to a minister. Such Constitution Court would be a healthy alternative. Canada is a capitalist country and the essence of that system is competition, not state monopoly. Without elected judges, Canada cannot be called a free and democratic country. If every second PM is corrupt at a certain point, and each of them appoints a puppet judge or two into the SCC, the latter court would become like a kangaroo court of a banana republic, sooner or later. Mr. Harper may sacrifice Mr. Gosselin, Madam Justice McLachlin or Mr. Justice Blais and appoint new, independent and unbiased chief judges. However, our inefficient court system may still have a cancer-like incurable illness.  

Therefore, the four opposition parties could easily agree upon a common platform that promises more justice to every Canadian, by a new Constitution Court. It is plain, obvious and undeniable that our present federal courts and the Supreme Court of Canada cannot answer many constitutional questions. Dozens of Canadians may pose hundreds of such good questions yearly but the courts are deaf and inefficient. There are too many cases and no answers. The opposition parties would gain a landslide victory by such promise. They cannot go wrong with that.

On the other hand, we have a nearly perfect RCMP where corruption is rare. The police side with the laws and society. Also, Canada has thousands of lawyers that are exceptionally good. The writer of this paper has met many Canadian lawyers in several provinces. All of them were knowledgeable professionals with integrity. None of them wanted to cheat him or to take advantage of him. If Canada has such a treasure, the best lawyers of the country could become judges of the new Constitution Court. The most plausible solution would be to rely on the bar associations of each province. Each of those associations could elect, say, two of their best members and nominate them as judges to the Constitution Court. Such court may have 13 or 15 members that hear each case by videoconference. When some of them would take a vacation or become sick, the other judges would be active. There would be no appeal from their decisions.

Most Canadians are laughing when they talk about North Korea and its silly dictatorship. They consider the North Koreans as dummy people that love their ruler blindly and unconditionally. They do not realize that Canadians are in the same boat. We cannot see that our media deceives us. Our major newspapers and TV programs serve the richest 1% of our country. That upper class lives in the misbelief that the more suffering of an average Canadian means more profit for them. Increasing oppression and poverty does not increase their wealth per se but makes them less rich. It may take decades for them to understand the truth in the correlation.

The rest of the media – including the smaller newspapers and radio stations – starts to wake up and realize the extreme risks of this country. You can read very good articles, almost daily, regarding the shifting and tilting of the Conservative Party. For example, “Party tilts right as PM faces scandal” or “Hard-core shit to the right.”

The Conservative party have many outstanding politicians. We may expect some of them crossing the floor in the House of Commons, perhaps even before the assassination of the writer.

As an average Canadian citizen, the writer is anxious to see some political development of harmonizing the laws of Canada – that is Parliament’s will – with the (widely unlawful) policies of the present cabinet. If the instant policies of our federal ministers are correct then the laws of Canada need a complete overhaul, perhaps the Charter should be declared invalid, and the federal legislation would become only a rough guidelines that is always overruled by the decisions of the federal ministers. One cannot have a carriage that goes both forward and in reverse at the same time. Or, if two horses are pulling it into two opposite directions, it would soon break apart. In our case, that fragile carriage or chariot means Canada. If the people of Quebec would prefer to jump out of such collapsing vehicle we cannot blame them at all.

When the US is in a crisis, the American president closes his speech by the words, “God bless America!” For half of Canadians, that may mean, “Steve keep our land glorious and free! O Canada we stand on guard for thee.” But the guards are sleeping so perhaps this article as a humble alarm clock would be appropriate at the right moment.   



[Canada’s policies IP 2 and MOU] and

[Canada’s laws] &

Cassels, J., & Adjin-Tettey, E. (2008). Remedies: The Law of Damages. Toronto: Irwin Law Inc.

Certified Questions – Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. (Updated on June 4, 2013.) Web.

Fine, S. (2013). Quebec politics: PQ to make case before Supreme Court against appointment of Marc Nadon. Toronto: The Globe and Mail. October 31, 2013, Page A3.

Furmston, M. P., Cheshire, G. C., Fifoot, C. H. (2007). Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston’s Law of Contract. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Gosman, E. (2000). Revelan una poderosa red de narcotráfico en Brasil. (In Spanish.) São Paulo.

I.R.P.A. (2013). Web.

Stokland, E. (2003). Brazil: Alone against the death squads. Amnesty International. Web.

Waddams, S. M. (1997). The Law of Damages. Toronto: Canada Law Book Inc.


