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Court File No.: A-123-18

FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

BETWEEN:

Zoltan Andrew SIMON

Appellant

(Applicant, moving party in this motion)

and

The Attorney General of Canada

(representing the Minister of National Revenue, both in their representative capacity)

Respondent

MOTION RECORD OF THE APPELLANT

(Applicant in this motion) to strike the Respondent’s motion and to prevent or rescind a vexatious litigant order; and for leave to continue the appeal on file

Under subsections 359, 369, 35(2)(a), 59(c) and 221 (1)(b) to (f) of the Federal Courts Rules and ss. 40 (3) to (5) of the Federal Courts Act

Zoltan Andrew Simon, Appellant            Attorney General of Canada

72 Best Crescent                                       Department of Justice Canada

Red Deer, Alberta   T4R 1H6                   Edmonton Regional Office, EPCOR Tower

Telephone: not applicable                         300, 10423 – 101 Street NW

Fax: (403) 341-3300                                 Edmonton, AB  T5H 0E7

Email: zasimon@hotmail.com                  C/o Ms. Wendy Bridges,

                                                                         Counsel  or/and

                                                                 Mr. Keelan Sinnott,                                                                           Counsel

                                                                  Tel.: (780) 495-7801

                                                                  Fax: (780) 495-3319

                                                                  Email:

                                                                 wendy.bridges@justice.gc.ca

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF APPLICANT’S MOTION RECORD

Notice of Motion................................................................................................... 3

All affidavits and other material served by the moving party for use on the motion:

     Affidavit of Zoltan Andrew Simon sworn on November 23, 2018...................................................................................................... 4

The portions of any transcripts (not applicable)......................................................................................   N/A

Written representations / Memorandum of fact and law of the appellant............................................................................................ 23

     PART I: A concise statement of fact...................................................................................................... 23

     PART II: A statement of the points in issue – Questions of general importance.......................................................................................... 34

     PART III: A concise statement of submissions.........................................................................................36

     PART IV: A concise statement of the order sought,

including any order concerning costs............................................... .44

     PART V: A list of the authorities to be referred to......................... 2

Any other filed material that is necessary for the

hearing of the motion: none.............................................................N/A

(a long list of statutes have been submitted for filing in August 2018)

APPENDIX A:Provisions of any statutes or regulations cited or relied on.......................................................................................... N/A

(a long list of statutes have been submitted and served in August 2018)

APPENDIX B: A book of the authorities to be referred to:

Bernard v. Canada (Revenue Agency), 2015 FCA 263 (CanLII)..................................................................................... 53

Campbell v. Canada, 2005 FCA 49 (CanLII)..................................................................................... 63

Canada (Attorney General) v. Klippenstein, 2017 FCA 115............................................................................................................................... 69

Canada v. Diflorio, 2015 FCA 11 (CanLII).................................................................................... 73

Chepanow v. Ontario, 1998 CanLII 8608 (FC)........................................................................................... 77

Forrest v. Correctional Service of Canada, 2008 FCA 397 (CanLII)...................................................................................................................... 81

International Taoist Church of Canada v. Ching Chung Taoist Association of Hong Kong Limited, 2011 BCCA 149 (CanLII).................................................................................... 85

Kallaba v. Bylykbashi, 2006 CanLII 3953 (ON CA) [16 selected pages]........................................................................................ 91

Lukezic v. Royal Bank of Canada, 2012 ONCA 350

(CanLII) …..............................................................................107

Mazhero v. Fox, 2014 FCA 200 (CanLII).................................................................................. 111

Mennes v. Canada, 2010 FCA 20 (CanLII)..................................................................................117

Olumide v. Canada, 2016 FCA 287.......................................................................................... 121

Supermarchés Jean Labrecque Inc. v. Flamand, [1987]

2 SCR 219, 1987..................................................................... 129

Vuckovich v. Royal Bank of Canada,1998 CanLII 2398 (ON CA)......................................................................................... 145

Notice of Motion

Court File No.: A-123-18

FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

Between:

Zoltan Andrew SIMON

Applicant

and

The Attorney General of Canada (in her representative capacity)

Respondent

Notice of Motion

TAKE NOTICE THAT the appellant, Zoltan Andrew Simon, will make a motion to the Court on Friday, December 14, 2018 at 9:30 a.m. or as soon thereafter as the motion can be heard, at the Federal Court of Appeal in Edmonton, Alberta, or

TAKE NOTICE THAT the appellant, Zoltan Andrew Simon, will make a motion to the Court in writing under Rule 369 of the Federal Courts Rules.

THE MOTION IS FOR and Order to stay or strike out the Respondent’s unlawful Notice of Motion – in which a claim was initiated and defined for an order to strike something and declare Z. A. Simon a vexatious litigant – without leave to amend, and for related or additional relief under ss. 221 (1) (b) to (f), 219, 105 (a) and (b), 59 (c), 110, 400 (2) and (3) (c), (g), and (h) to (j) of the Rules as shown below.

THE GROUNDS FOR THE MOTION ARE: The Crown’s improper Notice of Motion violates ss. 40 (1)-(2), 16 (1)and 50 (2)of the Act, also s. 59 (c) and 75 of the Rules.     

THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE will be used at the hearing of the motion: Affidavit of Zoltan Andrew Simon sworn on November 23, 2018, and such other evidence as may be required or determined to be necessary and that this Honourable Court may permit.

November 29, 2018.

______________________________

Signature of Zoltan Andrew Simon,

Appellant/Applicant, Self-represented litigant

72 Best Crescent, Red Deer, AB  T4R 1H6, Fax: (403) 341-3300; Phone No.: N/A

MEMORANDUM OF FACT AND LAW (pursuant of s. 366 of the Rules)

Part I: A concise statement of fact

1.      Introduction:Normally, the final determination of an appeal of an application for judicial review is done by a division of three justices. Please refer to Canada (Attorney General) v. Almon Equipment Limited, 2010 FCA 193 (CanLII), Steel v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FCA 153 (CanLII), and Canada (National Revenue) v. JP Morgan Asset Management (Canada) Inc., 2013 FCA 250 (CanLII). All of them were correctly decided by three-justice divisions. The improper and defective Notice of Motion filed and served by Ms. Bridges would undermine the principle of these decisions if a single FCA justice or prothonotary may make a final decision on the original application for judicial review, camouflaged as a motion for an order to declare the appellant a vexatious litigant. [The instant applicant submits that jurisprudence on this issue is quite divided.];

2.      So far Counsel for the Respondent has failed to serve a photocopy of the AGC’s consent and it has not been included into her motion document. So far Counsel has not filed and served a Notice of Motion requesting the Court’s permission to amend its Notice of motion or Motion record – fatal and incurable errors;

3.      The court cases of Zoltan A. Simon between 2007 and 2012 took place almost problem-free. Then the difficulties began when administrators of a Court Registry followed extremely vague directions and cut out dozens of pages from several of his submissions instead out striking them out by drawing lines; the Registry alleged late filing of one of his documents while soon the appellant proved that the administrators mistook the date of his service, identifying it with the date when a Purolator driver picked up the item, etc. In the previous appeal at the FC/FCA, a prothonotary dismissed the case without authority but prothonotaries were not members of the Court. See [21] of Vaughan v. Canada, 2000 CanLII 15069 (FC). Then a justice decided, ignoring the “stare decisis” and an order of Mr. Justice Evans, that the Christmas recess shall be included into the reckoning of day. Finally, a single justice of the FCA dismissed my Application for leave to appeal. He exceeded his jurisdiction because only a Division had the power to do that;  

4.      The major blow happened back on June 18, 2012 when the responding document of AGC, submitted by Ms. Wendy Bridges to the Supreme Court of Canada contained several untrue or/and misleading statements. She repeatedly alleged that Z.A. Simon had a claim against BC but not against Canada, disregarding the conclusions of the previous FCA verdict, in order to mislead the justices of the SCC. It is well-known fact that the SCC received about 1,000 appeal submissions annually. Ms. Bridges gambled and won: she correctly assumed that the three SCC justices would not have sufficient time to read the appellant’s long arguments, only – or at first – her false or misleading statement. Courts normally rely on the assumption that all Counsel, as officers of the Court, always write the truth;

5.      “A claim against BC is outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Court”, wrote Counsel W. Bridges as her subtitle on her page 005 that is page 12 of the instant Motion Record. She added that “This case involves a routine motions court decision to strike out a deficient statement of claim”; “No issue of public importance” has been involved, the applicant’s “lengthy and incomprehensible” pleadings are devoid of material facts supporting a reasonable cause of action against Canada, the amended statement of claim plainly fails to disclose a cause of action against Canada, no issue of public importance arises, etc. Please refer to Exhibit 1 of Zoltan Andrew Simon’s Affidavit sworn on November 23, 2018.