P.S.: For PDF files of the court orders and directions please contact Zoltan Andrew SIMON by e-mail: [Many of them are not available by]


Notice of Motion to the Chief Justice or a Judge to state a Constitutional Question


Court File No.: _______________











Appellant, Applicant to this Notice of Motion


(Also appellant in the FCA)








(Also respondent in the FCA)



Notice of Motion to the Chief Justice or a Judge

to state a Constitutional Question or Questions

Filed by Zoltan Andrew Simon, Appellant as of right pursuant to s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act


Ms. Jaxine Oltean, Counsel                                        Zoltan Andrew Simon, Appellant

Department of Justice Canada                                    (Applicant to this motion)

Prairie Region, EPCOR Tower,                                  72 Best Crescent (new address)

300, 10423 – 101 St., Edmonton, AB  T5H 0E7       Red Deer, AB   T4R 1H6

Phone: (780) 495-7324; Fax: (780) 495-8491 Phone: (403) 342-8826 (Home/ Landlord)

E-mail:                            Phone: (403) 392-9189 (cell.)

Fax: (403) 341-3300




Notice of Motion to the Chief Justice or a Judge to state a Constitutional Question                      1

Memorandum of argument of the appellant, applicant to this motion                                             4

Part I: A concise overview of the appellant’s/applicant’s position with respect to issues of      

   public importance that are raised in the Notice of Appeal; a concise statement of facts        4                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       

Part II: A concise statement of the questions in issue                                                                6                       

      Part III: A concise statement of argument (with paragraph numbers of legislation)                10

      Part IV: Submissions in support of the order sought concerning costs                                    12

      Part V: The orders sought, including the order or orders sought concerning costs                  13

      Part VI: Table of authorities alphabetically, with paragraph numbers of law                          13

      Part VII: Photocopies of relevant provisions of statutes, regulations, rules and case law:      15

         Constitution Act, 1982 (Part I: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms)                        15

         Courts Administration Service Act,S.C. 2002, c. 8                                                               20

         Criminal Code,R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46                                                                                   22

         Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7                                                                                    28

         Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106                                                                                       33

         Financial Administration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-11                                                             35

         Guidelines for Preparing Documents to be Filed with the Supreme Court of

               Canada (Print and Electronic) – an older version of the present website


         Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21                                                                                     44

         Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156                                                       47

         Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26                                                                                  53


CASE LAW:                                                                                                                                     

         Apotex Inc. v. Canada (Health), 2012 FCA 322 (CanLII)                                                    62

         Krpan v. The Queen, 2006 TCC 595 (CanLII)                                                                     64

         Meldrum v. Public Trustee of The Province of B.C., 1998 CanLII 5563 (BC SC)               66

         Zoltan Andrew Simon v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, [2012], SCC 34831  69

         Zoltan Andrew Simon v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada [May 30, 2013],

               Docket: A-367-12 [Federal Court of Appeal]                                                                 70

APPENDIX: Documents, including an affidavit that the applicant intends to rely on                 75           

      The appellant’s (here applicant’s) affidavit                                                                              75

      Exhibit 1: Z.A. Simon’s Notice of Appeal cover page to the SCC, received March 9, 2012  76           

      Exhibit 2: Letter of Mary Ann Achakji (SCC Registry) dated March 28, 2012                      77

      Exhibit 3: Letter of Barbara Kincaid (SCC Registry) dated May 24, 2012                             79

      Exhibit 4: Zoltan A. Simon’s letter to Mr. Roger Bilodeau (Registrar) dated June 4, 2012    80

      Exhibit 5: Front (style of cause) page of Applicant’s Motion of Reconsideration of

         Application for Leave to Appeal, received by the SCC Registry on Oct 25, 2012              82

      Exhibit 6: Letter of Michel Jobidon (SCC Registry) dated October 30, 2012                        83

      Exhibit 7: Letter of Roger Bilodeau (SCC Registrar) dated December 18, 2012                    84

      Exhibit 8: Zoltan A. Simon’s Notice of Constitutional Question(s) dated February 10,

            2013 (filed in the FCA and served on each Attorney General)                                         85

      Exhibit 9: A sample reply of an Attorney General’s Office to Zoltan A. Simon’s  

            Notice of Constitutional Question(s), received from Nova Scotia                                     87

      Exhibit 10: Letter of the Courts Administration Service to Zoltan Andrew Simon,

            Dated March 24, 2014                                                                                                        88    

      Exhibit 11: Representing Yourself in the Supreme Court of Canada, Volume I (extracts

            from the guide published by the SCC Registry or the Registrar)                                       89

      [Note: the last numbered page of this motion is 91. A TD bank draft in the amount of

            $75.00 is attached to this document as a filing fee.]