6.      All or most of her allegations were untrue, and the SCC was unable to get the full picture due to her misleading submissions. A reasonable person would think that the SCC would have delivered a very different decision if Ms. Bridges told them the truth or would not have expressed so many false allegations. The Supreme Court of Canada would have returned the controversial issues to the lower courts, and every substantive right between the two parties would have been clarified and settled with finality in 2013 or 2014, without any need for further cases;

7.      Instead of the wording used by Counsel in 2018 such as “The Appellant wasted the resources of the Courts at all levels”, she should have written, “The misleading statements of Ms. Bridges submitted to the SCC on 18 June 2012 caused a domino effect, resulting that there are still no final judgments in the controversy, and the AGC wasted the resources of the Courts between 2012 and 2018.”  

8.      Adding insult to the injury, Ms. Bridges now wants to enjoy costs originating from her false or misleading submissions written in 2012; There is no case law precedent where a Court rewarded a party for misleading that Court by false submssions;

9.      One could utilize the wording used by Ms. Bridges, and respectfully submit to the FCA now, “This case involves a routine motions court decision to strike out a fatally deficient Notice of Motion submitted by Counsel to the AGC.”

10.  A brief statement of factual allegations in the Crown’s instant motion to strike:

11. The AGC’s recent Notice of Motion at the FCA, is a claim against the appellant, claiming that he is a vexatious litigant. Its subtitle is “Respondent’s Motion to Strike and Declare Appellant Vexatious Litigant”;

12. Counsel to AGC, Ms. Wendy Bridges, is extremely vague in the said subtitle, printed in bold letters. She does not say what to strike. The name of the document she wants the Court to strike out is simply missing in her notice of motion. One may assume that she refers to the appellant’s Notice of Appeal. However, five lines below she asks the Court to dismiss the appeal “on a preliminary basis” but the word “preliminary” normally means that the striking out the Notice of Appeal would not be final, only for a short while or temporarily;

13. The Crown’s request is moot since the appeal has been suspended for half a year;

14. Consulting the librarians regarding the wording “on a preliminary basis” they understood the words that it would be a way to start a thing, but that could be modified later. They interpreted it as a conditional and not a final decision. [The Hungarian language may express this as “An iron ring made of wood,” or killing a person that stays alive after his death: kinds of oxymoron.]

15. In the appellant’s respectful opinion, whatever Ms. Bridges is requesting in her motion, a single justice has no power to terminate an appeal properly bought, in the disguise of a vexatious motion. The Crown does not explain clearly what it expects from the Court to be done: suspend the appeal temporarily, kill it completely, or both (?). This is nonsensical because “killing an appeal softly” is not a legislative option. A Court cannot consider such controversial wish that has no foundation in the Act or the Rules: an Alice in Wonderland aspect. Thus, such exercise is embarrassing for any Court, causing extreme difficulties in conducting the upcoming hearing. The Crown must offer the Court more than an incomplete skeleton within a serious pleadings, instead of causing confusion for the Justice(s) and the appellant involved as a last minute surprise. The Crown must show the exact paragraphs of any court order that determined the substantial rights of the Crown and/or Z.A. Simon in the controversies, but there was no such paragraph;

16. Counsel referred to sections 359 and 35(2)(a) of the Rules and section 40 of the Act but none of those allows the Court to strike anything. The wording “notice of appeal is struck” does not yield a single meaningful match by CanLII.org;

17. For an average person familiar with the legislative and procedural background it is hard, if not impossible, to understand what Counsel really wants. It seems that she realized, just before the submission of an appeal book, that she had no hope to obtain any evidence that allowed the CRA to seize the tax credit monies of Zoltan Andrew Simon in mid-2008. Thus, the only tactical or strategic solution remained for her to get an order somehow that would declare Z.A. Simon a vexatious litigant;

18. The appellant honestly believes that the vexatious litigant motion filed by Ms. Bridges was not commenced with the expectation that it may be successful but it was commenced for collateral strategic reasons, and that its purpose was to intimidate and harass the appellant and 16 million Canadians. Namely, her real purpose was to produce a landmark court order in case law – perhaps as a birthday present for the AGC who is unaware of the manipulations of Ms. Bridges – that would allow the Crown to seize monies of the public in the future without any legitimate reason and without the participation or approval of any court;

19. But returning to the two-page Notice of motion filed by Ms. Bridges, it contains several false or sweeping allegations combined with a wish list as follows:

20. An order declaring the Appellant a vexatious litigant;

21. Dismissing his appeal on a preliminary basis with costs;

22. The appeal is improper;

23. The appeal is bereft of any chance of success;

24. The Appellant exhibits vexatious behaviour;

25. The Appellant has abused the process of this and other Courts;

26. The Appellant repeatedly brought actions to determine issues already decided by courts of competent jurisdiction;

27. The Appellant initiated proceedings that are/were without merit and where no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief;

28. The Appellant rolled forward into subsequent court proceedings grounds and issues that have already been raised;

29. The Appellant persistently took appeals from judicial decisions;

30. The Appellant wasted the resources of the Courts at all levels;

31. The appellant, Zoltan Andrew Simon, respectfully submits that all of these sweeping and unsupported allegations are false, and their main purpose is to mislead this Honourable Court because Counsel is unable to show any evidence;

32. Originally, a few weeks before the first draft of the Crown’s Notice of Motion, Counsel tried to buy time and disagreed with the contents of the upcoming joint appeal book. “A party must not refuse consent where such refusal is calculated to achieve a collateral purpose, or benefit…” See [156] of IFP Technologies

     (Canada) v Encana Midstream and Marketing, 2014 ABQB 470 (CanLII), also 1455202 Ontario Inc v Welbow Holdings Ltd, 2003 CanLII 10572 (ON SC), [2003] OJ No 1785 at para 9;

33. The reason the Notice of Motion of Ms. Bridges was not brought on sooner is purely tactical as a “bully tactic” that is part of her tactical maneuverings;

34. As for a wish of Counsel 11 above, the Court has jurisdiction to issue such order related to “that Court” (see s. 40 of the Act) but she has not explained that she meant the Federal Court, the FCA, or both, let alone every court of the world;

35. Counsel has failed to specify which situation described in s. 40 of the Act would apply to Z.A. Simon: has he “persistently instituted vexatious proceedings” or has he “conducted a proceeding in a vexatious manner” in a certain Court on a certain date? If the latter would apply, did Counsel mean the instant appeal at the FCA as a vexatious proceeding, or, the main or only vexatious proceeding?