Notice of Motion to the Chief Justice or a Judge to state a Constitutional Question

Court File No.: _______________





Appellant, Applicant to this Notice of Motion

(Also appellant in the FCA)




(Also respondent in the FCA)



Notice of Motion to the Chief Justice or a Judge

to state a Constitutional Question

Filed by Zoltan Andrew Simon, Appellant as of right pursuant to s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act



TAKE NOTICE that Zoltan Andrew Simon applies to the Chief Justice or a Judge under subrule 47. (1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada,SOR/2002-156, section 61. of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, subrules 60. (1) (a), (b) and (c) and – if applicable – 61. (1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada for an order, statement, or declaratory relief to interpret several enactments, or, any further or other order that the Right Honourable Chief Judge or an Honourable Judge of the Supreme Court of Canada may deem appropriate;


AND FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that the motion shall be made on the following grounds:

(a) the constitutional validity or the constitutional applicability of applying an arbitrarily and wrongfully extrapolated paragraph 40. (1) of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, and/or of regulations made under them, particularly the “Guidelines for Preparing Documents to be Filed with the Supreme Court of Canada (Print and Electronic)” since the latter set of rules (on the official website) and the Registry’s official booklet entitled “Representing Yourself in the Supreme Court of Canada, Volume I, A Guide for Unrepresented Litigants” are both silent about (and therefore not harmonious with) section 61. of the same Supreme Court Act, that makes such Guidelines for Preparing Documents and the above mentioned guide (Volume I) invalid in appeals as of right where error in law is alleged; and

(b) the constitutional validity or the constitutional applicability of a common law rule: namely the routine policy of the Registry of the Supreme Court of Canada that – without any clear authorization by the laws of Canada – arbitrarily grants additional unconstitutional rights to the Registrar of the SCC that unreasonably reduces the power of the nine judges of the Supreme Court of Canada, by blocking cases of high public importance from them. The administrators and the Registrar of the SCC believe and declare in writing that they have the right to refuse the filing of any appeal as of right (pursuant to s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act) where error in law is alleged; Further, their unlawful policy claims that the Registrar – albeit he is not a judge – has the right to say the last word, or, issue the final verdict in rare cases of motions for reconsideration of applications for leave to appeal, accompanied by an affidavit setting out exceedingly rare circumstances, as it happened to Zoltan A. Simon on 18 December 2012; and


(c) the constitutional validity of the so far unknown legal principle regarding possible future administrative decisions (or future hypothetical administrative decisions) that served as a cornerstone in the reasoning of Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer’s Order(s) of July 20, 2012 [FC], camouflaging torts of intimidation, coercion, undue pressure and money extortion; and


(d) the validity of the Honourable Madam Justice Dawson’ Order dated May 30, 2013 since it was patently unreasonable to reinterpret rule 346. (2) of the Federal Courts Rules as absurd; also the improper policy of the C.J. or the Courts Administration Service for ignoring its appeal, constituting an unfinished business that brings the administration of justice in disrepute; and


(e) the validity of several procedural steps, errors and omissions of the FCA administrators in the Edmonton Registry that misinterpreted the word “struck” in the verdict of the Honourable Justice Evans by physically removing or cutting out pages prom the appeal book; plus further issues.


Dated at the City of Red Deer, Province of Alberta this 8th day of April, 2014.




Zoltan Andrew Simon, Appellant, Applicant to the motion (Self-Represented)

New address from 1 April 2014 (as shown in the Notice of Appeal):

72 Best Crescent, Red Deer, AB   T4R 1H6


NOTICE: New phone number from 8 April 2014: (403) 342-8826 (Home/ Landlord)

Phone: (403) 392-9189 (cell.); Fax: (403) 341-3300




ORIGINAL TO: THE REGISTRAR, The Supreme Court of Canada (Ottawa)

COPIES [print and electronic] TO: Ms. Jaxine Oltean, Counsel, Department of Justice Canada, Prairie Region, EPCOR Tower,   300, 10423 – 101 St., Edmonton, AB  T5H 0E7; Phone: (780) 495-7324; Fax: (780) 495-8491; E-mail:


NOTICE TO THE RESPONDENT TO THE MOTION: A respondent to the motion may serve and file a response to this motion within 10 days after service of the motion. If no response is filed within that time, the motion will be submitted for consideration to a judge or the Chief Judge (not to the Registrar since he is in a conflict of interest position: the motion for constitutional question is related to his actions or omissions, and the limits of his powers).