36. As for Counsel’s wish cited in our para. 21 above, dismissing the appeal on a preliminary basis with costs is absurd since the legislation or common law does not allow such punishment of an appellant through a vexatious litigant order, without a real hearing of the case on its merits. Such request is improper here, and the appellant respectfully requests the Court to strike out the words “dismissing his appeal on a preliminary basis with costs” from the Respondent’s Notice of Motion. Further, the BC SC has already punished the appellant for all his past court cases in Canada, in the FC, the FCA, and the SCC: why to punish a person twice?;

37. As for Counsel’s wish cited in our para. 22 above, Counsel has failed to explain why would Z.A. Simon’s instant appeal at bar “improper”. I.e., has she found a spelling mistake in it? Was it filed or served too early or too late? What would be her “better way” to appeal the decision of a Justice who denied jurisdiction despite that my originating documents satisfied the ITO test? Several years ago Ms. Lauzon, a judicial administrator of the Tax Court sent a letter to Z.A. Simon telling him that the (similar) issues were too complex and belonged to the Federal Court;

38.  If the Canadian lottery named 6-49 offers to each player some chance to win money, however low their chances are, they buy tickets. How can a lawyer declare with 100% certainty that in a case none of the participants can win? In the appeal case at bar, the appellant is trying to enforce the factual findings in the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Simon v. Canada, 2011 FCA 6 (CanLII), Docket: A-237-10, which stated, “There is no suggestion that any garnishment order issued from a court of competent jurisdiction.” The FCA conclusion was final, and neither of the (instant) parties appealed it in the SCC. The material finding is supported by an official letter issued by a BC ministry, written on paper under the BC Government’s letterhead. So far no counsel was able to demonstrate that the BC document would be forged. Finally, the SCC decision in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII) is final and clearly supports Z.A. Simon’s position. Ms. Bridges will have an uphill battle to demonstrate in the FCA that the SCC decision in Mavi, supra, and the 2011 decision of the FCA have been wrongly decided;

39.  The appellant respectfully submits to this Honourable Court that Counsel is trying to repeat her misleading strategy but she fails to establish any specific fact. She is throwing to the Court a rough list of past court cases of Z. A. Simon that anyone could find by a search online. She is expecting the Court to perform a “fishing expedition” in her service and for her favour, hoping that a Justice would be able to find something that she has been unable to find since 2012;

40.  The worst possible vexatious behaviour and abuse of process on a party’s behalf is a repeated attempt to mislead the courts habitually. Governments of most countries expect their lawyers to submit some “credible lies” to the courts if necessary. Ms. Bridges apparently cannot find anything smart, except sweeping and unsubstantiated allegations in the form of a list, almost like a wish list. She may claim that floods and thunderbolts destroyed the ministerial certificate against Z.A. Simon in every federal and provincial ministry and every court registry;

41.  Counsel offers a skeleton containing 100 or 110 words to this Honourable Court under the wording “The grounds of the motion are”. She is hoping that such a short reasoning would convince a Justice to grant endless rights to the Crown over 36 million subjects, and discard or suspend the rule of law in Canada on a preliminary basis although it has been working excellently since 1867;

A statement of facts in the wider background including in BC – if relevant

42.  In March 21 or 23 of 2007, S. Postuk, an officer of a BC ministry issued a false statement on a single page (with no official heading) alleging that Zoltan A. Simon [as a sponsor] had a debt to the Government of British Columbia and the debt was enforceable. However, in 2012, another ministry of BC – Ministry of Citizens’ Services and Open Government – stated officially that the Province had no record of such debt. See Exhibit 2 of Zoltan Andrew Simon’s affidavit sworn on November 23, 2018. In April 2007, perhaps based of the above statement of S. Postuk, a visa officer of Canada in Hong Kong refused to issue Canadian landed immigrant visas for the wife and stepson of the instant appellant, also their sponsor; 

43.  The Crown had 11.5 years to provide an explanation by referring to a legislation (Act, Rules, etc.) as the grounds for the punishment of the family members. So far none has been provided. Since October 2000, the Respondent has been unable or unwilling to produce the required ministerial certificate registered and filed in the Federal Court regarding the alleged sponsorship debt of Z.A. Simon. The Crown contravened ss. 146 (1) & (2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) by seizing Z. Simon’s tax credits. CRA seized his monies beyond the 6-year limitation period. The appellant has often referred to a long list of enactments, acts and rules – both federal and provincial, including the ITA – requiring a similar ministerial certificate before garnishing the monies of a taxpayer; 

44.  Para. [12] of a valid order issued by a division of three justices of the Federal Court of Appeal in Simon v. Canada, 2011 FCA 6 (CanLII), Docket: A-237-10, stated in the material factual findings of the FCA that “There is no suggestion that any garnishment order issued from a court of competent jurisdiction.”;

45.  In 2011, a landmark order of the Supreme Court of Canada clearly stated that the Crown must obey the IRPA by filing and registering a ministerial certificate of debt against the defaulting sponsors. Please refer to Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII) where the SCC mentions seven times the Crown’s obligation. Another order of the SCC in Markevich v. Canada, [2003] 1 SCR 94, 2003 SCC 9 (CanLII) clearly states that alleged debts of taxpayers cannot be taken beyond the limitation period. British Columbia and Canada (CRA) seized Z.A. Simon’s tax credit monies well after the end of the (then) six-year limitation period after his alleged default. The seizure took place in 2008, almost eight years after his alleged sponsorship default;   

46.  About 20 to 60 sections or subsections of more than a dozen enactments, rules or regulations have been contravened by the Crown parties as results of a domino effect. Three honourable justices of BC (Donegan J., Ball J., and Bennett J.A.), agreed upon the circumstance that the appellants’ Notice of Civil Claim in 2014 pleaded 20 to 60 possible causes of action. However, their apparent position was that the claims had no chance of succeed because the policies of Canada and the Province had the power to override the legislation. Later the Supreme Court of BC strangely held that 193 facts in the 2014 corresponded to 347 facts pleaded in 2017;

47.  The merits of the claims have never been heard by any court. The mandate of the justices or the extremely short time given for the preliminary hearings did not allow any judge to examine the 60 – now about 80 – causes of action. Most of those 60 or 80 issues are related to pure questions of law, so there was no need to hear witnesses or examine any evidence. The claims were clear and straightforward. If the Crown is choosing to contravene 60+ sections of the laws of Canada and BC since 2006, the instant applicant and his family were not unreasonable to claim that the Crown should pay for the resulting damages;

48.  Z.A. Simon’s – here very irrelevant – court cases in British Columbia between 2014 and 2018 are as follow:

49.  The 16 August 2017 Order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Ball declared Z.A. Simon vexatious litigant, adding that he “must not, without first obtaining leave of this Court, institute or commence legal proceedings in any British Columbia court, or file applications in any existing legal proceedings in any British Columbia court.” [Emphasis added.] His appeal of such vexatious litigant order failed at the BC CA, simply because the Vancouver Registry routinely prevented him to get access to the decisions – nay, only Reasons without orders – of the justices involved, and often sabotaged to file the documents submitted by the appellant. The Registry repeatedly drove procedural wedges between the BC courts and Z.A. Simon that violated many sections of acts and rules, including s. 12 of the Charter; The recent November 22 Order of the BC CA, dismissing the appeal of the vexatious litigant order against Z.A. Simon [as filed out of time] is or will be on appeal at the SCC when the FCA’s hearing would take place on December 14, 2018. (However, the SCC may not offer any remedy if the BC CA’s final vexatious litigant order is “final” only from the procedural point of view.)   

50.  In retrospective, obeying such terms as much as possible, on 5 September 2017, the instant appellant “filed” in the BC CA’s Vancouver Registry his originating Application for leave to appeal with a subtitle “to proceed as a notice of appeal”. Please note that the appeal was brought properly, on the authority of on the authority of R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII);

51.  It would have been worse for the appellant to submit two documents simultaneously in BC: a Notice of Appeal and an Application for Leave to Appeal. That would have seemed an open abuse of process for the same administrator of the Registry and she likely would not have filed them: if she would not file a single document, she would not file two documents, either. The Registry received on 5 September 2017 the prescribed number of copies of his originating document for the appeal but procrastinated till about September 12. Its administrators did not do anything: they failed to stamp the documents and did not send it out to the Court for directions. Thus, Z.A. Simon served unstamped copies of the same document on the AGC and the AGBC on 13 September 2017. He faxed the two affidavits of service with the proofs of delivery to the Vancouver Registry on September 13;

52.  The Reasons of the Honourable Madam Justice Bennett correctly stated that the proper was to proceed would have been by a Notice of Appeal (as the subtitle of Z.A. Simon’s originating document showed);

53.  Thus, both the beginning and the end of the procedural line have been correct: to proceed without an application for leave to appeal. However, the Registry struck out that possibility in the style of cause. The Registry arbitrarily, without the Court’s approval, put a procedural loop on that simple line, claiming that the appellant filed his document out of time. By doing that, the Registry introduced a “technical irregularity”. [The Reasons of Groberman J.A. may be correct about such minor irregularity but he should have mentioned that the “irregularity” has been created by the Registry, not the appellants.] Bennett J.A. attacked  the appellant at that procedural irregular loop stage created by the Registry;

54.  The written Reasons of the Honourable Mr. Justice Groberman has not been available for Z. Simon for several days since the registry simply did not send him a copy of it. The Registry followed this unfair strategy of silence practically at each procedural step. Thus, the appellant – in panic – served and filed an application to vary an order of a justice. Having been disabled to read the exact words, the appellant had no opportunity to list further palpable and overriding errors in the Reasons. In any case, justices are free to write any bizarre or weird personal opinion or explanation in their Reasons as far as those are not orders: they were not written in Form 25 as prescribed by the 47 (3)(c) of the Court of Appeal Rules. All justices involved in British Columbia made their Reasons in a factual vacuum, in a hurry. Basically, they echoed or copied the Reasons of Donegan J. who, in turn, automatically echoed the sweeping and untrue allegations of Counsel;

55.  At the previous hearing before a three-justice division of the Court of Appeal (in 2016 BCCA 52), the Court changed Donegan J.’s 20-60 possible causes of action into zero reasonable cause of action without much ado. The hearing was scheduled for two hours but in about the 35th minute the justices jumped up – while the appellant failed to stand up because he was distracted, expecting the speeches of counsel – and left the courtroom. In a few minutes the justices returned and announced the judgment. The appellant thinks that judges are free to cut a hearing short: maybe one of them had a headache, the other one a plan for an early lunch, and the third one a birthday party of his child. However, such freedom created a tainted procedure. Not to hear two of the three parties resulted in a reasonable apprehension of bias, at least the Canadian Judicial Council would likely say that: the file is not showing the fact that both counsel have been unable to answer the appellant’s crucial and grave questions of facts and law in the courtroom. The Court has offended the audi alteram parte principle;

56.  I asked the Court in writing, “In light of section 8 of the Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996, c 238, is an appeal brought when subsections 14 (2) (a) and (b) of the [Court of Appeal] Act are satisfied, “by serving a copy of the notice on every respondent”, or, is the latter subsection incorrect because a “filed” copy is a must which is only satisfied if a date stamp of the registry is shown on the style of cause? [Note: the BC Court has never answered this question.];

57.  In Perren v. Lalari, 2009 BCCA 564 (CanLII), it took three justices to decide in case of a long delay and one of the three judges (Mr. Justice Lowry) dissented on the issue. In Clock Holdings Ltd. v. Braich, 2009 BCCA 437 (CanLII) three justices decided on the merits, not a single justice in chambers. In Rapton v. British Columbia (Motor Vehicles), 2011 BCCA 71 (CanLII), and in Gourmet Gallery Inc. v. Pacific International Development Corp., 2000 BCCA 681 (CanLII) a single judge granted extension of time since a single justice had the power to do that. However, a single justice has no power to block an appeal where no actual delay took place and the appeal was brought within the prescribed appeal period, as in our case. The error or bad faith action of an administrator of the registry not to send out an initiating document to the Court for direction, sitting on it for a week and then placing a stamp on it showing the wrong date – September 26 instead of September 5 – is not a delay on the part of the appellant, on the authority of R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII). Further, three justices made the final decision in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mennes, 2014 ON CA; Semenoff Estate v. Semenoff, 2017 BCCA 17; Coote v. Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company (Lawpro), 2014 FCA 98; Houweling Nurseries Ltd., v. Houweling, 2010 BCCA 315; Campbell v. Canada, 2005 FCA 49; Olympia Interiors Ltd. v. Canada, 2004 FCA 195; Mennes v. Canada, 2010 FCA 20. [Mr. Mennes brought 64 separate proceedings.] Z. Simon’s Charter right is to be heard by three justices, not by one;

58.  In Fabrikant v. Canada, 2018 FCA 206 (CanLII), Mr. Justice Stratas gave a fair warning to Mr. Fabrikant, unlike now, in the case or appeal at bar.

Part II: A statement of the points in issue – Questions of general importance under section 110 of the Federal Courts Rules

59.  Was it a “slip of the pen” of Parliament that the word “application” showed up four times instead of the word “motion” in ss. 40 (1) and (2) of the Federal Courts Act?;

60.  Should the answer to the previous question be in the negative, if the Attorney General allowed to be heard on a motion [before a single justices] when the Act requires an application [to be heard by a Division of three justices]?

61.  Is it a prejudice against the appellant that, between August 23 and 28 as the Court index and docket online shows, the Registry has forwarded his 3-volume Motion Record to the Court (that so far had no time or opportunity to issue any order or direction about their filing) so perhaps the appellant’s file is practically empty and there is nothing before the chambers judge when hearing the case?

62.  Does it constitute procedural unfairness if the AGC or/and the Registry has never sent the appellant the prescribed consent letter signed with the AGC to support the motion under s. 40 of the Act, and it does not show up in the Motion Record?

63.  Does it constitute procedural unfairness if a counsel to AGC simple calls and instructs or orders the Court Registry to insert the AGC’s consent letter into the Crown’s motion record without submitting an amended motion record as required by section 76 of the Federal Courts Rules? [That type of change or amendment – the insertion of a document – is not allowed by those rules.]

64.  Did Parliament intend that clear words of the Act and Rules may be changed anywhere capriciously, “for the better administration of the laws of Canada” as stated in section 3 of the Federal Courts Act? Is that a better administration?

65.  The basic issue for the appellant is the instant status of the legislation: the enactments that reflect Parliament’s will. Are those enactments, act and rules still valid and obligatory for every Canadian? If not, are public servants of the federal and provincial governments exempt from those, being absolutely free, and is it optional for them to obey or disobey the law?

66.  What happens in situations where the decision-makers or tribunals have not got sufficient time to apply the laws of the land (including governing common law with the principle of “stare decisis”, the “plain and obvious” test, etc.)?

67.  Should such apparent shortage of man-hours assigned to decision-makers cause that innocent parties end up as “vexatious litigants” despite their good faith attitude, continuous trust and respect towards the decision-makers, the acts, rules and regulations that they obey wholeheartedly and never contravene?  

68.  Is it a normal, desirable and frequent situation in Canada if decision-makers are so overloaded that a decade or more would pass – 11 years in our case – during which not a single tribunal or court issues a final judgment as defined in s. 2 (1) of the Federal Courts Act, but instead, the Crown punishes the innocent parties by having them declared vexatious litigants due to the delays caused by its own employees? [The appellant is a security officer and he is concerned that if more and more court registries built unlawful impenetrable walls around the courts, sooner or later a normal person gets so frustrated by the lack of access to justice that he or she mails an envelope filled with, say, Anthrax to a registry and one or more innocent administrators would die. The Court may respect that person more because criminals allegedly have got more rights that innocent law-abiding citizens.]

69.  Is it desirable on the long run, and/or is it in the interests of justice that the administrators of more and more registries Canada-wide try to turn the courts into their playgrounds, forming wedges between the public and the state or state’s tortfeasors, by habitually refusing the timely filing of documents of the victimized parties while prevent the latter to receive the judgments of the courts in time?

70.  Does the governing common law, repeatedly confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada, still hold the following principles: Procedure cannot govern substance [as stated in R. v. Litchfield, [1993] 4 SCR 333, 1993 CanLII 44 (SCC), or “the rules are not the master but the servant of the court”, or, as cited from Sopinka J. in Metal World Inc. v. Pennecon Energy Ltd., 2014 NLCA 10 (CanLII), “As a general principle, the rules of procedure should be the servant of substantive rights and not the master.”?

71.  Since in the recent appeal of Z.A. Simon in BC the justices contradicted the above principle, and did not follow the decision made in R. v. Small, 2000 BCCA 433 (CanLII), does this Honourable Court approve the strategy of procrastination of some registries in filing documents that would produce more “vexatious litigants” by injustice, is in the interests of justice nationwide? Does this Honourable Court consider the date of “filing” a document (that obeys the rules and the lower court’s order as much as possible in form and content) the day when it arrives to a Court’s registry, or the date maybe several weeks later when they put a stamp on it?