ATTENTION: FOR THE REGISTRAR (additional note and request)

Copies of the relevant two judgments and reasons for judgment of the FCA, the court appealed from, and copies of the certificates in Form 23A and Form 23B have already been served and filed about a day after serving and/or filing of the originating document named Notice of Appeal. The website prescribes the filing of 1 original set of this motion, plus one copy of it.


On the filing of a motion the tariff of fee to be paid to the Registrar is $75.00. A TD bank draft in the amount of $75.00 is attached to this submission for the Registrar’s perusal. However, at the end of Schedule A, it is stated: “Any person may be exempted from paying any of the above fees, in special cases, at the Registrar’s discretion.” The applicant of the instant motion respectfully requests that the Registrar to reduce the above fee, perhaps to zero dollars, preferably by returning the enclosed TD bank draft to the sender. This is a key issue of nationwide importance, about the constitutional operability of the Registry and the SCC’s administration. Individuals with low income should not pay an extra cost for the errors or omissions of the Registry’s administrators, in the mind of a reasonable person.

Memorandum of argument of the appellant, applicant to this motion

Part I: A concise overview of the appellant’s (applicant’s) position with respect to issues of public importance that are raised in the Notice of Appeal and a concise statement of facts:


This is a matter of public interest involving several important questions of law, regarding the interpretation and construction of federal statutes, particularly aimed to the lawful operation of the Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal.

            The instant appellant and applicant to this motion, Zoltan Andrew Simon served a Notice of Appeal to the Crown and submitted it for filing to the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada. The latter Court received it on March 9, 2012. Please refer to Exhibit 1.

            A Registry Officer, Mary Anna Achakji, sent a letter to Zoltan A. Simon on March 28, 2012, informing him that his Notice of Appeal could not be processed As of Right, instructing him to file a notice of application for leave to appeal instead. See Exhibit 2.

The May 24, 2012 letter of Barbara Kincaid, General Counsel to the SCC Registry acknowledged the receipt of Zoltan A. Simon’s application for leave to appeal. She alleged that in their letter informed the applicant “that because the judgment appealed from relates to civil proceedings for which there is no automatic right to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada you must proceed by way of application for leave to appeal…” (Such claim was untrue since the May 24 letter was silent about “no automatic rights to appeal” in civil proceedings.)

On June 4, 2012 the instant appellant sent a letter to Mr. Roger Bilodeau, Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada. At that point the proceeding had a file number (34831) at the Supreme Court of Canada. In the letter, Zoltan A. Simon requested an update regarding filing data and status of his payments for filing fees. Please refer to Exhibit 4.

The October 4, 2012 judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Rothstein and Moldaver JJ. dismissed Zoltan Simon’s application for leave to appeal. Please refer to it under CASE LAW.

On October 23, 2012 Zoltan A. Simon, the instant applicant, submitted a Motion of Reconsideration of Application for Leave to Appeal. The Supreme Court of Canada received it on October 25, 2012 (but the Registry did not file it for a long time). Please refer to Exhibit 5.

On October 30, 2012 Michel Jobidon, Senior Registry Officer sent a letter to Z.A. Simon, acknowledging receipt of his motion for reconsideration. His letter reveals tow interesting circumstances: (a) the note to the respondent(s) shows that the motion was not yet registered on October 30, and (b) that in the Senior Registry Officer’s mind the Registrar was the proper authority that was entitled to make a final decision, namely acceptance or rejection of the motion for reconsideration. [There is no legislative basis or authority that would assign such power to the Registrar, Mr. Bilodeau.] Please refer to Exhibit 6.

On December 18, 2012, Mr. Bilodeau sent a short personal letter of opinion to Zoltan A. Simon. In it, he wrote: “I have reviewed your motion for reconsideration and your affidavit in support. I regret to inform you that, in my opinion, your motion does not reveal the exceedingly rare circumstances which would warrant reconsideration by this Court. Furthermore, please note that Rule 78 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada is not applicable to this matter. As a result, I am returning your documents.” (Please refer to Exhibit 7.) This personal letter does not contain the word “Order” and it does not indicate that it would be an order, judgment, or direction at all. However, it was the end of the game for the instant appellant, so to speak. He had no means to appeal it since the Registrar did not allow him to apply Rule 78 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada. [There is no legislation that would allow the Registrar to prohibit the application of Rule 78 for any appealing party.]