72.  Is it lawful for administrators of the courts Canada-wide to edit arbitrarily the documents submitted by any party for filing, striking out many paragraphs or names of parties, without a Court’s involvement or directions?

73.  Is it plain and obvious that the Hounourable Mr. Justice Manson did not err by declining jurisdiction of the Federal Court after hearing Z.A. Simon’s application for judicial review when the latter did not challenge the CRA’s correct assessment but objected the unexplained disappearance of his credit monies in 2008?

74.  On the grounds of the principle often expressed in the FC and FCA, “What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander”, if Justice Manson was allowed to assume that applications belong to the category of actions so they can be struck out on the grounds of s. 221 (1) of the Rules, while this Court asserts that the words “motion” and “application” are interchangeable, can the instant motion include the appellant’s request for remedy under ss. 40 (3) and (4) of the Act, without filing a separate application?  

Part III: A concise statement of submissions

75.  The appellant respectfully submits that

76.  There is no “final judgment” issued by any court of Canada determining or/and terminating the claims of the appellants. The BC justices involved overlooked that “final judgment means any judgment, rule, order or decision that determines in whole or in part any substantive right of any of the parties in controversy in any judicial proceeding; (jugement définitif)”, pursuant  to ss. 2 (1) of the Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, and ss. 2 (1) of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985;

77.  All of those previous decisions were only interlocutory and not final judgments, and no substantive right has ever been determined in any judicial proceeding;

78.  The “issues” in those previous court cases, provincial or federal, were same or similar: i.e., Should Z. Simon’s whole pleadings or only parts of them be struck out, with or without right to amend? However, such “similar issues” were always the issues of the Crown, never the issues proposed by the instant appellant;

79.  The lawful ownership of the amount of $$3,441.68, seized from Z.A. Simon’s CRA credit account in 2008, has never been addressed/decided by any Court. A similar case was Vuckovich v. Royal Bank of Canada, 1998 CanLII 2398 (ON CA);

80.  Otherwise, section 40 of the Act is silent of any judgment outside the FC or the FCA. The Supreme Court of BC (Mr. Justice Ball) based his decision on a single BC case, namely Z.A. Simon v. Penelope Lipsack. The latter was a provincial employee of BC, a public servant. Z.A. Simon, in the Provincial Court, filed a $25,000 claim against her in her personal capacity, and not against the Crown. The Justice conducted the hearing by teleconference and she correctly decided that Ms. Lipsack was an improper defendant. This was the only way to learn if she or the BC ministers controlled part of the tort situation. The decision revealed that she did not act as a capricious person in bad faith but as an employee under pressure;

81.  Turning to the substance, it is extremely easy to respond to the bizarre or absurd allegations of Ms. Bridges, as we cited them above in our paras. 22-30 as follow:

82.  As for our (22) above, the appeal is not improper because it obeys the Rules, the Act, and common law;

83.  As for (22), the appeal is not bereft of any chance of success because it tries to enforce two orders of the SCC and one order of the FCA: Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII); Markevich v. Canada, [2003] 1 SCR 94, 2003 SCC 9 (CanLII); and  Simon v. Canada, 2011 FCA 6 (CanLII), plus dozens of the relevant ones of the Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal, including unassailable decisions of the Honourable Mr. Justice Stratas;

84.  As for (23), the Appellant has never exhibited vexatious behaviour in any courtroom or in his pleadings. The Charter allows citizens to defend themselves and their legitimate and civil rights. The Crown has been separated him from his Chinese wife and stepson for 12 years, without offering any document or lawful explanation. His very limited number of actions and appeals were NOT brought for a purpose other than the assertion by his legitimate rights to live with his family, or, in the alternative, get financial compensation for the Crown’s torts and move abroad in order to reunify his family in a country where the rule of law dominates;

85.  As for (24), the Appellant has never abused the process of this and other Courts. Section 40 of the Act does not punish a litigant who, say, had 5 court cases in Brazil, 5 in Russia, 5 in India, 5 in Germany, 5 in Yukon, 5 in Ontario and 5 in Quebec. The Appellant had only three appeals in the Federal Court of Appeal as follow: Simon v. Canada, 2011 FCA 6 (CanLII);  Simon v. Canada, 2012 FCA 49 (CanLII), and Simon v. Canada, 2014 FCA 47 (CanLII) as the www.canlii.org website indicate, the instant appeal being the fourth one;

86.  As for (25), the Appellant did not bring any action in the Federal Court of Appeal because this Honourable Court only deals with appeals, not with actions. Only the Federal Court deals with actions so Ms. Bridges must initiate an independent procedure there under section 40 of the Act if she wants to declare him vexatious litigant there. The Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal are two courts, not one. Finally, actions are not appeals;

87.  As for (26), the Appellant has not brought any action in the Federal Court of Appeal so this kind of nonsense talk is an abuse of process in her text. As already submitted with plenty of support, Z.A. Simon has never brought any action to the Federal Court to determine issues already decided by courts of competent jurisdiction. No Court has ever determined the substantial issues of law or/and rights between the parties at bar. The Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada blocked three appeals of the appellant that have been properly submitted under s. 61 of the Supreme Court Act. He kept usurping the SCC’s powers. Persons versed in law know that registrars are not judges. A decision of a Registrar to prevent a document to reach the Division of a Court is not a final judgment and not a decision that determines substantive issues or rights;

88.  As for (27), Ms. Bridges alleges, “The Appellant initiated proceedings that are/were without merit and where no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief.” Since 2009, no Court of Canada has ever heard the appellant’s issues on their merit: Madam Justice Donegan assumed that my claim in BC had no merit but mentioned in her Oral Reasons in 2015 that it contained 20 to 60 possible causes of action: an oxymoron situation. 60 possibilities are not equal to zero possibility. Then two more justices of BC echoed those 20 to 60 possible causes of action (that now amount to about 80) and the assumption of no merit, without ever looking at any evidence because the procedures to strike pleadings do not allow to show or produce any evidence. It was an avalanche, by echoing and copying each other reasons, due to the shortage of time assigned to them;

89.  As for the same (27), Counsel claims that “no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief” where two orders of the SCC and one order of the FCA strongly supports the appellant’s position. She has zero proof or document to support her weird theory while the appellant can show those as follow. The Affidavit of Zoltan Andrew Simon sworn on November 23, 2018, Exhibit 1 contains the sic pages on which Ms. Bridges has mislead the SCC. Its Exhibit 2 shows the declaration of a BC Ministry that the appellant had no debt in the records of that Province; Its Exhibit 3 and 4 show how two counsel (to AGBC and AGC) knowingly mislead the courts of British Columbia, claiming that my 193 material facts were untrue; Its Exhibit 5 shows the AGC’s admission that the federal IP 2 policy mentioned contracts signed by the family class sponsors while subsection 132(4) of the IRP Regulations were silent of any contract. Thus, the Crown has misled every public servant, encouraging them to seize the monies of the sponsors automatically, without any proper and prescribed court procedure;

90.  Worse, Ms. Bridges assumes that, despite the two SCC and the one FCA order, 20 to 60 paragraphs or subparagraphs of the legislation – Parliament’s will – and dozens of relevant orders of the SCC and the FCA, no reasonable person would accept those arguments. She tells that no reasonable Canadian would care about those top authorities at all. Since justices of the courts are reasonable citizens, her sweeping allegation tries to claim, almost expressly, that all judges are idiots;            

91.  As for para. (28) above, Counsel wrote, “The Appellant rolled forward into subsequent court proceedings grounds and issues that have already been raised.” This sentence was probably borrowed, out of context, from Re Lang Michener and Fabian, 1987 CanLII 172 (ON SC): “…grounds and issues raised tend to be rolled forward into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented, often with actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings.” The appellant is of the humble opinion that the FCA is not obliged to follow a sentence written by the Supreme Court of Ontario which simply did not want to repeat the basic condition: in cases where the substantive rights between the parties have already been decided by a Court;

92.  As for para. (29), Ms. Bridges alleges, “The Appellant persistently took appeals from judicial decisions.” The Charter allows every Canadian to take appeals from judicial decisions, particularly if the decision-maker committed a palpable and overriding error in law, an error in principle, or forgot, ignored or misapprehended the evidence;