In the respectful opinion of the instant appellant-applicant, the Registrar chose this unique solution in order to silence Zoltan A. Simon’s pleadings that contained unpleasant news for the government. The pleadings have disappeared without a trace from the files since the Registrar had returned all documents to the sender.


On February 10, 2013 the instant appellant-applicant filed a “Notice of Constitutional Question(s)” and served in on the Attorney General of Canada, also on every attorneys general of each province and territory. See Exhibit 8. During the following weeks the attorneys general sent replies to him but none of them showed interest in the constitutional questions. None of them intended to be represented in that proceeding although some maintained the right to get involved at a later point. A sample reply here is written by the Office of the Attorney General of Nova Scotia. (Please refer to Exhibit 9.)


On March 24, 2014, the Courts Administration Service returned to Zoltan A. Simon the copy of his Notice of Appeal that had been properly submitted to the FCA Registry. (For its cover letter please refer to Exhibit 10.) Thus, the administrators of the Federal Court of Appeal have violated subsection 60. (4) of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26. The clerk or other proper officer (that includes the Registrar) of the court appealed from – the Federal Court of Appeal in the instant case – acted against the law when he or she refused the filing of a copy of the notice of appeal (to the SCC). It is unlikely that Ms. Sinclair acted on her own, without consulting her superiors.


Exhibit 11 demonstrates that section 61. of the Supreme Court Act is missing from the official booklet or guide published by the Registry or the Registrar of the SCC.


As for other issues of law, the instant appellant-applicant claims that at least seven improper, unlawful or unconstitutional steps occurred to him during his pleadings involving the Registry of the FCA in Edmonton. Those errors and omissions of the Registry’s administrators were always aimed at him and his finances while kept punishing him by extra costs, time and work through a psychological or mental warfare. One of the typical cases was the Registry’s refusal to accept his document because the administrators included the days of the Christmas recess into the reckoning although the Rules expressly state that those days shall be excluded from the computation of time. He needed to file a motion for extension of time. Another instance was that the Registry arbitrarily removed, apparently by scissors, many pages from his appeal book, misinterpreting the word “struck” in the verdict of the Honourable Justice Evans. (If certain paragraphs or pages of a document shall be struck, it should happen by the application of horizontal lines through the text in question. For an example please refer to Krpan v. The Queen, 2006 TCC 595 (CanLII), from paragraphs [19] to [22], see under our CASE LAW.)


The most disturbing development in the court administration is the “unfinished business” issue. Zoltan A. Simon, without delay, properly appealed the patently unreasonable Order of the Honourable Madam Justice Dawson, dated May 30, 2013. So far the FCC remained totally silent in the appeal matter. Since June 2013, no judge has been assigned to that case by the C.J. of the Federal Court of Appeal, or, by the Courts Administration Service.



Part II: A concise statement of the questions in issue:


  1. Is the short, clear and express section 61. of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, absurd and never applicable, simply because Canadian judges never make any error in law?


2.         According to a textual, contextual and purposive analysis, is the express and unequivocal provision in section 61. of the Supreme Court Act a valid legislation in rare cases when error in law is alleged, in light of the entirely consistent world "automatiquement" in the French version, or when read in the context of the statute as a whole, particularly as its immediately preceding subsection 60. (4) refers only to notice of appeal and not application for leave?


3.         Is there any indication in the laws of Canada that section 61. of the Supreme Court Act R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, should apply in criminal cases only, and not in civil or constitutional ones?


4.         Should the silence, regarding cases when error in law is alleged, be interpreted in the extremely long and complicated sentence of subsection 40. (1) of the Supreme Court Act that it shall override the express and unambiguous section 61. of the same Act that deals with such cases specifically?


5.         Shall an arbitrary insertion of “including cases when error in law is alleged” (or similar words) into section 40.(1) of the Supreme Court Act (when applied in court practice) overrule or vitiate the clear and express provisions given in sections 61., 97. (3) and 40. (3) of the same Act?


6.         Does such arbitrarily extrapolated interpretation of paragraph 40. (1) of the Supreme Court Act infringe sections 7., 8., 11. (a), (b), (d), (g), 12., 15. (1) and 52. of the Constitution Act, 1982 (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) and section 126. (1) of the Criminal Code R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46?