93.  As for para. (30) above, the Appellant has not waste wasted the resources of the Courts at all levels. A total of ten hours or so in the federal court system between 2007 and 2018, spent by preliminary hearings without a single trial where a party is allowed to show evidence, cannot be called a loss. For comparison, in Gitxaala Nation v. Canada, [2016] 4 FCR 418, 2016 FCA 187 (CanLII), the matter at bar contained approximately 250,000 documents and the Court handled it well;

94.  Returning to the second BC case of Z.A. Simon was filed in Golden (BC) in 2014 and heard in 2015 by Madam Justice Donegan. The case has not ended with an order, only Oral Reasons. The statement of claim contained material facts in 193 paragraphs. Counsel to AGBC and AGC alleged that none of the 193 facts were admissible but they did not propose another version of the facts. They denied each of the 193 factual allegations if the instant appellant, admitting that none (NIL) of my notice of civil claim were outside the knowledge of the AGs;

95.  There was a fatal misunderstanding between the wordings of my pleadings and those of Madam Justice Donegan, perhaps due to the different dialects or vernaculars used by them. The pleadings mentioned that Z.A. Simon wrote to several ambassadors, requesting them to help in his family’s reunification, but most of them did not respond. It added that he had to leave his home because his ex-wife physically and verbally abused him. These details ended up as “His complaints include accusations against his first wife, his second wife (Ms. Reyes); various provincial and federal government officials including ministers, deputy ministers, and various public servants; government lawyers; court registry staff; administration staff; a number of ambassadors to several different countries.” This sentence, though a domino effect, played a key role in converting an innocent person into a monster. An average person knows that ambassadors are not obliged to respond to any letter, and hearing the word “accusations” think that he accused the ex-wife in a courtroom as his opponent (which is not the case);

96.  In her paras. [42] to [44], Madam Justice Donegan concluded that suggesting a “method of translating Criminal Code sentencing ranges into monetary awards” was a major abuse of process, or five causes of action he listed (that anyone can find in the Criminal Code under four paragraphs) “are not known to law.” Let alone the fact that The Hon. Chief Justice Mr. Justice Hinkson contradicted or corrected Donegan J. in Henry v. British Columbia, 2016 BCSC 1038 (CanLII);

97.  She continued citing Z.A. Simon’s words, “The deliberately false or misleading representations or declarations of Crown Counsel — Ms. Wendy Bridges — before the Supreme Court of Canada, by commission or omission, the plaintiff respectfully submits, should be determinative. Although the plaintiff is certain that Ms. Bridges is/has been a person with high personal integrity, honesty and goodwill, obviously she has been under a tremendous pressure of her superior(s) that instructed or pressured her toward the last-ditch effort of the Crown, namely to make a false statement by affidavit or deposition.” Such honest and detailed description of a situation was “scandalous” and only a “sweeping allegation.”

98.  The instant appellant is probably the most humble person at any Court of Canada since 1867. When Mr. Justice Ball almost yelled at him in the Court room, he had to apologize several times. One of the reasons of his anger was: You cannot say that a justice (or court) “admitted” something because they were not criminals. (For a justice hearing many criminal cases, the verb “admit” may mean admitting a crime but a “Notice to admit” in the Rules does not imply a crime or accusation;        

99.  In Martin v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FCA 15 (CanLII), we read, “As a matter of statutory interpretation, the provisions of the Act are clear, and this cannot be changed by arguments…”

100.    In [38], [39] and [47] of Bernard v. Canada (Revenue Agency), 2015 FCA 263 (CanLII), the Honourable Mr. Justice Stratas stated,

“I choose to characterize the Board’s letter as an informal motion for direction from the Court under Rule 54. There is no other way to characterize it. Under Rule 54, it is not for this Court to give legal, tactical or practical advice to any party. Rule 54 is no substitute for reading the Rules and assessing on one’s own how to use them… Accordingly, in this case I declined to give the Board directions it sought and disregarded its letter.”

101.    In Campbell v. Canada, 2005 FCA 49 (CanLII), Mr. Campbell filed a series of motions but the Court decided that Mr. Campbell was not a vexatious litigant.

102.    In para. [14] of Chepanow v. Ontario, 1998 CanLII 8608 (FC), the Court said,

“a section 40 Order from this Court would be premature at this time, particularly since the matter has been dismissed on the basis of this Court’s lack of jurisdiction […and] …The high standards required for a section 40 Order are not met at this time.” [Emphasis added.] Just like in our case.

103.    In para. [97] of Kallaba v. Bylykbashi, 2006 CanLII 3953 (ON CA), Lang J.A. stated,

“… the motion judge was without jurisdiction to grant a vexatious litigant declaration. Section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (CJA), requires that such relief be requested “on application”. The legislature chose this unambiguous wording because the relief requested provides an extraordinary remedy affecting an individual’s basic civil rights of access to justice. As such, this relief is not available on an interlocutory motion… Since the motion judge was without jurisdiction to grant a vexatious litigant declaration, it is unnecessary to consider whether this appellant received a fair hearing.”  Then he continued in para. [99]:

“…the respondent did not meet the test of showing that there was no genuine issue for trial because there were many issues of credibility on material facts that could only be resolved at trial.”

For comparison, Z.A. Simon has never been allowed to be heard at trial while the same credibility question existed: the AGC and the AGBC denied all of his 193 material factual allegations in 2014, and the AGC denied all of his 347 factual allegations two years later. Both Counsel to the Crown have failed to offer alternative factual allegations since 2014, and every counsel routinely refused to disclose the facts or documents for every court;

104.    In para [10] of Lukezic v. Royal Bank of Canada, 2012 ONCA 350 (CanLII), the three justices agreed with the interpretation given by Lang J.A.:

“In detailed reasons, she set aside the vexatious litigant order because it was made on a motion in an action, not by way of application. She found that the order was therefore made without jurisdiction.”

105.    In para. [44] of Olumide v. Canada, 2016 FCA 287 (CanLII), Stratas J.A. decided harmoniously with the above principle of strict formality,

“The Registry will treat the notice of motion under section 40 of the Federal Courts Act as a notice of application. It will open a new file for the application.”

106.    The appellant admits that there are two camps in the jurisprudence. The above mentioned authorities require that the words of the Act to be taken as they are, on the ground of traditional statutory interpretation. The second camp thinks that the words of the Act shall not be taken seriously, and the word “application” can be squeezed under the larger umbrella of “motions.” But then, a new trend has been created for the Crown’s favour by such wishy-washy logic. For example: agreements can be placed under the umbrella of contracts; uncertified debt claims are actually debts; boyfriends and girlfriends are under the umbrella of spouses; fetuses are under the umbrella of children; seizures are under the umbrella of garnishments; prothonotaries are under the umbrella of justices; reasons without judgments are under the umbrella of orders. (And each umbrella equals with the miscellaneous junk under it.)

107.    Would this be a sound reasoning? The Interpretation Act demands liberal interpretation of the enactments, not an ultra-liberal approach;

108.    Adding up all the small and large “branches and leaves” above, and tying them together, when we pull the whole system, the entire tree would fall;

109.    Pursuant to s. 30 (1) of the Rules, “A judge or prothonotary who is not sitting in court may make an order on a motion if (a) the judge or prothonotary is satisfied that all parties affected have consented thereto; (b) the motion was brought in accordance with rule 369; or (c) for any other reason…” However, this contradicts ss. 50 (1) of the Rules, “A prothonotary may hear, and make any necessary orders relating to, any motion under these Rules other than a motion (a) in respect of which these Rules or an Act of Parliament has expressly conferred jurisdiction on a judge; (b) in the Federal Court of Appeal, so a prothonotary may ignore (b) and assume full power to make an Order under s. 50 (2) of the Rules, pretending that an appeal of a FC order originating from an application for judicial review is actually the same as an action, based on the “gap rule.” So eventually a Protho-notary may make an order without hearing the parties, despite that Parliament intended to assign the power only to a division of not less than three justices;

Part IV: A concise statement of the order sought, including any order for costs

110.    The instant applicant humbly and respectfully seeks remedies as follow:

111.    A Declaration stating that the proceeding instituted by the Crown is not a proceeding authorized by the law: the proper way is on application that requires to be heard by a Division of three justices, not by a single judge or prothonotary;

112.    A Declaration that an appeal and a vexatious litigant motion are separate procedures in the FCA as clearly expressed in the interlocutory judgments of the Honourable Madam Justice Gleason and the Honourable Mr. Justice Stratas, both issued in mid-2018;

113.    A Declaration stating that the Court of Appeal Act separates the notions or concepts of applications and motions, also the Federal Courts Rules clearly separate them from each other: PART 5 deals with applications while PART 7 deals with motions, without any indication or suggestion on Parliament’s behalf that applications are interchangeable with motions;

114.    A Declaration stating that the words motion and application cannot be used interchangeably because a notice of application is an originating document while a notice of motion is not;

115.    A Declaration that an appeal brought properly and in a timely manner cannot be struck – as a surprise – by a single justice or prothonotary that has not seen the appeal book and other documents prescribed by the Rules, but only by a Division of three or more justices after they have considered the merits of the required appeal documents in a full hearing;

116.    A Declaration that if one of those two procedures mentioned above ends, that fact would not automatically terminate the other pending procedure in the FCA without a proper hearing on the merits of the case, including evidence;

117.    An Order or Direction to the Registry to treat the Respondent’s motion under s. 40 of the Act as a notice of application, open a new file for the application under a new file number, and enter the upcoming order in the new file, on the authority of Olumide v. Canada, 2016 FCA 287 (CanLII), paras. [40] to [49];

118.    A Declaration that the Federal Court of Appeal has the power to hear the pending issue of the contents of the appellant’s appeal book immediately after the hearing of the Respondent’s motion under s. 40 of the Act, harmoniously with the previous interlocutory decisions of the Honourable Madam Justice Gleason and the Honourable Mr. Justice Stratas referred to above, on the authority of ss. 105 (a) of the Federal Courts Rules;

119.    An Order containing the determination of the application(s) or motion(s) under s. 40 of the Federal Courts Act, followed by the issuance of an Order or Direction determining the fate and content of the Appeal Book that was submitted for filing by the appellant in mid-June, several weeks before the decision of Madam Justice Gleason but the Registry has refused to file it without any Order or Direction;

120.    A Declaration or Statement that it constitutes procedural unfairness on the Registry’s behalf if its administrators delay the filing of an appellant’s document prescribed by the Rules, without an order of the Court, just because an opposing party is planning or considering the filing of a document under s. 40 of the Act;

121.    A Declaration that the appellant submitted for filing his reasonable version of the Appeal Book in mid-2018 that has not been filed by the Registry for unclear reasons, despite of his application to the Court to determine its content; the appellant is not responsible for such six-month delay; and he does not need to file a motion for extension of time for its filing;

122.    A Statement, Direction or Order clarifying the fate of the 3-volume responding motion record of Z.A. Simon that he submitted for filing in August 2018: whether it is formally before the Court for the purposes of the 14 December 2018 hearing in Edmonton, or not at all;

123.    A Declaration stating that it constitutes a procedural unfairness to change the scope of the 14 December 2018 hearing in the last minute by the Direction dated November 26 without a timely notice or warning because the applicant had no time and opportunity to find and submit relevant material, including governing common law, in order to prevent his appeal to be struck in a hurry, inconsistently with the previous directions of two respected justices of the FCA; Further unfairness is to limit the appellant’s Memorandum to 30 pages to be heard by a single justice when the Rules allow 30+30 pages to be heard by two divisions, separately, because one procedure may or would penalize and stigmatize Z.A. Simon’s person and personal behaviour while the other only the instant appeal at bar;

124.    A Declaration that justices are not obliged to follow the decisions of their colleagues in the same court where both of them are single judges, rather, they shall obey the principle of “stare decisis” and follow the decisions of the SCC and the orders delivered by divisions of courts of appeal;

125.    A Declaration that common law Canada-wide is divided because some of the authorities respect the Act and the Rules in this regard while others ignore them;

126.    A Declaration stating that notices of applications are originating documents while notices of motions are not;

127.    A Declaration that the Rules and the Act reflect Parliament’s intent that, generally  applications in the Federal Court of Appeal shall be heard by a Division consisting of no less than three justices while motions may be heard by a single justice;

128.    A Declaration stating that there in no case law precedent in Canada where a single justice of the FCA struck out a properly filed Notice of Appeal within a hearing (of three hours or less) that was originally assigned only for addressing the issuance of a vexatious litigant order that is a totally different issue; 

129.    An Order – issued either before or after the hearing of the Respondent’s motion under section 40 of the Act – that the recent meritless and vexatious motion of the Respondent be struck, without leave to amend, pursuant to section 52 (a) of the Act because the proceeding was not taken in good faith, it should have been brought on application and not on motion, pursuant to ss. 40 (1) of the Act, and a single judge has no jurisdiction to terminate a properly brought appeal without its hearing by at least three justices;

130.    Or, in the alternative, an Order stating that the Crown Respondent’s motion(s) or application be struck, without leave to amend, pursuant to ss. 59 (c) and 221 (1)(b) to (f) of the Federal Courts Rules, because the appellant complained about three months ago about the missing consent document of the AGC and other irregularities but Counsel remained idle and so far nothing has happened;

131.    A Declaration that both matters (the striking of the appeal and a final decision to declare Z.A. Simon a vexatious litigant in the FCA) are ultra vires a single justice;  

132.    A Declaration or Opinion stating that the necessary steps to be taken and the documents to be filed and served as prescribed by sections 343 to 347 of the Federal Courts Rules are not optional but reflect a legislative intent of Parliament so single justices have no power to suspend those rules in order to punish a party;

133.    An Order or Judgment stating that the procedure related to the Respondent’s motion under s. 40 of the Act – or the upcoming order itself – shall be stayed until the Respondent files and serves a copy of a certified ministerial debt certificate against Zoltan Andrew Simon, a prerequisite under s. 146 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, that is the main unresolved issue during the decade-long pending matters between the Crown and the appellant;

134.    An Order or Direction, pursuant to section 225 of the Federal Courts Rules, obliging the Respondent to disclose in an affidavit the document that allowed or ordered the Canada Revenue Agency to seize Z.A. Simon’s monies in 2008;

135.    A Declaration or Opinion stating that if AGC or CRA keeps refusing to show any ministerial certificate proving Z.A. Simon’s alleged debt to any ministry between 2000 and 2015, the Court may order the Crown to repay the monies taken from Z.A. Simon in 2008 by seizure, contrary to section 8 of the Charter;

136.    In the alternative, an Order to quash the upcoming Order or Judgment that would issue on 14 December 2018 or afterwards if the matters are heard and decided by a single justice or prothonotary, on the ground of excess of jurisdiction; 

137.    An Order that the instant motion of the appellant for a judgment to strike out the Respondent’s motion or application under s. 40 of the Act shall be dealt with in writing without appearance of the parties, pursuant to section 369 (1) and (4) of the Federal Courts Rules, before or during the 14 November 2018 hearing;

138.    An Order or Judgment issued regarding the content, merits, and fate of the 78 constitutional questions of the appellant that have been submitted to the Federal Court twice since 2016 but that Court had no time, power, or opportunity to address any of them;

139.    In the alternative, an Order or Declaration expressing that the infringement of the audi alteram partem rule constituted an excess of jurisdiction in the previous courts (FC and FCA) giving rise to evocation: Alliance des professeurs catholiques de Montréal v. L.R.B. of Quebec, 1953 CanLII 45 (SCC), [1953] 2 S.C.R. 140; Lalonde Automobile Ltée v. Naylor, [1974] C.A. 489.; and Supermarchés Jean Labrecque Inc. v. Flamand, [1987] 2 SCR 219, 1987 CanLII 19 (SCC);

140.    A Declaration or Opinion expressing that the Court correctly said in Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières v. Larocque, [1993] 1 SCR 471, 1993 CanLII 162 (SCC), “A breach of the rules of natural justice is regarded in itself as an excess of jurisdiction and consequently there is no doubt that such a breach opens the way for judicial review;”