7.         If the answer to question 6 is in the affirmative, together with the power in section 52. of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, can it be construed that such extrapolated interpretation of subsection 40. (1) has no power (and it is not applicable) in cases when error in law is alleged in the lower courts?


8.         In light of the Registrar’s rights or duties set out in section 3. (1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156, does the silence in the Guidelines for Preparing Documents to be Filed with the Supreme Court of Canada (Print and Electronic) and the SCC Registry’s printed guide named “Representing Yourself in the Supreme Court of Canada, Volume I”, regarding errors in law and section 61. of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, can it be construed that section 61. of the Supreme Court Act is wrong and invalid?


9.         Is the word “appeal” a mistake in section 40. (3) of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, because it intends to mean “application (for leave to appeal)”?


10.       Is there any authority or power in Canada besides Parliament that – without Parliament’s prior approval – may grant more judicial power for the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada than for the panel of nine judges of that Court?


11.       Do the laws of Canada grant a special power for the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada to make final judgment in a personal letter in the matter of a properly filed and pleaded Motion to the SCC for Reconsideration, simply by his personal opinion claiming that paragraph 78 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada would not be applicable to the matter?


12.       Does the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada have absolute immunity because he is actually a judge, and the definitions of “judge” and “Registrar” under section 2. (1) of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, are incorrect?


13.       Can section 12. of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156 (regarding the Registrar’s binding orders) and section 18. of the Supreme Court Act be interpreted together and construed that the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada has higher judicial authority and power than the panel of nine judges of that Court, including the Chief Judge?


14.       If the answer to question 13 is in the affirmative, can sections 3. (1) and 12. of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156 and section 18. of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, be construed that (at a certain point of time) the Registrar of the SCC alone shall deliver final verdicts in 100% of the appeals and applications for leave submitted to the Supreme Court of Canada, so the Prime Minister could disband the panel of nine judges and dissolve the SCC for good as a redundant authority and financial burden for the state?


15.       Is there a specific Canadian court – other than the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal – that has original or exclusive jurisdiction in tort cases involving the errors and omissions of the Registry’s administrators in the Supreme Court of Canada, particularly the Registrar?


16.       If the answers to questions 11, 12, 13 and 15 are in the negative, and the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada is a public servant of the federal Crown, can it be concluded in light of the 18 February 2014 judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal (Simon v. HMTQ in which the FCA denied jurisdiction) that sections 17. (1) and (2) (c) and (d), 17. (5) (b) and (6), and 25. of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7, are invalid and not applicable in cases against (or involving) such administrators of the Crown?


17.       Can the May 30, 2013 order (Docket: A-367-12) of Madam Justice Dawson overrule section 346. (2) of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, at the expense of Rule 3. regarding expeditiousness resulting in delays of a month or longer by re-interpreting the word “service” as “filing”?


18.       If an (interlocutory) Order of a Judge, like in Madam Justice Dawson’s matter above, is properly appealed but no procedure or decision follows it except silence, is such “unfinished business” harmonious with the purpose – the better administration of the laws of Canada – of section 3. of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7?


19.       Is the common law principle preventing situations that would “bring the administration of justice into disrepute” still a concern of the courts of Canada?


20.       Does the liberal and remedial nature of every enactment in section 12. of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-21, mean that the law always shall be remedial for the tortfeasors or criminals only, while shall not be remedial for the innocent and law-abiding victims of such torts or crimes?


21.       In light of sections 17. (1) and 17. (4) of the Financial Administration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-11, do court registries have any obligation to obey those rules and deposit public monies – including security deposits and filing fees – to the Receiver General’s account, particularly in cases when an appealing party’s pleadings are considered vexatious and an abuse of process, thus the disobedience of the registries would cause a financial loss for the state?


22.       Does a clerk or other proper officer (that includes the Registrar) of the court appealed from – the Federal Court of Appeal in the instant case – have the right to refuse the filing of a copy of the notice of appeal (to the SCC), by violating subsection 60. (4) of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26?


23.       In similar situations where the court administrators made several errors or omissions, would this Court, the Chief Justice, or a Judge involved prefer to

      (a) Let the nine judges know about the unlawful steps of the Courts Administration Service and their cumulative negative effects on a party, and deal with them within the instant appeal, or

      (b) Keep the unlawful administrative steps in secret from the panel of nine judges, forcing the party to start a new claim against the Crown on square one (at the FC) regarding those issues?