141.    A Declaration or Opinion stating that the fact that the appellant filed an application for judicial review in the FC in December 2017 and a similar notice of appeal in the TCC do not, per se, constitute abuse of process because only a vague borderline has been drawn between the realms of those two courts;

142.    A Declaration or Opinion stating that whether concurrent jurisdiction, overlap, or jurisdictional no man’s land exists between the Federal Court and the Tax Court, one cannot claim that the Federal Court of Appeal lacks jurisdiction in that controversial area of law;

143.    A Declaration or opinion regarding the “blowing both hot and cold” attitude of the Crown since Counsel in the TCC claimed that the matter belonged to the FC while counsel in the Federal Court claimed that the same matter belonged to the jurisdiction of the Tax Court: the Rules disapprove inconsistent pleadings;

144.    A Declaration stating that the continuous and stubborn non-disclosure of facts and documents by the Crown in the FC, FCA and the BC courts violates the rules and militates against a vexatious litigant order against the instant appellant;          

145.    A Declaration or Opinion stating that the courts’ refusal to allow Zoltan A. Simon to show any evidence for eleven years, between 2007 and 2018, or not issuing him a single “final order” that  seems to violate s. 12 of the Charter;

146.    An Opinion stating that “A jurisdictional error results generally in an excess of jurisdiction or a refusal to exercise jurisdiction, whether at the start of the hearing, during it, in the findings or in the order disposing of the matter. Such an error, even if committed in the best possible good faith, will result nonetheless in the decision containing it being set aside;” as cited from Syndicat des employés de production du Québec v. CLRB, [1984] 2 SCR 412, 1984 CanLII 26 (SCC);

147.    A Declaration, Statement or Opinion that it is improper or unethical for a party or its counsel to seek promises or strategical advices from a Registry Officer – here Danielle Lanteigne – whether a certain relief requested by that party will or will not be included in the hearing scheduled for December 14, because the Court is not bound or influenced by any promise or advice given by an administrator, and it is free to exclude the issue of any specific relief if that is against the Act, the Rules, or the previous decisions of two FCA justices, as in the appeal at bar;

148.    A Statement or Opinion added to the previous one, stating that the proper way to get directions from the Court is not through letters “under the table” sent to individual administrators of the Registry or to any Justice; The proper way is to file and serve a motion for directions as the Honourable Mr. Justice Stratas often explained in his past decisions in other cases;

149.    An Opinion stating that the Respondent’s failure to file and serve a proper motion for direction and obtain such last-minute “Direction” of the Court constituted prejudice and procedural unfairness for the appellant; 

150.    An Order or Opinion stating that – just as the laws of Canada cannot be suspended on a preliminary basis – a request of the Respondent “to have the appeal dismissed on a preliminary basis” is vague an improper in the light that the decisions of the two judges above (Madam Justice Gleason and Mr. Justice Stratas): the Respondent has already gained half a year while the appellant has lost half a year; a party cannot ask a Court to wait years until the party’s opponent dies;

151.    An Order stating that the Rules, the Act, or the “gap rule” do not give an option to the Court to have an appeal dismissed on a preliminary basis, let alone that the legislation does not tell how to “resuscitate” appeals while the word “preliminary” is not well defined: an appeal is either allowed or dismissed expeditiously, and cannot “hibernate” for years, pursuant to section 3 of the Federal Courts Rules;

152.    A Decision or Opinion stating that it is improper to keep “seeking relief this Court has no jurisdiction to give” – as shown in the June 14, July 3, and November 1, 2018 submissions of Counsel – because two justices of the FCA have agreed in mid-2018 that the vexatious litigant issues shall be heard separately from the original appeal itself [even if one hearing follows the other on the same day]; The proper way would have been to appeal both interlocutory decisions that a Division of this Court may/would not entertain, and now it is too late to do that;

153.    A Declaration stating that the separation of the vexatious motion under s. 40 of the Act from the regular appeal procedure cannot be combined unless the hearings are before a division of three justices, so the interlocutory decisions of Madam Justice Gleason and Mr. Justice Stratas are harmonious with the decisions of this Court in Canada (Attorney General) v. Almon Equipment Limited, 2010 FCA 193 (CanLII), Steel v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FCA 153 (CanLII), and Canada (National Revenue) v. JP Morgan Asset Management (Canada) Inc., 2013 FCA 250 (CanLII);

154.    A Declaration stating that purposive statutory interpretation of the wording in ss. 40 (1) of the Act, “if the Federal Court of Appeal or the Federal Court is satisfied, on application, that a person has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings…” implies that the Federal Court of Appeal in the context of an “application” means a Division of no less than three justices, not a single judge because a single justice cannot be satisfied that two other justices would agree with him or her;

155.    A Declaration confirming the essence of para. 192 in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2005] 1 SCR 533, 2005 SCC 26 (CanLII), “Statutory interpretation is a legal art which needs to be applied very carefully by the courts without losing sight of the underlining principle of such a task.”;

156.    A Declaration or Opinion stating that the expressio unius est exclusio alterius principle still exists and it is valid in the Federal Court of Appeal in cases where statutory interpretation is required;

157.    A Declaration that the wording of ss. 40 (1) of the Act, “… a proceeding previously instituted by the person in that court not be continued, except by leave of that court” refers to the Court of Appeal in the case at bar, without any legislative intent to include courts of other countries or provinces, or involve past decisions of any court of British Columbia against a person; [Italics added.]

158.    If the principle in the previous paragraph is correct, a Declaration or Opinion stating that Counsel’s reliance on the past court cases of Zoltan A. Simon in the courts of British Columbia is misplaced since those are not determinative for the purpose of proceedings under section 40 of the Act in the FCA: the said section is silent about past court cases of a party in other provinces as a negative factor;

159.    A Declaration or Opinion stating that if a single Justice issues a judgment against the law, exceeding his or her jurisdiction, the judgment may be a nullity;

160.    A Declaration or Opinion stating that when the interpretation of an enactment upon which the proceedings have been based or the judgment rendered contravenes any section of the Constitution Act, 1982 it is null or of no effects, pursuant to section 54 of the Charter; or it is void or voidable at least;

161.    A Declaration stating that courts of justice shall not automatically punish allegedly vexatious persons that call their attention to the unlawful actions or omissions committed by officers of the Court (administrators of registries, counsel, etc.), including provable false or misleading statements of those officers, otherwise a section 2 (b) Charter breach situation could arise;

162.    A Declaration or Opinion stating that if a single justice acts against the law without jurisdiction, and then another Justice follows his or her example, the second justice would act without jurisdiction as well;

163.    An Order or Direction stating that Court shall not issue a notice of status review in Form 382.2 to the parties at this stage, due to the instant special circumstances;

164.    An Order or Direction that, if Z.A. is found and declared a vexatious litigant, he cannot start any new proceedings in this Court unless the Court grants leave, on the authority of Canada (Attorney General) v. Klippenstein, 2017 FCA 115, [13];

165.    An Order, Direction or Opinion stating that the appellant has been prejudiced because so far he has not received a copy of the AGC’s “Consent to the bringing of an application and a motion for an order against the Appellant on behalf of the respondent filed on 28-AUG-2018” as prescribed by the Act; [Cited from the Court index and dockets of the Federal Court’s website online.]

166.    In the alternative, and Order of Opinion stating that the appellant’s reckless faith in the laws of Canada plus in the integrity and knowledge if its judges is badly misplaced so the Court shall deem and declare him a mentally incompetent person;

167.    An Order that the previous motion of the appellant requesting the completion of Madam Justice Gleason’s Order is moot and to be ignored without costs;       

168.    An Order for costs payable by the Respondent to the appellant in the amount estimated by the Court, including travel, hotel, loss of a day at work, photocopying, printing, binding, express postage, notary public fees, and filing fees at the Court;

169.    That the upcoming Order or Judgment clearly state its real legal nature: whether final or interlocutory, adding the terms or conditions to be followed if appealed.

All of these are respectfully submitted on this 29th day of November, 2018.

_______________________________  (Zoltan Andrew Simon, Appellant)