Part III: A concise statement of argument:

Ms. Kincaid’s letter of May 24, 2012 alleged that there was “no automatic right to appeal” in civil cases, thus contradicting the French version of s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act. The French text prescribes an “automatic” way to appeal. Thus the application for leave to appeal stage shall be skipped is error in law is alleged in the lower court(s).

The Registrar’s failure to keep the documents on file: Pursuant to section 17. of the Supreme Court Act, the Registrar shall report and publish the judgments of the Court. Since the word “publish” means to make something available for the public – and the above mentioned personal letter of the Registrar is not available for the public in any website or printed document – it follows that the letter is not an order or judgment from the official point of view. Pursuant to section 10. of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, “The Registrar shall keep all registers necessary for recording all activities in every proceeding.” Zoltan A. Simon’s documents entitled (The Applicant’s) Motion of Reconsideration of Application for Leave to Appeal belonged to the category of “every proceeding” but the Registrar did not want to keep its copies so the matter could remain in secret forever from the panel of nine judges of the SCC.

As for Madam Justice Dawson’s Order and its pending appeal, it seems proper to humbly call the attention of the judges to the statement of the Honourable Mr. Justice I. B. Josephson in paragraph [13] of Meldrum v. Public Trustee of The Province of B.C., 1998 CanLII 5563 (BC SC). It states that “The judicial branch of government must not usurp the function of the legislative branch…”

The applicant-appellant respectfully submits that there was a palpable and overriding error in her judgment, assuming that the clear reading of Rule 346. (2) of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 seemed illogical or absurd to her. Namely, she thought that “The Court has no cognizance of an appellant’s memorandum until it is filed…” The clear and express meaning of the wording “Within 30 days after service” cannot be changed without its violation to “Within 30 days after filing.” She overlooked the key circumstance that opposing parties are always fighting against each other, not against a Court or a Registry. Say, a delay of a week in serving an opposing party to the pleadings could cause a loss of millions of dollars to that party while such delay does not affect the Registry’s operation. Further, the term “x days after filing” shows up at least half a dozen times in the same Rules.

If a judge can overrule a clear and express provision of the legislation – here Rule 346.(2) – such judgment is against the other six instances as well. Madame Justice Dawson cited Rule 3. as well, pointing out the “most expeditious” determination of the proceeding. But, in reality, Zoltan A. Simon was punished by her Order to pay $500 for the Crown that filed its memorandum of fact and law 63 days after the service, instead of within the prescribed 30 days, a delay of 33 days on the Crown’s behalf. Thus, a party that consciously followed the Rules was punished for obeying the laws of Canada, and the Crown made $500 by disobeying the law. The fate of the $500 is still unclear because there is a valid appeal followed by a long silence, almost a year. Is her order valid and, therefore, Rule 346.(2) of the Federal Courts Rules absurd and invalid? Pursuant to section 3. of the Federal Courts Act, the Federal Court of Appeal is an additional court of law, … “for the better administration of the laws of Canada…” Does the Order of Madam Justice Dawson allow a delay of 33 days for any party in the future? For comparison, in Abdessadok v. Canada (Canada Border Services Agency), 2006 FC 236 (CanLII), the applicant exceeded the time limit only by 24 hours and he lost his case.

The instant appellant-applicant suffered irreversible loss as a result of his silenced appeal of the Dawson verdict because, pursuant to the Rules, the FCC should have disqualified the Crown’s pleadings for its long delay. The Crown did not apply for any extension of time either.

The applicant served and filed several motions in the Federal Court of Appeal. This one has limits that do not allow him to list more issues and controversies of law and court administration in the courts below. The honourable judges should feel free to look into each motion record in order to get a more complete picture regarding the widespread corruption in Canada and the lack of judicial independence, mainly in the administration of the lower courts.   


Part IV: Submissions in support of the order sought concerning costs:

            The instant applicant-appellant respectfully requests that this Honourable Court, Judge or Chief Judge to order costs to him for his expenses in connection with the printing, binding, serving and filing of this motion. He needs to send them by ExpressPost that is quite expensive. He is separated from her family by the government of Canada for the eighth year now; he needs to support as well his wife and stepson living in China. It would have been the duty of the Minister of Justice and the administrators of the Courts Administration Service to answer the presently submitted 24 constitutional questions. Or, rather, it belonged to their job descriptions to secure a normal administrative atmosphere in Canada in which such difficult questions would not have arisen. The instant applicant was doing their jobs for many years free of charge. The result may seem horrible for the government but rather interesting for the objective judges of the Supreme Court of Canada.

            The instant applicant-appellant respectfully requests that this Honourable Court, Judge or Chief Judge to suggest the Registrar to waive the prescribed filing fee of $75.00 and/or the security deposit of $500, in forma pauperis, pursuant to sections 97. (1)(b) and 59. (4). The appellant has been working hard since 2007 in order to clean up the mess created by public servants of the Crown; also he is trying to turn Canada’s court administration from its upside-down position back to the sound and logical standards prescribed by Parliament. So far he has been repeatedly punished for his efforts but in the instant case the motion to state constitutional questions is aiming to remedy the errors and apparent corruption in the administrative methods of the courts, mainly in the registries. It is in Canada’s interest to clarify these constitutional questions. Otherwise, maintaining the dangerous imbalance in our court system, the country may be heading to confusion and anarchy or an extremist government (fascist, nazist, anarchist, communist, religious fanatic, racist, supremacist, etc.) where a single person – a Registrar of that future regime – would have complete control over the whole state, probably associated with a future Prime Minister or dictator.


Part V: Orders sought, including the order or orders sought concerning costs:

(A)             The instant applicant to the motion seeks an order for costs at the discretion of the Right Honourable Chief Judge or the Judge assigned to the case; and

(B)              He seeks an advice, suggestion or instruction of the Court or the Judge(s) involved towards the Registrar, requesting him to waive to filing fee of $75.00 and/or the security deposit in the amount of $500.00 in the forma pauperis; and

(C)              He seeks an instruction of this Honourable Court or Judge(s) toward the Crown Counsel, asking her that – although the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada and the Guidelines (etc.) may not specify any limit regarding the number of pages transmitted by fax – the Crown should use that method as a last resort only since he does not have a fax machine; it should not exceed 20 pages for a transmittal, and the Crown should contact him before the transmittal; and

(D)             An Order or Direction stating the current filing status of the Notice of Appeal that was submitted for filing by Zoltan Andrew Simon on or about March 14, 2014; and,

(E)              Of course, his main request to this Honourable Court is to state the twenty-three constitutional questions proposed above, with some polishing, simplification or combination of them if required, in order to reduce their numbers. (He is apologizing for the long list of his constitutional questions and the grammatical or other mistakes in his pleadings in general.)


Part VI: Table of authorities, arranged alphabetically and setting out the paragraph numbers in Part III where the authorities are cited:

Constitution Act, 1982 (Part I: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms): 7., 8., 11. (a), (b), (d), (g), 12., 15. (1) and 52.;

Courts Administration Service Act, S.C. 2002, c. 8: 2. (b);                                                                

Criminal Code,R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46: 126. (1), 269.1 (1) and (2); 346. (1) and (1.1) (b);               

Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7: 3., 17. (1) and (2) (c), (d); 17. (5) (b) and (6), and 25.         

Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106: 346. (2);                                                                                   

Financial Administration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-11: 17. (1), 17. (4);                                               

Guidelines for preparing Documents to be Filed with the Supreme Court of

     Canada (Print and Electronic): extracts from an older version of the present website [in order to demonstrate

      that section 61. of the Act is missing everywhere];                                                                      

Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21: 12.;                                                                                         

Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156: 3. (1), 10., 12., 21. (1), 22. (2), 60. (1) (a), (b), (c), 78. (1);     

Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26: 2. (1) under “judge” and “Registrar”, 3., 17., 18., 40. (1), 40. (3), 43. (1), 60. (4), 61., 97. (1) (a) to (d), 97. (2) and (3).

Part VII: Photocopies of relevant provisions of statutes, regulations, and rules: Please refer to pages 15 to 75.

APPENDIX: Documents, including an affidavit that the applicant intends to rely on, in chronological order: Please refer to pages 75 to 91.


All these are respectfully submitted to this Honourable Court/Chief Justice/Judge on this 8th day of April, 2014, in the City of Red Deer, the Province of Alberta.



Zoltan Andrew Simon, Appellant (Applicant to this motion)





72 Best Crescent (new address since April 1, 2014 as indicated in the Notice of Appeal)

Red Deer, AB   T4R 1H6

Telephone: (403) 342-8826 (new number of Landlord/ Home)

Telephone (cell.): (403) 392-9189      Fax: (403) 341-3300

E-mail:          Website: